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INTRODUCTION 
 
Premises for the analysis  
 Analyzing the Middle Eastern context, it seems clear that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
remains one of the most serious issues effecting the instability of the region. In order to better 
understand the impasse that characterizes the peace process between these actors, I think it is 
necessary to comprehend the nature of the subjects involved in Israeli political life. It should be clear 
that this thesis does not deal with the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict per se, but it is focused instead 
on the domestic Israeli politics. Events connected with that conflict and with the Peace Process are 
analyzed only through the lens of the domestic debate. 
The dynamics of Israeli politics seem easy to understand. We have clear in mind the events (internal 
and external) that had heavily influenced the course of Israeli history and their political 
consequences, such as: the Six Days War of 1967, the Likud victory in 1977, the Peace process started 
during the first half of the 1990s and the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, with the consequent 
failure of Oslo Agreements. But, even if what we have just mentioned is obvious, it is not enough to 
fully realize the cultural and socio-political transformation of the country.  
Indeed, Israeli society is young, fluid, dynamic and characterized by a democratic system, subjected 
to numerous stresses and considerable strains. Among these elements, there is not only a precarious 
security context, but also the social and cultural challenge posed by various waves of immigration, 
that have been continuous since the early years of the State until today. During its sixty-eight years 
of life, the young state has accelerated major changes: the demographic and social transformations 
of the Israeli reality have undermined the image of the secular, western and socialist Israel as 
designed by the founding fathers. These changes of the main social structure have provoked a great 
ideological shift, that is clearly evident in the results of the elections of the last sixteen years. 
What has come out is a long-lasting dominance of the Likud and of the right-wing front in general. 
So, this complex framework demands a more nuanced understanding of the social stratification 
which is crossed by “cross-cutting lines”, dividing the population along ethnic, religious, social and 
economic status as well as ideological, cultural and religious outlooks.  
If we look at the election results of the 2003, 2006, 2013 and 2015 elections1, we can see that 
Ha’Avoda's defeat can’t be always confirmed as a direct result of a brilliant performance carried out 
                                                          
1 In 2003 Likud scored an overwhelming victory (38 MKs) against Labor, who performed poorly (18 MKs); also 
in 2015 and 2013 Netanyahu’s party was the biggest in the Knesset with respectively  30 and 31 MKs (while 
  
2 
by the right-wing parties (as in the case of 2006, in which it emerges as a winning party, Kadima, 
center training2) or, even in the cases when a Likud-led government was formed, it wasn’t always 
due to an overwhelming victory of the rightist coalition (we can observe what happened in 20093). 
Underlying these dynamics, this thesis wants to be an attempt to propose an original point of view 
of these phenomena, trying to explain the current Labor decline, not only taking into account 
demographic dynamics (and therefore attributable to the electoral results, strictly assessable by a 
point of numerical view), but considering these outcomes the product of a deeper process of cultural 
and political transformation of Israel, made finally evident through the electoral expression. 
Simultaneously, the Labor Party entered into a long-lasting crisis: the “land for peace” principle was 
crumbling down, giving to Israelis prove that it simply couldn't work and leaving them with a spread 
sense of mistrust; moreover, with the time passing by, Labor élite had not simply been able to fill the 
vacuum of leadership left behind by Rabin, even if Ehud Barak was able to conquer Israeli voters in 
1999. We have chosen to start our research from 1948 because is the year of the establishment of the 
State and also the beginning of the Israeli political experience as the natural continuation of the 
Zionist one in the Mandate period; while the temporal limit of this research has been established in 
2001, when the electoral results declared Likud's victory, headed by Ariel Sharon. Those elections 
were a turning-point because since that moment the Labor Party hasn't been able to win any 
following rounds of voting until today.  
So, my proposal is to analyze the lacking electoral victories of the Labor Party (Mifleget Ha’Avoda) 
from the second term of Rabin’s premiership (1992-1995), until 2001 (the year when Ariel Sharon 
brought back Likud to power, inaugurating a long-lasting dominance). These failures will be studied 
in the light of the events that followed Rabin's assassination, with the consequent collapse of the 
Oslo Process and with a special focus on the elements that favored the political shift taking place in 
Israeli society, facilitating the hegemony of right-wing coalitions in the Knesset, to the detriment of 
the Labor Party. 
One of the hypothesis, that this project has the aim to verify, is that the collapse of the Oslo 
Agreements, signed by Yitzhak Rabin, is strictly connected not only with the significant increase of 
violence in Israeli political environment of those days (due to the harsh opposition began against the 
                                                          
Ha’Avoda just 24 and 15). Data are taken from The Israeli Democracy Institute, Elections, 
(https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-elections-and-parties/elections/). 
2 Kadima won obtained 29 seats, Ha’Avoda 19 and Likud 12. Data from The Israeli Democracy Institute, Elections, 
(https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-elections-and-parties/elections/2006/). 
3 Kadima and Likud won respectively 28 and 27 MKs, but the leader which had more chance to form a 
government was Netanyahu instead of Tzipi Livni, so Likud was leading the Knesset for technical reason and 
not for a numerical advantage. Data from The Israeli Democracy Institute, Elections, (https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-
elections-and-parties/elections/2009/). 
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work of Rabin within the frame of the peace process) and with the consequent extreme polarization 
of Israeli electorate, but also with the decline of the Mifleget Ha’Avoda. Those years were crucial for a 
cultural transformation, leading Israeli politics to a very thorny phase in the history of the State of 
Israel itself. Through a wider perspective of Israeli political history, we would like to provide an 
interesting and functional background, in order to be able to underline how Israeli political 
tendencies changed with the advent and the collapse of the Oslo Process. 
 
Methodology 
 The processes outlined above are very different from one another and belong to different 
areas of study. Analyzing the political transformation of a country means to take into account 
different elements, such as: history, demography, ideological perspective, political change, 
institutional development, social and cultural transformations. This is the reason why it is necessary 
to adopt an interdisciplinary approach to conduct this type of analysis.  
According to this method, we have identified a set of tools that permit to point out some key-factors, 
resulting from different dynamics which are unidentifiable at first glance. Shown below are these 
instruments, grouped according to the several disciplines involved in the course of the research.  
 
Historical dimension 
Part of the groundwork will be focused on historical research in order to collect the necessary 
documents to give solidity to the analysis. The goal was to collect information about thorny 
historical events for Israeli politics for using them as a starting point for further analysis; the 
historical perspective is a considerable element because it is the parameter which guides the 
development of this study but notwithstanding this important role, it has to be considered as a 
preparatory tool for the development of further analysis which go beyond the historical dimension. 
At the same time, there was the attempt to create, to follow and to provide an alternative chronology 
of events, which is coherent with the traditional one, but which is more focused on circumstances 
involving Israeli socio-political arena.  
In this perspective is paramount to explain that the foreign policy events (regarding the 
relationships with other states) that are significant for this work are considered just in a measure 
that allow a deeper comprehension of the dynamics of Israeli politics, because the purpose here is 
not to satisfy the historical analysis, rather to recreate the context which influenced the internal 
context. The purpose that determines this criterion means also that, for the same reasons, the lens 
used in order to read such historical events are not neutral, but they belong to a specific national 
narrative: the Israeli one. This attitude has been chosen not with the intention of denying or ignoring 
the Arab (Egyptian, Jordanian, Palestinian or Syrian) perception, rather because the aim is not to 
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examine in depth the numerous Arab-Israeli wars, neither the conflict (or the Peace Process) with 
the Palestinians. 
Important documents have been founded by several Israeli institutions, such as: the Moshe Sharett 
Israel Labor Party Archives, the Central Zionist Archives, the National Library and the Israel State 
Archives; but, since the considered historical period is recent, many archives and documents are not 
yet available because still protected by state secrecy. Moreover, as you can notice only Israeli 
institutions were consulted in order to reinforce the internal perspective. 
 
Research on the field and available literature 
For this reason, it has been fundamental to integrate and enrich the historical sources with 
fieldwork material collected in Israel, with a review of the present state of the art and with a careful 
reading of the available literature. These different types of sources, analyzed in a comparative and 
integrated way, will be particularly important to outline the historical and political perspective of 
Israel.  
Spending almost a year researching on the field, allowed to enhance familiarity with Israeli culture, 
first of all by learning Hebrew, which allowed to comprehend better not only documents, but also 
newspapers, radio and television programs, sayings and popular songs, all elements which gave the 
opportunity to catch the cultural-political developments of the country. This aspect of the research 
gave also an advantage in the scrutiny of the current literature, which is used in this analysis with 
great attention for the ideological shades belonging to the different authors and scholars; this is true, 
especially for what concerns the relations between Israel and the Arab world and, in particular, the 
Palestinians. Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim and Llan Pappé (to name a few) are important members of 
this genre (the “new historians”), which harshly criticizes the approaches adopted by Israel and 
which created an intense debate on the topic (involving the identity issue of the state itself) with 
other Israeli scholars like, for example Baruch Kimmerling.  
For this reason, an attempt to carefully overlap the myriad of texts has been made in order to try to 
make the complexity of the Israeli case (analyzed in the light of different disciplines) more 
understandable. The choice of taking into account some works of the main academic currents and 
not to focus on some other important interpretations (which have contributed to develop the 
intellectual and critical debate in Israel),  was taken in order to consider the transformation of Israeli 
culture as it is today and not with the aim of giving less importance to After having created 
connections between the various fields of studies (mainly political history, electoral studies, 
demography and sociology), it has been possible to create a unify structure, a starting point for 
causes of reflection which can concretely have an 'incidence on the understanding of Israeli political 
dynamics.  
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Much of the literature reflects on the evolution of Israeli society, analyzing it from a historical point 
of view and explaining it through ideological and cultural parameters that characterize the vision of 
Zionist leadership. The works in which I come across dedicate a lot of attention to explaining the 
difficulty encountered (and perhaps even today) in trying to harmonize people who, despite 
belonging to a single people, the Jewish people, are distinguished by cultural traditions very 
different. Authors like S.N. Eisenstadt, Vittorio Dan Segre and Anita Shapira have largely explored 
Israeli society, pointing out how it has profoundly changed and how far it has departed from the 
original vision of the founding fathers. This topic is largely dealt with because Israel still has to 
handle a heated public debate on its own identity definition, trying to measure the Jewish and the 
democratic character. In terms of democracy, there are many books that aim to explain the Israeli 
political system, considered by many democrats, albeit imperfect. 
Sources such as books, articles, but also interesting testimonies offered by alternative types of 
documents, such as pictures, documentaries, videos, maps and expositions (for example the Israel 
Museum’s one, inside the Yitzhak Rabin Center in Tel Aviv) gave a precious contribution because 
they covered a wide spectrum of issues and topics, filling the gap left by the traditional literature, 
which sometimes lacked of correspondence with the very core of this research project. 
 
Electoral studies and data analysis 
 The last type of tool belongs to the field of social statistics. In our analysis perspective, 
quantitative data will be important as we will consider demographic and electoral trends. The 
analysis of the electoral turnouts (especially in 1992, 1996 and 1999) are fundamental in order to 
figure out whether there are any recurring variables that determine voters’ orientation, influencing 
the historical and political evolution of the country. A careful use of these quantitative sources will 
be useful just in order to strengthen the structure of this work and for this reason, the data we are 
talking about will be selected from a narrow range of specialized databases, such as: Israeli institutes 
involved in socio-political research (Israel Democracy Institute) and national authorities (Central 
Bureau of Statistics and Knesset Research and Information Centre). 
Many of the quantitative data used in this project come also from specialized and qualified 
researches already showed in other books and articles, see for example the works of Arian Asher, 
Moshe Lissak, Daniel Horowitz and many others. These scholars sought to make the mechanisms of 
Israeli voting behaviors more intelligible, which have peculiarities that are difficult to observe by 
external observers. These publications provide interesting scrutiny of the outcomes of those 
elections considered “critical” for country's life, such as 1977 and 1992. 
This type of analysis does not miss the chance to underline how ethnic belonging is still a profound 
cross-cutting lines in Israeli society; not only with regard to the great division between Arabs and 
Jews (Sammy Smooha introduced the concept of “ethnic democracy”), but also regarding the myriad 
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facets inside 'Jewish ethnicity. Sergio Della Pergola is one of the most authoritative writers on Israeli 
demography studies, a discipline that has become increasingly important over the years in 
influencing the country's political choices, especially in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Israel is an emblematic case where the perception of reality determines decisively the choice 
between different political positions: this kind of perception is about the way a person evaluates the 
surrounding reality, starting from his identity and his political culture. This last feature, when 
considered at a national level, comes out as the result of a socio-political, multi-faceted and complex 
reality, which could be better understood thanks to the tools mentioned above. The analysis of the 
dimension of the political culture is not important irrespectively of the research, but it is functional 
to understand how the disconnection between Israeli society and the values proposed by the Labor 
Party started and intensified with the collapse of the Oslo Process, decreeing a long-lasting decline 
that affects the party until today. 
 
Research Topics  
For the reason mentioned above, the chapters are going to be organized following different 
levels of analysis. The first chapter, “Political history of Israel: some premises”, is designed in order 
to show the dynamics which gave birth to Zionism, along with an overview if the main currents 
which belong to this ideology. These premises, indeed, are very important to our research because 
they allow a more complete understanding of the first years of the Jewish presence in Palestine and 
how, in that period, the political culture of the future State of Israel took shape. As a matter of fact, 
precisely in the years of the British Mandate in Palestine, Labor Zionism affirmed and gained its 
hegemony, through cultural and institutional initiatives. 
The second section of this dissertation, “Ideological and political apogee of Mapai (1948-1973)”, goes 
on clarifying the Israeli context in a historical-political perspective and outlying how the ideological 
and political assumptions of the founding fathers allowed Ben-Gurion and Mapai, the expression of 
Labor Zionism, not only to consolidate the fragile state of Israel but also to dominate the domestic 
political landscape. The traumatic events of the Six Days War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War 
(1973) gave birth to new territorial and political landscape, which changed deeply Israeli society and 
its ideological attitudes, indeed these wars contributed to weakening that set of interiorized values 
and symbols, belonging to Israeli civil religion, represented and spread by Mapai.  
The following chapter, “The rise of the Right and Mifleget Ha’Avoda ‘s loss of dominance (1973-1981)”, 
tries to delineate how, as consequences of the previously mentioned events, the Labor Party started 
its electoral decline, losing also its cultural hegemony until 1977, when Likud won the elections for 
the first time ever. What is important for this analysis is to understand the changes that have taken 
place inside Israeli society, paying particular attention to the effect of the main ethnic groups 
(Ashkenazim and Mizrachim); analysis of demography and its influence on orientations politics and 
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culture of society are central. It is fundamental to trace those dynamics that made possible a change 
of the electoral orientation of the Israelis; the 1977 elections were a political earthquake because they 
are the starting point of a new epoch (some scholars call it the “Second Republic”) in the history of 
the country. 
“The years of transition: from a dominant Likud to a challenging Labor (1981-1991)” is the fourth 
chapter, whose aim is to introduce the Eighties as a very important period of transition, which 
prepared the Israeli society and its attitudes for the major events of the 1990s. Begin is confirmed in 
the role of Prime Minister for the second time in the 1981 elections, considered the ballot which has 
been most strongly determined by the ethnic element in Israel history. The decade, which opened 
with the first Lebanon war, represented also a political stalemate, indeed Mapai and Likud formed 
together governments of national unity both after 1984 and 1988 electoral. If those years were 
characterized by the illusory tranquility of the internal political scenario, 1987 would upset this calm 
with the outbreak of the first Intifada, the Palestinian popular uprising, which will be an important 
moment for Israelis to become more aware and conscious about the un-sustainability of the existing 
status quo in the long term, starting to look for a political solution of the territorial contention with 
Palestinians. This event gave more importance to the “Palestinian dimension” of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict (also determined by the signing of the David Peace Camp peace treaty with the Egyptian 
ten years before); this passage had profoundly shaped the attitudes of a part of Israeli public opinion, 
which was one of the key-elements that would have led to the beginning of the peace process in 1991 
and to the victory of Yitzhak Rabin in 1992. 
The core of the analysis thus is developed through the fifth and the sixth chapters, entitled 
respectively “Mifleget Ha’Avoda and Rabin era (1991-1995)” and “History, elections and the Labor 
Party (1996-2001)”. It is precisely with the advent of the 1990s, along with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the outbreak of the Gulf War that international attempts to foster an agreement between 
Israel and its Arab neighbors in the region converged with a favorable climate of openness 'among 
Israeli electorate. The elections of 1992 were critical because they demonstrated this change of 
attitude assigning the victory, after fifteen years, to Yitzhak Rabin as the head of the Labor Party.  
The decision to define this period as the “Rabin era”, was taken despite he was prime minister for 
only three years, until his assassination in 1995; therefore, this emphasis is meant in order to 
highlight the importance of those years led by the Labor government, during which an agreement 
with Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), was signed for the first 
time in 1993. This event introduced a new, concrete horizon, considered unattainable until that very 
moment. What is extremely interesting for this analysis is verifying how profoundly and how 
radically the introduction of this new perspective has changed the political culture of Israeli society, 
which in those years would have to face the trauma of the Prime Minister’s assassination, the spread 
of extremist political language, the increase of terrorist violence and the decline of the Oslo process. 
The sixth and last chapter investigates more on the directions of these dynamics, starting from some 
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tendencies and variables which emerged as decisive for the outcome of 1992 elections, such as: the 
importance of leadership, the preponderance of issues as a decisive variable for political affiliation 
and voting orientation, the close correlation and interdependence between the pace of the peace 
process and Israeli internal politics. The following electoral rounds of 1996 and 1999 are read taking 
into account the electoral performances of the Labor Party, trying to explain also the causes of the 
long-lasting political decline which the Labor camp is still experiencing today, for the benefit of 
Likud and its national-religious allies. 
After having showed the structure of this project, a brief outline of the analysis’ core issues is 
presented below. This dissertation has “integrated” structure, in which thematic elements 
(explaining factors and issues relevant for the analysis) are shown and combined with an historical 
excursus of Israeli political life. 
 
What guides political affiliation? Identity formation and borders perception 
Functional to this research was trying to understand the elements that have influenced the 
election results in the period in question (1992-2001). Religion and ethnicity are two very important 
vectors for political affiliation in Israel, but specifically speaking about the period we are analyzing, 
another main factor contributed to electoral preferences formation: the concept of identity related 
to the perception of borders. The elections that took place during those years were, indeed, mainly 
driven by the issue variable of the peace process and the Territories. 
Already during the pre-state period, different ideas about the territorial dimension and the identity 
of Israel, were one of the main points that had distinguished the Revisionist wing from the Labor 
one; but the depth of this division came out strongly, influencing Israeli politics as never it had done 
before, during the 1990's and the early 2000's. 
Starting from these considerations, we will proceed to analyze Labor Party’s statements about the 
territorial issue, looking at policies, proposals and attitudes regarding settlements and positions 
taken during the various attempts to reach an agreement with the Palestinian side. These peace 
process aspects are crucial to understand why and when the Mifleget Ha’Avoda has failed the 
opportunity to make real his “land for peace” vision and what were the weaknesses of this approach, 
that seems to be still unable to convince the majority of Israelis.  
 
Many identities for one Israel  
The territorial debate is probably the main field of public discussion, where the dispute among 
the different groups of Israeli society reaches its highest level of intensity. But there are other issues 
(such as the state and the religion, for example) that contribute to delineate the major rift-lines 
dividing the country on political issues of great importance. What comes out is the creation of strong 
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groups inside Israeli society, which are mainly and strongly characterized according to a specific 
political orientation, established along with religious, ethnic and identity elements. 
The result of this high political polarization touches the issue "democracy" in a state that is not 
characterized by a monolithic society. So how the lively debate about political representation can 
be handled? What are the standards for establishing civil and political rights? Those questions, 
related to the topic of identity, are a spark for reflection on a difficult choice that the State of Israel 
will take in the coming years. This selection contains three elements: land, identity and democracy, 
the founding national triad. The most difficult aspect is that, the preliminary choice of a pair of these 
options, automatically excludes the third one.  
The future of national identity, increasingly fragmented and heterogeneous, involves the very 
character of the state which, by definition, is to be Jewish and democratic. It would seem, however, 
that, in this particular historical moment, giving up one of these three elements of identity is too 
expensive for the society. This, in my opinion, is the reason why a person chooses to adhere to 
policies that emphasize the exceptional character of the nation which, though, continues to find 
itself isolated and in a instable security. Israel will have to decide how to approach these options in 
order to ensure his own survival, but this goal requires the sacrifice of one great political vision: the 
Greater Israel, the Jewish State or the Israeli democracy. 
 
Party analysis: Mifleget Ha’Avoda’s success and decline 
Israeli society is divided by cross-cutting lines polarizing and lighting up the political debate, 
especially on several critical issues; two of them are central for this analysis: state identity definition 
and the approach towards the peace process.  
Due to the dramatic change of the social composition, also the main political guidelines of Israeli 
voters changed and, with them, voters' preferences; for this reason, we need to analyze what 
happened to Israeli highlighting general political trends, correlated also with the response given by 
political parties. In particular, our attention will be paid to the changes concerning Israeli Labor 
Party we will observe the transformation of the proposed values, his political vision and his electoral 
programs.  
The main questions about the domestic political scenario are clear: why the party has failed in the 
past 16 years? Instead, why Likud was able to win consensus? What role played the collapse of the 
Oslo Process and Rabin's assassination? The analysis will focus exclusively on the Mifleget Ha’Avoda, 
also taking into account those political and social processes that have provoked the loss of influence 
that Ashkenazi Labor component used to have. Other parties will be considered only when the 
comparison will be useful to the research. 
 
Political history of the State of Israel  
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Analyzing the history and the transformation of Israeli political framework will be 
fundamental. For this reason, in the background of this investigation we will keep in mind the 
evolution of the Zionist movement in a historical-political perspective, in order to understand the 
value-related basis of contemporary parties. Moreover, is it also fundamental being aware of the 
ideological assumptions of the founding fathers and of the historical context that allowed Mapai (the 
party from which Labor originated) to maintain political and cultural hegemony in Israel until 1977. 
This theoretical framework is expected to help us understanding the cultural and political 
environment in which the events from 1992 until 2006 took place.  
Moreover, the course of the Peace Process and the following failure of Oslo Agreements are two very 
important elements that will be taken into account, not as an independent topic of the research but 
as a functional tool to illustrate the correlation between those events and the political change in 
Israel. That is also the reason why part of the analysis will be dedicated to the role of Yitzhak Rabin, 
in order to highlight what he was able to offer to Israelis and what he achieved (or missed) with the 
Oslo Accords in 1993. This aspect is crucial for the research because it allows to be focused on 
political leadership and its importance in order to convince voters about the reliability of the 
candidate.  
In conclusion, the reason why our research should investigate these topics is incident to the political 
and social framework of Israel, where peace and security remain key terms of the political debate 
and one of the major focus on public opinion.  
 
Research hypothesis and conclusions  
What we can suppose is that the political events of the 1990's and of the early 2000's had special 
implications on Israeli history and politics; indeed, what has emerged from those years is that the 
internal debate rests on the peace process (and vice versa), connecting the Israeli-Palestinian 
confrontation to different and contrasting visions of the state of Israel: the first one envisions it as a 
Jewish Nation, loyal to its ancestral homeland; the second one imagines a modern, secular state, at 
peace with its neighbors. This strong ideological clash has been reinforced by specific demographic 
tendencies that have been developed during these last twenty-six years. Indeed, the immigration 
from the Former Soviet Union and the high birth rate in the religious and nationalist sectors of the 
society seems to assure a future numerical advantage of right-wing parties. The result is a deeper 
polarization of the political arena, which has acquired a more rightist tendency, leaving the Labor 
camp in a deep impasse. 
All true; but the last elections on March 2015, albeit assigning the task of leading the State to 
Benyamin Netanyahu, did not seem to confirm this overwhelming majority (in fact his coalition 
obtained just 2 more seats in the Knesset, 61 to 59, in comparison to the opposition’s block). So, is it 
just a matter of numbers? Also, the results of 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2003 elections (even if not take 
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into consideration in this dissertation) instilled the same doubt regarding the predominance of the 
demographic factor and the un-reversibility of the voting trends that are taking place. Starting from 
those analysis, after a preliminary reading of materials, taking into account sources of different kind 
and considering the interesting research activities on the field, the following hypothesis have been 
formulated. 
 
The quest for leadership 
 The Labor Party is no longer able to exert a strong attraction on voters for several reasons 
and not only because it is facing an increasingly “fragmented society”. Among these causes, this 
research will focus especially on the fact that, after Rabin's assassination, Mifleget Ha’Avoda wasn't 
able to take advantage of his work, in order to maintain a significant role within the public debate 
about security, that is still today one of the strongest sources of political polarization. Moreover, 
after the 1992 elections, Israeli political competition has become more “presidential”, undertaking 
strong individualistic dispositions which are giving increasing importance to political personalities 
and leaders, rather than to party ideology or organization. Probably this step back was also due to 
the fact that no other candidate, proposed by Labor coalition, was trusted by Israelis as Rabin was; 
so, what came out has been an increasing and easy monopolization of the military and security 
discourse by the Likud. 
 
A prominence of the issues variable 
 Israeli politics is mainly and deeply based on a struggle between opposite visions of the 
State, which are represented by the two main political forces: Labor camp and the rightist wing led 
by Likud. The difference between these two coalitions is that; for the nationalist forces, those ideas 
are very important for the definition of party identity, while the leftist camp has lost this centrality, 
focusing more on welfare and social issues. It seems somehow, that this change in Labor's political 
attitude has been fundamental in boosting the ongoing loss of influence in the society of the Ashkenazi 
Labor component (already started in the 70's). These considerations, in addition to a preliminary 
study of Arian Asher's electoral analysis, suggest that considering the “issues variable” as the 
strongest element defining electoral choices in Israel, between 1992 and 2001, seems reasonable. In 
fact, this aspect would explain, in a certain measure, Mifleget Ha’Avoda ‘s defeats at the ballots. 
 
Oslo: the origin of a new decline 
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 Lastly, we can consider the events taking place during the analyzed period (1992-2006) as 
fundamental for the development of this research. In fact, they are not only the framework in which 
took place Labor Party's loss of influence, but they are also factors that actively contributed to this 
process. What this project would like to highlight is how those historical and political occurrences 
created the favorable conditions for a radical change that invested Israeli society, influencing 
political trends and voters' preferences.  
In particular, the hypothesis is that the collapse of the Oslo Process (started after Rabin's 
assassination) played a very special role in outlying the reasons of Labor camp's decline, leaving 
Israeli left unable to reaffirm his vision on the national political scene and to offer a trustworthy 
leadership.  
In conclusion, while Mifleget Ha’Avoda still losing at the ballots, the political arena seems to be 
dominated by a more nationalist way of conceiving the State and its relationships with its neighbors. 
For the Labor camp will be essential to regain part of the lost consensus in order to rebalance Israeli 
political discourse and to face the identity and political challenges to which Israel is called to 
confront with. This will be a critical step, not just to break the status quo in the Palestinian issue 
but, above all, to ensure an internal balance, that is fundamental in order to delineate a secure future 
for the country itself.  
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Chapter 1. POLITICAL HISTORY OF ISRAEL: PREMISES 
TO MAPAI’S ASCENDANCE 
 
 This dissertation starts with a chapter about the origins of Zionism and about the dynamics, 
developed in the pre-State period, that defined the fundamental characteristics of Israeli political 
arena. The parties competing today are bolstered by different vision of Zionism that first animated 
the founding fathers and the members of the Zionist movement  
Particular attention is given to the role of Socialist Zionism as the main political actor who was able 
to build the cultural patterns which formed Israeli dominant ethos and civil religion, assuring to 
Ben-Gurion and to Mapai political dominance during the first decades of Israel history.  
For the reasons mentioned above, the following paragraphs don’t want to provide an anthology or a 
complete examination of all the Zionist authors and currents. The leaders and the interpretations 
were selected and analyzed because were considered functional and useful in order to obtain a 
general framework, able to explain the premises relevant for a better understanding of Israel political 
history.  
Moreover, between the lines of historical events, we are going to read those occurrences which 
helped to shape Israeli identity today (such as the myths of Tel Hai and of the 1948 War), built by a 
pattern of symbols and values which, still today, make Israeli assumptions, aspirations and attitude 
embody the constructs of Zionism. 
 
1.1 The origins of the Zionist movement in the European context 
 In the Nineteenth century, Europe was about to face various transformations due to events 
that would characterize the entire century and the future of the continent itself. The echoes of the 
French Revolution and of Enlightenment followed the spread of ideals that contributed to the 
development of movements that sought the pursuit of civil and political rights. A strong nationalistic 
sentiment sparked among European peoples, causing the emergence of independent riots, spread 
across the continent; moreover, the industrial revolution became an opportunity to improve the 
social and economic position of many individuals, while simultaneously facilitating the processes of 
urbanization and “proletarianization” of the masses, thus preparing the path to schools of thought 
inspired by Socialism and Marxism. This explosive mixture of elements could not avoid to involve 
the existence of European Jews. They were still organized according to the criteria of the Jewish 
religion and thus had to measure with a change that was slowly spreading among the societies where 
they lived. It can be said that, modernity and the spirit of the epoch. 
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The identity challenge to European Jewish reality was not directed to homogeneous situations, but 
had to face a difference between the communities living in Eastern Europe or in Western European 
countries. Indeed, while for the first time, Jewish religion was officially called to confront with  
Western Europe was experiencing a “bourgeoisification” process involving the Diaspora favored by 
the opportunity to participate to public life and by the opportunities offered by the industrial 
revolution, the Eastern conditions was characterized by a general underdevelopment. 
Indeed, in Western Europe, following the French Revolution4 and the emancipation of French Jews 
(1791), several decrees were emitted by other European nations5 in order to grant equal rights to the 
Jews living in those countries: «The walls of the ghettos [...] were demolished by the French 
Revolution6», in the territories of the Russian Empire numerous discriminatory initiatives against 
Jews were still taken, such as the 1791 Catherine II of Russia decree7, which forced Jews to live in 
“homogeneous territories8” (ie. inhabited areas) that formed an interrupted strip of land known as 
Yiddishland9, the land of the Yiddish language. These areas became the cradle of Eastern Ashkenazi 
Judaism, a real social microcosm, where communities were organized according to the shtetl10 model, 
a small village that survived thanks to subsistence economic activities, mainly trade and handicrafts. 
Precisely the ban on the Jews to work in the agricultural field, pushed them to deal with those 
brokerage activities, which subsequently gave birth to typical prejudices, origin of the aversion in 
                                                          
4 Hersch, I. H. The French Revolution and the Emancipation of the Jews, The Jewish Quarterly Review, vol. 19, n. 3, 
1907, pp. 540–565. 
5 Luzzatto Voghera G., L'antisemitismo: domande e risposte, Feltrinelli Editore, 1994, pp. 19-21. 
6 Stein L., Zionism, Ernst Benn, 1925, p. 23 quoted in Marzano A., Storia dei sionismi. Lo Stato degli ebrei da Herzl a 
oggi, Carocci Editore, 2017, p. 22. 
7 After the partition of Poland (end of the Eighteen century), more than 5 million Jews lived inside the Russian 
empire. 
8 “The Residency Zone” was the western region of the Russian Empire bordering the Central European 
powers, where the Jews were confined by the imperial power from 1791 to 1917. This area corresponded to the 
largest part of what is now Lithuania, Belarus, Poland, Moldova, Ukraine and the western parts of Russia. It 
was created by the Empress of Russia Catherine II in 1791, after several attempts aborted by her predecessors 
to expel Jews from Russia, unless they converted Orthodox Christianity. The reasons for the creation of thi 
zone were primarily economic and nationalist. 
9 It is the name given to a vast area in which the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe lived before their 
destruction during the Second World War. 
10 It is an East European market town, in private possession of a Polish magnate, inhabited mostly but not 
exclusively by Jews. The concept of shtetl culture describes the traditional way of life of Eastern European 
Jews. Shtetls are portrayed as pious communities following Orthodox Judaism, socially stable and unchanging 
despite outside influence or attacks. 
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Gentile societies11. The fundamental activities were Torah or Talmudic studies and society was 
dominated by Yiddishkeit12, a cultural trait that involved the individual in any aspect of his existence.  
Meanwhile, in the Jewish German world, Haskalah13 (Jewish Enlightenment) developed. It was born 
in XVIII century and it was one of the primary causes of the start of the Jewish Reform movement14. 
The Reform movement tried to bring Judaism closer to contemporary European standards of 
behavior, combining reason and Judaism, in conjunction with the emergence of the first forms of 
Jewish emancipation. This line of thought has as its objective not so much to change the nature of 
Jewish identity but to create open positions towards surrounding societies15. For this reason, 
maskilim (followers of the Haskalah) thought it necessary to reform some of the institutions of the 
Jewish world to better prepare for the encounter between the two cultures.  
There was never a genuine attempt to reform the religious world, because Haskalah focus was about 
culture and the way of perceiving society; relationship with religion, however, began to be re-
evaluated in a rational way, with the aim of establishing a balance with it, resizing its role (for 
example, the legal one). There were even some episodes in which some Jews, influenced by maskilim 
and by the new proximity to European culture, were attracted by the possibility of being fully 
integrated into society and, thus, converted to Christianity. The occurrence of these cases 
contributed to ending the experience of Western Jewish Enlightenment. Some influences also 
touched the lives of Russian communities, which were stimulated to develop a kind of political 
activism, which led to the organization of campaigns for emancipation and the formation of 
politically committed groups; in this way it was attempted to bring Judaism closer to contemporary 
European standards of behavior. These attempts led to two fundamentally different outcomes, but 
equally significant: on one hand, assimilation and, on the other, Jewish nationalism, both 
fundamental to the birth and development of the Zionist movement. 
                                                          
11 Vercelli C., Israele: storia dello Stato, dal sogno alla realtà. 1881 – 2007, Giuntina, 2007, p. 66. 
12 Literally means "Jewishness”, or better, “a Jewish way of life”. It can refer to Judaism or forms of Orthodox 
Judaism, but also it has come to mean the "Jewish essence" of Ashkenazi Jews in general and the traditional 
Yiddish-speaking Jews of Eastern and Central Europe in particular. From a more secular perspective it is 
associated with the popular culture or folk practices of Yiddish-speaking Jews, such as popular religious 
traditions, Eastern European Jewish food, Yiddish humor, shtetl life, and klezmer music. 
13 Literally, Haskalah comes from the Hebrew word sekhel, meaning “reason or intellect” and the movement was 
based on rationality. It encouraged Jews to study secular subjects, to learn both the European and Hebrew 
languages, and to enter fields such as agriculture, crafts, the arts and science. The Haskalah eventually 
influenced the creation of both the Reform and Zionist movements. 
14 The major author of this movement was Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) who tried to connect reason with 
Judaism.  
15 Jewish virtual library, (www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org). 
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1.1.1 “Le shanà habaà beYerushalayim”: next year in Jerusalem 
 The common element between the different experiences of Western and Eastern European 
Judaism consisted in the Jewish tradition and in its ancient nostalgia for the Land of Fathers, Zion16. 
The reference to a distant but never forgotten Land has, for centuries, been the common 
denominator for individuals and communities dispersed throughout the world; the Jewish 
theological doctrine establishes the relationship between the people of Israel and God in the 
mediation carried out by the this land: People, Land and God therefore constitute an indissoluble 
unity, called berith (covenant); in the Bible, the term recalls to remind the alliance17 between Yhwh 
and the people of Israel, this is the deepest concept of the Jewish world, as it implies a relationship 
of exclusivity between the one true God and his chosen people.  
The Exodus from Egypt should have been concluded with the arrival of Jews in the Promised Land 
and this would have been the reward for having faith in God and respecting the Decalogue. The 
Jewish European Diaspora18 represented instead the opposite situation and starting from this 
premise we can understand why for many Jews the condition of exiles was considered a divine 
punishment for not respecting Yhwh's commandments; the dispersion of the people was therefore a 
punishment imposed by God and would come to an end only with a spiritual return on the straight 
path, realizing the divine plan of bringing his people back into the Land of the Fathers.  
There is thus a link with the Land that is not only physical, but is strengthened and maintained 
through the Torah and the tradition. This collective feeling of return was (and is) a point of 
convergence for the identity of the Jewish communities scattered around the world, convergence of 
a memory reinforced by liturgical tradition: for example there is a religious precept to reside, at least 
                                                          
16 Zion is a toponym for Mount Zion, but it also indicates the hill and fortress of Jerusalem. The name Zion 
was first used for the Jebusite fortress (“the stronghold of Zion”), on the southeast of Jerusalem, below the 
Ophel and the Temple Mount. On its capture by David it was renamed "City of David". In poetry Zion was 
used by way of synecdoche for the whole of Jerusalem Zion often referred by way of metonymy to Judea or the 
people of Judea.  
17 Among the many alliances stipulated, the most important were: the promise made to Abraham in which he 
is assured of a progeny during the centuries that will settle in the land of Palestine and the one made with 
Moses at Mount Sinai after the gateway from Egypt. On this occasion, Yhwh revealed his commandments to 
the chosen People promising protection and the Land of Israel, provided they did comply with these laws: the 
mitzvot, expressed in the Torah. 
18 When we speak of Diaspora we must consider that it does not refer only to the Jewish presence in Europe 
from the Middle Ages onwards, but rather began in 586 b. c. to the Babylonians, with the destruction of the 
second temple. The Jewish state came to an end in 70 a. d. when the Second Temple was destroyed under 
Roman domination. From that moment on, Jewish history would be the division and dispersion story we 
encounter in the historical period we are considering. 
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for period, in the land of Israel, or the orientation of the prayer towards Jerusalem, or the concluding 
part of the Seder19 of Pesach20, which reads, “next year in Jerusalem” (Le shanà habaà beYerushalayim). 
The ambition to return, from the earliest times of exile, had mingled with a messianic theme of 
redemption and salvation; an act that would have been accomplished precisely by the advent of the 
Messiah, who would bring the people of God back to Zion. All this resulted in a passive wait on the 
part of the Jewish people21, doing little to realize the kibbutz galuyyot22, which would eventually mark 
the end of exile and suffering.  
However, it should be emphasized that the concept of Eretz Yisrael, corresponding to the Promised 
Land, is not univocal if it is to be transposed on a geographic map, so it is necessary to distinguish 
what is based on the divine promise and what derives from the concrete existence of the ancient 
Israeli kingdoms23. There are several visions: the first one, the most maximalist (adopted up of 
Revisionist Zionism24) considers the extension of this territory going from the Sinai to the 
Euphrates river, but there is little evidence in the scriptures25. The second one, more restrictive, is 
based on the divine intervention recalled in the Torah, recalling Eretz Yisrael to the area between the 
Mediterranean and Jordan river's eastern bank26. The latter is the dominant version of the tradition 
and of the Zionist movement until the year of the creation of Transjordan27, separating this area from 
the rest of the Mandate of Palestine. So, referring to the biblical tradition when it comes to define 
                                                          
19 During the first two nights of Pesach it is used to have dinner following a special order of food and prayers 
called the seder, during which the whole story of the conflict with the pharaoh is told, until the final escape 
following the Haggadah of Pesach. 
20 It is the Jewish Passover, which lasts for eight days and reminiscent of the exodus and the liberation of the 
Israelite people from Egypt. 
21 Ravitzky A., Religious Radicalism and Political Messianism in Israel, in Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious 
Radicalism, University of Chicago Press, 1996, p 15. 
22 Ingathering of Exiles. Israel is realizing the vision of the Biblical prophets and the ideals of the Zionist 
movement in serving as the gathering place for Jews from all parts of the world. 
23 Vercelli C., Israele: storia dello Stato…, op. cit. , pag. 30 
24 The Revisionist Zionism thinking line finds political expression in the creation by Ze'ev Vladimir Jabotinsky 
of the Zionist Revisionist Party. It is characterized as a nationalist, anti-communist and liberal. 
25 Isaac R. J., Israel Divided: Ideological Politics in the Jewish State, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977, pp. 20-
21. 
26 The territory shown in this current corresponds to the Israeli boundaries during the tribal period in the 
Land of Canaan; it had its greatest expansion under the realms of David and Solomon. 
27 Trans-Jordan was a British protectorate established in April 1921. It was agreed that Abdullah bin Hussein 
would administer the territory under the auspices of the British Mandate for Palestine with a fully 
autonomous governing system. On May 25th 1946, the Emirate became the “Hashemite Kingdom of 
Transjordan”, achieving full independence on  June 17th 1946.  
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the meaning of the Promised Land is useful, not because it helps us in defining it geographically, but 
because it allows us to grasp the context within which this connotation was born and the value it 
still has today. 
Despite the rampant secularization in Europe and the assimilationist choice of a part of the Jewish 
world, another group made the way of Jewish nationalism and, even though Zion had no longer the 
meaning it represented for their parents, it became the «Detached symbol from its original 
geographic naming: an honorary title which could have been applied to any country where Jews 
lived, anticipating the solution of the Jewish problem, through emancipation28». Zionism is rooted 
in the Jewish tradition and in the élan of 19th-century nationalist ideologies; it deeply outdistanced 
itself from the messianic-religious vision, undergoing rabbis and orthodox Jewry’s opposition: they 
were against the secular attitude of the Zionist project29, in which divine intervention was not 
contemplated anymore. Zionism, in a certain sense, was a rebellion against the passive attitude of 
European Jews, moving the focus of Redemption on human initiative30. 
Despite this fundamental discrepancy, the origins of this political movement cannot be fully 
understood without taking into account Jewish cultural heritage, of which Zionism is its modern 
evolution31 and factual fulfillment. The same term, Zionism, was used for the first time only at the 
end of the century (1890), by Nathan Birnbaum in his magazine “Selbst-Emanzipation!” (Self-
Emancipation), whose meaning derives from the ancient desire to return to Zion32 (shivat Zion). With 
Zionism, returning to Zion is understood as a social and political act that would put an end to the 
oppressed minority condition of Jews in the Diaspora. 
 
1.1.2 Before Zionism existed: the forerunners 
With the emergence of Enlightenment in Europe, there was a spread of behaviors that 
stigmatize any form of community specialism, encouraging the centralization and modernization of 
                                                          
28 Halpern B., The Idea of the Jewish State, Harvard University Press, 1969, quoted in Marzano A., Storia dei sionismi..., 
op. cit., p. 23. 
29 For a further analysis about the emergence of secularism in Jewish cultural environment and its patterns see 
Jobani Y., Three Basic Models of Secular Jewish Culture, Israel Studies, vol.13, n.3, pp. 162-165. 
30 Walzer M., Zionism and Judaism: the Paradox of National Liberation, The Journal of Israeli History, vol. 26, n.2. 
September 2001, pp. 125-136. 
31 Bidussa D. explains in “Il Sionismo politico” (Unicopoli Editions, 1993), how the term “Zionist” is mistakenly 
conceived as a synonym for "Jew"; surely it involves Jewish identity in terms of historical, cultural, political 
and psychological redefinition, but such overlap does not fully match. It creates instead a renewal, a 
solicitation of the self-conscious dynamics of Jewish cultural and political actors. 
32 In this sense, the term Zion is used in a wider sense, not only by indicating the city of Jerusalem and the 
territory of ancient Israel, but also referring to the places of a people's history and memory. 
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political orders. In a similar context, the autonomy of Jewish communities appeared to be opposed 
to the new principles and was thus abolished; the criterion that was underlined was the granting of 
individual civil rights in exchange for the suppression of political communities and preserving cult 
associations: it was the root of emancipation33. 
But what emerged clearly was the crisis of religion. Members of Jewish communities responded in 
three different ways34: denying the existence of ongoing processes and trying to keep the new ideals 
far from their community reality (isolationists); trying to adapt their culture to modernity and 
responding to the ongoing challenges (adaptationists); participating in the process of emancipation 
with the certainty that there was no contradiction in being Jewish and at the same time modern, 
thus seeking social and political assimilation (assimilationists). The Zionist movement, as the 
Jewish expression of the idea that nationalism and sovereignty were the proper answers to the 
“Jewish question35”, belongs to this latter group. From a cultural point of view, those who adhered 
to these new trajectories had to reformulate their relationship with Judaism; emancipation allowed 
the process of re-elaboration of the meaning and function of Judaism in modern society. 
Given the extreme heterogeneity of diasporic Judaism and since there was no unified theological 
and spiritual institution, it is not a surprise that the idea of the State in Jewish thought has never 
been translated into a unified and shared position. Moreover, despite this strong common nostalgia, 
the hypothesis of a reconstruction of the Jewish homeland was not shared by all Jews. Rabbis, for 
example, considered belonging to Judaism as a religious bond and did not recognize the Jewish 
people as a national community. Above all, from their point of view, the project of returning to the 
Promised Land was basically a heresy36, a grievous infraction of messianic project. 
The fundamental problem was the definition of the role of religion within the new political 
experience, which represented a paramount friction; indeed, if religious identity remained the main 
factor in defining Jewishness37, it was not enough to reach a shared definition of Judaism (still today, 
one of the more intense debates is about the definition of the juridical concept in order to define who 
is a Jew and who is not). 
 Political Zionism thus appeared on the scene with a new idea of community, no longer based on the 
Diaspora dispersed among Gentiles, but on the patterns of a national society. If Judaism had 
guaranteed the preservation of Jews through separation, as something different from the 
surrounding societies, Zionism was asking to continue their survival as equals: becoming citizens 
                                                          
33 During the nineteenth century, the legislation of almost all European states abolished the limits imposed 
over the centuries to Jewish communities and granted them civil rights equal to those accorded to all other 
citizens. 
34 Akiva O., Israel: Politics, Myths and Identity Crises, Pluto Press, 1994, p. 15. 
35 That is, the persistence, in a more or less latent way, of some anti-Semitic hostility. 
36 Klein C. ,Israele: lo stato degli ebrei, 2000, Giunti, p. 20. 
37 Akiva O., Israel: Politics, Myths and Identity Crises, Pluto Press, 1994, p. 12 
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meant to go “beyond the walls of the ghetto38”, which had preserved Jewish lifestyle, but also 
isolating the communities from di outer world.  
The core of this national movement was not of a religious nature, but it had to do with the awakening 
of the nationalistic feelings of the Jews and the liberation of the masses from the rigidity of the 
patterns of Jewish community life in exile. These rigorous collective schemes were responsible for 
the extinction of national aspirations, enslaved in a closed intellectual and moral systems, unable to 
elevate and to allow individuals to be aware of their conditions. The national idea was still 
overshadowed by the idea of social and political emancipation, even if during that period, the 
struggle for equal rights in the West was coming to an end because the idea of equality and 
emancipation was losing its impetus, 
The three precursors of political Zionism were rabbis Yehuda Alkalai, rabbis Zvi Hirsch Kalisher 
and Moshe Hess, who preceded the actual emergence of the mass movement; the identification of 
these forerunners is made simply on the basis of the analogies between their thoughts and the 
Zionist idea, analyzing them in the historical process that brought to the birth of the future political 
movement39.  
 Yehuda Alkalai40 (1798-1878) was very involved in the Balkan nationalist aspirations and in their 
attempts to gain independence from the now decadent Ottoman Empire. From this experience, the 
idea of a national freedom was born in Alkalai's mind, for he was convinced of the possibility of a 
new “Jewish Redemption41” through the creation of Jewish settlements in the Holy Land, founded 
through human effort and commitment. However, he believed that this self-redemption was directly 
in the tradition42. 
Alkalai was convinced that in order to safeguard the security and freedom of the Jews, they should 
have striven for a life within their Forefathers homeland. In his essay “The Third Redemption” (1843) 
it was explained how this event would not have been done miraculously, but rather thanks to the 
efforts of the Jewish people who should have been organized and reunited, breaking the Diaspora 
conditions.  
Rabbi Kalisher43 (1795-1874), like Alkalai, was profoundly influenced by the galloping nationalism 
that in XIX century was investing all over Europe. Particularly present in the thought of Kalisher, 
expressed in the work "In search of Zion" (1862), was the awareness of the poor conditions of Jews 
in Europe and that the beginning of Redemption would come with the human effort: «The 
                                                          
38 Vercelli C., Israele: storia dello stato.., op. cit., p. 35. 
39 Katz J., The Forerunners of Zionism, in Renharz Y. and Shapira A., Essential papers on Zionism, Cassell, 1996, p.38. 
40 He was born in Sarajevo in 1798, but he passed his childhood in Jerusalem. 
41 Hertzberg A., The Zionist idea: a historical analysis and reader, Jewish Publication Society, 1959, p.104. 
42 Ibidem, p. 105. 
43 He lived in Posen, Poland, witnessing various attempts by the Poles to regain their freedom. 
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redemption of Israel [...] should not be imagined as a sudden miracle. [...] When many piety and 
connoisseurs of the Torah will go to the land of Israel and settle in Jerusalem [...] The Creator will 
listen to them and affection on the day of the Redemption44». This objective would be achieved not 
by divine intervention, but through the awakening of the philanthropists’ interest and through the 
consent of powerful nations. The idea of the Messiah was now secondary and Alkalai devoted 
himself to engage in this challenge some great philanthropists, such as Lord Rothschild45 and Sir 
Moses Montefiore46, convincing them to buy land from the Ottoman Empire47. 
Moshe Hess48 (1812-1875) presented some discrepancies in his thinking with respect to the first two 
authors, for he was a man coming from Western secular culture and a supporter of socialist ethics. 
The greatest danger he identified was this extreme attempt by European Jews to be accepted by 
their respective fellow citizens, even at the expense of eliminating every stretch of Jewishness and 
denying their origins. The point was that no reform of religion would have been radical enough to 
make Jews be accepted, thanks to this intuition, he was able to identify an important change in the 
meaning of anti-Semitism: slowly, hatred against the Jews was justified no longer on religious level, 
but on the racial one.  
The more Jews denied their belonging to a national community, more their position would 
deteriorate. Indeed, for Hess, there was a kind of insuperable unfamiliarity, even after emancipation, 
since the latter was based on a sense of universalistic justice and not on sincere respect for Jews. So, 
the exiled Jew who denied his own national identity would never have gained the respect of the 
Gentiles: he would remain a hybrid, which would not convince his compatriots of his loyalty 
towards the nation49. The only hope was to maintain the bond between the Jews and their spiritual 
center, a unit that has been maintained through the centuries all over the world, and which has 
preserved this identity as a people: «There is a nation scattered throughout the world and dispersed 
among the peoples»50. Emancipation would have led to the historical need for a national solution to 
the Jewish question, thus overcoming the purely religious conception of Judaism. The Jewish 
national movement had found in these premises its raison d’être. 
                                                          
44 Kalischer Z. H., Seeking Zion, in Hertzberg A., op. cit., p. III- 4. 
45 This noble title Rothschild Baron is a title created in the United Kingdom in 1885 for Sir Nathan Rothschild, 
a member of the Rothschild family. This dynasty played a key role in the creation of the State of Israel, since it 
fundamentally funded the project since the very first attempts. 
46 Italian-British entrepreneur and philanthropist. He founded Mishkenot Sha'ananim in 1860, one of the first 
settlements of the New Yishuv. 
47 Katz J., The Forerunners of Zionism, in Reinharz Y. and Shapira A., Essential Papers on Zionism, Cassel, 1996, p.42. 
48 Born in 1921, he was a great friend and collaborator of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. 
49Moshe H., Rome and Jerusalem, in Hertzberg A., op. cit., p. 121. 
50 Ibidem, p. 138. 
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1.1.3 The emergence of the Jewish question and the rise of Zionism 
 The recognition of a Jewish question was the fundamental factor in the evolution of the 
Zionist movement but, at the same time, a failure for those modernized Jewish elites integrated in 
the countries of origin; a defeat that saw emigration as an obligation, imposed by the circumstances 
rather than a virtuous choice. The tragedies of the Russian pogroms of 1881-8451 and the Dreyfus 
Affaire52 in France were necessary to prepare the ground for the widespread of Zionism.  
The pogroms were followed by a series of laws that institutionalized Jews discrimination: restricted 
access to higher education, universities and professions, limitations to their freedom of movement 
and residence. The effect these horrible actions had on Eastern Jews was dramatic, it seemed that 
these events meant to Jewish communities that it was no longer possible for them to live in Russia. 
Thus, without an organization or collective coordination, they began emigrating; most of them went 
to the United States and many others moved to the cities of Central and Western Europe.  
Leo Pinsker53 (1821-1891) published in 1882 his book “Self-Emancipation! The appeal of a Russian 
Jew to his brothers”. He was paradoxically part of the more integrated Russian Jewish group that 
had always positively seen the possibilities of assimilation, becoming a moderate supporter of 
gradual social integration. For these reasons, he was struck and disappointed from pogroms far more 
than his contemporaries, because he had put great faith in emancipation, but the pogroms had 
destroyed this hopeful vision, prompting him to advise mass emigration. Pinsker realized that the 
essence of the problem resided in the fact that the Jews were perceived as a non-assimilable element, 
“not digestible by any nation54”. The Jew represented for the Gentiles an irrational residual of the 
medieval heritage because European Jewry continued to persist in an unnatural condition: without 
a Land, without a Country; having no territory to exercise their sovereignty on, meant to lack the 
basis for mutual respect, besides the fact that international law principles, ruling relationships 
among nation, were in the Jewish case inapplicable. This was the foundation that guaranteed 
fairness of treatment and respect of human rights.  
Pinsker was pushed by a deep sense of shame, because these sad events had not only revealed the 
rejection that Russian society had expressed against the Jews, despite their efforts to integrate, but 
had mostly revealed their helplessness and humiliating situation: «Insulted, robbed, ill-treated and 
                                                          
51On March 13th 1881, a handful of Russian revolutionaries assassinated Tsar Alexander II and anti-Semites 
spread the rumor that the assassins were Jews, causing a subsequent wave of pogrom that invested the entire 
Russian empire. 
52 It was a political scandal that divided broke out in France, from 1894 until its resolution in 1906. The scandal 
began with the treason conviction of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a young French artillery officer. Sentenced to life 
imprisonment for allegedly communicating French military secrets to the German Embassy in Paris. 
53 Polish doctor, adhered to Haskalah and moved to Odessa, where he died. 
54 Pinsker L., Auto-Emacipation: An appeal to his people by a Russian Jew, in. Hertzberg A., op. cit., p. 182. 
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dishonored; we don’t dare defend ourselves and, what is worse, all this is accepted as natural [...] 
You can prove your patriotism a thousand times ... the same, one morning you will discover that you 
are considered foreigners and an enraged multitude will remind you that in the end you are nothing 
but vagabonds and parasites [...]55». 
He argued that they had a totally wrong to approach, indeed, there was in some degree a rejection 
of the actual circumstances. This denial led to the continuous appeal to justice and equality as a 
solution instead of using a rational approach. «You are fool, because you expect human nature, from 
something that has always been devoid of humanity. You are unworthy because you have no love for 
yourself and respect for your nation56». 
Pinsker insisted on the importance of not losing the propitious moment represented by a series of 
circumstances that were determining the fate of many European peoples; the proposed solution was 
thus Jewish emigration towards a land that would guarantee them a permanent shelter. Times were 
therefore potentially allying with the Jewish cause and, even though there wasn’t yet a charismatic 
leader able to lead a coordinated general action, the existing small associations constituted a good 
starting point for the great national project.  
In the same years, many movements came up with the ultimate goal of favoring the emigration in 
Palestine; the first true expression of modern Zionism was a small group called Hovevei Zion (those 
who love Zion). The method by which they proposed to restore the Jewish presence in the Land of 
Israel was very concrete: manual work and man's commitment would have fostered the change that 
would have concretely taken place through the acquisition and cultivation of the land. In a few years, 
this organization grouped dozens of groups with the same intent, which eventually came together 
in the Hibbat Zion movement. 
When Pinsker published his work “Self-Emancipation!”, it became their ideological manifestation 
and the author was placed at the top of the movement. The influence that this organization had on 
the Russian thinker was fundamental, in fact, for him the Promised Land began to acquire the 
predominant and exclusive role in being the chosen place for the future Jewish nation. On the scene, 
there was also another group called Bilu (acronym of “Bet Ya'akov Lekw veNelkah”, “Jacob's house, come 
and walk”) which will be of great importance for subsequent developments of the Zionist 
movement: « (The Jews) slept, immersed in the false dream of assimilation [...]now, thanks to God, 
they woke up. [...] The pogroms woke you up. [...] We want a dwelling in the country that belongs 
to us, because it is recorded as ours in the archives of history [...]57». Although only a few Biluim 
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56 Pinsker L., Auto-Emacipation…., op. cit., p. 189. 
57 Morris B., Vittime…, op. cit., pag.31.  
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reached Palestine from 1882 to 1884, they had great importance, being the vanguard and introducing 
the mystic of the pioneers, in Zionist ideology58. 
During those years, from 1881 to 1903, the First Aliyah 59 took place, consisting in pioneering groups 
(from 20,000 to 30,000 olim60) emigrating to Palestine and building the first settlements by working 
as simple farmers. The first agricultural colonies such as Rishon leTzion, Petakh Tikvah and Rosh 
Pinah were built; the new villages took the name of the new Yishuv61. Although the participation of 
Hibbat Zion members was low compared to the numbers desired by Pinsker, their activity, nicknamed 
"practical Zionism62", paved the way for the advent of Theodore Herzl and his political Zionism, 
which transformed this movement from elite ideology into a political force. 
 
1.2 Political Zionism 
What specifically involved the fate of Jewish communities was the spread of a new type of 
hatred, which was called anti-Semitism. Many had tried to justify the hatred of the Jews, but the 
reality was that the anti-Jewish sentiment was so rooted in psychology of European societies, that 
it could also have been compared to an anomaly passed down from one generation to another and 
«since it was transmitted for two millennia, was incurable63». Anti-semitism is a modern term, 
highlighting the Fact that Jews were no longer rejected for the religious factor, but for elements 
linked to the new, modern world. 
Theodore Herzl64 (1860-1904) recognized that anti-Semitism derived from a new phenomenon: the 
politics of masses; when the Affaire Dreyfus took place, he had the occasion to follow the trial very 
close as news correspondent from Paris for the important Viennese newspaper “Neue Frei Press”; this 
episode contributed to arouse his sensitivity to the Jewish problem which was already very acute. 
His awareness about the Jewish question and his perception of the lurking existential danger were 
                                                          
58 Encycloapedia Judaica, vol. 16, p. 1038-1039. 
59Aliyah is the Jewish immigration from the Diaspora to the Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael), also defined as the act 
of “ascending". “Making aliyah” by moving to the Land of Israel is one of the most basic tenets of Zionism. 
60 This wave of immigrants consisted mostly of Jews from Eastern Europe. Most of them were family members 
who embarked on the journey to the Promised Land for religious reasons and with the hope of improving their 
conditions. It can be said that they had no political purpose. 
61 It was formed by the settlements and the Jewish residents in the land of Israel from the first aliyah, until the 
establishment of the State of Israel. 
62 It was intended to pursue the Zionist ideal in a concrete way, realizing on a practical level, without following 
diplomatic or political paths 
63 Vercelli C., Israele: storia dello stato…, op. cit., p. 53. 
64 He was born in Budapest in 1860. He was educated in the spirit of the German-Jewish Enlightenment, and 
learned to appreciate secular culture. 
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matured during the years: emancipation, even if it succeeded, was based on abstract principles and 
it did not win the hearts and minds of the people who refused to accept Jewish citizens as an integral 
part of society.  
So, Herzl's conclusion was very simple, there was no point fighting anti-Semitism, the only option 
was to circumvent it; the main attempt of Zionism became the achievement of “normality65”, 
meaning the obtaining of a situation for European Jews accepted and considered regular by the other 
national societies. 
In 1986, he wrote “Der Judenstaat: Versucheiner Moderner Lösung der Judenfrage” (The Jewish State, 
Attempt for a Modern Solution to the Jewish Problem). The basic idea was simple, restoring the 
Jewish state. His work had a great impact because of the simplicity and immediacy of the concept 
that was expressed, the starting point was the assumption that unfortunately anti-Semitism had to 
be taken as a given and immutable variable in the equation that defined situation of Diaspora 
communities in Europe, which meant the impossibility of assimilation. «We have sincerely tried to 
join the national communities in which we live, trying to preserve the faith of our fathers. We are 
not allowed. In vain we are patriots [...]. In our native homelands, where we have lived for centuries, 
we are still declared aliens [...] 66». 
Herzl considered the Jewish issue not as a problem of social or religious origin (as it had been in the 
Middle Ages), but of political reason: it was a national matter. Starting from these circumstances, it 
resulted that the only plausible solution was of a political nature, that to say the constitution of an 
independent state whose sovereignty was in the hands of the Jews: «Let’s give us given sovereignty 
over a piece of land on the Earth's surface sufficient to satisfy our righteous needs, everything else 
we will provide it on our own67».  
These ideas led the author to emphasize the possibility for the Jewish in the Diaspora to renew 
himself, to “rise from their ashes” and to recover the honor, pride, and respect from the gentiles; 
refreshing traditional Judaism and transforming it into “muscular Judaism68”. Much emphasis was 
placed on the central role that the Jews would play in fulfilling this project, trying to shake them 
from their torpor and inviting them to action by focusing their resources on the collective effort. 
Herzl was convinced that the times were ripe to make that what once seemed like a dream could 
finally become reality. 
In order to achieve the conditions of return, a Jewish society should have been built and it would 
have founded the state, fully expressing the political modernity of political Zionism, which totally 
differentiates from the religious one because it rejects the passivity of the individuals: «The 
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construction of a Jewish nation, which forms a political body, which wants the creation of a 
sovereign state in the Land of Israel, is the fundamental objective of this doctrine and this 
movement69». 
Zionist project was endowed with a political body in 1897 with the first World Zionist Congress 
held in Basel70, during which the World Zionist Organization was founded; the program adopted 
was very simple: «Zionism strives to get a publicly recognized and legally guaranteed focal point for 
the Jewish people in Palestine. In order to achieve this goal, the congress proposes the following 
methods: 1. Encouraging the principle of colonization of Palestine by Jews who are farmers, 
agricultural workers and artisans; 2 Unifying and organizing  all Jewish communities in local and 
larger groups in accordance with the laws of their respective countries; 3. Strengthening individual 
consciousness and Jewish national consciousness; 4. Activating the necessary means to obtain the 
consent of those governments that can favor the realization of the aims of Zionism71». 
The movement thus came to a decisive stage for its development on August 29th 1897, when the first 
Zionist congress started in Basel. Though it did not start under good auspices, because of the strong 
opposition by some Jewish communities and German rabbis, the goal of institutionalizing Zionism, 
bringing together Judaism representatives, was achieved. In fact, congressional participants decided 
to create organs that would represent the newborn Zionist Organization (haHistadrut haZion) on a 
political, legal and moral level: the Society of Jews72 would have played the role of the “moral person” 
of the movement and the Jewish Company73 instead would incarnate the “legal person74”.  
Equally important, from a symbolic point of view, the hymn (Hatikvah75), the hope, and the flag of 
the Zionist movement were chosen; the latter was inspired by the tallith, the Jewish prayer shawl 
with the Magen David in the center. In this case we can see how Zionism had wisely used Jewish 
tradition, transforming it and utilizing it to structure a Zionist civil religion, which will become the 
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foundation of Israeli civil religion76. For these reasons, at the end of the Basel meeting, Herzl felt so 
confident to proclaim the famous sentence: «In Basel I founded the Jewish state 77». 
Max Nordau78 (1849-1923) explained with these words what was meant by political Zionism: «The 
new Zionism that has taken the name of political Zionism differs from ancient religious and 
Messianic Zionism as it refuses any form of mysticism as it no longer identifies with messianism and 
does not expect a miracle to return to Palestine but wants to prepare it with its own efforts. New 
Zionism is only partly produced by the inner thrust of Judaism itself, the enthusiasm that Modern 
Jews have for its history and its martyrology; [...] for another part is the effect of two thrusts that 
came from outside: the idea of nationality that has dominated Europe's thinking and feeling for half 
a century and which has determined world politics; the anti-Semitism that the Jews of all countries 
suffer most or less 79». 
Political Zionism is therefore the result of the cultural conception of contemporaneity, from whom 
it seizes opportunities; this movement replied to the problems of being Jewish in the modern world, 
offering the national way as a solution, which is the complete and definitive vision of the fate of the 
Jews. It fits perfectly into the current of political movements of the late nineteenth century, not only 
by simple temporal coincidence, but also because Zionism shows all the constituent features of 
political, social and cultural modernity80. Its ideological nature, while being varied, is due to the fact 
that it has the goal of building a society where Jews can live expressing their cultural, social and 
spiritual subjectivity in their entirety. In order to do this, a reform of Jewish self-perception and of 
the way they conceive the world is essential. In this framework, religion is the tool which allow the 
construction of the identity of a “new man”, whose essence is manual, agricultural work. 
This means that the movement had a new approach towards the relationship between politics and 
religion; this does not mean a rejection of the traditional heritage, but exclusively of the passivity of 
the historical perspective, which is no longer awaited, but is loaded with a creative and 
interventionist élan. It is necessary to take part in the construction of its own history, becoming 
active political subjects.  
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1.2.1 Cultural Zionism, another perspective 
 Ahad Ha’am (1856-1927)81and his “cultural Zionism82” were openly in contrast with Herzl’s 
political Zionism; he criticized what seemed an exclusively materialistic process that had as its sole 
purpose the creation of a state. This new entity would be aimed at solving problems that Jews lived 
in the Diaspora, such as poverty or persecution that, by the way, could have come back in any case 
for they are linked to "material" factors. According to him, instead, the true focus of the Jewish 
question was the crisis that Judaism was experiencing. The material problems observed in the 
Diaspora would have ended not simply by the foundation of the state, rather religion would have 
been able to end the dispersal of exiles: for this reason, Zionism had to start from another 
assumption: the problem was spiritual.  
Judaism was the strong element which would have provided the Jewish community with a powerful 
aim but, because of its weakened condition it was almost incapable of imprinting this turning point: 
«Speaking of national religion, we intend to recognize Judaism as basically national and all attempts 
by the “Reformers” to separate Jewish religion from its national element have had no results except 
to ruin both nationalism and religion. So, if you want to build and not destroy, religion must be 
taught on the basis of nationalism. [...] But if you talk of propagating “religious nationalism”. I do 
not know what you are talking about. [...] From my point of view our religion is national, which 
means that it is the product of our national spirit83». 
Ahad Ha’am meant that Judaism could not be conceived as a purely spiritual element, but in order 
to achieve its full accomplishment it had to be realized concretely through the realization of a state. 
Exile Judaism could not develop independently respect to the surrounding societies, in fact the risk 
of confrontation with modern culture beyond the ghetto walls meant in many cases its 
disappearance. What was needed first was the creation of a homeland where conditions existed to 
develop one's own national culture: at that point men and women would grow and, thanks to the 
education received, they would have founded not just a State for the Jews, but finally a Jewish State 
in its essence. These arguments did not oppose political Zionism, but focused on the fact that its 
core was Judaism as a source of national culture. 
Ahad Ha'am's vision imagined the creation of a complex of institutions inspired by the values of 
Jewish tradition. Herzl’s conception of the State was thus based on political premises, Ahad Ha’am 
envisioned it as the concretization of ethical principles. The common element between these two 
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concepts was the awareness that all this could not have been done without a functional educational 
project for newcomers and new generations, This became one of the key points of Zionist 
leadership’s vision, which attempted to develop an Hebrew education, starting with the recovery of 
the language and the creation of a modern school system, mainly aimed at the formation of the 
“future citizen” and the satisfaction of the work market demand for prepared Laborers. Thus, a 
nationalist education was asserted in order to introduce immigrants into a new historical reality. 
 
1.3 Zionism: from theory in Europe, to practice in Eretz Yisrael 
 The Zionist movement was strengthened after the first Congress, with more solid bases and 
projected totally on the road that would have led to the realization of its project. But when 1903 
Jospeh Chamberlain (the British colonial secretary) offered Herzl a charter for part of East Africa, 
the Uganda Plan84, it gave birth to one of the most crucial moment in the history of the Zionist 
movement, where ideology and myth clashed with practicality and reality. 
The fact that a world power like Britain was offering a territory of its empire was a stunning 
achievement for a young political organization such Zionism: basically, it was the international 
recognition of this organization as a national movement.  
Herzl brought the proposal before the Sixth Zionist Congress (August 24th 1903) and asked the 
members to evaluate genuinely the capacity of “Uganda” to absorb mass Jewish immigration; his 
position was motivated because the pivotal point of his vision did not reside in the precise 
geographical place where the Jewish state should have been, rather about negotiations in order to 
achieve the essential conditions that would have allowed the creation of a Jewish national home, 
giving priority to political and diplomatic action. In addition, his openness towards alternative 
solutions was given by a sense of urgency in the face of the distress experienced by Russian Jewry85. 
After having encountered a harsh opposition, the Uganda plan was dropped86. This episode was 
more important for its symbolic meaning than its political one; at the very end, the evocative power 
of the land of Israel won over any other consideration and demonstrated to be deeply interiorized in 
the very beign of the Jews who adhered to the Zionist idea. Thus, Palestine was not just a territory 
that could be replaced with any other, in this way, the idea of returning the Jews to the land that 
made Zionism underwent a fascination that went beyond economic, political interests or benefits. 
After the Uganda crisis, the Land of Israel steadily moved to center stage, the territorial principle 
increasingly overriding the ethnic and the popular, even if declined with different shades, marking 
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the beginning of a new phase for the movement87. So, Zionism found itself into a deep depression, 
worsened with Herzl’s sudden death in 1904; in that year, the members of the Second aliyah 88(1904-
1914) found affinity with the emergence of radical Zionist circles, such as Poal’ei Zion89 (Zionist 
workers) and HaPo'el HaTza'ir90 (the young worker)91. They wanted a different Zionism that would 
have been different from the “bourgeois version” typical of Hovevei Zion; this new interpretation 
would have been meaningful not only for the Jewish collectivity, but also for the individuals, 
embodying a psychological revolution in the image of the Jew (revolution of norms, behaviors and 
values). This emerging current emphasized national and cultural factors and the struggle for a life of 
authenticity in the Land of the Forefathers. 
This increased importance of the role of ideology was due also to the convergence with some tragic 
events: another wave of pogrom broke out, from 1903 until 1906, this time in Kishinev (Russia). 
These occurrences were a turning point in the history if Zionist movement, indeed those pogroms 
awakened a sort of rebellion in the souls of Russian Jews against the persecutions that, since long 
time, were became a normal part in Jewish communities’ daily life. They were also the factors that 
provoked the second aliyah; the vast majority of these immigrants were an elite group of about 
40,00092 young men and women who came to Palestine motivated by national idealism (and by the 
desire to achieve better living conditions, first of all the freedom from the terror of the pogroms).  
The second aliyah differed considerably from the first one because it contributed radically to the 
settlement project in Eretz Yisrael and because it gave rise to a radical transformation of the “new 
Yishuv93”, whose political, economic, social and cultural structure was indelibly formed in those 
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years. young men and women who came to Palestine motivated by national idealism (and by the 
desire to achieve better living conditions, first of all freedom from terrors of the pogroms).  
Ber Borochov94 (1881-1917) together with Aaron David Gordon95(1856-1922) were the intellectuals 
that better interpreted the new convergence between Zionism and socialism96; Borochov had in his 
mind the image of an “overturned pyramid” as the symbol of the Jewish social structure97, he believed 
that the redemption of the Jewish people would only take place through the ingathering of the 
people in Palestine and through the transformation of this social organization: Socialism and 
Zionism could not be separated While Gordon was more active, contributing to the settlement of 
the land and joining the young immigrants; he thought that manual work was a sacred principle to 
devote himself and that this was particularly true for the Jewish people because the renaissance of 
the Jewish nation would have come true only through agricultural work. This was a regenerative 
process, “a revolution of the men in the Jew98”, which would have allowed the redemption of the 
individuals thanks to the direct contact and unity with the Land: «[...] The fundamental question is 
to know whether this condition "Jewish work on Jewish land" is only a condition of secondary 
nature or an essential condition, a principle, a foundation without which the redemption of our land 
and our resurgence can't be conceived; [...] when we will have set Jewish work as the basis of our 
activity [...], then we will be able to really say that we have opened a new page of our work in Eretz 
Yisrael [...], we are missing work, not only as a link between man and the land, but also as the main 
force to create a national civilization[…]99». 
 
1.3.1 The Zionist ethos and the emergence of a Hebrew culture 
 The new immigrants, laden with pioneering spirit, felt very close to the “new Jew” Zionist 
ideal; this envision included the return to the lost paradise, the rural community, a life close to nature 
                                                          
94 Born in Ukraine, Ber Borochov was educated in a Russian high school. He was attracted by the revolutionary 
socialist trends of the time. In 1901, his interests in Jewish problems led him to establish the Zionist Socialist 
Workers Union. Active in Jewish self-defense, the organization was opposed by both the Russian Social 
Democrats and some of the Zionist leaders who disapproved of the combination of Zionism and socialism. 
95 David Gordon was one of the early supporters of the Hibbat Zion movement, and the first Hebrew journalist 
to propagate Zionist views through his publications. 
Born in Vilna, Gordon received a yeshiva education and then became a student of the Haskalah movement. 
96This was particularly true for immigrants coming from a Russian cultural back-ground.  
97 Merhav P., The Israeli Left..., op. cit., p. 26. 
98 Gordon A. D cited in Rubinstein A., From Herzl to Rabin: The Changing Image of Zionism, Holmes & Meier 
Publishers, 2000, p.25. 
99 Gordon A.D., Il lavoro, type-written copy in Italian, in Marzano A., Storia…, op.cit., p. 58. 
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and physical contact with the elements100. Indeed, Zionism believed that a man who cultivated the 
soil had a profound connection with his Land and, living from his honest work, the pioneer 
developed a simple lifestyle, a love for nature and (above all) independence. This romantic vision 
was expressed fully by the Jewish agricultural worker, becoming the central image of Zionist 
propaganda. 
Moreover, beyond the economic need and ideology purpose, there was a political vision behind this 
approach; according to “practical Zionists101” a concrete hold over the country’s territory through 
the purchase and the settlement of the land was believed to be the best way to create a Jewish stable 
presence in Palestine. Gordon’s concepts were completely assimilated by the new olim: kibush 
ha’avoda (conquering of the Labor) and kibush ha’adama (conquering of the land) became pivotal 
concepts of their action102. 
Between 1908 and 1913, the Jews bought about 400,000 dunam103 over a total territory of 27,000,000 
dunam; the most prominent notables families sold the estates, attracted by the considerable rise of 
the prices (quickly increased thanks to the high Zionist demand). This business was also possible 
thanks to the help of the Palestine Land Development Company, founded in 1908 by the idea of 
Arthur Ruppin104(1876-1943); his project was very linear, that is, to create a Jewish economic and 
social system in which the production chain and the market were also Jewish. 
It was under his suggestion that a qevutzah of young people, already part of a settlement near Hadera, 
had decided to move to uninhabited land on the shores of Lake Tiberias in Galilee; this experiment 
was giving rise to the first kibbutz105 (called Degania, cornflower), a new experience that took shape106 
from a simple initiative from the bottom that, starting from the experiences and the daily necessities, 
managed collectively daily-life issues. The kibbutz became an expression of nationalist sentiment and 
socialist ideal and began to support the moshavot107 of the first aliyah , but while the latter were based 
                                                          
100 Rubinstein A., From Herzl to Rabin: The Changing Image of Zionism, Holmes & Meier Publishers, 2000, p. 19. 
101 Shapira A., Israel: A History, Brandeis University Press, 2012, p. 35. 
102 Marzano A., Storia…, op.cit., p. 58. 
103 Land measurement unit adopted from the Ottoman age to our days in various Arab countries to calculate 
the land surfaces. It equates to 1000 square meters. 
104 He was born in Germany and once in the Land of Israel, he became Head of the Palestinian Office (haMisrad 
haEretz Yisrael).  
105 The kibbutz is a community-based reality based on socialist principles and incarnating the highest principles 
of Zionism. 
106 In order to have a more detailed outline of kibbutz development and history, see the chapter The Kibbutz 
Movement, in Merhav P., The Israeli Left: history, problems, documents, Barnes, A. S. & Co. Inc., 1980. pp. 167-179. 
107 Typical form of agricultural cooperative, which brings together small farms founded by Labor Zionists in a 
small village. 
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on private property and the use of local Labor, the kibbutzim developed a totally Jewish community, 
with its economic system and independent from the others already existing. 
The consequences of this approach had a dramatic impact on the relations with Arab workers who 
lived in the land of Palestine; essentially, the fellahin108 were removed from the lands they cultivated 
and felt as their own (although they belonged to the notables, the aristocrats, who often lived in cities 
far from the lands, such as Jerusalem, Nablus, but also Damascus, Beirut or Istanbul109); landowners 
also had great interest in selling those lands, not only because they were difficult to cultivate, but 
above all because the land value in Palestine grew by 5,000%110 between 1910 and 1944. 
Local workers began thus to feel resentment towards the new Jewish settlers, which were 
increasingly a concrete threat. Thus, the first disagreements arose for economic and social reasons, 
but the situation was made more delicate by the frequent contacts between the two populations 
and, despite these attempts of coexistence, at the beginning of the XX century the nationalist 
question was becoming increasingly explicit assuming more and more relevance in the antagonisms 
between Jews and Arabs. Therefore, the famous phrase «a landless people for a land without a 
people111» turned out to be basically wrong, presenting to the Zionists a further challenge: a choice 
about the nature of the relations that were to be established with the local Arab population. 
The increase in tension led to the spread of a need felt by the olim, to be able to provide for self-
defense, so every settlement had to be fortitude in order to become self-sufficient. The slogan was 
avoda ivrit (Jewish work) applied in the model of the homat vemigdal (the wall and the tower), so the 
settlement was conceived as a small citadel, capable of self-defense and of accomplishing that 
spiritual regeneration through manual activity. They had the task of ensuring the active possession 
of the territory, safeguarding the principle of social justice, educating its members to Labor cult and 
overcoming the outdated heritage of Galut112. 
It was thus spreading the “cult of strength” reinforced through the efforts and the struggle, the cult 
of a nation molded by workers: those were the fundamental values of the Zionist enterprise. This 
attitude was also expressed through the foundation in 1908 of military organization called 
                                                          
108 Fellah is a farmer or agricultural laborer in the Middle East and North Africa. The word derives from the 
Arabic word for “ploughman” or “tiller”. 
109 In 1858, within the framework of the tanzimat, was created the “Ottoman Land Code”, requiring land owners 
to register ownership. The reasons behind the law were twofold: to increase tax revenue, and to exercise 
greater state control over the area 
110 Morris B., Vittime…, op. cit., p. 55. 
111 Shapira A., Israel…, op.cit., p. 36. 
112 It is a word that expresses the condition and feelings of a dispersed and homeless nation. This word refers 
to the historical awareness of the Jewish people of their condition, which began with the destruction of the 
Second Temple in Jerusalem (70 d. c.) and finished with the creation of the Jewish State. 
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HaShomer113 (the guardian) by a group of young activists, the objective of this under-covered group 
was the surveillance of the settlements and in few years, it became responsible of the security of 
many villages. With the time passing by, HaShomer began also to protect the workers in the fields, 
getting in contact with the local Arab population.  
From the purchasing of the land and its farming, the focus was becoming also its protection: the 
agricultural worker was becoming also a soldier. Since that moment, going to Palestine would have 
been the choice not made by those men who had nothing to lose, but by pioneers who thought that: 
«History plays where no history has ever been produced [...]114». Those who were part of this group 
embodied the ideal of the halutz, the pioneering fighter, who create the direct relationship with the 
physical space through agriculture and defense: the myth of a “nation in arms” was founded.  
The pioneers of the second aliyah under-estimated the “Arab question”, concentrating all their efforts 
in hard work, in the face of almost prohibitive living conditions; their daily struggle against an 
adversary environment made those men and women part of the myth of Zionist narrative, becoming 
a model for the future generations of Israel. Thus, it was the "miracle" of creation, in which 
agricultural settlements and fields grew on arid or swampy soils. Indeed, a new society was created. 
The years between the first aliyah and the outbreak of World War One were crucial for the formation 
of a national culture, characterized by a secular Jewish identity, the use of Hebrew as the spoken 
language and the independence from Galut cultures115. Thus, a national education was created in 
order to promote the development of a native Hebrew culture, characterized by speaking Hebrew, 
e behavior that emphasized physicality and self-definition dialectically opposed to that of the 
Diaspora, clearly displaying a secular identity116. 
Nevertheless, the most important change that occurred in Palestine was secularization of culture, 
even if a strong connection was maintained with Jewish tradition, celebrating festivals and rites of 
passage; basically, there was a difficulty of creating a new heritage without the sacrality given by the 
centuries-old ritual behind it. So, the Bible was the element that symbolized the connection with 
the national past; it was a guidebook to the local fauna and flora and to ancient settlement sites like 
River Jordan or Mount Gilboa; it was the "book of memory117". 
                                                          
113 It took the name from Shimon Bar-Gyora, an hero of the Jewish rebellion against the romans in the I century 
d. c.. His motto was: «Through fire and blood Judea fall; through fire and blood it will rise again». 
114 C. Vercelli, Israele: storia dello stato…, op. cit., pag. 130. 
115 The basis of cultural rebirth was widely understood as the passage, the transformation, from the passive 
observant yehudi (Jew) of Diaspora to the secular, resourceful ivri(Hebrew), of Eretz Yisrael 
116 Even-Zohar I., The Emergence of a native Hebrew Culture in Palestine, 1882-1948, in Reinharz Y. and Shapira A., 
Essential Papers..., op. cit., p.730, 
117 This expression originated in Exodus 17:14 and it was often used by Ahad Ha’am. 
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Despite this vivid cultural and educational effort, the attention of Zionist leadership was mainly 
focused on the most practical aspects of the project, such as welcoming and accommodating 
immigrants, considered the raw material that would have allowed the building of the state; they 
were pursuing a “territorial118” strategy, according to which the purchase of new lands was thus the 
absolute priority. 
 
1.4 The Mandate Epoch 
 In the first decade of the XX century, British interest in the land of Palestine was increased 
once it became clear that the end of the Ottoman Empire was very close. Starting from spring 1915 
the partition of the Middle East was a topic discussed between Britain and France and these secret 
talks led to the Sykes-Picot Agreement119 signed in 1916, which established the division of the 
territories of the Ottoman Empire under British and French authorities. Iraq, Transjordan and the 
route in Southern Palestine were under the British rule, while Syria and Lebanon were given to 
France. Western Palestine and the area from the south of the Sea of Galilee to north of Gaza was 
under international rule.  
At the same time, Sir Arthur McMahon120, acting on his government’s behalf, promised Sharif of 
Mecca Hussein bin Ali121 through correspondence that, in return for an Arab support against the 
Ottoman Empire122, Britain would support the creation of an independent Arab zone from the 
Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea123. The contradiction between this promise and the agreement 
                                                          
118 Vercelli C., Israele: storia dello stato…, op. cit., p. 100. 
119 Secret Agreement signed in 1916 between France and Great Britain. This treaty was about the future division 
of the territories of the Ottoman Empire, after the end World War I. France would take over the direct control 
of the Great Lebanon and the northwest coast of Syrian, while Britain would dominate the provinces of Basra 
and Baghdad. The space between these extremes should have been occupied by a large Arab state, actually 
divided into areas of influence under the great powers. The province called Palestine would be subject to a 
Franco-British rule. 
120 He was High Commissioner in Egypt. 
121 Husayin Bin Ali was the last of the rulers belonging to the Hashemite dynasty nominated by the Sublime 
Gate. Thanks to his lineage with Prophet Muhammad, enjoyed enormous prestige among Arab populations, 
for he was known as the King of Hijiaz. That is the reason why the British recognized the importance of his 
figure. 
122 London was very concerned about the future of the region due to the precarious conditions in which the 
Ottoman Empire came. For this reason, the great British power was already thinking of the future layout of 
the region once the control of the Sublime Gate would have disappeared altogether. The chart between Mc 
Mahon and Husayin is precisely the emblem of British maneuvers to secure its influence in the Middle East.  
123 Hussein wanted to found an independent Arab state that included the Hijiaz and other adjacent territories, 
in order to restore the caliphate. 
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with the French government was difficult to explain and this plot will become even more intricate 
with the Balfour declaration issued in 1917; the promises made by McMahon will be overturned and 
the frustrated hopes of the Arabs will join the feelings of anti-Zionist hostility that the people of 
Palestine began to manifest124. 
 
1.4.1 The Balfour Declaration and Weizman’s Synthetic Zionism 
 Jewish presence in Palestine was not particularly opposed by the Ottoman Empire, as it was 
in a complex and delicate situation of evident decline. Thanks to the internal crisis the Sublime Gate 
had to face, Zionism could realize its immigration and settlement policies. However, the leadership 
of the World Zionist Organization was still looking for the support of a great power; after Herzl’s 
failure with Istanbul125, Chaim Weizmann126 (1874-1952) succeeded in London.  
One of his more important achievements was the reunification of the two currents that came into 
open conflict over the Uganda Plan, practical and political Zionism; following this appeasement, 
“synthetic Zionism127” born in 1907, he chose this name because this school of thought, on one hand, 
it supported the immigrants and pioneer’s enterprise in Palestine and, on the other, it also attributed 
great importance to diplomatic action (especially towards English politicians), fundamental 
support to practical Zionism ‘s activities on the ground.  
Thanks to his diplomatic initiatives, he obtained what he felt was his greatest achievement: the 
Balfour Declaration, written in 1917 by Lord Balfour (Foreign Minister of Loyd George’s government) 
to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, president of the British Zionist Federation. Those few words 
stated: « […] His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this 
object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and 
                                                          
124 Sanders R. The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour Declaration and the Birth of the British Mandate of 
Palestine, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1983, p.229-255. 
125 Herzl long sought to obtain the support, or at least a nullity, from the Ottoman authorities for the mass 
entrance of Jews in the province of Palestine. In 1901 he met the sultan Abdul Hamid II, when he tried to obtain 
his consensus for the Jewish settlement of Palestine in exchange of economic benefits, but the sultan rejected 
the deal. 
126 He was a successful scholar and chemist. He became the strongest personality of the Zionist movement 
after Herzl's death and in 1920 he was elected President of the World Zionist Organization (WTO), covering 
that role until 1946. 
127Shlaim A., Il muro di ferro: Israele e il mondo arabo, Il Ponte,2003, p. 30. 
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religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status 
enjoyed by Jews in any other country […]128.». 
The analysis and the literature devoted to the motivations that prompted the British representatives 
to release that document is wide and in-depth, there was a sort of convergence between British 
interests and the Zionist cause. The international arena was changing and among the numerous 
strategic consideration made by London, one of the most vital was the need to control a territory 
near the Suez Canal (opened in 1869), a fundamental passage to reach India and close enough to oil 
fields in Mesopotamia129. Although the motivations of British government were sincere in 
supporting the birth of a Jewish national home, supporting the Zionist movement seemed to be the 
best strategy to follow in order to legitimize British presence in Palestine.  
Few days after, in December 1917 when the World War I was about to end, General Sir. Edmund 
Allenby entered in Jerusalem, opening a new era of Jewish history in Palestine. Indeed, the scope of 
the declaration was so important because, concretely, it provided the support of Britain for the 
national revival Zionist project in Eretz Yisrael. The Jewish people were considered a nation. 
The British influence and control on those areas was officially established at the San Remo 
Conference in 1920, Britain was granted with the Mandate of Palestine130, giving it the responsibility 
for implementing the Balfour Declaration; the Mandate131.was then created by the Council of the 
League of Nations132 on July 24th 1922; the fact that London was ready to realized what expressed in 
the declaration didn’t mean that no attempts were made in order to promote the participation of 
Arab representatives in the Mandate institutions. So, on June 1922, the British Colonial Office 
                                                          
128 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Balfour Declaration, Foreign Policy – Selected Reference Documents, 
n.1, 2/11/1917. 
129 Gelvin J.L., The Israel-Palestine Conflict... op. cit., p. 82.  
130 The British mandate for Palestine was a legal permission for the administration of post-Ottoman Palestine. 
The official document was ratified by the League of Nations in 1922 and became effective in 1923. 
131 A state or territory was taken into "custody" by a mandate power, which administered it legally and 
politically. But the mandate had a temporary character, in fact, the power that governed had the task of 
accompanying the people on a path that would lead to national independence. 
132 It was born by the will of the winners of the World War I, as a result of the shocking experience. It is the 
first international organization of history and it was created with the precise aim of preventing the outbreak 
of conflicts. 
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published a White Paper133 announcing that the Mandate “did not contain or imply anything which 
need cause alarm to Arab population of Palestine134”. 
Thanks to the Mandate, Great Britain could thus assert its control over Palestine, inaugurating a 
period that will be crucial to the formation of the future State of Israel. But, with the time passing 
by, it was becoming clearer that the international momentum of opportunity that had led to the 
great achievement of the Balfour Declaration had gone.  
 
1.4.2 The State in the making and Labor supremacy 
 The British Mandate of Palestine began with a general change in the attitude that the 
Government of London had regarding the Zionist project. The main reason for this shift was due to 
the Arab claims about the promises made by London during World War I135; this conflict surely 
changed the landscape which Jews in Europe and Palestine would have to face. First of all, the 
primary objective of Zionist leadership was changed: promoting immigration in the promised Land 
was replacing the priority of planning the future of the Yishuv. 
The World Zionist Organization began to focus its efforts to secure work and housing for 
immigrants in Eretz Yisrael, through political support and funding; in order to be more efficient, it 
opened one branch also in Palestine, which will be transformed in the Zionist Executive which over 
time assumed the task to govern the Yishuv. But the institution-building process was just begun; in 
1920, the Histadrut (HaHistadrut HaKlalit shel HaOvdim B'Eretz Yisrael, the General Federation of Jewish 
Workers in the Land of Israel) was founded136 and it was composed by two branches: the economic 
arm, Hevrat HaOvdim (Society of Workers, a group of companies, including banks and building 
enterprise) and by the Kupat Olim Clalit (the General Health Service) which provide medical help for 
all its members137.  
Mapai's political control within this institution was strong and consolidate thanks to its majority 
(established through elections) in the representative bodies, this element allowed the party to 
                                                          
 133London synthesized the new approach with the promulgation of a White Paper, which declared the need 
to control Jewish immigration, for Palestine was not to be considered as the Jewish national headquarters but 
one of the possible places where the Jewish State could have been developed (of course if the “environmental” 
conditions would have allowed it). 
134 Shapira A., Israel…, op.cit., p.76. 
135 Shlaim A., Il muro di ferro…, op. cit., pag. 31. 
136 The process that led to the foundation of this organization is showed in Tzahor Z., The Histadrut: From 
Marginal Organization to “State-in-the-Making”, in Reinharz Y. and Shapira A., Essential Papers..., op. cit., pp. 479-
484. 
137 Merhav P., The Israeli Left..., op. cit., pp. 237-240. 
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exercise a strong influence on the majority of society; in a country with no mechanism of absorption 
of immigrants, this organization played a leading role in helping newcomers to settle in. Moreover, 
the relationship between the labor union and its members was based on their fully dependence on 
the system, internalization of its values and the political backing they gave on return138. 
Meanwhile the Yishuv’s political autonomy was built around Knesset-Yisrael (Jewish Assembly), a 
body encompassing all the Jews of Palestine except for those who did not wish to belong. Its 
members elected an Assembly of Representatives, which in turn elected a National Committee 
(Va’ad Leumi) from among its number. Knesset-Yisrael was split between religious and secular, right 
and left, moderates and activists, reflecting the Jewish political blocs present in Palestine.  
In 1929, according to what was established in the Mandate, the Jewish Agency139 was created. It was 
responsible for the management of Jewish immigration, the purchase of Arab lands and the setting 
of the Zionist leadership’s political agenda in Palestine. In addition, the Agency immediately had the 
crucial role to regulate the relations between the Jews living in the Mandate territory and the British 
authority. If, for London was mainly a representative authority, this the institution will become 
responsible for the formation of an embryonic state, according to the Zionist perspective, promoting 
the construction of schools and hospitals. Thanks to the Jewish Agency, the Yishuv succeeded in 
pursuing a semi-independent government experiment, which would prove to be fundamental in 
1948. On the other hand, the same principle was applied towards the Arab community and, already 
in 1922, the Mandate authorities approved also the formation of the Supreme Muslim Council 
(SMC), appointed in order to administrate and to foster the development of Arab political realities. 
An year later, in 1930, Mapai (Mifleget Po’alei EretzYisrael, Party of the Land of Israel’s Workers) came 
to life from the fusion between Ahdut Ha’Avoda140 and HaPo'el HaTza'ir 141embodying the ideology of 
socialist Zionism as conceived by David Ben-Gurion142 (1886-1973). The Mapai's program stated: «A. 
Mapai recognizes that the Labor movement in Eretz Yisrael is united in is historic aim: devotion to the 
establishment of the Jewish people in the land of Israel as a free working people, rooted in all the 
branches of the agricultural and industrial economy and autonomously developing its own Hebrew 
culture [...]. 
                                                          
138 Isaac R. J., Party and politics in Israel ..., op. cit., p.28. 
139 Founded in 1929 by the 16th World Zionist Congress, it was considered the de facto government of a state 
under construction. 
140Zionist Socialist Labor Party in Palestine founded in 1919. It aspired, through organized mass immigration, 
to mold the life of the Jewish people in Ereẓ Yisrael as a commonwealth of free and equal workers living on its 
labor, controlling its property, and arranging its distribution of work, its economy, and its culture 
141 The entire process of unification is well explained in Merhav P., The Israeli Left..., op. cit., pp. 46-56. 
142 His name was David Grün, but he changed it with David Ben-Gurion (the son of the lion) when he arrived 
in Palestine in 1906 from Poland.  
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B. Mapai considers itself to be responsible for pioneering realization in the Zionist movement [...]. 
The party participates in the Zionist Organization and its institutions, in the Socialist International, 
in the Knesset Yisrael (and in the institutions of self-government) as the representative of the Jewish 
workers in Palestine for active and responsible pioneering activity [...]143». 
The party will lead the independence struggle and after the establishment of the state, the 
subsequent government for almost thirty years; Its centrality lied in the ability to direct and control 
governmental activities as well as organize mass support and participation. From the first years of 
its existence it faced the nation-building challenge, gaining legitimacy, compliance and loyalty of the 
population for the new system of government, through a state building process designed to 
penetrate society, in order to regulate behavior in it and draw a larger amount of resources from it144. 
When Ben-Gurion arrived in Palestine, he was profoundly influenced by the ideas of Borochov and 
Gordon and by the activity of the movements Po'alei Tzion and Tze'irei Tzion (then merge into HaPo'el 
HaTza'ir in 1905), which at that time contended the hegemony on socialist Zionist movement in Eretz 
Yisrael145. Ben-Gurion’s Labor Zionism soon abandoned the values most linked to international 
socialism for a kind of nationalism that would have focused on nation-building process, making 
socialist ideology a mere means for realizing the Zionist project. When Mapai was founded, it was 
clear that the objectives of the national struggle had the highest priority on the collectivist project: 
«The identity of our Zionism and our Socialism does not consist of an objective identity, existing out 
of ourselves, in Zionism and in Socialism as such, in an abstract sense; [...] From socialism in general, 
in its abstractness, we can't deduce our activity in Eretz Yisrael. [...] Socialist Zionism means integral, 
full Zionism, completing all the historical content of Israel's national redemption without residues 
and without conditions, without surrenders and without compromises146». 
With the right and center movements lacking political consciousness, the left consolidated around 
an ideology that used socialist imagery; in this way the Labor movement fulfilled the national 
mission with its organizations and with its values. In particular, the cultural project was very 
important and in 1925 Davar, the daily newspaper of Histadrut was published for the first time by 
Berl Katznelson147 (1887-1944), trying also to get the intellectuals involved and to strengthen the 
special relationship between the Labor movement and the young Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
                                                          
143 The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, The Union Conference - speeches and lectures, Archives of 
organizations and institutions Mapai - Labor Party, 2-021-1930-6, 01/05/1930- 01/07/1930, pp. 97-99. 
144 Medding P. offers a detailed explanation of this dynamic in Mapai in Israel: political Organization and Government 
in a New Society, Cambridge England: University Press, 1972, pp 9-13. 
145 Merhav P., The Israeli left..., op. cit., pp. 11-16. 
146 Ben-Gurion D., L’Operaio nel Sionismo (1933), in Bidussa D., Il sionsimo…, op.cit., p. 188-189. 
147 Berl Katznelson born in Belorussia. He was the son of a member of Hovevei Zion and from childhood grew up 
with dreams of aliyah. In addition to his desire to settle in Israel, Katznelson was strongly imbued with the 
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One of the final aim of Ben-Gurion’s vision was to create a “cultured worker148”, a “new Jew”, a model 
pioneer bearing his hoe and rifle; the halutz ethos was powerful, for it presented a young person with 
a concrete mission whose importance was never in doubt. In this cult, a special place was reserved 
for those born and brought up in Palestine, the sabra149, the desert cactus gave its name to this 
generation: its prickly pear has at horny outer skin but sweet and juicy flesh; the sabras were said to 
be direct, honest and brave, free of the hypocritical mannerism of bourgeois society, with strength 
that lay not in words but in deeds. Thus, did the settlers idealize. 
Promoting the pioneer as the ideal type of the Labor movement was part of the multifaceted attempt 
to shape Hebrew society in Palestine into an alternative to bourgeois society, the seeds of an utopian 
society were agricultural settlements matched the deal. This culture had its own symbols and 
clothing fashion highlighted proletarian and collectivist attitudes: the simple blue shirt worn by 
youth movement members, the young women’s safran (dress) and long braid, the Palmach150 fighter’s 
khaki shorts, the kibbutznik’s temble hat. The most preferred leisure activity by kibbutzim were circle 
dances, hora circles usually danced on Shabbat and other Jewish holidays, which provided 
opportunity for applying religious symbols to the new secular world. 
The education system worked to inculcate this ethos and the commitment to the Zionist idea. 
Schools and youth movements took trips to historic sites such as the graves of the Maccabee in 
Modi’in, or to Masada and every trip included explanations of the historical events. The text read in 
these places, the songs sung together, the physical exertion of the walks and the sense of collective 
belonging helped to foster love of the country and its history. This identification with the physical 
Land, its climate and its landscapes coalesced to make the children born in Palestine acquire the 
feeling of being masters of the country.  
In this way Ben-Gurion's political and ideological triumph took place; Mapai reported a strong 
majority in the 1931 elections to the Assembly of Yishuv Representatives (a kind of parliament). Two 
years later, on the occasion of the Eighteenth Zionist Congress, he obtained 44% of the votes for the 
presidency of the WZO; finally, Ben-Gurion was elected president of the Jewish Agency in 1935. In 
                                                          
ideal of physical labor and when he arrived in Israel in 1909, he worked on farms and served on several Labor 
councils. To meet with the health problems of workers, he helped initiate Kuppat Holim, the Sick Fund. 
148Shapira A., Israel…, op.cit., p 136. 
 
150 It was Haganah striking force, it was established on May 19, 1941, due to fears of a German invasion of 
Palestine. The force originally consisted of nine assault companies: three in the northern Galilee, two in central 
Galilee, two in southern Galilee, and one in Jerusalem. The Palmach bases were situated on kibbutzim, so 
members of the Palmach were responsible for their agricultural tasks as well as their military training exercises. 
This social framework created by the Palmach was considered to be the core of the Sabra, or native-born Israeli. 
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this way, he became the dominant political character of the Zionist movement, internationally, but 
especially in the Mandate of Palestine. 
The use of a strong socialist propaganda by the Labor movement and its predominance created an 
increase in tensions with right-wing movements until it came to the creation of a deep political rift 
within the youth leadership. 
 
1.4.3 The struggle for the State and Revisionist Zionism  
  The 1920 represented a watershed in Arab-Jewish relations, for in that year riots broke out 
in many cities, even in places where for decades the two communities had lived together. On April 
4th while the celebrations for Nabi Musa151 and Pesach were taking place, a group of Muslim pilgrims 
coming from Hebron, entered in Jerusalem, shouting for the Arab independence and singing the 
praises for King Faysal; this as the beginning of series of intense violence against the Jewish 
inhabitants of the city152. This episode brought to the exacerbation of the relationships between 
Arabs and Jews in Palestine and giving proof of the need for the Zionist institution to be provided 
of a defense force, increasing the importance of the Haganah and other military groups as HaShomer. 
Also relevant, in order to understand the effect of these clashes on the Zionist movement, was the 
episode of Tel Hai, a small settlement north of Galilee and just below the Golan Heights that enters 
Lebanon, at the border with Syria (the Metulla area). In January of that year, Tel Hai was the only 
Jewish presence in that area along with two other outposts, contrary to Yishuv's institutions 
suggestions153, settlers decided not to evacuate rather resist, until when the settlement was attacked 
and all residents were killed in combat. Among these, there was Joseph Trumpeldor154 who, before 
dying, would have said these words:  «Ein davar, tov lamutbe'aderetzenu155» (there is no doubt, it is good 
to die for our country), becoming the Zionist symbol of the individual will to give his own life for 
the defense of the nation. Thus, it began the myth of Tel Hai and, with also Masada156, became an 
emblem of extreme resistance and patriotic pride. 
                                                          
151 Meaning “Prophet Moses” is the name of a seven-day long religious festival that was celebrated annually by 
Palestinian Muslims, beginning on the Friday before Good Friday, according to the old Orthodox Greek 
calendar. The celebration consisted in  a collective pilgrimage from Jerusalem to what was understood to be 
the Tomb of Moses, near Jericho. 
152 In order to read a detailed account of the events, see Morris B., Vititme..., op. cit., pp.125-128. 
153 Caplan N., Palestine Jewry and the Palestine Question 1917-1935, Frank Cass, 1978, pp. 49-51. 
154 Former Russian Army official lost an arm in the Russian-Japanese War of 1905. 
155 Morris B., Vittime..., op.cit., p.123. 
156 During the Great Revolt of the Jews against the Romans , a group of 960 Jews found refuge there and stayed 
there for three years, until the Roman army marched against Masada with the Tenth Legion and 10,000 Jewish 
slaves. Once it became apparent that the Tenth Legion would soon succeed in breaching the walls, Elazar ben 
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In addition to becoming a central element of Zionist ethos, Tel Hai episode opened a period of 
clashes between Jews and Arabs that would take place between 1920 and 1921; in the same years, an 
important shift took place inside Arab nationalism in Palestine157: from a broader vision, including 
Palestine under the rule of a Great Syria, to more local aspirations158. In this context of growing 
hostility, the ability to self-defense soon became important; the third aliyah (between 1919 and 1923) 
gave an important contribution to the cause, as it brought into the Land of Israel Jews coming mainly 
from Eastern Europe, strongly influenced by socialist and Marxist ideas, which will be the future 
political and military leaders of the Israeli establishment. The great difference between them and the 
previous masses of Polish and Russian Jews emigrating to Palestine was that they chose to emigrate 
as a symbol of generational refusal of the Diaspora Jewry, conceived as archaic and submissive.  
This set of ideals gave rise to a particularly operational and realistic Zionism: it was the movement 
of the Halutzim, the "pioneers": they came to the promised Land, marked above all by the Jewish 
experience of exiles of inability to self-defense, which thus was becoming an unavoidable 
requirement in order to create a Jewish State able to protect and to provide security to the Jewish 
people. For this reason, the Haganah159 born in 1920, whose primary objective was the defense of 
Jewish settlements from Arab attacks; actually, its structure was not homogeneous, indeed, there 
were several units in it, which profoundly disagreed with the main guidelines of the organization: 
moderation and proportionality. So, in 1931 took place the first secession, giving birth to Irgun Zvai 
Leumi160, representing a more aggressive and offensive approach towards Arab and British targets. 
Another wave of violence occurred in 1929 when a pogrom in Hebron and the “crisis of the Wailing 
Wall” occurred. On August 23rd the Jewish community of six hundred people, who for centuries had 
been living in the city, suffered a series of attacks by Arab fellow citizens. The dead were 64, and 
though hundreds of Jews were saved from their Arab neighbors, the shock was so strong that the 
survivors decided to abandon Hebron. This was the end of the secular Jewish presence in that place, 
which would start again after 1967 when the city became a symbol of the Jewish colonization of the 
occupied Palestinian Territories. 
                                                          
Yair, the Zealots’ leader, decided that all the Jewish defenders (men, women and children) should burn the 
fortress and commit suicide. 
157 For a detailed study on the Palestinian nationalism see Muslih M., The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism, 
Columbia University Press, 1988.  
158 Marzano A., Storia…, op.cit., p. 99. 
159 It was the first paramilitary organization in Israel, created to create an independent military force from the 
foreign government. It ceased to exist in 1948. 
160 The National Military Organization was born in 1937 with a strong connotation of the right and will join 
the Revisionist movement by becoming its armed arm. 
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During the same days, Jewish rallies were taking place in the streets of Tel Aviv and by the Kotel161, 
claiming their rights over Temple Mount; the issues of the Holy places had become in the previous 
year one of the strongest symbols for Muslims in order to oppose the Zionist's advancement. Rumors 
spread about the intentions of the Jewish demonstrators to go on Haram al-Sharif162 and the Muslim 
population was incited to attack the Jews and defend the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The clashes were 
widespread all over the city and in other different towns; the British authorities tried to take control 
of the situation but it was hard to handle. After one week of turmoil, thirteen Jews and one hundred 
and sixteen Arabs died, while three hundred and thirty-nine and two hundred and thirty-two people 
(respectively) were wounded163. The result of those events was an increased exacerbation of the 
opposing perceptions and the embitterment of the relationships between the two communities164. 
While Haganah and the Jewish population maintained in general a cautious approach (havlagah, self-
restraint165), Irgun proved to be ready to react and raise the level of the violence. This attitude was 
deeply inspired by the ideas of Vladimir Zeev Jabotinsky166 (1880-1940), who had already founded 
Betar Youth Movement (Brit Trumpledor, Trumpeldor’s Pact), in 1923. From this point, a growing 
activism led him to take over the leadership of the dissident Irgun military organization167. 
One important moment of Jabotinsky’s political career was in 1921, when he joined the Zionist 
Executive 1921 where, from the beginning, he entered in a sharp contrast with Weizmann, being his 
main opponent for all his life. After few years, Jabotinsky resigned from the Executive, because he 
thought that the policies (in particular the acceptance of the White Paper of 1922) pursued by the 
Zionist leadership would have caused the loss of Palestine168; so in 1925 he seceded and established 
                                                          
161 The Kotel ha-Ma'aravi (the Western Wall) is the holiest place in Judaism and it consist in the remains of the 
Western part of the wall of the ancient complex of the Second Temple.  
162  In Arabic means Noble Sanctuary. This place is identified in both Jewish and Islamic tradition as the area 
of Mount Moriah where Abraham offered up his son in sacrifice and where  Prophet Muhammad's night 
journey to heaven had started. 
Today is the second holiest place for Islam, due to the presence of The Dome of the Rock (Qubbat al-Sakhra), a 
shrine encircling the Holy Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque, a former Byzantine basilica. 
163 Morris B., Vittime..., op. cit., p.151. 
164 For an in-depth analysis see Simoni M., At the margins of conflict. Social perspectives on Arabs and Jews in British 
Palestine 1922-1948, Venezia, Cafoscarina, vol. 1, 2010. 
165 Codovini G. ,Storia del conflitto arabo israeliano palestinese…, op. cit., p. 19. 
166 Born in Odessa, Russia, he worked as a journalist and during World War I persuaded the British to form 
Jewish volunteer units within the British Army. 
167 Isaac R. J., Party and politics in Israel ..., op. cit., pp. 36-37. 
168 Shavit Y., Fire and Water: Ze'ev Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement, in Reinharz Y and shapira A., Essential 
Papers..., op. cit., pp. 548-549. 
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the Union of Zionists Revisionists (HaTzohar, Brit HaTzionim HaRevizionistim) which called for the 
immediate establishment of a Jewish State169. 
Revisionism reached popular levels of popular support in the Twenties170 when the Arab clashes and 
British policies began to create a climate of disillusionment in the Yishuv; Jabotinsky used these 
sentiments to form his own movement and in particular the ideology of Revisionist Zionism.  
Basically, the cause of Jabotinsky's controversy with the official Zionist leadership relied in the 
conception of the Jewish state; he traced two fundamental principles that consisted in: the integrity 
of Eretz Yisrael on both sides of the Jordan river171 and the obtaining of a Jewish sovereignty over the 
whole area. His vision of Zionism was maximalist and his most emblematic expression of his vision 
is “The Iron Wall”, an article published in 1923 in the Russian magazine Razsvet.  
His starting point was the acknowledgment of Arab opposition to come to any form of compromise 
with Zionism, arguing how this attitude was understandable:  «Every native population will resist 
to foreign colonists as long as there is hope of being able to free themselves from the danger of foreign 
settlements. This will be the behavior of the Arabs until they have a glimmer of hope to be able to 
prevent Palestine becoming the Land of Israel 172». 
For this reason, it was useless to have false illusions that, in the end, the compromise with the Arabs 
would come because of their satisfaction thanks to the economic progress and wealth brought by 
the Jewish presence. There was no possibility that the local population would have spontaneously 
accepted the aims of the Zionist project173.  
The real question was whether it was possible to reach peaceful ends with peaceful means; the 
possibility of coming to a non-violent situation would have depended on the attitude of the Arabs 
towards Zionism and considering the type of the relations that were being established between the 
two communities, Jabotinsky felt that a voluntary agreement with the Arab side would have been 
impossible to achieve.  
Starting from this assumption, Jabotinsky argued, therefore, that the only approach to keep with 
the Arab question was to build an iron wall of Jewish military power, with this concept, he did not 
intend to say that there was absolutely no possibility to reach an agreement with the Arab neighbors, 
but that such a conclusion couldn’t be achieved in that historical moment, rather that it would have 
                                                          
169 Shindler C., Israel, Likud and the Zionist dream: power, politics and ideology from Begin to Netanyahu, I.B. Tauris, 1995, 
p.11. 
170 The Revisionist movement went to have four delegates in the Fourteenth Zionist Congress in 1925, to a 
quarter of the delegates in 1931 when Weizmann lost the presidency and was replaced by Nahum Sokolow. 
171 He firmly opposed the decision of Winston Churchill of 1921 (then secretary of state for the colonies) to 
give rise to the Trans-Jordanian, removing Palestine from Jordan's left bank. 
172 Shlaim A., Il muro di ferro…, op. cit., p. 36. 
173 The transformation of Arab land in a state with Jewish majority. 
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been attainable in the long-term. The iron wall was a temporary tool suitable for exhausting Arab 
hopes regarding Zionist defeat and persuading Arab nationalists to be more incline towards 
compromise.  
Moderate Zionists criticized these positions and Jabotinsky replied with a second article titled “The 
morality of the iron wall” (1923, Razsvet), in which he simply by affirmed the existence of two 
possibilities: Zionism was a positive phenomenon or a negative one. This question, however, 
required an answer before deciding to become Zionists174. Moreover, accusing the iron wall-method 
of being immoral, for it aimed at the development of Jewish settlements in Palestine against the will 
of local populations, was contradictory, because the logical consequence would have been the total 
surrender of the project of rebuilding the Jewish national home. The unpopularity of the message 
transmitted by Jabotinsky (the majority of Yishuv's population preferred to consider the Arab 
question as secondary or in any case easily resolvable) made impossible for the revisionists to 
concretely defy the supremacy of Labor Zionism. 
 
1.5 Towards the establishment of the State 
 David Ben-Gurion was a pragmatic politician and what distinguished his approach towards 
the Arab question was, first of all, an inflexible realism. His fears increased when he realized that 
the Arab opposition was based on a matter of principle and consisted of a strong rejection of Zionist 
envision; for sure, he was one of the first Zionist leaders to understand the national character of Arab 
revolts, though he felt that the establishment of a national home in Palestine did not have the same 
meaning for Jews and Arabs. While the latter had potentially many other nations in which they 
could live as an independent people, for the Jewish people it was the only place to establish their 
own nation175. So, he, like Jabotinsky, came somehow to consider the conflict with the Arabs as 
inevitable, but the big difference between them was that the Labor leader considered cooperation 
with the British indispensable for Zionist success. 
However, the clash between Jews and Arabs would have become even more radical in the mid-1930s, 
following the great flow of immigrants176who came to Palestine between 1933 and 1936177. Indeed, in 
1936, the Great Arab Revolt took place, which consisted of a series of strikes and a widespread 
                                                          
174 Jabotinsky V., The Iron Wall, Rassivet, November 11th  1923. 
175 Kaplan J., The Zionist movement, vol. I, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Rothberg School for Overseas 
Students, 1983, p. 330. 
176 About 164,000 people arrived in Palestine following the spread of Nazi persecution in Europe. 
177 The local population understood that Yishuv's expansion would have ended up reducing them in their own 
land, for this reason. 
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campaign of civil disobedience against Zionism: the mufti of Jerusalem178 invoked Arab Laborers to 
join a general strike (lasted about six months) to protest against Zionist immigration; whit the time 
passing by, it turned into an uprising against Jewish settlements and an uprising against the British 
administration179. After a wave of random violence against Jewish presence, the Arab Higher 
Committee180 took command and made political demands: cessation of immigration and land sales 
and representational government that would place power on the hands of Arab majority181. 
Following the Arab revolt, the Royal Commission of Inquisition, called the Peel Commission, was 
sent to Palestine in order «to ascertain the causes of the disorders and whether both Arabs and Jews 
had legitimate reasons for discontent and to advise on their removal182». The Commissioner found 
that the two national groups had nothing at all in common and that they were entangled in a bitter 
conflict over the right of ownership. The conclusion was that, in order to satisfy both sides, a 
partition of the country had to take place, in order to establish two independent states, Jewish and 
Arab. According to this plan, the Jews would have gained some 5,000 square kilometers, including 
a large part of Galilee, Yzreel valley, the Mediterranean coast to the present Ashdod. The Arabs 
would have had the Negev, the coastal plain of Ashdod, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This 
territory would be joined to the Trans-Jordanian to form a single Arab state; Bethlehem, Jerusalem 
and the Ramla corridor to Jaffa, would remain an enclave under British control to protect the holy 
places183.Moreover a population exchange184will be realized between Jewish residents in Arab 
territory and Arab inhabitants inside Jewish areas, in order to avoid problems of coexistence185. 
The proposal raised bitter dispute among Zionists ranks186;on one side, the supporters of the 
partition, led by David Ben-Gurion187, who saw the British proposal as a starting point for future 
                                                          
178 Mohammad Amin al-Husayni was the mufti of Jerusalem. This figure was the supreme Sunni Islamic legal 
authority responsible for the proper management of the Islamic holy sites of Jerusalem. 
179 It started in the wake of riots that took place in 1936 and 1939, called The Great Uprising, ending the Arab 
hostile period called The Riots. 
180 During 1936 Great Revolt the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), a loose coalition of recently formed Arab 
political parties, was created in order to manage the protest.  
181 Shapira A., Israel..., op.cit., p. 84. 
182 Morris B., Vittime…, op.cit., p. 179. 
183 The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: an Interactive Database (BETA), Peel Commission Report -1937, p.,383-384, 
(http://database.ecf.org.il). 
184 This move would involve 225.00 Arabs and 1,250 Jews and would provide compensation for all those who 
would be moving. 
185Ibidem, p. 389-390. 
186 The Ara group guided by Hajj al-Amin was against this proposal too. 
187 He is one of the nation's fathers, an exponent of Zionist socialism, and is considered the founder of the 
Israeli Labor Party, having created Mapai. 
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negotiations, which allowed at the same time to fulfill the task assumed by the World Zionist 
Organization: to bring about the birth of the State of Israel188. 
On the other one, for the opponents, made by Jabotinsky’s revisionist group, accepting this division 
would have meant giving up the vision of the historical Land of Israel189: the myth stood in opposition 
to the partitioned state190. Moreover, there was also another group of opponents who based their 
objections not on history but on the rational argument that the partitioned Jewish state would be 
unable to sustain itself and to absorb the masses of immigrants. So, at the Twentieth Zionist 
Congress in 1937, a large majority joined the ranks around a resolution allowing the Zionist 
Executive entering in the negotiations based on the partition plan. Conversely, the High Arab 
Committee191 rejected the partition and in 1937 the clashes resumed.  
British policy was now guided by the need to ensure peace and quiet in the Middle East because 
appeasing Arab populations was part of Britain’s preparation for the approaching conflict in Europe: 
«We are forced to assess the Palestinian problem, especially from the point of view of its effects on 
the international situation [...] If we really have to hurt somebody, better the Jews then the Arabs192». 
London put into effect its new attitude with the publication of Malcom Mc Donald White Paper in 
1939, which stated that immigration would be limited to 75.000 over a period of five years and that 
any further immigration would be conditional up to Arab consent. Palestine would become an 
independent state (with Arab majority) after a ten-year transitional period193. Land sales in most 
regions of the Mandate were restricted. 
The outbreak of World War II in September 1939 changed the Yishuv’s priorities; the struggle against 
the White Pare was replaced by fear of war. Ben-Gurion coined a slogan «We shall fight the war 
against the Hitler as if there was no White Paper and we shall fight the White Paper as if there were 
no war194»expressed the Zionist dilemma. In the end the struggle against the White Paper195 was 
                                                          
188 Hertzberg A., The Zionist idea…, op. cit., p. 587. 
189Israel State Archive, Palestine Royal Commission - Evidence Submitted by Jabotinsky, (ISA-
MandatoryOrganizations-pubBritishMandate-000tynl, Jerusalem, 1/2/1937-31/1/1946). 
190 Isaac R. J., Israel Divided..., op. cit., , p. 32. 
191 It was created by the Grand mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amain al-Husayni in 1936 in order to join the effort of 
the whole Palestinian community during the 1936 Arab revolt. 
192  Neville Chamberlain, in Morris B., Vittime…, op. cit., p.203 
193 It also introduced the “certificatim” system, legal immigration documents granted to a number of people 
decide by London, which effectively curtailed Jewish immigration 
194 The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, Minutes from Meetings (Heb.), Archives of Organizations and 
Institutions Mapai - Labor Party, 2-023-1939-28, 09/11/1939-12/12/1939, pp. 92-114. 
195 Despite the fact that it had been a convergence of efforts between Zionist leadership and British army in 
order to fight against the Nazi invasion of Northern Africa in 1940, the Zionist efforts were also concentrated 
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shelved until better times196 and the Yishuv enlisted itself in the war effort by placing at Britain’s 
disposal its production capacity, human resources and military potential of 25.000 - 28.000 
soldiers197. 
Meanwhile the news that about the Holocaust tragedy arrived to the Zionist leadership, becoming 
a new moral motivation for the establishment of a dwelling place for the Jewish people in Palestine; 
a much more inflexible type of Zionism developed during World War II and the commitment to 
state became even more desperate in the shadow of the Shoah. Thus in 1942 at the Hotel Biltmore in 
New York, an extraordinary Zionist meeting with the presence of some members of the Jewish 
Agency gave birth to the Biltmore Program, which was the first explicit declaration made by the 
Zionist movement about the will to create a sovereign, independent socialist Jewish state, where 
the ingathering of the exiles could be realized198. 
Immediately after the end of the war, the Jewish Agency's executive asked the British government 
to declare Palestine a Jewish state, in line with what the Biltmore Program, but the British 
government didn’t want to grant Zionist’s requests: London became the unique obstacle on the road 
towards independence. Between 1945 and 1948 Zionist leadership fought with all its energies to 
achieve the creation of the Jewish state; Ben- Gurion was the example of the “Zionist warrior”, 
assuming total control of the institutions and, contrasting with Weizmann’s opinion, he decided to 
start an open opposition campaign against British rule, launching an armed struggle: the Hebrew 
revolt, avoided in the previous years, was about to explode. 
Jews that were enlisted in the British Army had been trained and had acquired some familiarity with 
weapons and combat strategies; with the help of Great Britain, the Palmach (Plugot Mahatz, striking 
force), a special department of the Haganah, was founded. The latter had the task to coordinate its 
action with paramilitary groups created by the revisionist movement: Irgun and Lehi199(Lohamei Herut 
Yisrael, Israel's Freedom Fighters). Although these two organizations were much more intransigent 
regarding the relationship with London, the three movements united in the Movement of Jewish 
Revolt200(Tnuat Hameri Ha'ivri), which began to pursue an anti-British strategy by hitting sensitive 
targets. There was a real escalation, which even led to the assassination of an English official and to 
                                                          
on the Aliyah Beth project. It was conceived in order to allow Jewish immigrants and refugees to arrive in 
Palestine clandestinely. Aliyah Beth made it possible to enter12.000 people in the country. 
196 Even the Revisionist activists decided to offer a truce, after their offensive against the British in the 
following of the 1939 White Paper. 
197Morris B., Vittime…, op.cit., p. 213. 
198 The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: an Interactive Database (BETA), Biltmore Conference-1942, 
(http://database.ecf.org.il). 
199 A clandestine organization led by Avraham Stern, from which he took the name “Stern Gang”. 
200 Shlaim A., Il muro di ferro…, op. cit., p. 48. 
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the terror attack (ninty-one victims) at King David Hotel, headquarter of the British Mandate, 
perpetrated by the far more extreme Irgun and Stern Gang. 
On February 14th 1947, the British government, unable to handle the situation and in the wake of a 
wider reorganization of its colonial system, decided to withdraw and end the Mandate in Palestine, 
leaving the newborn United Nations Organization the task to find a solution; the General Assembly 
appointed an ad hoc committee: United Nations Special Committee for Palestine (UNSCOP). The 
committee spent five weeks in the territories of the British Mandate listening to Jewish and British 
officials, visiting the country, and meeting populations. The members found a general difference in 
the way they were welcomed by Jewish communities, compared to Arab distrust and generally they 
found the areas under Yishuv‘s control more developed than the Arab villages characterized by 
underdevelopment. The Jewish community was judged "a state in the making". 
The Partition Plan, contained in Resolution 181, was voted by the General Assembly on November 
28th 1947. The vote was broadcast via radio around the world: the votes were 33 in favor, 13 against 
and 10 abstained, endorsing the partition of Palestine; Arab representatives left the room, uncapable 
to understand how 37% of the population would have obtained 55% of the territory and stated that 
any attempt to enforce the Resolution would trigger a war. 
Meanwhile, all Jews in the Yishuv were glued to their radios and when the result was announced, 
they flooded in the streets, taken by a feeling of spiritual elation; only Ben-Gurion did not take part 
to the celebration, aware of the bloody toll the establishment of the Jewish State would exact:  «I 
couldn’t dance that night. I looked at the other people dancing in happiness and I couldn’t avoid to 
think that war was already there waiting for them201».  
 
1.5.1 Ben-Gurion and the last and the Declaration of Independence  
 The situation rapidly deteriorated after the vote of the General Assembly; on November 30, 
the Arab guerrillas launched military attacks against Jewish targets; the war broke out immediately. 
The first Arab-Israeli war started as a “civil war” in November 1947, between the Yishuv and the 
Palestinian-Arab community and, in May 1948, it was transformed into a conventional war involving 
the newborn State of Israel and other Arab countries (mainly Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq), united 
under the direction of the Arab League202. The Civil War, although presenting moments of 
                                                          
201 Morris B., Vittime…, op.cit., p.243. 
202 An international institution, the Arab League (officially the League of Arab States) was founded in Cairo 
on 22 March 1945. At its creation the Arab League comprised Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, 
Syria, and Yemen. The Arab League proposed strengthening ties between Arab states and coordinating 
regional economic and military policy, while refraining from intervening in any conflict between league 
members. 
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considerable difficulty for the Haganah. The historical reconstruction of these events is not going to 
be showed in these paragraphs because it is not the aim of this analysis and because a thoroughly 
detailed literature already exists, which is able to explain the entire sequence of historical 
occurrences; anyway it is useful for our research to now that this first phase of the war ended with 
the victory of the Jewish military forces and their conquest of important areas that had been assigned 
by the UN Resolution under Palestinian or international control. During the operations, some 
dramatic events took place, giving birth to the Palestinian refugees’ problem: hundreds of thousands 
of Arabs fled or were forced to leave from their homes. 
The unexpected military success gave the strength and the security needed to Ben-Gurion in order 
to make the conclusion of the British Mandate to coincide with the proclamation of the State of 
Israel. Thus, on May 14, 1948, at the Modern Art Museum of Tel Aviv, on May 14th (5 of Yiar according 
to the Jewish calendar), the Hatikva, the hymn of the future Jewish state was sung and David Ben-
Gurion read the Declaration of Independence in front the members of the Moetzet Ha'am (People's 
Council).  
The text of the Declaration of Independence stated:  «[...] On the day when the British mandate ends, 
and (in virtue of) the natural and historical right of the Jewish people in accordance with the 
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, we proclaim the creation of a Jewish state in 
the Land of Israel land, which will be named Medinat Yisrael203». Zionism had come to accomplish its 
highest goal, the State of Israel was born, which would forever change the path of the Jewish history. 
However, Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary: «All the Country is celebrating, joy is profound - and once 
again I am the only one sad among so many cheerful people, like on November 29th 1947204»; the 
threat was the imminent invasion by the Arab states, which would have forced the young state to 
fight the first war of its history. A few days earlier, the Haganah leaders had told Ben-Gurion that, 
along with their opinion, the chances of success were around 50%205. 
«Recently our main and only concern was to defend the Yishuv from the Palestinian Arabs [...] but 
now we are facing ì a completely different situation. The Land of Israel land is surrounded by 
independent Arab states [...] There is a danger: an attack towards the Yishuv by neighboring states 
with their regular armies, with the extent to destroy it 206», so Ben-Gurion transformed Haganah into 
Israeli official army, Tsahal (acronym Tzva Hahagana le Yisrael, Israel Defense Forces)). 
                                                          
203 The Knesset, The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, Official Gazette. n. 1; 5 Iyar 5708, 14-05-1948, 
p. 1 (www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm). 
204 Ben-Gurion, The War of Independence: Ben-Gurion’s Diary, edited by Rivlin G. and Orren E., Israel 
Ministry of Defense Edition, 1982, vol.2, p. 416 as reported in  
205 Shlaim A., Il muro di ferro…, op. cit., p. 58. 
206 Morris B., Vittime…, op.cit., p. 241. 
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Thus, on May 15th  1948, the regular armies of six Arab states invaded the territory of the newborn 
Jewish state; Israel was created in the midst of a war and its first goal in foreign policy was survival. 
Indeed, the purpose of the Arab League was to defeat the new-born state and eliminate its 
presence207. Of course, we have to underlying the difference between the rhetoric of politics and the 
real objectives of the military campaign208 
The contrast between the two factions was very tough; the Arab armies enjoyed numeric advantage 
and a large supply of weapons, but they faced a Zionist movement motivated and resolute more than 
ever: the Holocaust had shown that Jews could count only on their own forces in order to survive 
and that an eventual military defeat would have meant another bloodbath of the Jewish people. 
With the wound of the Shoah still open, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fighters had the motivation 
and the spirit of sacrifice needed, while the rival soldiers were far less motivated because they 
weren’t fighting for their causes, but fought for the homes and the families of someone else209.  
After the conflict, some elements that characterized it would have influenced the collective 
imagination (on both sides), having important political consequences210; the first Arab-Israeli war 
ended with a stunning Israeli victory and a humiliating Arab defeat. Paying a heavy toll in terms of 
human lives, the Israelis were able to defend the new state and extend its borders. The state of Israel 
was a fact and modifying it would be a hard, if not impossible, enterprise:  «the State was presenting 
[...] as a miraculous and revolutionary phenomenon211». 
 
1.5.2 The First Arab-Israeli War: the birth of a narrative 
 The aim of this paragraph is not to present an historical close examination of the complex 
events that led to the birth of the Palestinians refugee problem, nor to provide a complete framework 
of the cultural debate developed around the different versions and opinions formulated by Israeli 
and Palestinian historians. This choice was made for several reasons: first of all, because there is 
                                                          
207 Codovini G. ,Storia del conflitto arabo israeliano palestinese. Tra dialoghi di pace e monologhi di guerra, Bruno 
Mondadori, Milano, 2007, p. 24. 
208 For an in depth- study regarding this issue, see Eppel M., The Arab States and the 1948 War in Palestine: 
The Socio-Political Struggles, the Compelling Nationalist Discourse and the Regional Context of Involvement, 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 48, N. 1, 2012, pp. 1-31. 
209 Shlaim A., Il Muro..., op.cit., p.60. 
210 The Israelis were forced to abandon the Jewish part of East Jerusalem, whose synagogues and cemeteries 
were destroyed; The Israeli parliament was, however, located in West Jerusalem, considered the only state 
capital. The Trans-Jordanian region expanded to occupy the entire western part of the Jordan, or the West 
Bank, and on December 16, 1946, King Jordan Abdallah annotated this area (against the Arab League's opinion) 
and gave the name of Jordan the Hashemite. 
211 Segre V.D., Il Poligono Mediorientale, Fine della questione arabo-israeliana?, Il Mulino, 1994, pp.119-120. 
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already a complete and developed literature about this issue, written and analyzed by outstanding 
scholars and, secondly, because the analysis of the events that took place in 1948-1949 has to be 
functional to this study, which would like to understand how these dramatic events have influenced 
the formation of Israeli national narrative. 
One of the consequence of the first Arab-Israeli conflict was the expulsion of 600,000 Jews were 
expelled from the Arab states involved in the conflict and the exodus of 650,000 Palestinians from 
the territories allocated to the Jewish state according to the Partition Plan; the problem of 
Palestinian refugees was officially born212. After this mass transfer, inside the territory of the Jewish 
state213, according to the boundaries of the armistices214, there were left only 150,000 Arabs: about 
100,000 had found shelter in Lebanon, another 100,000 in Syria, 200,000 in the Gaza Strip occupied 
by Egypt and 350,000 in West Bank215, for a total of four hundred and eighteen villages destroyed216. 
Looking at this numbers we understand why Palestinians refer to this war using the term Nakba, the 
disaster217. 
The numerical data regarding the refugees is one of the main points of controversy218: Israeli 
institutions officially declare 800,000219 exiles, while Palestinians estimate a number ranging from 
900,000 to 1,000,000 people. Besides of the debate regarding the data describing the scope of this 
phenomenon, there is also an harsh opposition about the different interpretations of the dynamics 
and the causes that produced this exodus: if the traditional Israeli historiographic version (for 
example, supported by Efraim Karsh or Shabtai Teveth) claims that the Palestinians voluntarily left 
the place of residence motivated by their leaders to flee in order to allow the Arab League armies to 
fight more effectively, the opposite narrative (mainly Palestinian but also confirmed by some Israeli 
                                                          
212 Codovini G. ,Storia del conflitto arabo israeliano palestinese…, op. cit., p. 26. 
213 Israel State Archives, The State of Israel - War Map, המחלמ תפמ - לארשי תנידמ, ISA-Collections-Maps-
000g5cn, 1/01/1949 - 31/12/1949. 
214 Israel State Archives, Intelligence Services - Armistice Agreements,קשנה תותיבש ימכסה - ןיעידומה יתוריש, ISA-
PMO-PublicDiplomacyMadia-0009lc3, 1/1/1949- 31/12/1952, 
215 The 1949 Armistice Agreements are a groups of armistice accords signed in that same year between Israel 
and the main Arab countries involved in the war (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria). The boundaries 
established are also known the Green Line. 
216 This historical reconstruction was proposed, in particular, by Khalidi W. in his volume All That Remains. The 
Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992. 
217 Kadish A., Myths and Historiography of the 1948 Palestine war revisited: the case of Lydda, Middle East Journal, vol.4, 
n.59, 2005, pp. 617-634. 
218 Depending on the historical reading provided, several authors propose various data: Efraim Karsh 600,000, 
while Pappe (known for his harsh criticism of Israel) 750,000. 
219 Reported by Walter Eytan, General Director of Israel Foreign Ministry, in Marzano A., Storia dei…, op. cit., 
p.124. 
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scholars like Ilan Pappe220) claims that the Zionist leadership conducted a premeditated operation 
of ethnic cleansing, through the adoption of the Dalet Plan221. 
In order to fulfil the aims of this research, an explanation of the historical events is therefore 
required; for this reason, a selection among the different historical interpretations had to be made. 
In this case the reconstruction of the events showed by Benny Morris222 will be adopted as the main 
framework of reference for our analysis. This choice has been made, taking into consideration the 
fact that Morris is an Israeli scholar (allowing to keep a point of view from inside the Israeli 
narrative) but, who is representative of the “New Historians”, a group of researchers who questioned 
some of the founding myths of the state interpreted from Zionist rhetoric223. 
According to his research, the problem of refugees resulted in a number of causes, the most 
significative are: the escape of Palestinian leadership and middle-class, the violence of Israeli military 
operations, the widespread panic among Palestinian population and the massacres accomplished by 
extremist Jewish military forces224. This explanation could emerge only after the opening of the 
Israeli archives in the mid-1980s; the study of this documentation has made it possible to provide a 
structured alternative to the other two rival interpretations since, according to Morris, neither of 
them show exhaustively the reality of the events225. For this reason, the birth of the Palestinian 
refugees should be read as the result of a set of overlapping variables, including: the structural 
weakness of Palestinian society and the propensity of leaders of Yishuv to the idea of the transfer of 
at least part of the Arabs present inside Israeli territory226. 
There were several phases that led to the Arab abandonment of their villages and cities: in a moment 
preceding the invasion of the Arab coalition, the spontaneous escape of Palestinian middle-class 
occurred but, even if this moving away was considered as something temporary in their minds, it 
implied the closure of schools, hospitals, businesses and services, creating chaos and 
                                                          
220 Among his works, Pappe I., The 1948 ethnic cleansing of Palestine, One World Publications, 2006, The Modern 
History Palestine, One Land, Two Peoples. 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2006. and The Israel/Palestine 
Question, 2nd Edition, Routledge, 2006. 
221 The objective of this plan was to gain control of the Jewish areas attributed by the UN divisions to the 
future state of Israel and to create a solid and continuous basis for Jewish sovereignty. 
222 His major work, dedicated to this issue is: Morris B., The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, 
Cambridge University Press, 1987.  
223 Caplan N., The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Contested Histories, John Wiley & Sons, 2011, pp. 232-233. 
224 The best known was the massacre of Derir Yassin (April 9, 1948) completed by Lehi and condemned by the 
Haganah, in which about 110 people died. For further detailed studies, Pappe I., La pulizia etnica della Palestina,Fazi 
Editore, 2008, pp.112-159. 
225 Morris B., Vittime…, op. cit., p. 320. 
226 Shavit A., Interview with Benny Morris: Survival of the fittest, Ha'aretz, January 8th 2004. 
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impoverishment. In this way Arab-Israeli hostilities were only an aspect of the Palestinian collapse; 
this was in fact the background in which, in a second phase, mass breakaways were caused by Israeli 
military operations: the army attacks and the fear they provoked were another main reason for this 
exodus. There was even an "escape psychosis" caused by the reports about the massacres and 
reprisals that were accomplished by the most aggressive and extremist elements of Jewish 
paramilitary organizations. But in the last phase of the war, updates regarding the difficult 
conditions of the refugees, instilled the firm will to stay in the Palestinians, putting an end to the 
spontaneous evacuations. 
The IDF strategic plans, in particular the Dalet Plan, directly contributed to the emergence of the 
Palestinian refugee problem, even though these operations were not politically directed to the 
expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs and when the evacuation of villages were forced by the soldiers, 
they were determined by «a peculiarity of factors and a complexity of the situation, which does not, 
however, make the Israelis innocent227». The real intentions of the Dalet Plan have been widely 
discussed, without coming to a satisfactory conclusion, fixing to very different opinions about its 
nature: on the one hand it could be understood as a simple tactical and military plan, on the other 
hand228 it is seen as a true “expulsion strategy”. 
In spite of everything, we can't talk about a systematic transfer policy (which was never even 
discussed by leadership of the newborn state), but rather we have to consider the cumulative effect 
of the factors shown before, which caused the Palestinian population’s exodus229. 
The traditional Zionist version depicts the war of 1948 as a struggle between the powerful Arab 
opponent and the tiny Israel, an unprecedented struggle between Jewish David and Arab Goliath, 
in which the former fought in a heroic and desperate battle for survival, which claimed the life of 
6,000 Israelis230 (1% of the population of the time231). This version of the Independence War was 
fundamental to the nation-building process in Israel. This interpretation of what happened in 1948 
                                                          
227 Codovini G. ,Storia del conflitto arabo israeliano palestinese…, op. cit., p. 186. 
228 The attempt to de-structure Israeli narratives regarding the state's foundation period is the instrument by 
which Palestinian historians have sought to bring attention to the expulsion of refugees. The scholar Walid 
Khalib not only anticipated the thesis of the new historians, but also inaugurated the argument for which the 
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1999, p.84. 
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is a «popular and moralistic version [...] still taught in schools in Israel. This is a first example of the 
use of a nationalist interpretation of history in the national building process232».  
Israeli civil religion233 was born from the creation of a narrative told in order to consecrate different 
historical events, producing a political contract in order to bolster the creation of a nation and to 
spread, among Israelis, the feeling to belong to the same history: the 1948 war is included in this 
symbolic set of founding myths. 
In this process, however, the different opinions are emerged: the “new historians” are Israeli scholars 
that, thanks to the opening of the Israeli archives (which took place in the 1980s), researches and 
surveys and testimonies have reconsidered the knots of Israeli civil religion and its set of myths 
(especially that of the foundation of the state234). These historians began to demolish the official 
Zionist rhetoric, according to which the Palestinians fled spontaneously; due to this historical 
interpretation, they accuse Israel speaking about “original sin235”. The aim of the new historiography 
is to de-construct Israeli identity standards, composed by symbols, icons, places and dates to show 
how it is the result of an artificial political construction, characterized by the invention of a 
tradition. 
Criticism towards Zionist narrative is not peacefully accepted, since for a state seeking legitimacy 
since its birth, such reproach has tremendous consequences; for the sake of this analysis, it is 
interesting to examine how the dramatic 1948 events have influenced the Israeli cultural process. 
The foundation of the state was a moment of great importance for the development of the Israeli 
civil religion which, through the canonization of the events, produced a political pact, bonding the 
nation and legitimizing the state in which Zionism achieved its highest fulfillment. In this context, 
it is understandable why the “new historians” are also referred to as “post-Zionists” because, by 
contrast, the Zionist character of State is secondary for them, while it is even more important to 
stress another of the Zionist aims, that was: normalization236. Herzl’s movement proposed to solve 
the “Jewish problem” through the creation of a Jewish State because, first of all, it would have 
                                                          
232 Shlaim A. in Codovini G., Geopolitica del conflitto arabo israeliano palestinese. Spazi, fattori e culture, Bruno 
Mondadori, Milano, 2009, p. 252. 
233 A set of believes, similar to a traditional religion (in the sense that it organizes a system of meanings through 
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power. His goal is to sanctify the society to which it belonged. 
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constitution of the Jewish state; from the nature of the conflicts of 1967 and 1982, to the Israeli responsibilities 
of the missed peace agreements. 
235 Ibidem, p. 245. 
236 Liebman C. S. and Don-Yehiya E., Civil religion in Israel, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983, p. 26. 
  
57 
allowed the Jews, viewed as different and irreconcilable elements with the majority of the 
population, to be considered as a nation among the family of nations, like anyone else237. 
Ben-Gurion had another project in his mind: the creation of a cultural paradigm in order to unify 
society on the basis of a common identity expressed by a powerful civil religion. The “sanctification” 
of Israeli State would have provided the ideological strength needed in order to accomplish the 
nation-building process that was about to start. 
 
  
                                                          
237 Barnavi E., Storia di Israele dalla nascita dello stato al’assassinio di Rabin, Bompiani, Milano, 2001, p.237. 
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Chapter 2. IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL APOGEE OF 
MAPAI, YEARS OF CONSOLIDATION (1948-1973) 
 
 With the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Labor elite (in particular Mapai238) was 
considered the winner, as the national project was finally realized. For this reason, the party that 
represented the founders of the State benefited from a long period of great and unbeaten electoral 
support, mainly due to a high degree of institutional penetration and almost complete ideological 
domination. The presence of Mapai in all the major aspects of Israelis’ lives through the Histadrut, 
along with the constant threat of conflict with the Arab neighbors, made it possible to merge the 
ideological objectives of the party with what was perceived as the national interest239. The party's 
success became so closely related to that of the state that political opposition was almost seen as 
an attack against the country itself. 
A fundamental part of the nation-building program envisaged by the Labor leadership included 
Mapai's ideological shift from socialism to nationalism, or according to Ben-Gurion's version, to 
statism or mamlachtiut. In this chapter we will see how the party, from the apogee of its political 
and ideological dominance, found itself, before the Yom Kippur War broke out, in a position of 
weakness and increasing loss of influence. The abandonment of the ideological principles that 
characterized the period of the struggle for the foundation of Israel, together with the occurrence 
of significant historical events and profound changes of Israeli society, will lead to the slow decline 
of Labor-based hegemony that will end with the electoral defeat in 1977 and the birth of a new 
ideological and political power: the Likud. 
 
2.1 Ben-Gurion's national project 
 Although the creation of the State had been accomplished, a lot of work still had to be done 
in order to make Israel a strong and a safe country, able to welcome the waves of immigration which 
were pouring into its borders. Ben-Gurion had clear in his mind the path which had to be taken. 
According to his opinion, the “Jewish revolution240” was much more difficult than the other 
revolutions of history, as it was not only directed against the system, but it had even to create a 
new one; the Jewish people had to become masters of their own destiny and it could be realized 
through a creative process that represented the antithesis of the Galut.  
                                                          
238 Mapai (Mifleget Poalei Eretz Yisrael—The Workers Party of the Land of Israel) was established in 1930 as a 
result of the union of two parties: Ahdut Ha’Avoda and HaPo'el HaTza'ir. Throughout its existence, Mapai was the 
largest, strongest and most dominant party on the political scene. See, chapter 1, page 27. 
239 Lockery N., The Israeli Labor Party in the shadow of the Likud, Ithaca Press, 2007, p. 10. 
240 Herzberg A., The Zionist idea…, op. cit., p. 609. 
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The latter symbolized the material, political, spiritual, and cultural dependence, while the Zionist 
task was to break radically with this dependency, creating with its own efforts the necessary 
conditions for a future as an independent and free people. This was the core of this revolutionary 
thought. «[...] The conquest of Labor and land, self-defense, the development of the Hebrew 
language and its culture, freedom for the individuals, cooperation and social responsibility, 
preparation for further immigrants and the merger of the various Diaspora in one single Nation 
[...]241 ». According to the vision of the leader these were the means by which the State would have 
been built. In particular, he emphasized the role of a strong political culture, the task of absorbing 
new immigrants and maintaining the security status-quo, needed for Israel's survival242. 
 
2.1.1 The creative cultural project: civil religion and mamlachtiut 
 David Ben-Gurion saw the challenge of cultural creativity as an integral part of the national 
project, which was to be able to incorporate the event of the foundation of the State into Jewish 
historical tradition. So, various cultural activities began to be institutionalized, whose aim was to 
revive Jewish culture and to “popularize243” its traditions. For example, in establishing Israel's 
official calendar, all major Jewish holydays were included, such as Sukkot244, Yom Kippur245 and 
Pesach246; while Shabbat was established as the weekly official rest day (although every religion is 
allowed to observe its own). There were other events alongside them that were meant to underline 
a more national and secular character of the Israeli collective identity, just think about the 
Independence Day (Yom HaTzmaut) and the Memorial Day for the Fallen Soldiers of Israel and 
Victims of Terrorism (Yom Hazikaron l'Chalalei Ma'arachot Yisrael ul'Nifge'ei Pe'ulot Ha'eivah). 
All these moments are part of a narrative that creates a kind of “landscape of memory247”, which 
gives a social character to the national myth and to commemoration, facilitating the citizens to 
confer them an emotional relevance.  
                                                          
241 Ibidem, p. 613. 
242 Gorny Y., The “Melting Pot” in Zionist Thought, Israel Studies, vol. 6, n. 3, Autumn 2001. 
243 Eisenstadt S., Israeli Society, New York, Basic Books, 1967, p., 369. 
244 It is the Feast of Tabernacles and remembers the life of the People of Israel in the desert on their journey to 
the Promised Land. 
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247 Bilu Y. and Witztum E., War-Related Loss and Suffering in Israeli Society: An Historical Perspective, Israel Studies, 
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60 
Another fascinating aspect was the habit that the newcomers had to change their name: since 
immigration to Eretz Yisrael symbolized a rebirth so, who made this step converted his name into 
one which created a deep connection with the Land of Israel. Many of the new immigrants, 
especially the youngest, took part in this symbolic process by adopting a name that seemed to be 
more appropriate to the place they lived in. In this way it was attempted to eliminate the old 
diasporic identity and to build a connection with the nascent Israeli society. This was part of the 
wider project of “secular Judaization”.  
Pertinent to the Israeli civil religion formation process was also the decision to introduce in state 
schools the teaching of Jewish tradition, read in a secular and nationalist key; the purpose was to 
prevent the new generations of Israelis from growing up losing their contact with a specific 
cultural dimension. The question was whether it was possible to teach the content of religion 
without teaching the religion itself. In the schools, the study of the Bible was proposed and 
integrated within a modern pedagogical scheme which was able to impart the historical heritage.  
It was attempted to bring the essence of Judaism back to the messianic element of tradition in 
order to create an Israeli culture that contained elements of continuity and change. This task was 
critical, also because in some ways the traditional religion opposed the state’s symbolic system and 
therefore “competed” for the absolute loyalty of the people. 
It was particularly important for the cultural absorption of the masses coming from Arab countries: 
their attachment to tradition was seen as an impediment to their re-education in the spirit of new 
national culture. Mapai wanted to institutionalize its authority by integrating new immigrants and 
providing them with an aggregating cultural element which could be an easier tool for their 
interpretation of Zionist civil religion248. 
So, Ben-Gurion made the effort to articulate a new ideology that could united the country under 
the symbols of Statism (mamlachtiut) with the aims to convince large sections of Israeli society to 
adhere to it, to diminish the internal ideological and religious conflict, especially by co-opting the 
more conservative parties. In this way Mapai gained the opportunity to set the most favorable 
conditions for a relatively quiet political environment, in which was possible to build large 
government coalitions, engaging also those parties with very distant ideologies, in order to obtain 
a strong and extensive popular support: this strategy explains the historical pact that the prime 
minister made with the Mafdal (Miflaga Datit Leumi, National Religious Party 249), including it in any 
governmental coalition formed by the Labor Party until 1977. The main reason for this political 
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appeasement was not a question of obtaining more seats in the Knesset, but to avoid the eruption 
of a Kulturkampf with the most religious segments within the society. 
 
2.1.2 The Ingathering of the exiles 
 Israel is a unique socio-demographic laboratory: from 1948 to 2005, the people immigrated 
in Israel were up to 2,993,007250, this number demonstrates Ben-Gurion's success in configuring 
Israel as a state based on immigration. It was mainly during the first three years of the state’s life 
that the phenomenon known as “mass aliyah” or the “big aliyah” took place, contributing mostly to 
the achievement of that number of new-comers. The management of mass immigration was a hard 
challenge undertaken by the state becoming, sometimes, an example of lack of consideration for 
human needs, rather giving priority to the benefits for the community and not to the living-
conditions of individuals. Fundamentally, it was believed that the power of ideology would have 
molded a new human being and a new nation but very soon, both the Israeli society and 
establishment became aware that it wasn't able to absorb immigrants without losing the founding 
ideals, due to the fact that mass immigration was one of the major causes of social change251.  
During the struggle for illegal immigration, the main Zionist slogan was “free immigration”, but 
suddenly it became clear that despite high expectations and rhetoric, no one was really prepared 
for the tremendous mass of human beings who were going to arrive into the country. The fact that 
the population had doubled so quickly obliged the government to impose austerity, harder than 
the one applied by European countries during post-war reconstruction252: the situation was 
aggravated by the absence of monetary reserves and of a primary industry, as well as inadequate 
agricultural production. The high rates of immigration were mainly justified by the difficult 
situation that many Jewish communities throughout the Middle East were living; indeed, the 
relations between Muslims and Jews had been compromised following the foundation of the 
Jewish State (and the First Arab-Israeli War in 1948). In order to secure those Middle Eastern 
communities, the new-born state decided to carry out operations that could have allowed those 
Jews to come in Israel: for example, the so-called “Magic Carpet253”, which made possible the 
transfer of the entire local Yemeni Jewish community. 
The problem that these immigrants were arriving in Israel without the certainty to be provided 
with house and work; this precarious situation transformed their entry into the country in a 
traumatic experience. The government tried to solve these problems at the best of its possibilities: 
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for example, the lack of housing was partially resolved by setting new arrivals in Arab villages 
remained without its inhabitants after the 1948 clashes, or by creating new urban centers in the 
areas of the country still uninhabited. But the truth was that although the Israeli government was 
trying to organize such processes, actually it had limited control over migrations, due to the fact 
that unexpected political situations provoked the immigration of hundreds of thousands of people, 
whom the Jewish state could not turn its back to. Ben-Gurion, from his point of view, did his best 
to reject any statement that portrayed Israel as limited in its absorption capability: «We cannot 
put any restrictions on immigration. The State of Israel was born to provide, as it is their right, a 
house for these people254». 
So, they created the ma'abarot, refugee absorption camps where immigrants were placed before 
being sent to their permanent residence; the problem was that, outside these places, there was no 
place to move them and so in a short time the situation became intolerable. But for the newcomers 
the hardest impacts to deal with were: the unfamiliarity with the Israeli bureaucracy, whose 
language was not understood by the newcomers and their difficult to get used to physical Labor, 
considered degrading for their homeland culture. The Zionist model was clashing with the reality 
that was emerging:  the melting pot within different diasporas (mizug galuyyot), which was 
supposed to create a typical national character, appeared to be more difficult to realize than 
expected. This hypothesis of ingathering the exiles (kibbutz galuyyot) had to be compared with the 
concreteness of immigration processes; the reasons that motivated the decision to do aliyah were 
different for each group of immigrants and this motivational factor appeared to be the most crucial 
one in determining the construction of Israeli collective identity.  
At the end of the day, the most important variable influencing the pace of immigration to Israel was 
more often the negative situation in the countries of origin than the attraction exerted by Israel's 
quality of life or by Zionist ideology. So, the great migratory flux that seemed to emphasize the 
rhetoric of the “ingathering of the exiles255” was only partially true. Indeed, the Zionist axiom were 
turned up side den: Jewish immigrants did not emigrate in order to “ascend” to Zion, rather to 
improve their living conditions. The gap between the ideological dimension of the Zionist project 
and the reality of Israeli facts was demonstrated by this mechanism. Coming back to Zion, in its 
original meaning, postulated the acquisition of political and moral maturity that would make Israel 
the elective homeland of all Jews. Moreover, “Israeliness” had to become the character of a common 
Jewish identity, a vehicle of homogenization. However, this did not happen, since immigrants, even 
once fully integrated into the new country, continued to cultivate their originating unique identity. 
Breaking this attitude was difficult, because the model of the melting-pot, envisioned by Ben-Gurion 
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and the ingathering of Jewish communities dispersed all over the world in the Land of Israel. 
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had as a reference point the sabra, educated by the ethos of Labor Zionism and committed to the 
collectivist ideal of Kibbutz. But this image described only a small minority of the Israeli population 
of that period, whose cultural influence was, despite the numbers, enormous. The fascination of this 
experience is strong still today, but it remains proportionally inversed to its diffusion among Israeli 
society, which had radically transformed. 
  
2.1.3 Borders instability: prioritization of security issues and state 
consolidation 
 One of prime minister's priorities was to ensure Israel's security, in this case the concept 
was not confined to a military point of view, but extended to the economic, political and social 
spheres. Ben-Gurion, aware of the precarious conditions in which the country was subjected256, 
pursued an extremely cautious politics, at the same time characterized by aggressive rhetoric 
aimed at achieving certain economic and cultural standards that would allow national 
development. «Israel can't have security without immigration [ ...] Security means the settlement 
of the population in the empty Northern and Southern areas, the dispersion of the inhabitants, the 
creation of industries throughout the country, the development of agriculture and growth of the 
economy will free our people from the foreign economic dependency. It has always been my deep 
conviction that these advances are imperative to our survival257». 
This perception was one of the causes that the Armistice of Rhodes258, it was never transformed 
into real peace agreements which left only a temporary arrangement to make Israelis' lives difficult 
without actually getting into the war. An example of this behavior was the economic boycott 
implemented by the Arab League259.Arab-Israeli relations between 1949 and 1956 were 
characterized by a low and incessant conflict, involving various areas of relations with the state of 
Israel. But no doubt, the most problematic expression of these hostilities was the attrition along 
the borders after the war of 1948; this situation dictated three basic necessities260 to the Israeli 
government: “settling the land”, ensuring security along the borders, breaking the Arab “political 
and economic siege”. 
The most grueling areas of Israel were a particular prerogative of Ben-Gurion, who conceived the 
population of such territories as the essential prerequisite for Israel's survival. Of course, this type 
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of settlement was not carried out for economic reasons, but for security reasons: the creation of 
agricultural communities on the border would have increased boundaries’ patrolling and defensive 
reinforcement. This project was tested by the several skirmishes, which between 1950 and 1953 
involved the members of those establishments, the population in those areas and Palestinians 
refugees261, who from the neighboring countries, tried to go back to their previous homes and 
recover some of their belongings; this situation brought to human losses on both sides, material 
damages262  and great discomfort 263.  
It should also be considered that these circumstances, together with the perception of a military 
equilibrium in favor of hostile armies, contributed to increase the sense of insecurity among Israelis.  
This perception was based on the certainty that military superiority corresponded with the ability 
to mobilize as many soldiers as possible and, referring to a numerical comparison, Israel had no 
chance. In order to obviate this weak spot, Moshe Dayan264(1915-1981) gave the greatest 
contribution in order to improve IDF efficiency; assuming that the amount of available troops could 
not have been significantly increased in order to compete numerically with the opposing armies' 
superiority, he decided to fully exploit technology and organizational capacities in order to 
rebalance this disadvantage. As a result of this very tense situation, an open military confrontation 
with Egypt broke out in 1956. 
 
2.2 Mapai between foreign policy settings and internal divisions 
 Alongside the need to stabilize the security dimension, the government had to deal with 
some internal political considerations that directly affected the decision-making process regarding 
foreign and defense policy. The main players in the Israeli political scenario were the dominant Mapai 
and the opposition represented by the right party Herut265 and Mapam266; both formations were 
backed by growing public discontent that called for a firmer   response to Arab provocations, 
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criticized the government for have failed to ensure effective protection to Israelis. Ben-Gurion 
became the personification of this militant-nationalistic state of mind and was the undisputed 
leader of the school of activism in foreign policy, giving predominance to military actions and putting 
aside the slow diplomatic mechanism. On the other hand, the vision represented by Moshe Sharett 
(1894-1965)267 was guided by a more cautious disposition.  
In those days, the central theme of the debate between these two factions of the Labor camp was 
the military reprisals that took place along the borders of the new-born state; daily security issues 
prompted regular discussions within the government that was regularly split between moderates 
and activists, so decisions were taken with a narrow majority, or reflecting the difficult compromise 
between the two visions268. In this troubled spirit , the exhausted Ben-Gurion expressed his desire to withdraw temporarily from politics 
269, leaving Sharett the post for Prime Minister. The new premier found himself with the difficult 
task to keep the party cohesive, to lead the government and the country; In addition, the way Ben-
Gurion resigned weakened the government and the authority of his successor. Indeed, before 
retiring, he used all his political power not only to appoint Pinhas Lavon as Minister of Defense, but 
also to appoint Moshe Dayan as Chief of Staff and to promote Shimon Peres as General Director of 
the Ministry of Defense. Indeed, the outgoing prime minister wanted to rely on this trio in order to 
continue the “iron wall”, defensive approach he built and to contrast Sharett's appeasement, the man 
who was chosen by the party as his successor (contrary to his opinion)270,.  
It was no coincidence that he chose these three personalities who shared the firm support for 
advocates of active defense policy, promoted by Ben-Gurion. Lavon's nomination was a direct 
attempt to undermine Sharett's premiership; the minister soon assumed a hawkish behavior, 
becoming a socialist thinker in Ben-Gurion's faithful realpolitik disciple. Dayan belonged to a new 
generation of tenacious commanders born on the national soil, while the three previous heads of the 
armed forces were politically independent, he was an active member of Mapai, with a reputation as 
a lover of political intrigue271. He also showed total loyalty to his mentor, and after his retirement, 
along with Peres, he used to regularly visit the old boss to inform him of current issues and to have 
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his advice. His appointment as chief of staff was a milestone in the development of Israel's military 
doctrine272, whose pivotal element was the retaliation approach.  
Erroneously, Sharett was considered a weak, hesitant, lenient politician of Ben-Gurion and 
completely obscured by the latter, in fact he was an independent and original thinker as far as the 
question of Israel's security was concerned. As far as the difference between personality and 
character was concerned, there was no doubt that there was enormous diversity between them, 
Sharett himself admitted: «There has always been an incompatibility of character between us; I'm 
calm, discreet and cautious, Ben-Gurion is impulsive, impetuous, and acts according to his intuition. 
The term that distinguishes myself is caution, Ben-Gurion's one is courage273». But despite their 
incompatibility of character, they worked side by side for two decades (as prime minister and 
minister of foreign affairs) and they can even argue that they complement each other. It was since 
1953 that under the impact of the deterioration of the security level, their political differences 
became more pronounced and their personal relations became tense and difficult, resulting in the 
tragic break in 1956. 
The main point of divergence between the two politicians was a different conception of the Arab 
world: Ben-Gurion had little knowledge of Arabic culture and history and no sympathy for the 
neighboring populations; in general, his image of the Arab neighbors was that of a primitive, fierce 
fanatic enemy who exclusively understood the language of force, constantly emphasizing the 
extraneousness, the profound gap between “us” and “them”. Sharett, however, who lived part of his 
childhood in an Arabic village, spoke his language correctly and knew culture and politics well; 
having many Arab friends kept in touch with them and was able to win their trust, both politically 
and socially. 
As for the general terms regarding an agreement with former Arab states, there was no real difference 
between the two politicians; both believed that an agreement should have been based on the status 
quo. Like Ben-Gurion, Sharett was unwilling to bring most of the Palestinian refugees back in 1948 
or to surrender large portions of territory. Unlike Ben-Gurion, however, he attached great 
importance to patient, creative diplomacy and a conciliatory language that would reduce Arab 
hostility. Another important partition was the attitude towards the external factor: a key principle 
of Ben-Gurion's political credo was confidence in oneself, nourishing a deep belief in the Jewish 
people's ability to remodel their destiny to the Middle East through the direct action and the 
realization of factual situations: «Our destiny does not depend on what the Gentiles say but from 
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what the Jews do 274»; Sharett acknowledged that the United Nations played an irreducible role in 
the creation of the State of Israel and was in favor of making the institution a wider task also in 
regulating the Arab-Israeli conflict. He believed that international public opinion influenced Israel's 
security and that it was therefore a factor to be taken into account in due consideration.  
What Sharett did during his premiership was to try to create an alternative foreign policy that did 
not create the idea of a besieged fortress, but its starting point was to try to reduce the barriers that 
separated Israel from its regional context. This project was largely obstructed by the refusal of the 
minister of defense to accept prime minister's authority on defense issues; Lavon did not regularly 
know the government of army operations along the borders and his relations were often partial and 
inexact. Since 1954, the prime ministerhas started to convene a committee of major Mapai ministers 
to discuss defense and foreign affairs issues; The members were Moshe Sharett, Pinhas Lavon, Golda 
Meir and Haram. In this way, the Cabinet could control the work of the defense minister and avoid 
direct confrontation with the latter within the ruling coalition: the prime minister feared that a coup 
d'état with Lavon would split the party, creating the conditions for a return to Ben-Gurion. 
Relationships with the latter became progressively tense and difficult, causing profound frustration 
and mental anguish in Sharett; the old leader had come back to assert his inflexible foreign policy 
line, maintaining an apparent formal subordination to the premier. 
The results of the elections of June 20th 1955 showed the Mapai losing 5 of its 45 seats, compared to 
the previous Knesset and Herut, the main opposition party, increasing from 8 to 15 seats275, becoming 
the second largest party after Mapai. It was broadly widespread that the premier's moderate line had 
contributed to the party's poor electoral outcome. After the test of the urns, there was an attempt 
within the party to replace the prime minister with Ben-Gurion and to redeem the issue a large party 
congress was called to clarify the roles and formulate a clear position in foreign policy. Sharett was 
furious because he did not believe he had failed in his duties and therefore did not think he had to 
leave his place to a better man. Foreign policy was at the center of the agenda of Mapai Central 
Committee on August 8th 1955276; when it ended, the Prime Minister remained formally head of 
government until his rival succeeded in creating another coalition in 1955277. During this long period 
of time, his office was intolerable from the intensification of the conflict between the two factions: 
activists and moderators. Sharett was exhausted in trying to contain Ben-Gurion and his officers, 
and when he began to adhere to the idea of undertaking a preventive campaign against Egypt, 
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Sharett decided to resign from his rival: his premiership was over and soon the Suez Crisis will have 
broken out278 in 1956. 
 
2.2.1 Ben-Gurion's resignation and the Lavon Affair 
 The Sinai campaign against Egypt deepened the hatred between Israel and the Arab world 
without leading to that long-awaited strategic improvement of the Jewish state 's security 
conditions. One of the direct consequences of this confrontation was the rise of Ben-Gurion's 
political prestige, which became undisputed leader on foreign affairs and defense policies. His power 
was so great that his coalition partners used to joke by saying "he only presented to the government 
proposals where he wanted to be defeated279".  
Between 1957 and 1963 the Prime Minister enjoyed a quasi-undisputed political and political 
monopoly; This was also possible thanks to the fact that he was accompanied by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs by Golda Meir, who being a follower of Ben-Gurion was guided in all the most 
delicate issues. 
As the years passed, the Prime Minister became increasingly irritable and inflexible, adopting a 
personalistic and eccentric decision-making style so as to counteract his party colleagues, even with 
the faithful Golda. Some years later, in 1961, evidence emerged that Colonel Benjiamin Gibli had 
falsified some documents to attribute to Pinhas Lavon the responsibility of the Egyptian 
operation280, this episode became known as the “Esek HaBish281” (the mishap). Lavon, then defense 
minister, repeatedly expressed his innocence, asking Ben-Gurion to rehabilitate his name but the 
leader replied that “he could not do it because he was not a judge 282”.  
In 1960 a special government commission was appointed to shed light on the events and finally it 
was discovered that Lavon did not actually order to do so. The issue continued to plummet for years 
by tearing up the Mapai and putting Ben-Gurion's weak faculties into the toughest test; the fact was 
that the incident had been the pretext for starting the struggle for succession to the old boss: on the 
one hand there were the zeirim, the young (like Dayan and Peres, faithful to Ben-Gurion) on the other, 
the vats, or party veterans (Meir, Eshkol and Sapir, joint front with Isser Harel, head of the Mossad), 
part of Gush, the party's institutional machine. These dynamics demonstrates how in those years the 
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internal politics began to become closely linked to foreign and defense policy, mutually influencing 
each other. 
Finally, with an ad that surprised everyone, Ben-Gurion submitted his resignation on June 16th 1963. 
However, his decision seemed whimsical and suddenly preceded (and somehow announced) by a 
long process of splitting and deteriorating, of which the Lavon Affair was the inaugural event. Ben-
Gurion was a tired and disillusioned man; although in 1963 Israel was safer than it was in 1948, the 
leader became subject to enormous and irrational doubts over the long-term destiny and survival of 
a famous country. The government then passed into the hands of the old guard of Mapai, led by Levi 
Eshkol. 
He was the unanimous candidate for the old leader, both as leader of Mapai, and as Prime Minister. 
The premier also assumed the role of defense minister, demonstrating that he had learned well from 
his mentor how to handle defense affairs. In fact, Levi Eshkol increased Tsahal's deterrent ability and 
if the army arrived so well prepared for the 1967 conflict, the merit was largely her. Even though the 
Prime Minister immediately stated he wanted to maintain some continuity with the policies 
previously pursued, his rise to power made it clear that he could gradually take on Sharett's trend 
in foreign policy. 
 
2.2.2 Levi Eshkol's Ma'arach versus Ben-Gurion's Rafi: the split inside the 
Labor camp  
 Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the prime minister promoted the birth of Ma'arach 
(Ha'ma'arach le'Ahdut Po'alei Yisrael), derived from the merger of Mapai and Ahdut Ha'avodah; this union 
was part of a series of maneuvers for the conquest of power in the struggle between the zeirim of Ben-
Gurion and the victorious supporters of the premier. The entry of a new party into training could 
counterbalance these tensions by offending a group of young leaders who had important military 
experiences such as Yisrael Galili and Yigal Allon. Ben-Gurion strongly opposed the idea of creating 
a unique list with Ahdut Ha'Avoda because there were profound ideological differences with leader 
Yitzhak Tabenkin283 (1888-1977), further more leftist than the pragmatic Mapai284.  
This political move provided Ben-Gurion's pretext to complicate the life of his successor, pulling 
back the Lavon affair again, trying to discredit Eshkol, accusing him of having decided to reinstate 
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the former defense minister without having had the consensus from the party285. Whatever the 
motivation for this behavior, he changed his attitudes towards his ally by demonstrating an 
unprecedented treasure, even accusing him of weakening the country's security and trying to openly 
resign. 
After the failure of his attempt, in 1965 a scission took place inside the Labor camp with the creation, 
of a new party, Rafi (Reshimat Poalei Yisrael, The Israeli Workers List); Dayan and Peres resigned from 
their posts and joined the new party formation. From an ideological point of view, this group was 
not differentiated for a clear difference, but rather had a close proximity to Ben-Gurion's 
technocratic style, compared to the conservative tendencies of Gush286; the “young guard” wanted to 
see a change within the party institutions through the cessation of the provision of some services 
provided by the Histadrut 287. In general, these differences can be traced back to the general intent of 
breaking the unity of the party based on the sanctification of internal decision-making structures 
and basically the non-acceptance of Eshkol's leadership288; who, in 1965 elections, defeated Ben-
Gurion: Ma'arach got 45 seats, Rafi only 10. Two months later, the Prime Minister was re-affirmed by 
submitting a coalition that enjoyed the support of 75 of 120 Knesset members289.  
We can examine the division between Rafi and Mapai by analyzing the weaknesses that did not allow 
the party to learn how to contain the internal conflict and to avoid splitting. The characteristic that 
made possible for Mapai to maintain political dominance for a long time was the ability to 
incorporate various social groups into the party, providing them with material and symbolic ideals. 
In particular, this was reinforced by the internal decision-making process that used loyalty to the 
party to produce policies based on a consensus and a compromise acceptable to everyone. In the 
years before 1965, the party failed to achieve this kind of compromise and endangered its central role 
in state policy; perhaps the degree of conflict was so high and generalized that it was not possible 
to reach a meeting point. Mapai's performance was therefore bankruptcy because, apart from the 
inability to contain separatist tendencies, in the 1965 parliamentary elections, alignment gained 
roughly 5% less votes than 1961 and 8% less of 1959290.  
On the other hand, given the importance of the personalities who left the Mapai in order to form Rafi, 
the split also brought to light the strength of the party's organizational structure, demonstrating 
how the political power of the party was in the incorporation of the various forces social, 
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institutional penetration and control over the structures and processes it had developed in previous 
years. 
 
2.3 The Six Days War and the creation of a new State of Israel 
 Levi Eshkol, in fact, guaranteed the delicate transition between Ben-Gurion's monarchy and 
the new Labor Party, opening a new era for the domestic political arena, for example by authorizing 
the official burial of Jabotinsky's remains in Jerusalem, an event full of symbolic implications. In 
spite of his good performance, the attacks on that part of the labyrinth that he felt as a widow of 
Ben-Gurion kept on making it easy for him; it was described as weak and uncertain and, according 
to Abba Eban, this false image had somehow influenced Nasser's opinion, which, underestimating 
Eshkol, would have encouraged aggressive and anti-attitude from 1964 onwards 291 . 
2.3.1 The waiting period and the shadow of a new Holocaust 
 The following three weeks were a traumatic experience for Israeli public opinion and passed 
on to history as the “waiting period”. The nation was prey to a collective psychosis. The memory of 
the Holocaust was an extremely strong psychological factor that deepened the feeling of isolation 
and accentuated the perception of the threat. Numerous Israelis felt that their country was facing 
the danger of an imminent destruction, for the matter did not concern them in the Tiran Strait, but 
on the very survival of the Jewish state. Three factors can help explain this widespread sense of fear 
among the Israelis: the constant and persistent national Holocaust trauma that has always played a 
central role in the political, cultural, and psychological socialization of all Israelis; the enormity of 
the firepower and the greatness of the rival hosts, and finally a widespread sense of political 
isolation. In support of this impression, after the blockade of Tiran, Nasser's prestige grew 
throughout the Arab world as ever before and began to talk about the imminent end of the “Zionist 
entity” On the streets of Arab capitals, slogans began to rise, asking Nasser to “throw Jews at sea292”. 
«The Israelis' morals were soon worn out by the daring Arab pressure fearing that the neighbors 
were laying the groundwork for a second of genocide. [...] In the Middle East, the air is full of 
violence, the appalling applause of the massacre, military marches, the massive crowd movements 
in Arab capitals, incendiary sermons in mosques, public places, and inflammatory statements [...] 
Compete with creating a new political situation that risks at any time to escape the calculations of 
the governors293 ».  
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The hesitant actions of the Israeli government also contributed to make the situation more confuse, 
because they projected, a weak and insecure image of the country, giving Nasser the impression that 
he could push beyond the limit; Eshkol and his government, hoping for a diplomatic solution to the 
situation, tended to postpone the decision about possible military actions. 
Meanwhile, the pressure exerted by the army on the government to agree to immediate military 
action against Egypt has intensified considerably, on May 28th the council of ministers decided to 
wait another two or three weeks. The same night, also known as the “Night of the Generals”, the 
high commanders of the defense expressed their disappointment and accused the political 
leadership of weakness and indecision. The present agreed to point out that time was an essential 
factor and that, the more expected, the more the price of the victory in terms of losses would be. On 
that occasion, the prime minister continued to support his position contrary to a preventive attack; 
what came into that situation was so harsh and offensive that it could have interpreted that meeting 
as an act of open rebellion. 
However, following the entry into the Sinai of Egyptian forces, Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin decided 
to partially mobilize reserves as a precautionary measure; he, feeling very under pressure, felt the 
need to speak with Ben-Gurion, but instead of encouraging him ,“the old man of Sde Boker” he 
warned Rabin, saying, «In this case, you, or anyone who allowed you to mobilize the reserves, made 
a serious mistake»,  adding:« You put the state in a dangerous situation. We do not have to go to 
war. We are isolated. You are responsible 294». These words contributed to the nervous break-down 
e of Chief of Staff, who remained immobilized for twenty-four hours. Ben-Gurion, despite his 
extreme hardness, had good reasons to worry about the mobilization of reserves: thus, doing the 
nation was so destabilized, with its own frozen economy and daily shattered by the peak of tension 
generated by the threat of destruction coming from Arab media295. Rabin296 felt reprimanded by the 
old leader and these words contributed to his nervous collapse (May 23rd) that set him in for 24 
hours, after which he returned to full management of his duties. 
An atmosphere of “eve of Holocaust” was created, once again the enemy would come to destroy the 
Jews. PLO President Ahamed Shukeiri stated in those days: «In the event of a clash, no Jew will 
survive297.» People could not remain indifferent to rumors about the imminent end of the Jewish 
state. Damascus Radio broadcast on May 23rd the following proclamation: «Arab masses this is your 
day. Run to the battlefield [...] Let them know that we will hang the last imperialist soldier with the 
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guts of the last Zionist298». Anxiety took over Israelis, thousands of them had experience the 
Holocaust and Adolf Eichmann's trial a few years earlier 299  
had rooted in society the Shoah's awareness and the fear of annihilation. Rumors predicted the deaths 
of thousands and the presence of genocide in the minds of the Israelis was a powerful psychological 
force exacerbating the feeling of isolation, impotence and siege. 
All over the country was nothing more than an imminent extermination: no one was saying that 
Israel would be conquered or its destroyed cities, even the newspapers compared Nasser to Hilter. 
Ha'aretz, the most important newspaper, came to publish a statement of May26th 1967, alongside that 
of the German dictator of 1939300.  
The former said, «If Israel wants the war, then Israel will be destroyed», the second: «If the Jews 
dragged the world into a war, then the heifers of the whole world will be destroyed». The leitmotif of 
the anti-Semitic threat came back with all its power. 
In those days the sense of claustrophobia increased, so that the Tel Aviv Religious Council had 
instructed some rabbis to inspect parks, basketball courts, and empty land plots to consecrate them 
as cemeteries for the tens of thousands of deaths expected: only a haunted nation from the memory 
of the genocide he could prepare so meticulously at the massacre301.  
In contrast to these collective sentiments, the army's state of mind was set; the high commanders 
did not even doubt for a second to defeat the enemies, especially if the IDF had attacked first and for 
this reason invoked an immediate beginning of the conflict. On May 28th Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, 
in an attempt to respond to the needs of the country to be led by a strong leadership, held a radio 
talk, the latter being known as the talk of stuttering, because Eshkol during his enunciation did not 
he managed to decipher well what he wrote and incapacitated in his own words, adding more 
tension to what existed in the homes of the Israelis. 
All this showed weakness and public opinion lost confidence in leadership just as the ongoing crisis 
required it ever before and began to increase public pressure for a change in the vertices; the 
ineffectiveness of these attempts to handle the crisis was also determined by the unexciting 
performance of Eshkol, which, having more diplomatic inclinations, had to face its lack of experience 
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in foreign affairs and strong internal critiques. His former party colleagues who had gathered in Rafi 
in 1965 had become the fiercest opponents of his government: Ben-Gurion, Peres and Dayan tried to 
exploit the situation, undermining the prime minister's credibility in an attempt to conquer 
important positions within the government. 
The internal crisis was solved on June 1 with the formation of a government of national unity that 
included the two largest opposition parties: the Gahal with Begin and Sapir as ministers without a 
portfolio and Rafi with Dayan at the much-warded ministry of defense. This was also partly due to 
the orchestrated campaign by Gahal and Rafi to erode Eshkol's authority: the widespread Israeli 
population was exploited by the antagonists of the Labor government302. In spite of Eshkol's qualms 
to take the road towards the conflict303, in the face of increasingly aggravated conditions, on June 4, 
the government gathered in full swing and made the decision to go to war304. On June 5th 1967, the 
IDF launched its attack: the Israeli Air Force launched an air strike that in a matter of hours would 
have allowed it to completely eliminate Egyptian aviation and inflict serious damage to Syrian. This 
memorable operation ruled the course of the clashes from the first few hours, and it was no 
coincidence that the Six Days War was the shortest and most striking conflict between all those 
conducted by Israel for the sake of victory, whose pliability gave rise to many problems. 
 
2.3.2 From the anxiety of destruction to the euphoria of creation 
 The Six-Day War began with the attack of Israeli aviation on a surprise flight of June 5, 1967. 
Within a few hours Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian aviation was destroyed; with the 
annihilation of about 400 enemy planes, the fate of the Arab armies was marked. When the weapons 
were silent, a wave of euphoria in messianic colors swept the country. On June 8, the daily 
newspaper Ha'aretz said: «The glory of ancient times by the new state of Israel and its splendor will 
illuminate the enterprises the successes of Jewish society the element of continuity of the long 
history of the people of this country all over Jerusalem is our joy rejoicing the inhabitants of Zion 
305».  
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In less than one-hundred hours, the IDF had captured an area three and a half times larger than Israel 
itself, inhabited by more than a million Palestinians (the 61,000 sq km Sinai, the Gaza Strip 363 sq 
km and the West Bank with Jerusalem East 5700 square kilometers). 
The Israelis began to pour hundreds of thousands into the new conquered territories and see the 
extraordinary victory with their own eyes: their fears in the previous week had turned into a national 
euphoria, but beyond this collective sense of relief and salvation. Two apparently contradictory 
emotions filled the nation: the first was the joy of returning to the land of fathers Eretz Ha'avot, the 
second was the sense of hope and expectation that the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be 
near306. After so extensive territorial gains, the idea of exchanging land for peace took on a new 
meaning: the phrase: «I'm waiting for a phone call from King Hussein307 » as Dayan would say shortly 
after ceasing-the-fire 308. The war had paved the way for a possible solution: in the end the Israelis 
had something to surrender in exchange for peace and the Arab states sooner or later understood it. 
This remarkable result has led many observers to question the self-defense character of the war, but 
this outcome is more to be attributed to Tsahal's undeniable strength and to the fact that when the 
government ordered the IDF to attack, political goals and territorial were not defined309; for 
example, actions in Golan, Jerusalem and the West Bank were not only defined in advance, but not 
even hypothesized. In some cases, the government was allowed to move from events, while others 
took advantage of the opportunities that were present in the field. Most likely, this was due to the 
conception that Eshkol had been in conflict, that is, of a limited and defensive war, which, in the 
end, had the removal of the Egyptian threat to Israeli security. Indeed, in the months immediately 
preceding the outbreak of hostilities, the Prime Minister's diplomatic apparatus had sought in all 
ways to limit clashes exclusively on the southern front; they were aware of the possibility of some 
attacks on the Syrian front and were equally determined to avoid any military clash with Jordan, 
dodging the complications that would arise if it had to do with the West Bank population with a 
Palestinian majority310.  
The confrontation on the eastern front was then started by Jordan, with King Hussein dragged into 
conflict by the powerful current of Arab nationalism 311, thus committing the greatest mistake of his 
life. If King Hussein had not begun the bombings on Jerusalem on June 5th 1967, Jordan would 
maintain control over the Holy City and the West Bank; in fact, nobody within the Government or 
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the State Staff had proposed to conquer those areas before the Jordanian army made its move. At 
that point Israel had the historic opportunity to free Jerusalem, but Eshkol, Dayan and Rabin sought 
to postpone the decision as much as possible, aware of the consequences and repercussions that 
would result from the army's entry into the Old City. The balance of the invasion broke when Dayan, 
aware that the UN was declaring a ceasefire, without consulting the government gave orders to 
Tsahal to cross the walls and at 10 am on June 7th, the entire Jerusalem was in Israeli hands. In front 
of the Wailing Wall, the minister of defense declared: «We gathered Jerusalem divided, the capital 
of Israel that had been divided into two. We returned to our most sacred places and returned to not 
leave them anymore 312».  
Decisions on the West Bank were also followed by military developments, without a precise 
political plan; that meant that the Israeli reaction to the Jordanian bombing was held in the hope 
that the Hashemite king would give up. Dayan met with senior officers to analyze the unexpected 
development of the situation: «How do we control 1,000,000 Arabs? », asked Rabin. Another official 
corrected him: «1,250,000313». In addition to these unknown consequences, another motivation that 
led to curbing the start of operations in the West Bank was the government's intention to preserve 
the status quo with Jordan; Intelligence had argued that King Hussein would not be involved in 
hostilities and the deal with Nasser was therefore a lightning strike. The Israeli military machine 
moved only when a serious threat to the government headquarters in West Jerusalem was posed: 
only then Rabin gave the order to IDF to begin operations on the enclave of Mount Scopus (Har 
Hazofim). 
General Uzi Narkis gave the following account: «First, the Israeli government did not intend to 
conquer the West Bank, but was strongly opposed to such an action. Second, there was no 
provocation by Tsahal. Third, the reins were loosened only when a serious threat to Jerusalem's 
security emerged. This is what really happened on June 5th, though it is hard to believe it. The end 
result was something no one had planned314». Rabin agreed that the final result was not derived from 
a political design, but from the contingencies of war: «War developed according to its intrinsic logic 
and this development brought into play all the forces of the Jordanian army set up in Judea and 
Samaria and willing or unhappy led to the conquest of the historical boundary of the Land of Israel: 
the Jordan River315». 
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2.4 The National Unity Government and the debate over the future of the 
conquered Territories  
As soon as the canons were silent, an intense public and government debate began to 
understand what the fate of the Territories would be. The first official discussion took place on June 
14th in the Ministerial Committee on Defense. In those days, the Cabinet began discussing the 
proposals made by the committee and reached a decision adopted on June 19th, confirming the 
general outline and specifying the conditions: guarantee freedom of navigation in the Tiran Strait, in 
the Gulf of Aqaba and in the Suez Canal, demilitarization of the Sinai. The resolution also proposed 
a similar covenant with Syria specifying that demilitarization of Golan was required, guaranteeing 
that it would not interfere with the flow and course of Jordan's waters. 
The Cabinet meeting of June 19th decided that the old international borders between Israel, Egypt 
and Syria would be the basis for the definition of a permanent border; Israel would retreat from Sinai 
and Golan in exchange for peace316: that decision was never made public but communicated to the 
United States to inform Cairo and Damascus. From there to a few days both Arab capitals responded 
negatively 317.  
The West Bank Gaza Strip was not specifically mentioned in the diplomatic note, but it was 
understood that those areas (excluding Jerusalem) were negotiable. On June 27th 1967, by a 
unanimous vote of the Cabinet and almost unanimous to Knesset, the Israeli government annexed the 
Arab part of East Jerusalem under Jordan's control since 1948318.   
The Holy City with its expanded boundaries was unified as “the eternal capital of the State of Israel”. 
During the summer of 1967, the leadership of the dominant Labor Party, especially Prime Minister 
Levi Eshkol, was ready to explore the possibility of exchanging peace in exchange for territories. 
The Israeli government however agreed to not return to the borders of 1967, even called by a dove 
like the Foreign Minister Abba Eban “the borders of Auschwitz”, but while some ministers were 
willing to give in exchange for peace a portion more or less extensive territories, others (including 
Begin and representatives of the National Religious Party) wanted the annexation of the entire West 
Bank, as part of the historic Land of Israel319.  
Finding a point of understanding over the West Bank was more difficult because of many ideologies 
represented in the national unity government. Menachem Begin's territorial maximalists collided 
with Eban's moderates. One position. Intermediate between these two solutions was proposed by 
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Allon who encouraged the annexation of Judea and the granting of a semi-autonomous status to 
Samaria, warning the colleagues not to rely too much on the Jordanian option. Dayan shared this 
skepticism with Hussein, but questioned whether Israel was able to establish unilateral 
arrangements on the West Bank; the defense minister therefore proposed to proceed in a pragmatic 
way to improve relations with Palestinian residents, but without deciding on their status in advance. 
It seemed, therefore, that for the parties most inclined to exchange some of the territories captured 
in 1967, there were basically two viable paths: to reach an agreement with King Hussein or to grant 
autonomy to Palestinians under Israeli control; the first alternative was known as the Jordanian 
option, the second as the Palestinian option. It is generally believed that Israeli post-war foreign 
policy was based on the first motion; Israeli leaders were so attracted to this option by failing to 
consider others. 
Eshkol, despite his sympathy and for Jordan's leader, wanted to surely try the Palestinian option. 
The main considerations he considered were security and demography. He felt that Israel should 
exercise control over the areas that extended to the River Jordan for safety issues, but at the same 
time it was still in the wake of absorbing a large Palestinian population within the Jewish state: the 
problem was as a manager the West Bank without turning Israel into a bi-national state. Who 
perhaps was closer to the prime minister's position was Rabin: from a security point of view he 
thought it was a mistake to return the West Bank to the Jordanians, but at the same time thought 
that demographically speaking, the annexation of those lands would be was a disaster for the future 
of the state of Israel. For these reasons, he concluded that the best solution was to grant a special 
status to the West Bank320. 
Allon and Dayan were in agreement to support the Palestinian option but their views differed on 
Israel's security needs in the West Bank. The former considered control of the Jordan Valley as 
fundamental while the latter considered far more important the control of the mountain range from 
Jenin in the north, in Hebron in the south. Allon was much quicker to put his ideas on the paper 
(presented to the Council of Ministers on July 26th) on the paper, which provided for the Israeli 
incorporation of the following areas: a wide strip of land 10 to 15 km along the Jordan River, the 
largest part of the Judean desert along the Dead Sea and a substantial area around Jerusalem, 
including the Latrun area.  
This arrangement was considered to include as few as possible Arab inhabitants in the areas to be 
annexed to Israel. Dayan proposed instead the creation of those who defined the “four fists321” along 
the mountainous ridge crossing the central part of the West Bank, each of these “fists” would consist 
of a large military base, surrounded by civilian settlements and located near the largest Arab city 
(namely Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, and Hebron). The most striking aspect of the plan was the desire 
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to set up Jews in the heart of the area most densely populated by Arabs. In conclusion, the Allon 
Plan became the unofficial fundamentally groundbreaking Israeli government governing peace 
policy until 1977. 
On February 26th 1969, Levi Eshkol died in Jerusalem, was sixty-four years old and suffered from 
cancer. A few months before his death, Prime Minister Eshkol had stated: "I can address my words 
to Nasser that Great Israel has never been and will never be our policy, we are flexible on everything 
and we do not want any part of the West Bank be populated by Arabs322»,  
with these words the moderate nature of the more flexible area of the Labor government was 
reflected, of course this interview caused considerable debate among the hardest elements of the 
same party and among the ranks of Likud, still a member of the government of national unity. 
The results of the war led the Israelis to feel a false sense of security, the conquest of an abundant 
portion of territory seemed to offer now the strategic depth that was previously lacking, posing a 
threat to security of other nature, forgetting that those lands lived a population with a unique 
history and identity. At that time, military achievements made him believe that the army had a ready 
response to every need, not to mention that military response was not always a countermeasure; 
Israel closed in this way, celebrating the new era that seemed to be finally inaugurated and adhering 
to the only strategy that seemed viable: to establish itself in the territories pending a hypothetical 
negotiation323. 
 
2.4.1 Different voices inside the Labor Camp: ideological and pragmatic rifts  
 It is important to explain why the Labor Party that ruled the nation for a decade after the 
war and repeatedly declared its will to surrender territories in exchange for peace did not pursue 
peace more vigorously: stiffening Israel's position was a departure from traditional policies pursued 
by the elite of Mapai veterans and was contrary to the convictions of influential leaders such as 
Pinhas Sapir and Abba Eban. These (and some younger ministers) shared moderate tendencies: 
Sapir, considered the most powerful at political level in his party and in the nation, was convinced 
that continuing Israeli control over the Palestinians would be a disaster, he said: «If we continue to 
hold the territories will eventually possess them324». At the end of 1967, these Sapir-led veterans 
exercised full control over the party and covered the most important positions in government, so 
that they failed to impose their own political vision? Because they left an uncompromising attitude 
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to gain ground in the party. Definitely Arab refusal 325 it was part of the motivations, but there were 
also some complex political dynamics within Mapai itself: in the fall of 1965 this group of veterans 
had been challenged by two new political factions within the party and new generations of political 
personalities who did not shared their ideological beliefs; in May 1967 during the intense waiting 
period before the war, Prime Minister Eshkol was persuaded to form a government of national unity 
under heavy popular pressure and finally this paved the way for the return of most of this party's 
party Labor files in 1968. Although there was a complex combination of reasons that brought Ben-
Gurion's Rafi from Mapai, an inexorable sequence of political events, the secessionist group realized 
that trying to obtain from outside what had failed getting from the inside was a mistake of political 
calculation, failing to bring enough votes to the Labor camp to achieve this goal326. 
Less than three years after the great division, the Rafi returned to the Labor ranks by forming Mifleget 
Ha'Avoda HaYisraelit (the Israeli Labor Party), along with Mapai and Ahdut Ha'Avoda. 
The result of these developments was that the prime minister was in an unenviable position; in the 
months after the Six Days War, he confronted himself with a closure attitude towards the 
compromise with the Arab side on one side, and on the other by members of his own party who 
called for a tough line and a policy of expansionism in new territories327.  
Dayan's attitudes in the years after the Six-Day War were certainly influenced by two factors: his 
pessimism about the readiness of Arab governments to reach a compromise with Israel and its strong 
attachment to the land of the Bible. «We did not betray our dream, nor did we forget our legacy, we 
returned to the mountains, to the cradle of our people, to our heritage, to the Land of the Judges, to 
the fortress of the kingdom of David, to Hebron and Sichem328in Bethlehem and Anathoth, at Jericho, 
and at the Jordan River. We know that to give life to Jerusalem we must deploy our soldiers and our 
weapons on the hills of Sichem and the bridges of the Jordan329». The strange mixture of pragmatic 
realism and poetic nostalgia was reflected in its policies that were very often inconsistent and 
contradictory, but which in fact helped Israel strengthen its control over the Occupied Territories 
and prevent efforts to test the new opportunities for peace. 
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Dayan adopted a strategy of “maximum coexistence in a conflict” and this meant that: «Israel would 
brandish a stick over the terrorists' head and offer a carrot to those who were ready to live peacefully 
under the Israeli government330». The underlying idea was to pursue economic integration of the 
West Bank and Gaza, above all through the establishment of Jewish settlements, alongside the 
“open bridges policy"331” allowing the Arabs to relive with families remaining in Israel and in the 
territories of having entry visas. This was followed by occasional choices and from now on, the 
absence of a strategic option by the government was compensated by the actions of groups of 
interest: on the one hand, this symmetry between the will of some formally annexed political 
formations (Begin and PNR, the Religious National Party) and the dissent of Labor governments 
that triggered the debate, still open, regarding the definitive annexation of Judea and Samaria. The 
result of this aptitude was not that significant peace initiative that could be conducted by 
governments led by the Labor Party between 1967 and 1973, whatever the motivation of the Rafi and 
Ahdut Ha'Avoda colleagues. Eshkol and Sapir and other Mapai veterans found themselves crushed on 
one side by the maximalist vision of Tabenkin and on the other by Dayan's ambivalent pragmatism. 
When the prime minister died in February 1969, Sapir's leader wanted to avoid a fight between 
Dayan and Allon for succession and then sought to keep power in the hands of Old Mapai's guard 
calling the 70-year-old Golda Meir to accept the premiership. Golda's involvement meant not only 
renewing the commitment to adopting the policy of non-decision, but also starting to refuse any 
other formulation of possible dialogue, which made her thus the “Golda the intransigent” epithet: 
«Intransigence was about to become my second name332».  
 
2.5 The re-opening of the Zionist territorial debate and the emergence of a new 
Israeli political culture   
The victory of the Six Days War brought with it the beginning of a period of uncertainty in 
Israel, reopening the old question to the territorial aspirations of Zionism; a discussion held closed 
with the 1949 armistice agreements that seemed to ensure the possibility for the Zionist movement 
to be able to achieve its fundamental goals within the boundaries bounded. However, in the summer 
of 1967, the problem of what to do with the acquired territories was raised and faced with no easy 
answers to these questions. Zionism seemed to know a second youth, in a sort of Jewish revival, but 
on the wave of some paradigms that dramatically transformed the country's cultural phenomena: 
«For many, Israel is no longer the revolution of the new Jew, by the founding fathers, but by a 
fortune-in-law, to be firmly defended by affirmation of prophecy to be preserved with respect to 
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threats more than with the history of a political society, now for some it seemed to have to do with 
a messianic creation [... ] Born from the encounter of modern Jewish nationalism with messianic 
Judaism, this well-organized, militant and rooted minority neo-Zionism, will draw the Israeli 
political landscape, modify the demographics of occupied territories, and will weigh decisively into 
the seeking a compromise with the Palestinians333 ». 
Certainly, the government of national unity formed hastily before the outbreak of the conflict was 
unable to provide an efficient solution, as it consisted of twenty-one ministers belonging to seven 
different parties and represented a wide range of ideological positions (not counting the internal 
divisions to single strata). Within the government of that period, the most striking split was that of 
the National Religious Party, until 1967, ally placid, pragmatic and obedient to the Labor Party, but 
the Six Day War had awakened strong feelings among the Bnei Akiva334 militants, among the students 
of the yeshivot and among the NRP rabbis, inspired by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook and his son Rav 
Zvi Yehuda Kook 335.  
They greeted the army's achievements as the first signal of imminent redemption; for them the state 
was not the end, but the instrument for the conquest of the earth, an element which provides for the 
sanctification of Israel itself336. Religion began to engage in history, preparing the ground suited to 
the young leadership of these movements to subdue the role of Zionism as a torchlight to Laborers, 
their youth organizations and their kibbutz. New pioneers felt and the newly conquered land would 
have been their frontier; the melancholy of messianic and nationalism feelings that they set up 
proved to be powerful and inebriating, indeed, place after place, the government337 surrendered 
facing the settlers' enthusiasm and silenced in front of the creation of new outposts, that were no 
longer built for safety reasons, but aimed at determining their belonging to the Jewish State. 
Much more than the coastal plain, the hills of Samaria and Judea kept the memories of the Bible and 
incarnated most of Jewish history and identity; the holy places of Judaism had given a new messianic 
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meaning to the newly won war338. A few days after the war, a popular Israeli singer recorded a song 
with this chorus: «O Mother Rachel we will never leave you again from your fields in Bethlehem 339».  
These words and their historical meaning touched the hearts of those who were ready to give up 
those fields if they could have exchanged them with peace 
The outcome of the war significantly increased Israel's negotiating position with regard to the "land 
for peace" criterion340", but they also awakened the dormant aspirations among many Israelis in the 
acquisition of the entire area coinciding with historic Eretz Yisrael, thus introducing within the 
society the seeds of political polarization. Meanwhile, the new territories allowed the Israeli defense 
leaders to cultivate the illusion of improved security through the new line of defense that was further 
away from Israeli-populated centers. The underlying idea was that the new conquests would 
complete the work started in 1948 in a perspective but more referring to a religious vision with a 
messianic background than the original Zionist project341; the vision of the Great Israel or the 
Integral Land of Israel reappeared, referring to the concept of indivisibility of the Land of Israel, 
which claimed the spatial continuity of the territories included in the 1949 green armistice line and 
those newly conquered. 
It was affirming the messianic conception of the Jewish state as, “the beginning of the dawn of our 
redemption” (reshit tzmihat geulatanu), an expression derived from religious Zionism, subverting the 
Israeli political agenda deeply. The debate about the fate of the Palestinian Territories occupied in 
1967 heavily involved the state's state-of-the-art debate, so that each deployment of a different vision 
of the future of these lands used a different way to refer to these areas: Administered Territories, 
Opponents for Occupied Territories, and Eretz Yisrael's visionaries Yosh (or Yehudah veShomrom, Judea 
and Samaria). Not only that, the Israelis introduced a word previously unused by the Zionist 
vocabulary, that is, the term hityashvut (settlement) was replaced by the hitnachalut biblical term used 
in the Old Testament to describe the settlement of Israeli tribes in the land promised to them by 
God at the time of Joshua and the Judges342.  
In March 1974, the paintings and their ideology were firmly expressed in an extra-parliamentary 
movement called Gush Emunim (the blockade of the faithful), vaguely affiliated with the National 
Religious Party and with strong bonds with the righteous rightist. «Religious messianism, but not 
ultra-Orthodox, the Bloc of the Faithful was characterized by the will to colonize [...] the West 
Bank, increasingly called Judea and Samaria. The resorts chosen by the movement were not so much 
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the valley of the Jordan or the Golan, which had some strategic importance, as the hills of the West 
Bank, though densely populated by the Palestinians that corresponded to the areas over which the 
Jewish kingdoms of David and Solomon [...] The movement sanctions with its birth that redefinition 
of Zionism that was less and less political project is increasingly religious design [...]343». 
His leaders would set tones and content of right-wing activism over the territories and forced Labor 
into defensive Labor; the settlers were the expression of the will to make the 1967 conquests 
definitive and as such would be a hindrance to the path of peace as many Israeli, Arab and American 
politicians had observed in the 80's and 90's. The Gush Emunim would become the course of two 
decades a powerful figure in the Israeli political scenario. 
Jewish settlements began from areas already inhabited by Jews in the past (such as the Etzion block) 
to those demographically and traditionally Arab. The phenomenon gradually unfolded and almost 
by itself, without obeying a predetermined plan344. In the following years, other colonies appeared 
in various parts of the Golan, the Gaza Strip and the Jordan Valley; they were of a different kind 
depending on the objective they responded to: the creation of a bearing security zone following 
strategic principles, the establishment of the historical land of the people of Israel motivated by 
Messianic drives or more simply the desire to improve their standards of life while paying attention 
to the governmental facilitations that stimulated the transfer to areas of the West Bank345. 
This phenomenon was possible thanks to the hesitations of the government, in fact the attitude of 
the executive was ambiguous at first: some doves, such as Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir, were 
always opposed to colonization, while others supported it unreservedly. Allon and Dayan were 
ambiguous, the second most likely to be willing to swap land for peace, even in the West Bank, but 
on other occasions it seemed to be opposed to abandoning one centimeter of the Earth of biblical 
Israel. Some of the exponents of the Ahdut Ha'Avoda, like Galilee, silently shared the illegitimate aims 
of the settlers: to some extent they found in this enterprise, taken in common with the image they 
had, to be the heirs of the first pioneers who had created the Zionist country, conquering dunam after 
dunam. Soon, the attitude more or less favorable to the colonists soon intertwined with the internal 
rivalries to Mapai, especially between Dayan and Allon. 
The peak reached in April 1968 when a group of militants led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger took 
accommodation at the Garden Hotel in the Hebron suburbs to celebrate Jewish Passover; they had 
a valid permit one night in return for the promise to return to Israel the following day. But at the 
right time, militants raised an Israeli flag and said they wanted to stay346; Hebron's accident created 
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a precedent, and the Colonies, thanks to the help of some elements within the Defense apparatus, 
had been able to deceive the decision makers and this pattern would be repeated in the following 
years, whenever the movement the authorities were impudent. Second, the government did not 
immediately expel the settlers, an act of weakness347 which was largely dependent on the presence 
in the coalition of National Religious Party and Herut members. 
Finally, the compromise was reached and settlers were allowed to stay in Hebron, moving to the 
barracks of the army in the city. From a few months, that bridgehead became an agreement for the 
construction of a large Jewish settlement in the suburbs of Hebron, the current Kiriyat Arba, which 
some years later turned into the transfer of many other settlers in the heart of Arab city, both in 
buildings occupied by Jews before the massacre of 1929, and in new buildings. Almost without 
exception, the government provided the settlers with the indispensable tools to be successful: 
soldiers to ensure protection, water dispensers and emergency generators for the supply of 
electricity. 
In the first decade after the war, Israel had created a total of 21 settlements, including 10,000 
inhabitants348 located in the West Bank in Hebron, Har Gilo (near Bethlehem) Gush Etzion, 
Kedumim, Ofra and Ma'ale Adumim; to these were added the outposts built in the valley of the 
Jordan. The rhythms of the colonizing enterprise will remain somewhat until 1977 when, with Likud’s 
victory, it would have witnessed the affirmation of the messianic political rhetoric. The Six Days 
War, made the Israelis live a mystical reunification experience with their past, thus representing the 
fulfillment of the prophecies of redemption and triggering epochal change in the nation's political 
culture, which changed Israel's political history. 
 
  
                                                          
347 Furthermore, we must emphasize that, on one side, the institutions were very reluctant to authorize the 
use of force by the IDF  in order to physically remove the Jewish occupiers and, on the other, that those settlers 
were very motivated, making impossible to convince them to leave without resorting to coercion. 
348 Elad M., The Birth of ..., op. cit., p.77. 
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Chapter 3. THE RISING OF THE RIGHT AND MIFLEGET 
HA’AVODA’S LOSS OF DOMINANCE (1973-1981) 
 
 The October War was not only a trauma for the Israelis, but its most important function 
was to be the catalyst event that raised the discontent and the changes that took place within Israeli 
society, transforming them into the epochal political change of 1977, when Likud (headed by Begin) 
won the election, ending the thirty-year Labor dominance.  
One of the important factors that is likely to have contributed to the decline of mamlachtiut was the 
successful building of the country; Labor was associated with the years state-formation and the 
following nation-building years, but as time passed by, the existence of the State no longer evoked 
wonder; sense that reality fell short of the ideal further contributed to the end of the pioneering 
epoch with which Labor had been identified and from which it derived its legitimacy. The result 
was that by 1977 there was a semi-total correspondence between the party and the state itself in all 
its major activities.  
One of the area in which Mifleget Ha’Avoda conspicuously failed was in the socialization of succeeding 
generations of Mizrachi immigrants and this fail had been confirmed by analysis of the electoral 
results of the elections since 1973; as we are going to see in this chapter, from that year, voting 
behavior indicated that Labor camp lost the political support of the new Israeli proletariat 
(represented by Oriental new-comers) and of the younger generations. 
Moreover, after the 1967 War, an ideological and parliamentary re-alignment was taking place; as 
we are going to see in the next paragraphs, Begin’s Likud will find a reliable partner in the religious 
front, breaking the historical alliance within Labor and NRP, which contributed to the overturning 
result of 1977. Finally, the mismanagement of the events of the Yom Kippur showed an evident 
erosion of responsiveness of the party to the demands of the public, contributing to the erosion of 
Labor legitimacy and dominance. 
But mostly, the greatest challenge that Mifleget Ha’Avoda failed to face was the crisis of identity that 
many Israelis felt and that corresponded to a change in political culture, leaving space for the Likud 
to win ideological predominance in this new landscape. 
 
3.1 The end of Mifleget Ha’Avoda’s hegemony  
 The military debacle was deemed by Israeli public to be responsibility of Labor government 
and it proved to be the catalyst event which exacerbated criticism of policies, style and ethos.  
A considerable section of the general public (and of members of the party) considered Dayan to bear 
the burden of responsibility for the military mistakes together with Minister Galili (the Prime 
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Minister closest adviser) for the unreality and immobility of Israel foreign and security policy in 
recent years. One part of the General Party Committee wanted these men to be removed from their 
positions in the leadership and this demand was formally presented with the proposal that the list 
of candidates for the 1973 elections, to be re-opened. Unfortunately, this last request, if accepted, 
would have meant putting off elections to a later date. 
This postponement, even if it would have gained popularity among the electorate, would have 
caused more difficulties for the Labor Party in the attempt to establish a broader coalition in a 
national unity government. This impossibility would have brought to the government's lack of legal 
or moral mandate, which would prevent the formulation of any far-reaching decisions, leading to a 
complete political paralysis349. 
Moreover, ever since the October War not only Mapam but also many members of the Labor Party 
Central Committee had demanded the annulment of the Galili Paper350 (the previous statement of 
party policy approved in September 1973351) and the revision of the Ma’arach’s election platform in a 
more consistent dovish direction. One of the earliest internal party reactions took place in a meeting 
in November, which was carried on by former high-ranking army officers affiliated with Mifleget 
Ha'Avoda; the leader of this group Joseph Nevo (mayor of Herziliya at that time), called the meeting 
to discuss the need to revise party policy on political-military affairs. He stressed that it was 
impossible to separate the issue of leadership from policy-making and stated that, as a consequence 
of the war and since the basic premises on which the Galili Document was based, this paper should 
be reviewed. In the first Central Committee after the war, on November 28th 1973, was called for a 
major policy debate, characterized by unprecedented mutual recriminations between top party 
leaders. Many speakers called in vague terms for a need for changes in political personnel and new 
foreign policy; in his speech Moshe Dayan answered to those who directly or indirectly called for his 
resignation by saying that the prime minister merely had to accept the letter of resignation he had 
previously given her. He emphasized that this was a decision the premier had to take and not the 
critics to his policies. 
The meeting continued with two conflicting points of view clearly emerging; top contending party 
leaders associated with Sapir attacked Dayan and those closely associated with him, like Peres, and 
claimed that the Galili Statement was inoperative. The supporters of Golda Meir and Dayan 
                                                          
349 Merhav P., The Israeli Left…, op.cit. p. 287. 
350 For summaries and recommendations regarding the Galili Document see The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor 
Party Archives, Party. Articles (Heb), 4-04-1970-190, Section: Personal archives, Archive Lova Eliav (Arie Eliav), 
1970/01/0- 1981/12/31, pp. 29-31. 
351 The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, Mercaz (Heb), 2-932-1974-1125, Series: Office of the 
Secretary General, 1973/09/03, file n.29. 
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attacked those who criticized them and contended that the Galili Statement remained a relevant 
and active part of party policy. 
A group composed by representatives of all factions of the party presented the Central Committee 
a new document containing fourteen principles352. This paper, even though a compromise was 
essentially of a dovish character and stressed Israel’s readiness for peace negotiations and territorial 
compromise, while, of course, guaranteeing defensible borders. Pinhas Sapir openly claimed that the 
new fourteen-point policy statement was the only relevant statement for the future, addressing 
himself personally to Dayan and specifying that security and the absorption of the immigrants 
would had have greater priority on the settlement project of the Occupied Territories. Moreover, he 
argued that peace was more important than borders, about which the party should have been more 
flexible. 
Then Golda Meir answered back and, after having defended her policies, she contradicted Sapir’s 
position by clearly stating that she refused to consider the Galili Statement as a dead issue, calling 
for a direct vote of the Central Committee on the issue. The tensions caused by the extremely rare, 
direct and public exchange of personal criticisms and expressions of opposing views between Meir 
and Sapir reached a peak at 2 AM, when the Committee was called to cast a vote in order to decide 
over Golda Meir’s candidacy for prime minister; the result was 291 in favor of Golda against 33 and 
17 abstentions353. Most of the remaining 615 members of the Central Committee were already gone 
by that moment354. 
The vote on the Galili Statement was avoided by a decision of the Secretary-General of the party 
Yadlin, who declared that there was no need for such vote, since Sapir’s statement was the new 
official interpretation. Sapir opposed Meir and Dayan’s requests for an open vote regarding the Galili 
Statement not only because of his ideological oppositions against the provisions for settlements in 
the Territories, but also because he feared that an open confrontation on the issue could have caused 
a split in the party. That also the reason why he and his comrades decided to support anyway Golda’s 
leadership, while pressing for policy changes. 
The Galili Document was thus not cancelled, but freezed and the Alignment conducted the election 
campaign in a dovish tone, against the Likud’s attacks. The changes in the period following the 
traumatic events of October 1973 represented a new threshold in the developing of Israeli political 
system. This was a major crisis of confidence in the credibility of the national party leadership and 
in the Labor Party, manifested also in the emergence of new internal party coalitions. The 
                                                          
352 The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, Agenda of Meetings of Party Institutions (Heb), 2-932-1971-1021, 
Series: Office of the Secretary General, 1973/12/05, file n.1021, pp. 29-31. 
353 The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, Minutes from meetings (Heb), 2-023-1973-108b, Section: 
Archives of organizations and institutions Mapai - Labor Party, 1973/11/28 - 1973/12/20, vol. II, pp.39-120.   
354 Aronoff M.J., Power and ritual…, op. cit., p. 151. 
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developments of the War of October caused deep shock among the people, which started to ask 
questions which reached the source of trust, there was developing a crisis of confidence in the 
government and the Secretary-General of the party at that time, YigalYadlin, replied back saying 
that: «The people will be wise. When the time comes for them to vote, they will vote correctly355». 
 
3.1.1 1973 Elections and Labor’s reaction 
 These attempts of reform worked out only partially. Indeed, the elections to the Eighth 
Knesset (held on December 1973) faced the Israeli voters with a dilemma356: on one hand they wanted 
to express their bitterness over the establishment’s mistakes, by voting against the Alignment; on 
the other had, they wanted to reach some political settlement and perhaps also peace, so bringing 
the Likud to power would have ended such hopes. And since these opposite desires neutralized each 
other, the results didn’t bring any clear change in the administration. 
Despite the fact that the party tried hard to distance itself from the mechdal, the way in which the 
war was managed persuaded many Mizrachim to desert Labor; the vote of Oriental Jews for the 
Ma’arachin 1973 plummeted by 20% (from one-half of the Sephardim to one-third) Begin’s cultivation 
of the development towns357 began to pay political dividends, indeed, the new generation of Israeli-
born Mizrachim deserted Mifleget Ha’Avoda in droves; if before the Yom Kippur war 62% of Israelis 
born in Asia and Africa were prepared to support the Alignment, after the conflict only 43% of 
Israelis from a Mizrachi background were still willing to endorse the policies of Labor camp358. 
On the eve of elections, in December 1973, opinion polls showed that a huge section of electorate 
(from 20% to 40%) were undecided which party to support and it was unprecedented, given the 
degree of conservatism of the Israeli voter. But this time, the sense of discrimination experienced by 
Sephardim was finally about to boil over in those elections and, similar drop in support, was mirrored 
in the voters between the age of 25 and 49, who turned their backs on Labor359.  
                                                          
355 Ibidem, p. 144. 
356 Merhav P., The Israeli Left…, op.cit. p.288. 
357 Ayarat Pitu'ah is a term used to refer to the new settlements that were built in Israel during the 1950s in order 
to provide permanent housing to a large influx of Jewish immigrants from Arab countries, Holocaust survivors 
from Europe and other new immigrants. The towns were designated to expand the population of the country's 
peripheral areas and to ease development pressure on the country's crowded centre. For this reason, the 
majority in such towns were built in areas scarcely populated, such as Galilee in the north and Negev in the 
south. 
358 Shindler C., Israel, Likud…, op.cit., p.74. 
359 Penniman H. R. and Elazar D. J., Israel at the Polls 1981, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1986, p. 49. 
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Indeed, the epoch of Ha’Avoda’s ideology was clearly identified with the period of the British mandate 
which culminated in 1948 with the independence and with the first yearsof the existence of the 
state. The fact that Labor has relative difficulty in attracting the votes of the young (many of whom 
did not experience the “epoch”) indicated a partial short- circuiting of the party's claim to 
dominance. While there was evidence that Labor lost its ideological dominance, it retained a clear 
position of power on the crucial issues of defense and foreign policy. After the war, about 70% of the 
sample thought that there were substantial differences between the alignment and the Likud on 
these matters. When asked the question, “Whose foreign and defense policies are closest to your 
own attitudes?”, 60% answered the alignment, 35%, the Likud. So, Mifleget Ha'Avoda retained many of 
the characteristics of a dominant party360. 
The 1973 elections, viewed in the perspective of the Labor Party's declining claim to dominance, 
must be seen as part of a process-and not as a break with the past and. From this perspective, the 
rise of the Likud was possible thanks to this decline; indeed, we have to underline that this massive 
shift away from the Alignment permitted the Likud to increase the percentage of vote compared to 
past elections and to be regarded as a genuine alternative to the ruling élite. At the end of 1923, the 
Ma’arach lost 5 of its 56 seats in the Knesset, while the second largest parliamentary bloc, the Likud, 
increased its seats from 32 to 39. The election results made it possible for the Alignment to form a 
government with a stable majority: Ma’arach, 51; the Independent Liberals (Libralim Atzma'im),4; 
Mafdal, 10361; the Alignment-affiliated Arab lists, 3 and Ya’ad (Civil Rights Movement), 3362. This time, 
however, the renewal of the traditional coalition came up against difficulties, the parliamentary 
decline of the Labor camp, the NRP’s relative weight increased and led to increase its pressure for 
concessions in legislation, the educational system, domestic and foreign policy363. The Alignment 
was able to win the elections, but its majority was quite narrow. 
 
3.1.2 From Golda Meir to Yitzhak Rabin 
 The following meeting of the Central Committee took place on February 24th 1974. The main 
item on the agenda was the ratification of the proposal by the party’s candidate for prime minister 
to form a minority government of 58 members (out of 120 Knesset) composed by 54 Ma’arach members 
plus 4 members from the Independent Liberal Party. Traditional Labor’s coalition partner, Mafdal 
(or National Religious Party) had (due to internal factional strife) demanded the formation of a 
                                                          
360 Arian A., Were the 1973 Elections in Israel Critical?, Comparative Politics, vol.8, n.1, 1975, p.163. 
361 The religious parties declined in favour of the Likud. the NRP obtained 10 seats instead of 12 the Torah Front, 
5 instead of 6. 
362 Knesset elections results 
363 Merhav P., The Israeli Left…, op.cit. p. 289. 
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National unity government with the participation of Likud and a change in the status quo agreement 
on religion and state, requests which were found unacceptable by Labor Party. Only on March 10th 
the Knesset voted its approval of the new government led by Golda Meir which included Mafdal and 
Dayan.  
However, the coalition did not last longer than a month, indeed on April the prime minister 
submitted her resignation; the Cabinet crisis emerged in the wake of the interim report of the 
Agranat Commission appointed by the government to investigate the causes and responsibilities for 
the blunder of the October War. This report put the blame on the IDF’s chief of staff and on the chief 
of the intelligence, without commenting the responsibility of the defence minister. 
The public opinion however refused to accept this artificial separation and demanded a general 
dismissal of the people involved, but since the Dayan refused to resign and both Meir and the Rafi 
faction inside the party didn’t want to dismiss him, Golda Meir had no choice other than to submit 
her resignation. Moreover, another reason for that dramatic step was that the premier was aware of 
the ferment among Israeli public that couldn’t be ignored. This discontent manifested itself in a 
variety of protest groups, which became a widespread social movement demanding the removal of 
the whole old establishment. 
This highly critic environment was the main factor that influenced Golda Meir to resign on April 
11th 1974, which automatically brought down the coalition she had formed. After this event took 
place, only two alternatives were left: holding new election or appointing a successor, who would 
have been called by the President of the State to form a new Cabinet. After an intense discussion, 
Labor General Committee decided on April, by a majority of 283 to 170, to form a new government364; 
the most popular candidate for the task was the finance minister Pinhas Sapir, who had built such 
a strong and dominant position in the party. But, instead to become prime minister he decided to 
keep a dominant role behind the scenes, being a kingmaker by selecting the party’s candidate for the 
highest poliyical position in the country. Indeed, he was key in the designation of Rabin by giving 
him his personal support in front of the party365. 
Due to this, the final contest (held between Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin) was won by Rabin 
and, for the first time in Israel’s history, the premier was not nominated by his predecessor, rather 
elected by a secret ballot at a meeting of the party’s executive366. The premier won by a narrow 
majority, 298 to 254 (54% to 46%). The final choice was made in favor of Rabin because he was a 
man able to to improve the image of Mifleget Ha'Avoda in the eyes of the electorate and of the younger 
generation in particular. On the contrary, Shimon Peres, who had (without any doubt) a 
                                                          
364 Ibidem, p. 290. 
365 Aronoff M.J., Power and ritual…, op.cit., p. 158. 
366 The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, Minutes from Meetings (Heb), 2-2025-1974-59, Series: Party 
Bureau Protocols, 1974/04/16, file n.59, p.55. 
  
92 
considerably wider political experience, was also strongly associated with the Gush, the party 
machine. This leadership contest was thought in order to show to Israeli public that the decisions 
were no longer being made behind closed doors but in front of the public opinion, even if it, 
inevitably, gave also the evidence of a still divided party. 
After the formation of the Cabinet, Rabin and Labor executive institutions had one more choice to 
make between the creation of a small coalition government, or of a wide national unity government; 
so, the party met on May 9th367 and it was decided, by an overwhelming majority of 302 to 36 (6 
abstentions), to authorize Rabin to form a coalition between Ma’arach, the Independent Liberals and 
the Ya’ad368. The resolution left the door open for the Mafdal to join the coalition even on a later date, 
while the motion proposed by Rafi to open talks with Likud in the attempt to form a national unity 
government, was taken down. Only then the prime minister was able to form is government and to 
present it to the Knesset, winning a vote of confidence of 61 to 54 (5 abstentions) on June 3, 1974. 
 
3.1.3 Rabin’s first government, 1974-1977 
 Yitzhak Rabin was a novice in politics when he became prime minister on June 3, 1974. In 
the struggle for the party’s leadership, one of his main advantages was that he could not be 
associated in any way with the grave mistakes of Yom Kippur War; Rabin was an element of 
newness in country’s political life, indeed he was the first prime minister to be born in Israel 
(precisely in Jerusalem, in 1922) and the first to come from Tsahal and not from Gush. His government 
seemed like a breath of fresh air; among its 19 ministers, only 7 had served in the last executive and 
the average age of members was lower than any other previous Israeli administration. 
However, the new governmental body was far from being a united and harmonious team and many 
of its problems resulted in internal conflicts within the majority party. In fact, Ma’arach (or 
Alignment) was born in 1968, but its constituent factions still retained their sectarian loyalty, 
making it very difficult to form a uniform guide-line for action. The most important ministerial 
portfolios were then divided among the most influential souls within the Alignment; Shimon Peres, 
who enjoyed Rafi' support, gained the Ministry of Defense, while Yigal Allon, a member of the Ahdut 
Ha’Avoda, assumed the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, the animosity between Rabin 
and Peres was still there, creating a very hostile environment for cooperation: the distrustful Rabin 
                                                          
367 The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, Minutes from Meetings (Heb), 2-2025-1974-60, Series: Party 
Bureau Protocols, 1974/05/9, file n.60, p.44-118. 
368 The CRM was established by MK Shulamit Aloni toward the elections for the Eighth Knesset and was a 
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thought that his rival was constantly plotting against him and Peres never stopped the attempts to 
undermine the prime minister’s authority. This total and continuous reciprocal rivalry has produced 
deleterious effects on government action.  
As prime minister, Rabin faced further difficulties in leading a coalition with a very close 
parliamentary majority (61 out of 120 Knesset members), due to Mafdal's refusal to join the coalition. 
This party had always been a traditional ally of Mifleget Ha'Avoda since 1948 and its leaders had taken 
part in almost all governments however, after the Six Day War, the NRP had become more 
nationalistic, opposing the return of any part of the biblical land and shifting closer to the right-
wing parties. Hoping to attract National Religious Party’s consensus, Rabin had granted the 
recourse to public before the conclusion of any peace agreement that would have called up to the 
concession of any part of the West Bank. These efforts bore fruit in September 1974 when, finally, 
Mafdal joined the government coalition and increased the number of seats in the Knesset (ranging 
from 61 to 68). At the same time, this new entry seriously limited Rabin's freedom of action over 
Jordan and the Palestinian question. 
After several months of stalemate, the signs of a new approach began to emerge through prime 
minister's speeches; Rabin clarified that the path to peace included big risks, at least as much as 
those associated with a denied dialogue and that a government unprepared to face them would have 
failed its task anyway. He also stated that the path to peace was not necessarily to begin with direct 
talks between Israel and the Arab neighbors, but it could have gone farther gradually, by involving 
other actors and granting small portions of territory in exchange of a political agreement. This 
approach represented a significant departure from previous policy, which consisted of maintaining 
the status quo and dodging political risks, although the need to gain time in relations between Israel 
and the Arab world continued to be relevant in Rabin's thinking. 
According to Shlomo Avineri369, appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
1976, Rabin had a grand strategy to close the Israeli Arab conflict: «Rabin told me clearly that he did 
not doubt that the Arab-Israeli agreement would involve the withdrawal of most of the Territories 
that IDF had conquered during the Six Day War, except Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and other 
                                                          
369 He is an Israeli political scientist. He is Professor of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
.He also headed the Israeli delegation to the UNESCO General Assembly, and in 1979 he was a member of the 
joint Egyptian-Israeli commission that negotiated the Cultural and Scientific Agreement between the two 
countries. During his time at the Foreign Ministry, Avineri followed the official line of the Rabin government 
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strategic points of interest. Densely populated Arab areas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip could 
not remain under our control forever and, in order to ensure maximum negotiation flexibility, we 
should have avoided to build Jewish settlements in those territories. The Jordanian kingdom should 
have been the partner for talks about the future of Judea and Samaria. However, and this is the core 
of the matter, this process should not take place in the wake of the Yom Kippur War and under the 
pressure of Arab oil power, then at its peak. Rabin said that for no reason Israel should have 
withdrawn from the Territories in a way that might have seemed an expression of weakness. The 
first task of his government was therefore to gain time for Israel to rebuild its strategic, diplomatic 
and psychological position after the tragedy of Yom Kippur, and only then (Rabin indicated a period 
of about five years) from a strong position, the Jewish State could have engaged in agreements 
according to the guidelines I had indicated370».  
The crucial point of the strategy was to erase the idea from the minds of the Arab neighbors that a 
weak Israeli State would have made concessions. The strategy impressed Avineri because he was 
simultaneously moderate and extremist: dovish in the ends, hawkish in the means, generous to the 
concessions that could have been made to the Arabs states in a context of a peace agreement, but 
inflexible in the way that this agreement would have been reached371. 
As we will see later, personal problems added to political issues brought Rabin to announce his 
resignation on April 7th 1977; they put an end to nearly thirty years of Labor rule and brought Likud 
to power. Three days later, the party’s Central Committee elected Peres as head of the transition 
government and party leader, heading the Ma’arach for the very close general elections of May 17th 
1977. The first term of Yitzhak Rabin as prime minister lasted just three years; Rabin himself 
considered this period as a personal failure, regretting his lack determination in imposing his 
authority on the party and the government. Because of this overly cautious temperament, he did not 
even stand out in the achievements gained in foreign policy’s issues: his strategy was to rebuild an 
iron wall made of Israeli military force to a point where concessions could not be interpreted as a 
sign of weakness. So, the real lesson that he could draw from his premiership was that time did not 
play in favor of Israel, unless it was spent in an active diplomacy in seeking peace with the Arabs; 
lesson that Rabin put into practice when he returned to power 15 years later. 
With his resignation, Rabin left the Labor Party in full stalemate: even the main editorial of January 
10th 1975 in the Jerusalem Post (a paper traditionally supportive to Labor) was headlined “Labor 
Disarray” and said: «It has by now become almost a clichè to remark on the disarray inside the Labor 
Party. And while the other political parties maybe in an equally sad state, the inner weakness and 
tensions of the Labor Party are of more interest and importance since they intrude more easily and 
directly into the arena of government» and it followed: «The machinery of the historic party, with 
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its forums for airing issues of state and giving direction to the party “representatives” in government 
have become moribund372». The editorial criticized Prime Minister Rabin for having failed to show 
any sign of interest in resuscitating his party. It attributed this behaviour to his natural caution, his 
absorption in the affairs of state and to his former military career, entirely divorced from party 
organization. Rabin had been disappointing for those who had expected him to take an active role 
in assuming the leadership of the party and in the process for its reform; the premier has indeed 
concentrated all his efforts on government matters of state to the detriment of internal Labor 
affairs373. The secretary-general criticized Rabin government’s behaviour for its low degree of 
consultation with party’s institutions, much less involved in any stage of decision. These were the 
conditions in which Ma’arach was about to face the 1977 elections. 
 
3.2 A change in political culture: towards the 1977 elections 
 The elections of 1977 must be considered a turning point in the political history of Israel. As 
showed by Asher Arian374, the analysis of the upset can be thought of in terms of three concentric 
circles, which refer to different temporal distances of the elements that brought to 1977 results. 
The three years from 1974 to 1976 marked the definitive Labor decline, decreed by the elections for 
the Ninth Knesset in 1977. The end of the hegemony of what was the party of the founding fathers 
was due, to an irreversible weakness of the Left camp rather than to an excellent performance of the 
Right (Ma’arach decreased its presence in the Knesset from 51 to 32 MKs, while Likud increased it from 
39 to 43). The consequences of this change were not only political, but also institutional and social, 
that because the victory of the right parties was possible mainly thanks to some transformations 
that took place in the country.  
Indeed, Begin was prepared to promote and take advantage of the ideological aspect of the political 
clash, with the aim of representing the “other half” of Israel, that was formed by Mizrachi Jews and 
supporters of Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionism, a more nationalistic and conservative current375. 
In 1977, an overturn of the existing political balance occurred and a new hegemony was built thanks 
to the convergence of different trends; from the strictly political point of view, MiflagatHa'avoda was 
paying the price for the dramatic mistakes of the Yom Kippur War; while, on a social level, long-
term transformations were matured, the most important one was the attempt of integration and the 
growing awareness by the Mizrachim within Israeli politics. Among the alienated group, Ma’arach 
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increasingly came to be perceived as the party of the European-born veteran elite; so, the Oriental 
Jews increasingly found response to their demands in the anti-establishment376 leader of the 
opposition Begin377. There was no coincidence, thus, that one of the slogans of Likud was “leHeitivim 
haAm378” (benefit to the people379), aiming to highlight the populist character of its political and 
economic proposal, in opposition to the choices made by former Labor governments.  
The increasing accusation that had spread against Labor establishment was therefore in accordance 
with the aim of the Begin’s party in challenging the mamlachtiut, Ben-Gurion's statalism. In addition, 
the interweaving of these factors became even more intricate if we considered that, after the events 
of 1967, the linkage between religious and rightist electorate was becoming more and more 
consolidated380. 
The overlapping between religious identity and Mizrachi origins made even more interesting the bind 
of the ethnic and religious variables, destined to assume growing relevance in the near future. A 
resounding shift from the secular policy of the first thirty years was taking place and the appearance 
of actors in the political scenario, which were capable to reshape the agenda based on policies that 
were argued on the identification with religion’s public function. 
The forthcoming 1977 elections would have created a solid linkage between right-wing parties and 
the religious circles, underlining the ideological affinities between Jewish nationalism and religion, 
pursuing the definitive re-emergence of messianic orientation which, though never disappeared 
from Israeli landscape, it had been absolutely minor in both cultural and political terms since 1948. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter (pages 23-27), the occasion was given by the conquest of 
West Bank during the Six Days War; with that event was created the connection between rightist 
ideological identity and the demand for representation manifested by the groups that were at the 
margins of political power and society in Israel.  
That meeting originated the linkage between the spiritual ferment in Jewish (and partially also 
Israeli) identity and the nationalism on ethnic basis, that Likud aimed to represent. The emergence 
of this trend was only possible with the parallel decline of the Left and its role as the building agent 
of a new society, whose founding valuesare Labor- inspired. 
                                                          
376Whereas in the early years of the state, Ben-Gurion succeeded in denying legitimacy to its main opponent, 
Herut, over the years it became increasingly difficult to do so, especially after the inclusion of this party in the 
national unity government of 1967. Indeed, the participation of Begin and his colleagues established their 
legitimacy and paved their ascension to power.  
377Aronoff M. J., Israeli visions…, op.cit., p. 7. 
378Vercelli C., Israele…, op.cit., p.286. 
379This policy was translated into a series of measures that stimulated capital profits and encouraged private 
consumptions. 
380 This trend will be confirmed on subsequent electoral rounds, culminating in the direct elections for the 
prme minister in 1996. 
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Religion as a political instance came back, bringing with it the reopening of the great question about 
the secular character of the State; Labor's decline and its ideological monopoly also concerned the 
vision enacted by the founding fathers about the state’s autonomy (institutional and cultural) from 
religion. Indeed, Ben-Gurion choose the opposite mechanism with the aim to create Israel’s civil 
religion (where the religious symbols were interpreted and re-elaborated in a new secular 
framework); on the contrary, between the 1960s and the 1970s, the contents of religions were 
undergoing a process of politicization and used in order to validate nationalist tendencies, justifying 
them through the use of messianic references381 . Until those years, religion was ambiguously 
understood as a cultural element belonging to a secularized tradition by the majority of Israelis; but 
in 1977 the religious element came back reversing the relationship with politics and trying to 
establish its primacy. However, it must be underlined that Mapai first and Mifleget Ha’Avoda after, 
they both tried to accredit themselves as credible political partners in the eyes of the religious front; 
thus, the Labor camp had already supported and indulged on a number of draft laws that gave 
control to these parties over religious affairs since long time. 
This tendency caused two results: on one hand the political comeback for Labor was modest 
(truthfully, the religious groups found themselves culturally closer to the right-wing parties rather 
than to the left side of the parliament); on the other, the religious Right increased its bargaining and 
conditioning power, giving birth to long-term consequences reflected on domestic and international 
image of Israel. 
While this parliamentary welding between the nationalist and religious parties was taking place, 
the Gush Emunim was founded382, providing its support to the settlement cause with its action on the 
ground; it immediately conformed itself as a flexible structure, able to represent the interests of the 
settlers animated by a messianic ethos. Indeed, they were deeply committed to the principle of 
absolute devotion, messirut hanefesh, and to the aim of sanctifying the Land with their physical 
presence. 
It was very significant that the form adopted to represent the interests of the settlers was an extra-
parliamentary movement, thus introducing a variable capable of influencing the choices of parties 
inside the Knesset, able to maintain the maximum freedom of action. On one hand, Gush Emunim 
organized a new way of living and sharing politics, introducing those aspects of the mass 
movements: the informality of interpersonal relationships, the refusal or the opposition to politics 
seen as a mediation product between parties, supporting a rhetoric of a new civil religion and of a 
new Israel. 
The historical time of Eretz Yisrael should have been facilitated through the conquest of the space, 
through the physical possession of the Land (and not Time anymore), ending the age of  
                                                          
381Vercelli C., Israele…, op.cit., p.290. 
382We have already mentioned about this movement in the previous chapter, at page 25. 
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old party-politics; this was a radical subversion of original Zionist assumptions, in which the 
conquest of physical space was understood as a time-dependent variable, rather of political realism, 
for which it did not matter where the Jewish State would have been built, but how this process 
could have been carried on383. The aim of the Block of the Faithful was extremely ambitious, for it 
was mainly focused on Israeli society itself and not on the Palestinian side of the dispute.  
In order to understand this process, it can be noticed also at a linguistic level, there was a change in 
the use of the term to refer to settlements: the old concept of hitnatkut, dear to Labor movement (that 
is to say the idea of creating agricultural communities where one could live and work collectively), 
was opposed to the new-old concept of hitnachalut, linked to the non-productive biblical value of the 
territory. Indeed, for the followers of the Block of the Faithful, the land did not have any economic 
or security implications, but it only referred to the ancestral bond of the brit (covenant) between 
Yhwh and its chosen people384. After the epoch of secular Zionism, the age of Religious Zionism had 
come: a radical change manifested, an overturning of the political culture of the country385.  
«New Zionism reformulated the original revolutionary ideology in religious terms and succeeded in 
gaining first the support of the young and subsequently of a large part of the general Israeli public386». 
And, even if this ideology was not implemented by the majority of the population, it established its 
domininace anyway. Liebman and Don-Yehiya387 analyzed the changing of political culture in Israel 
tracing the role of traditional religion in civil religion, which is “what is most holy and sacred in 
political culture388”. In their work they identified Labor Zionism as the dominant of several varieties 
of civil religion from independence to approximately 1967; at that moment the new civil religion 
reached a dominant position, reaching its peak of influence with the Likud victory in 1977. This new 
political culture was focused around the conception of the Jewish tradition and the Jewish people, 
characterized by penetration of religious symbolism in civic life389 and being a counter-ideology that 
legitimized and motivated commitment within politics. 
 
                                                          
383Bidussa D., Il Sionismo Politico, op.cit., p .43 
384Newmann D., From Hitnachalut to Hitnatkut. The Impact of Gush Emunim and the Settlement Movement on Israeli Politics 
and Society, Israel Studies, vol.10, n.3, Fall 2005, p. 207. 
385 Vercelli C., Israele…, op.cit., p.290. 
386Weissbrod L., From Labor Zionism to New Zionism: Ideological Change in Israel, Theory and Society, vol.10, n.6,1981, 
p. 798. 
387 Liebman C. S. and Don-Yehiya E., Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State, 
University of California Press, 1983. 
388Ibidem, p. ix. 
389Aronoff M.J., Israeli Visions…, op.cit., p. 126. 
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3.2.1. The crumbling Rabin’s government 
 The first circle is related with the unique events which preceded the 1977 elections. Rabin’s 
great misfortune was to take over the reins of government at a historical low tide for Labor Zionism. 
He was also inexperienced in dealing with politicians and political intra-party issues. 
In the second week of December 1976, the unique events which directly led to the elections took 
place. On Friday afternoon December 10th, the first consignment of U.S. F-15 fighter planes arrived 
in Israel, a welcoming ceremony was arranged and government ministers and MKs took part; 
unfortunately, the planes arrived less than one hour before the beginning of the Shabbat (on Friday 
evening), leaving inadequate time to hold the ceremony, return home and prepare for the 
inauguration of the Shabbat. The ultra-orthodox front (including Agudat Yisrael390) was furious and 
moved a vote of no-confidence as a result of what they felt, that to say insensitivity to the feelings of 
the religious population and deliberate desecration of the Jewish festivity by government and army 
officials. 
As an orthodox religious party, the Mafdal could only agree with the stand taken by the Religious 
Torah Front391, but as a coalition member of the Labor-Mapam led government, the NRP could not 
easily support a motion of no-confidence: the dilemma was complex because of Israel's law of 
collective responsibility392. This law grants the prime minister the possibility to fire a minister if the 
Knesset delegation of that minister fails to support the government in certain specified votes. Few 
days after, the government won the confidence by a vote of 55 to 48; Dr. Yosef Burg, the senior NRP 
minister, sustained the coalition, but the rest of his delegation abstained: the abstaining behaviour 
pushed Rabin to quickly dismiss the NRP ministries formulating the law of collective responsibility 
and declaring to the Knesset that abstention of NRP’s delegation was to be considered a voluntary 
act of resignation393, announcing also the decision to hold early elections in the spring of 1977. 
Lastly, Rabin made a further big mistake deciding to the held Knesset elections as the first one of the 
series including the Histadrut and local elections, in this way political elections were supposed to be 
the first ones to absorb the wrath of the electorate against the party. Indeed, the public sense that 
                                                          
390It began as a political party representing orthodox Jews in Poland. It later became the Party of the Haredi 
population of Israel. It was the umbrella party for almost all Haredi Jews in Israel until the 1980s, as it had 
been during the British Mandate of Palestine. 
391 The Religious Torah Front was formed when the Ultra-orthodox parties Agudat Yisrael and Poalei Agudat 
Yisrael decided to fight the 1955 elections on a joint list.  
392The law must be understood in terms of the difficulty of ruling without a secure majority in the parliament, 
making ministers responsible for their behaviour of back-benchers. 
393 Merhav P., The Israeli Left…, op.cit. p.318. 
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Labor was a party grown indolent after nearly three decades in power began to manifest itself in a 
series of scandals that came up during the electoral campaign. 
The election year opened with the suicide of Avraham Ofer, the former head of Shikun Ovdim 
(Histadrut’s Housing Corporation), on January 3rd 1977; this action was due to his disappointment at 
learning that investigation against him started for having taken by fraud public fund. Then, just a 
month later, the State’s Attorney General filed charges against Asher Yadlin, the head of Kupat 
Olim394, for having taken IL 280.000 in birbes395. Rabin’s policy of openness had uncovered the 
malfeasance of his predecessors and clearly demonstrated the old way of operating; yet the public 
perception of Mifleget Ha’Avoda didn’t change, despite party’s effort to propose a different style of 
ruling under a different leadership.  
In march, one last (but not least) scandal involved Leah, Rabin’s wife; rumors that she had a still 
active bank account in the U.S.396 spread and the existence of the account was confirmed by an 
article written by Dan Margalit published on Ha’aretz (March 15th 1977). It was illegal for Israelis to 
hold a foreign currency account abroad without prior authorization by the division of the Treasury 
and, because of the allegations against her, the prime minister decided to give his resignation as 
leader of the Alignment397. Rabin despite his good intentions was defeated by the party’s past 
misdemeanors. Actually, in retrospective, Rabin gained in moral prestige by his decision to share his 
wife blame and to suffer all the consequences up to designing the position for which he had fought 
so hard398. 
The image of mismanagement remained with Mifleget Ha'Avoda until the end of the electoral 
campaign when, in April, the State Comptroller399 issued its annual report and indicated the lack of 
                                                          
394 This was especially embarrassing to the government since he had already been approved as head of the 
Bank of Israel, although he had not yet taken office. 
395 Even if this allegation was discounted by the judge, the Yadlin Affaire seemed to confirm the cancerous 
corruption within Labor. 
396 After President Carter’s assignment, during a visit in Washington some Israeli embassy employees heard 
some gossip that Leah was carrying out transactions at the Dupont Circle branch of the National Bank. 
397 The punishment for violating the law was up to three years imprisonment or a fine three times the amount 
illegally held. 
398 Merhav P., The Israeli Left…, op.cit. p.323. 
399 The role of the State Comptroller is to oversee and inspect the executive branch of Israel’s governing 
administration. The Comptroller is elected by the Knesset by secrets ballot. In order to ensure the Comptroller's 
independence and freedom to inspect the Government's actions, it is controlled by the Knesset's Finance 
Committee rather than by the Ministry of Finance. The Comptroller's responsibility is to the Knesset alone. He 
interacts with it and reports his findings to it. The Comptroller's duties and responsibilities as are defined in 
the Basic Law of 1988: auditing the economy and the administration of the State, inspecting the legality, 
efficiency and economy of the audited bodies. 
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sufficient supplies in the army emergency warehouses; moreover, it criticized the IDF for wasting 
financial resources and condemning its large scales expenditures that were not subject to 
parliamentary control. This fact touched a raw nerve since that was one of the problems Israel faced 
during the Yom Kippur War and the public had been assured that it would never happen again. 
All these irregularities stirred up a great resentment among Israelis: the Ma’arach was perceived as 
having been sucked into a vortex of corruption which permeated its entire structure; the askim 
(impolite term coined to refer to party bureaucrats) became hate-figures and symbols of the malaise 
affecting the entire country. The new leadership personified by Rabin and Peres, which was 
supposed to bring a breath of fresh air, was in effect overwhelmed by the degree of corruption 
accumulated over decades400. The age of ideology was rapidly fading and the post ‘48 generation of 
Israelis had different expectations; unlike their parents they were not pioneers, they wanted a 
decent life and a leadership which governs fairly and rationality. These aspirations were set against 
a background of economic downturn and inflation, in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. Thus, 
whether the issue was party democracy or runaway inflation, the future of the territories or the 
honesty of party leaders, the Mifleget Ha’Avoda could offer nothing that the public wanted.  
 
3.2.2 1973, a catalyst year 
 The Yom Kippur War was a very earthquake for the political system, moreover in two 
months after the cessation of hostilities, the elections for the eighth Knesset were held, but they did 
not completely reflect the loss of public confidence in the ruling leadership. A period of incubation 
between 1973 and 1977 elections brought out many of the tensions within the system and stirred the 
difficulties faced by the Alignment’s leadership; almost every problem faced by the system become 
more acute and a crisis of legitimacy in the government and its handling of the country's developed.  
Israel had lost its image of invincibility, morale suffered and in addition to these psychological issues 
the country faced economic and social problems as well. This was the most obvious political 
outcome of the period following the Yom Kippur War that was immediately followed by the rising 
of protest movements, composed by intellectuals, politicians but also by militars. 
The most important one was Yisrael Shelanu (Our Israel) lead by Motti Ashkenazi.; he demanded 
Dayan’s resignation and rapidly he was joined by 5000 sympathizers who agreed to sign a petition. 
The rapid growth of the protest movement fed on a deep malaise that the war and the unresolved 
political problems fueled among many Israelis. This movement was significative because its 
members were animated by an unwavering patriotism, which was the fuel for their bitter criticism 
of the government401; their primary motivation was their love for the state and their desire to fight 
                                                          
400 Shindler C., Israel, Likud…, op.cit., p.81. 
401Bar-On M., In Pursuit…, op.cit., p.74. 
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corruption: «We are trying to break the walls of the Israeli bureaucracy and cause a small crack in 
the self-defense edifice the Israeli leaders have erected around themselves402». 
Even if some of those movements fade away in a matter of months, those groups activated and 
channeled the spread loss of faith in the ruling party authority and allowed other parties to mobilize 
the support of the public, becoming real alternatives to a Labor-led government; the decline of Labor 
spiritual dominance and the setting up of accounted ideology enabled the voters to change their 
behavior403, even if Labor majority survived in 1973 elections. 
The results will become visible just in 1977 elections, when voters faced a new reality: three parties 
were competing for power404, for the first time the electorate was offered more than one real 
candidate for prime minister; with two alternatives to its rule, the MiflagatHa’avodà will lose more 
than a third of the voters. 
 
3.2.3 Changing political system, in a changing society 
 Between the Sixities and the Seventies some processes, that were at work for long time 
inside Israeli society, became evident through resounding effects that changed the political system 
of the country. The event that concentrated all these dynamics were the 1977 elections. First of all, 
we can notice that the established parties were undergoing a crisis of succession; the political 
leadership of Israel was the same who set up the political structures in the pre-state era and which 
ran the country after independence. Then, more than fifty years later, that élite had all but 
relinquished its dominance and the next generation of political leaders had failed to emerge.  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, we can assume that the very crisis of leadership inside the 
Labor camp started in the 1960s with Ben-Gurion’s retirement, reaching its peak with the Lavon 
Affaire, event the party never really recovered from. Under these circumstances, the ability of the 
Gush to maintain dominance in elections of 1963,1969 and 1973 was impressive, even if in those years, 
a significant drop in its votes could already been registered. 
So, what happened in the Sixties was that two processes overlapped: the aging and retirement of 
the traditional political leadership and the emergence of politicians that came from the high ranks 
of Tsahal. Both Ma’arach and Likud (with Ariel Sharon and Ezer Weizman405) experienced an influx 
                                                          
402 Interview with Motti Ashkenazi, Ma’ariv, February 8th 1974. 
403 Arian A., Elections…, op.cit., p. 35. 
404 We are referring to Alignment (Mifleget Ha’Avoda and Mapam), Likud and the Democratic Movement for 
Change (DMC). In the next paragraphs we are going to analyze these political groups and their behaviours 
during 1977 elections. 
405After the establishment of the State of Israel, Weizman was a pilot for the Haganah in the 1948 Arab–Israeli 
War. He served as the commander of the Israeli Air Force between 1958 and 1966, and later served as deputy 
Chief of the General Staff. Upon retiring from the military, Weizman joined the right-wing Gahal party. n 
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of new leaders with a strong IDF background, but the aftermath of the 1973 War accelerated the 
process of leadership turnover especially in the Labor camp: Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Yigal 
Allon replaced Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan and Aba Eban in 1974 respectively as prime minister, 
defense minister and foreign minister. The attempt made by the veteran leaders (especially by Pinhas 
Sapir) to introduce former IDF personalities into the government and into the party organization 
was adopted in order to enhance the party’s public image by the prestige of these the new leaders.  
The emergence of a younger leadership with strong roots in the defense establishment and the 
eclipse of the old party élite became clearer in the years of the Rabin’s government, when an uneasy 
bifurcation existed among the Labor members of the Cabinet, dividing those with a military past 
and those with a Gush experience. It seemed that a strong and unified leadership failed to emerge so, 
under a certain point of view, Begin was the only to represent continuity with the leadership of the 
Founding Fathers for he was the last of the older generation still active in politics. He was then in a 
position of top leadership.  
In the eve of the 1977 elections, not only party leadership was in flux, but also the electorate was 
undergoing to some major transformations. The factor that affected most was the demographical 
change in the composition of the Jewish population, with the emergence of the immigrants from 
Asia and Africa and their children as the dominant ethnic group in the country406. The composition 
of Israel electorate changed dramatically since the first election in 1949, then most of the eligible 
voters were immigrants from Europe, but in 1977 almost at order of the eligible voters were Israeli-
born more than half were immigrants or children of immigrants from Asia, Africa or North Africa407; 
demographic changes are important to understand the 1977 political turnout because for the first 
time in half a century the movement lost the hegemony it had held in Israeli politics since well before 
the establishment of the State. This political power was based on the ability of Mapai to control 
country’s economy and bureaucracy and to dive life to an extended patronage system. 
Among Mizrachi Jews immigrants and their descendants there was a sense of abandonment and 
betrayal with the Labor establishment for its inability to improve their status within Israeli society, 
indeed many of them remained on the lowest level of the socio-economic and education ladder while 
hopping inflation and housing shortage intensified their discontent. Thus, it was true that the Mizrachi 
communities abandoned the Labor Party in increasing numbers from the beginning of the 1960s due 
partly to the growth of this perceived sense of discrimination against them.  
Nevertheless, it was only in 1973 and 1977, with the creation of alternatives by political 
entrepreneurs from the veteran parties, that it was possible for these voters to desert Labor camp in 
                                                          
1977, he became Defense Minister under Menachem Begin.During his term, Israel launched the Litani 
Operation against the PLO in south Lebanon.  
406Arian A., Elections…, op.cit., p. 6. 
407  Central Bureau of Statistics, Results Elections to the Ninth Knesset, n.17, 1977. 
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such a large number. Indeed, the Mizrachi Jews did not form new political actors, but they simply 
transferred their loyalty to them. This is part of the explanation for the emergence of a politics of 
social class and ethnic group which was new to Israeli politics and which opened the era of political 
polarization. The 1977 elections culminated with the realignment of the electoral outcomes with the 
changing society by deposing the dominant party408; Likud’s strength increased steadily, as it was 
able to take use demographic and ideological forces in its favor. 
 
3.3 HaMahapach  
 The Knesset Elections of 1977 are better known as HaMahapach409 (the revolution) because the 
Likud gained over 10% more of Knesset seats and 3.2% additional votes than it had in the Eighth 
Knesset; but the most stunning result was Labor’s loss of 40% of its seats and 15% of voters. Observers 
predicted that a landslide away from Ma’arach was imminent410, but nobody could forecast a decline 
of such significance: Labor decline from 51 seats (including 3 Arab seats affiliated with Labor) to 
32(if we consider 1 Arab affiliated seat, 33) was indeed a shock411. When the ballots were closed, 
what happened was that the right-wing bloc won 43 seats compared to Labor’s 32 and it was clear 
that a new era was about to begin in Israel’s political life412.  
 
3.3.1 The political actors 
 Once we have seen the political and social context of the 1977 elections took place, we can 
now proceed in the analysis of the major actors that had a prominent role in the electoral 
competition, that is to say: the new Democratic Movement for Change, the Alignment, the Likud and 
the role of the religious parties, with particular attention for the National Religious Party. 
 
                                                          
408Arian A., Were the 1973 Elections ...op.cit., p.157. 
409A phrase coined by TV anchor Haim Yavin, when he announced the election results live on television with 
the words "Ladies and gentlemen: a revolution!" (Gvirotai veRabotai: Mahapakh!). 
410 The newspapers’ surveys taken in n the months prior to the electoral turnout indicated as follows. Ma’ariv 
– Labor 35%, Likud 24%, DMC 11%, Religious Parties 5%; Yediot Ahronot - Labor 33%, Likud 29%, DMC 11.   
411Throughout the campaign, polls showed at least a 10% spread between Labor and Likud, to the former 
advantage. 
412 Perez D., The War Election and Israel’s Eighth Knesset, Middle East Journal, Spring, 1974. 
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3.3. 1.1 Dash, Democratic Movement for Change 
 It is important to underline that not all the voters that abandoned Labor were captured by 
Likud, but rather were conquered by a new political actor, Dash (Tnu a Demokratit LeShinui, Democratic 
Movement of Change). Ma’arach’s votes moved away from this party, determining the rise of the 
Likud, winning 11.6% of the total vote while the Alignment registering a 15% drop from 1973413.  
The Democratic Movement of Change (DMC) performed very well, considering that it was 
established a few months before the elections by a coalition of hawks and doves, nationalists, 
conservatives and liberals, all demanding for change within the political scenario and of the system 
they believed responsible for an unwholesome environment. 
DMC was formed by YigalYadin, IDF’s chief of staff in 1948. He criticized party bickering, increasing 
bureaucratization and growing signs of corruption in political life; moreover, he was also openly 
expressing similar dissatisfaction about the conduction of 1973 war. This group merged with Shinui 
(change), led by university law professor Amnon Rubinstein, one of the protest groups emerged 
after the October War; the common denominator of all those groups was their slogans focused on 
political change, efficient government, clean hands and electoral reform. These issues found a 
common cause in the discontent of former generals, ranking government officials, professors, 
intellectuals of diverse political and social orientations, but also several members of the very same 
Labor establishment.  
The party’s platform414 placed emphasis mainly on electoral reform, advocating a system made by 
several electoral districts, that would have replaced the model based on a single national 
constituency. On other issues, including peace, Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories and 
economic problems there were few major differences between DMC and Labor’s platform. Their 
vision for a peace plan called for an Israeli security border along the Jordan river and in the areas 
west to the river, essential for Israel’s defense; no withdrawal from the West Bank unless as integral 
part of a fully treaty; opposition to a sovereign separate Palestinian State west of the river; 
establishment of only one Arab state as Israel’s neighbor in the east “whose capital shall be in the 
East of the Jordan River” and the capital of Israel in a unified Jerusalem. Considering the relatively 
insignificant differences between Dash and Ma’arach on issues of greatest concern for the electorate, 
the element which allowed this new group to succeed in winning 15 seats in the parliament and thus 
becoming Israel’s third largest party, was undoubtedly its call for electoral reform. In general, the 
Democratic Movement for Change adopted an evasive and noncommittal vision, in order not to 
break the political heterogeneous composition of its movement which included hawks and doves, 
                                                          
413Merhav P., The Israeli Left…, op.cit. p. 253. 
414 The Israel Democracy Institute, Dash Party Platform (Heb.), Parties and Elections: 1977, 
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religious and non-religious and, to some extent, was exactly this strategy that made possible to 
assume the traditional model of a center political group.  
 
3.3.1.2 Ma’arach and the missed opportunity for internal reform  
 The scope of Mifleget Ha’Avoda’s breakdown revealed also disaffection among its most loyal 
voters belonging to Labor affiliated organizations, which was indicated by a defection of some 20% 
kibbutz voters in favour of Dash. Even if their total constitutes about 3% of the electorate. Indeed, 
kibbutzim support was considered as the backbone of Labor movement, providing the foundations 
from which Socialist Zionism reached out to achieve a national constituency415. On the other hand, 
we can also notice how fragmentation among Alignment’s ranks found expression through vote 
defections or the creation of new parliamentary groups other than DMC, such as for example Shelli 
(Shalom leYisrael, Peace to Israel) or Hofesh(Freedom), not only among the disappointed voters but 
also among ex-élite personalities. 
Fractionalization might have been predicted along with the disappearence of the traditional 
leadership following the 1973 War; not only the party’s organization and its leadership were in 
transition, but the electorate too was being transformed: a younger generation of Israelis was 
becoming able to vote and Mizrachim416 were becoming more awareness about their role in Israeli 
political life. Those two sectors of the population were not tied with Labor movement with the 
sentiment that could bound many veterans to the establishment and its institutions417.   
After the War of October and after the creation of the Alignment in 1969, the traditional ideological 
differences between Mapai, Ahdut Ha’Avodah, Rafi and Mapam had greatly dissipated; this was one the 
major element that allowed Rabin, the first non-Mapai premier in Israel political history, to become 
prime minister in 1973. During the years of Rabin’s administration (1973-1977) both government and 
party were managed by a triumvirate, including the premier, the defense minister Shimon Peres from 
Rafi and foreign minister Yigal Allon of Ahdut Ha’Avodah.   
These top personalities represented each one a faction of the broad coalition forming the Alignment, 
each of them with diverse and often conflicting perspectives about the territorial and peace 
compromise. For Peres the West Bank was an integral part of Eretz Yisrael, which thus should be 
opened to Jewish settlement (although he was inclined to returning part of the occupied areas); 
                                                          
415Jerusalem Post, May 17 th 1977. 
416 Immigrants and Israelis from Asia or Africa were 43% of the Jewish vote and those with European or 
American origins, 52%: 
417Ma’ariv, March 31th 1977, p. 17. 
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Allon and Eban, second and third respectively on the Alignment list, were instead much more willing 
to discuss peace in terms of a settlement to include substantial Israel withdrawals418. 
The conditions that affected the Ma’arach on the eve of the elections are useful also to understand 
the reasons of the incapacity of the Alignment to project a significant and effective electoral 
campaign. Indeed, the strategy that was approved didn’t help the Labor camp improving its image 
in front of the public; Chaim Bar-Lev was the campaign manager and, like Rabin, was a former 
general of IDF419 with minimal experience of party politics and therefore he  
lacked the party organizational skills required during an election campaign. The chosen tone of the 
campaign was really unfitting the political climate, because it was all focused on the arrogant 
assumptions that Alignment knew what was best for Israel, thus failing to respond to the concerns 
of the electorate about the unsatisfying performances of the Labor leadership manifested since the 
Yom Kippur War.  
As we have already seen in the previous sections, the Alignment was seriously in disarray by a series 
of political economic and psychological circumstances; it failed to present itself in front of the 
electorate with a clear-cut alternatives policy420 to those of Likud and DMC. The party lack of 
direction was summed up by un-apologetic advertisement that appeared one day before elections: 
«Even a responsible government can err, but to to elect an irresponsible government would be a great 
error421». When Mapam tried to change and correct the contents of the electoral campaign, it was 
already too late to erase the impression that have become entrenched in the mind of the public in 
the course of the last few years422: that, in terms of ideology, there was no such fundamental 
difference between the Ma’arach and its rivals and that there was no possibility to heal the Labor 
party from the degree of corruption and mismanagement that characterized its ruling epoch. 
Lastly, it is useful to underline how the decision to hold the elections of Histadrut after the Knesset 
elections impacted on the final results: moving the Histadrut’s electoral turnout a month after the 
                                                          
418 Their opinion was based on the Allon Plan (seen in the previous Chapter 2). 
419 During the June 1967 Six-Day War he served as the Deputy Chief of Staff in the IDF. In late 1968 he built a 
high sand-dune wall with a line of fixed fortifications along the east bank of the Suez Canal. This became 
known as the Bar-Lev Line. During the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, although retired from the IDF and 
serving as the Minister of Trade and Industry, he was recalled by Prime Minister Golda Meir back into military 
service and he played a pivotal role in the war. Between 1977 and 1984 he served as General Secretary of the 
Mifleget Ha’Avoda, the largest faction in the Ma’arach. 
420 The Israel Democracy Institute, Ma’arach Party Platform (Heb.), op.cit. 
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parliamentary one, removed the possibility of withstanding such protest votes in an organization 
where the Alignment could bear them and still retain power423.  
In conclusion, MiflagatHa’avodà failed to socialize a new generation of supporters and leaders, to 
maintain responsive party institutions, truly to integrate the Mizrachi Jews, to keep its historic 
coalition partnership with Mafdal, to prevent the main nationalist opposition to gain legitimacy and 
to prevent (or resolve) the crisis of identity that emerged in the late Sixties and the mid-Seventies. 
 
3.3.1.3 Likud, a new candidate for political dominance 
 The opposite challenging force, Likud, was also a product of a process of splits and mergers 
among diverse political factions. It was formed in 1973 by different parties: Gahal424, the Free Center 
(HaMerkaz HaHofshi), the National List (Reshima Mamlakhtit425) and the National Movement for 
Greater Israel426 (HaTenu'a Lema'an Eretz Yisrael HaSheleima, also called Land of Israel Movement). The 
core of Likud was Herut a rightist and nationalist party led by Menachem Begin, whose program 
emphasized that the Jewish state was the whole historical Palestine, considering the partition of 
Western Palestine in 1948 as unjust. 
After 1965, Herut (when it joined Israel Liberal Party in order to form the Gahal, Gush Herut-
Liberalim427), it maintained its role as major opposition party in Israel, obtaining 26 seats in 1965 and 
1969; the performance of the right-wing blocks improved with Likud of 7 seats (for a total of 39 in 
1973428). It isuseful to underline the fact that Herut functioned as the strongest component in both 
these formations and that before the creation of these wider groups, Herut’s main goal was the 
creation of a Jewish State on both sides of the Jordan River, including Israel, Judea and Samaria and 
the Hashemite King of Jordan. This vision was inherited from the revisionist program of Vladimir 
                                                          
423 Lochery N., The Israeli Labor Party: in the Shadow of the Likud, Ithaca Press, 1997. 
424 This party born in 1965 from the merger between Herut and the Israel Liberal Party (Miflaga Libralit Yisraelit), 
the very ancestor of today Likud. 
425 This party was formed by politicians who belonged to Rafi, the party founded by Ben-Gurion in 1965. When 
in 1968 Mifleget Ha’Avoda was formed also with Rafi’s participation, this group decided to seceed and to form 
an independent parliamentary formation, until its adeherence in Likud. 
426Political organisation in Israel formed in 1967,which subscribed to an ideology of Greater Israel. 
427 The alliance brought together the only two right-wing parties in the Knesset, each with 17 seats at the time. 
The Gahal platform largely incorporated Herut's approach to security and foreign affairs and the Liberal Party's 
approach to economics and finance. 
428 Arian A., Elections…, op.cit., p. 41. 
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Jabotinsky429, whose territorial aspirations were incompatible with those liberals which came from 
the General Zionist movement430.  
After the merge, Likud then adopted a “diluted” version of its previous foreign policy calling for 
«Israeli sovereignty between the Jordan and the sea. […] Settlements in all parts in all part of the 
Land of Israel, without uprooting anyone from his Land and enactment of Israeli law over all the 
territory of Eretz Yisrael (including West Bank and Gaza). Arabs in Eretz Yisrael who desire 
citizenship and promise loyalty to Israel will be granted equal rights431».  
Economic and social politics were the links that have held Herut and the Liberals together rather 
than foreign and security issues: lacking Begin’s charisma, the Liberals provided the basic social 
orientation for the Gahal bloc, representing interests of Israel Manufacturer Association and of the 
small private sector in agriculture. Basically, they opposed the Histadrut apparatus and the special 
privileges that its affiliated organizations through its historical institutional ties with the Labor 
governments.  
So, on social and economic issues, Herut remained essentially faithful to the classic tenets of 
Revisionism: national solidarity, improvement of the opportunities for private enterprise, 
opposition to proliferation of bureaucracy, reduction of state directed paternalism and containment 
of preferential tax treatment for collective and Histadrut432 owned enterprises. This socially conscious 
attitude increased popularity among workers and the socially disadvantaged; safeguarding the social 
and economic needs of these groups became an important part of its program. Herut voters came 
from working class elements and among people motivated by strong nationalist feelings (with East 
European os Sephardi origins), thus, gradually Herut gained popularity among newly immigrated and 
second-generation Jews from Arab countries. and this affiliation made it to become Israel’s second 
largest party since 1955.  
Likud was also bolstered by the messianic and territorial aspirations of Mafdal and other groups who 
were intent on settling Judea and Samaria, which they regarded as a religious duty. Because of this 
emphasis the party acquired the character of being interesting mainly in foreign affairs with a 
strongly activistic policy; moreover,  without being a religious party in the strict meaning of the 
term, Herut had a positive attitude towards Jewish religious traditions therefore it was supported by 
Orthodox circles, moreover the party esteemed religion as a bond between the People and the Land 
of Israel, because it contained the very pronounced assertion of the Jewish character and destiny in 
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the Holy Land. Despite this strong connection with Judaism Herut (and then Likud) was a secular 
party, which took characteristics of traditional religion that provide principles and moral basis to 
the national claim433.  
One of the main reasons for Likud growing popularity was the public dissatisfaction with the 
deficiencies of Labor-led government; in particular IDF’s unpreparedness at the beginning of the 
Yom Kippur War was a major factor of this dissatisfaction but it was far from being di only factor. 
Furthermore, people were impatient with the mounting waves of labor protest, corruption and 
crime, as well with the government’s incapability of dealing effectively with the problems of the day. 
Lastly, concernign to foreign policy, the Alignment government seemed too dovish, to proponents 
of stronger positions and too hawkish to those more inclined towards compromise. Moreover, 
religious circles regarded it as too secular, secularists as too prone to give in to the orthodox: there 
was a general dissatisfaction with the government. 
Likud took advantage of all this criticism regarding the mismanagement and the corruption of 
Ma’arach its main slogans for the electoral campaign. In this way Likud portrayed Labor as a decaying 
party, one that could not be trusted with the nation’s security: Miflagat Ha’avodà’s claims to be strong, 
vigilant and peace-seeking were mocked. The message was clear and was predicted on public shock 
and sensitivity after the shock of the October War: «For peace not surrender, vote Likud434». Ma’arach 
could not project such a focused approach because it had to explain mistakes in the war and to 
account for its inability both to reform itself and to relate to lower-income stratawhich should have 
constituted a natural source of support.  
In general, Likud didn’t offer any stunning originality in its electoral campaign, rather it repeated the 
old principles of the Israeli right435, such as: opposition to any territorial partition regarding Judea 
and Samaria, free Jewish settlements activities all over the West Bank, electoral reform, abolishment 
of proportional representation, depoliticization more exactly desocialization of the Histadrut and 
(above) all Begin to power.In general, the leitmotiv (in common with Dash) during the campaign was 
that the Labor movement  had been running the country for 29 years and it would have be a good 
thing for Israel if the Ma’arach was about to take a four-years break and this argument seemed to 
have been convincing enough to Israelis, who  voted in order to break Labor political monopoly. 
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3.3.1.4 Mafdal, the pivotal force 
 Both tradition and experiencehave always made one or more of the religious parties, junior 
partners in most government coalitions led by Labor camp since the establishment of the State of 
Israel. Until displaced by DMC as the third largest party in 1977, they held the balance of power; but 
in that year the National Religious Party (NRP) increased its strength just from 10 to 12 Knesset seats, 
3 less compared to the Democratic Movement for Change’s performance436. Despite this apparent 
loss of influence, the elections for the ninth Knesset were the turning point that decreed the shift of 
the religious bloc (composed by NRP and Agudat Yisrael) away from the Alignment, becoming 
reliable partners for Likud. This change of position was possible not only thanks to a good 
performance of this latter and to Labor’s decline, but also for the the ideological distance that was 
created between the NRP (most of all) and the Mifleget Ha’Avoda itself after the 1967 War.  
Indeed, the conquest of the Territories reopened a harsh debate inside Zionism, awakening 
messianic feelings and territorial aspirations that were dormant throughout Israeli society. What 
happened was that the dominant and younger faction of the NRP became strongly influenced by the 
newborn Gush Emunim and they started to pressure their leadership to move the party closer to 
groups inside the Knesset that could support better their vision. Likud and Begin were the supporters 
of the Eretz Yisrael concept that better suited to the national-religious sentiment of the NRP. The 
success of Begin’s party was also possible thanks to the Gush Emunim and to the members of the 
National Religious Party who naturally amplified Likud’s platform demands to hold western 
Palestine under Israel’s control; moreover the movement was able to recruit and to channel the 
political fervor of Orthodox Jews close to the NRP, which was influenced by his younger members 
into taking a position largely identical to that of the Gush Emunim and to opt for a formation of a 
parliamentary alliance with the right-wing parties, instead of the historical Labor partner437. 
Indeed, their insistence on establishing Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria led, if not to direct 
confrontation, to friction with Labor governments since the 1967 War; settlements built by Gush 
Emunim without official permission were major embarrassments to Rabin, because failure to deal 
decisively with it was a continuous reminder of his government’s indecisiveness on the West Bank 
and on many other issues.Moreover we don’t have to forget that the occasion to the religious parties 
to break the historical alliance with Labor was given by Rabin itself (in 1973) after the NRP’s refusal 
to support the government in a parliamentary vote of non-confidence. After this episode any new 
prime minister will have kept in mind that disagreement with his religious colleague in the cabinet 
could be the cause for the dissolution of the government itself. For this reason, since the Ninth 
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Knesset, the relatively strong position of the religious groups meant also a new relationship between 
state and religion. 
 
3.3.2 The electoral results: a social and political analysis 
 On May 17th 1977, 1.771.726 votes were cast with a turnout of 79.2%. The most significant 
factors in the results were, first that Mifleget Ha’Avoda lost its pivotal position in the coalition building 
process and second that Likud was able to put together a winning coalition without support of 
centrist or leftist parties. The biggest loser of the 1977 elections was of course the Alignment, who 
lost a third of its support since 1973 when it received 39.6% of the votes, compared with 24.6% in 
1977. The Likud gained, but less than what Labor lost. Indeed, it improved on its 1973 vote (30.2%) 
in 1977 by one-tenth, 33.4%438.  
Of great importance for the Likud was the shift made by the religious parties away from Labor 
towards the right wing of the Knesset, after what Peres’s disappointed supporters sarcastically term 
the “smart exercise439” of 1976, when Rabin broke the historical partnership with religious parties440. 
Actually, this trend started well before the 1976 split, with the radicalization of the National 
Religious Party after the Six Days War; indeed, since then onwards the change was both ideological 
and generational, with the younger generation (especially of NRP) proving more militant and 
messianic supporters of Eretz Yisrael. Consequently, they moved into the Likud camp along with other 
religious parties, thus providing the rightist camp with an inbuilt blocking majority for the rest of 
the 1970s and for much of the 1980s.  
The performance of Likud in increasing its number of seats from 39 to 43 was impressive; the 
elections marked a momentous change, provoking a move away from Labor Zionism towards a more 
nationalistic interpretation of it, expressed by Likud and religious parties441. It represented the 
ascendancy of bloc politics over simple party politics with the smaller parties lining up behind one 
of the two major parties (Labor and Likud) to form political blocs and potential coalition partners. 
In 1977 elections, the Alignment underwent its largest loss of seats ever experienced in any other 
election, losing support on two fronts: the first one in favor of DMC in traditional Labor middle-
class strongholds and second in favor of Likud among the key groups of low-income ethnic and young 
voters.  
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The shift away from the Alignment was uneven; indeed some groups moved to the Likud, others went 
to the DMC: these crystallizing of the electorate made the 1977 election significant for the future of 
Israeli politics for the catcher of nature of the Labor party was diminishing the upper middle-class 
voters of Western European and American extraction and high levels of educated flocked to the 
DMC, instead many lower class workers with oriental background joined their causes and 
constituted the major bulk of Likud supporters.After the election about 50% of the Likud voters and 
60% of the DMC voters  in the sample said that the major factor in their voting decision was that 
they distrusted a government headed by the Alignment; 40%of the DMC voters and 50% of the Likud 
gave a positive reason for their vote: trust in the leadership of the party they voted for442.In general, 
between 1973 and 1977 one-half of electorate switched its vote in 1977; among those who supported 
the Labor camp in 1973, less than a half voted for the Alignment again in 1977, while 20% of them 
went to the Likud and 18% voted for Dash . Among those who did not vote in 1973, 40% gave Likud 
their vote in 1977 and 16% voted for Dash.  
When asked by Ma’ariv daily newspaper to select three issues from a list of twwnty which they felt 
could most affected the outcome of the elections, respondents gave the following ratings 1- inflation 
(34%), 2- peace negotiations (30%), 3-  standard of living(26%), 4- administrative corruption (22%), 
5- tax burden (22%), 6- political leadership (21%), 7- economic gap between Ashkenazim and 
Mizrachim (17%), 8- policy in the “administrated areas” in the West Bank and Gaza (16%)443. Many 
voters seemed to ballot against Labor rather than for anything in particular444; this could be 
demonstrated by a poll that the same newspaper (Ma’ariv) took in March 1977, asking “Do you have 
faith in the Rabin-led government and do you rely on its work over the past two and a half years?”. 
The results showed that only the 28% responded yes without reservation (compared to the 58% of 
“yeses” to this question regarding Golda Meir in 1973). On the other hand, 53% found Prime Minister 
Rabin statisfactory in defense and foreign policy, compared to the 29% backing Labor’s attitudes in 
these areas in December 1973445. 
Ma’ariv analysis of voters’ characteristics showed that half were over 30 and half between 19 and 29. 
Among the younger voters 28% supported Likud compared to only 25% who would vote for Labor 
camp; instead among the electorate over 50, 33% supported the Alignment, compared to 16% for the 
Likud, demonstrating that support for Ma’arach rose and for Likud with the rise in age. Polls showed 
stronger support for Likud among Oriental Jews with Europeans and Americans backing Labor; Jews 
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arrived before 1948, of whom 85% were Europeans gave far greater support to Labor446. Since 1948 
those who were most Mizrachi Jews, whose socio-economic status was lower and worse than the 
Ashkenazi one; with the time passing by the immigrants with oriental origins found themselves 
more inclined towards Likud: by 1977 ethnicity and status were reflected in voting patterns. 
Even if the social gap was recognized by the voters as one of the ten most important problems, it 
still did not politicize the Mizrachim into significant groupings of their own447; indeed, all parties 
gave them priority in their platforms but actually placed few Oriental Jews among the lead positions 
on their lists. Attempts by young immigrants from Iraq and Morocco to rally Mizrachim in the Israel 
Black Panthers448 (HaPanterim HaShhorim) during the 1960s stimulated wide debate but were short 
lived and ineffective to give any factual political representation.  
By 1977 the Black Panthers were factionalized into at least three or four competing groups, such as 
Hofesh, Zionist Phanters and Shelli. Given Mizrachim’s real social and economic problems against a 
background of cultural and ethnic tensions, the very obstacle to success for the Black Panthers’ 
experience was the divisiveness inside the group, where personal competition prevailed on 
                                                          
446 Ibidem 
447 The arrival but, most of all, the absorption of Oriental Jews gave birth to a series of inequalities (economic 
and social) between these new-comers and the Ashkenazi population who already was settled in Israel; the 
attempt to create a single national culture has brought to some form of discrimination, heavily suffered by 
Mizrachim, coming from an opposite cultural environment. 
Those are the themes that paved the way for a wider reflection about the relation between Israeli society and 
his citizens, whose ethnicity can defined as Arab. This debate is one of the most important inside Israeli 
academy but it will not be analyzed in this context. This was a choice made in order to focus the discourse of 
this chapter more on the political attitudes and voting behavior of those people, rather then on the academic 
research who is currently debating about correlated sociological dynamics. For a more in-depth reading, see 
Khazzoom A., The Great Chain of Orientalism: Jewish Identity, Stigma Management, and Ethnic Exclusion in Israel, 
American Sociological Review, vol. 4, n.68, 2003, 481-510 and the debate about the terms “ethnic democracy” 
formulated by Sammy Smooha, Ethnic democracy: Israel as an archetype, Israel Studies, vol.2, n.2,1997, pp.198-241; 
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of the state. The Black Panthers felt that this discrimination could be seen in the different attitude of the 
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ideological and tactical disagreement, facilitating the ability of the largest parties to co-opt leaders 
of the Mizrachi communities. While they had yet to demonstrate their ability to provide a national 
political leadership, instead they proved to have became dramatically powerful in local politics, to 
be able to cast their vote as a cohesive group and to represent a relevant political power, which 
radically re-shaped the national political scene449.  
This dynamic was confirmed by the analysis of voting patterns in cities and sub-district in terms of 
socio-economic characteristic of those areas revealed that party vote and social class450 are related: 
relatively low socio-economic districts and those with a high percentage of citizens born in Asia and 
Africa generated higher levels of support for Likud than in the previous elections. In districts with 
relatively high socio-economic class structure and a large proportion of European background, the 
Alignment either held its ground. The Likud was particularly successful in areas where the 
disadvantages strata were largely concentrated; all this indicated that a large part of Israel working 
class, especially the lower income-groups switched their vote in favor of Likud for the first time in 
Israeli. After almost two decades of socialist Labor hegemony, the entire population had to deal with 
the shock of seeing the Ma’arach’s presence in the Knesset increasingly reduced; hardly anyone was 
able to foresee Likud’s emergence as the strongest party enabling it to form a government without 
either Alignment or Dash. The President of the State charged Begin to form the new government and, 
after hard bargaining, he succeeded in ensuring sufficient parliamentary support for his coalition 
consisting of Likud, Mafdal, Agudat Yisrael and Moshe Dayan; Ma’arach, after having rejected Begin’s 
offer to join a national unity government, went into opposition for the first time since the foundation 
of the State of Israel. 
 
3.3.2.1 The final political outcome: Labor at the opposition 
 Peres believed that «Corruption hurt us at most451», but the salient fact was that Labor had 
steadily declined as a political force in Israel. This phenomenon was taking not only in Israel indeed, 
in those years, worldwide inflation increased unemployment and the general economic dislocation 
in several western countries, taking their tolls among socialist parties in Sweden, Australian and 
other democracies. In Israel, where these economic effects were greatly exacerbated by specific 
problems of spiralling defense costs, relatively low productivity of labor and 30 years rule by one 
party which had lost its charismatic leaders and the high elan which once characterized it. For these 
dynamics, loss of power was only a matter of time: «The voters punished the Alignment and we 
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deserve it. […] Great things the party achieved […] We allowed corruption to grow. […] The voters 
were fed up with the regime’s inability to gain control over the deteriorating domestic situation452».  
The gradual decline and final defeat of “workers’ hegemony” in Israel cannot be fully understood and 
explained without taking into consideration the deep structural changes in Israeli working class, 
with their political implications. The Israeli Labor movement originated from, and has been mainly 
based upon, workers who had been motivated to immigrate and become workers by socialist Zionist 
ideology, and who took for granted the connection between Zionism and socialism. However. 
during the course of realization of the socialist-Zionist ideology, a new working class developed in 
urban areas of the country, mainly consisting of new immigrants from the Middle East and North 
Africa. The latter had no socialist-Zionist background instead, on the contrary, this new working 
class had been extremely vulnerable to nationalist and social demagoguery, so skillfully practice by 
the Israeli right. 
In addition, Ma’arach complacency and emphasized pragmatism, as well as its failure to drawing a 
clear-cut demarcation line between left and right, created a vacuum which was inevitably filled by 
ideas and values alien to the Labor camp; the Mizrachi Jewish workers, as the urban and younger 
generations, were particularly receptive to these ideas: the argument of absence of options far too 
often used and abused by the establishment, gradually eroded. 
The working people and younger generation finally overcame their former inhibitions and translated 
their protest against the establishment into voting for reactionary453. The challenge for Ma’arach in 
the following decades would have been the attempt to adapt itself to this structural changes and 
ideological-psychological development; bringing back Israeli working class and youth back to the 
Labor-Zionist ethos would have been accomplished through an educational and ideological 
offensive. Otherwise all its congresses, discussions, splits and mergers would be hanging in air 
unrooted in social reality. 
 
3.4 The first Begin’s government 
 Begin was a charismatic leader, who attracted both harsh opposition and deep admiration. 
His personality and his attitude towards the world have been forged by the tragic loss of his family 
during the Nazi holocaust. 
He was marked by this experience and, for the rest of his life, he saw the world as a deeply hostile 
and dangerous anti-Semitic environment; from this perspective he perceived Arab hostility as an 
extension of the same hatred that had brought to the extermination of European Jewry, intensifying 
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his distrust towards goyim454 (especially towards Arab countries). It seemed that he wanted to prove 
with all his strengths that the world was expecting nothing but the occasion to destroy again the 
Jewish people and how, with such a great threat, only a powerful Israeli military force could protect 
Jews, avoiding a second Shoah.  
Begin often described his generation as the forged by "Holocaust and Redemption455"; for him and 
his combat fellows of the period of their militancy among the ranks of Irgun and of the struggle for 
the state, the cause-effect link between Shoah and the formulation of coherent principles for Israeli 
foreign policy was clearer, stronger and more direct than any other Israeli political group456. 
The prime minister thought that Tsahal's main function was not “to fight a war”, but to deter Arab 
armies from doing it; in this perspective he chose the members of the executive, satisfied with the 
idea that the sole composition of the Cabinet could discourage Arab enemies from attacking Israel. 
Begin said to his advisers: «The Arabs won’t start a war against us if military leaders like Dayan, 
Weizmann and Sharon are sitting together in the government457». Indeed, the most important 
decision taken by Begin during the bargaining period of the government coalition was was to offer 
the Foreign Ministry to Moshe Dayan (who accepted the offer as long as the government wouldn’t 
have extended Israeli sovereignty over the Territories conquered in the Six-Day War). 
One of the reasons that motivated Begin to offer such an important role to a prominent political 
figure, who belonged to Labor ranks, was the need to emphasize the continuity of Israeli foreign 
policy; the premier  was well aware that out of Israel was perceived as a fanatic, extremist, warlike 
and he also knew that his rise to power could create the fear of possible tensions between Israel and 
his neighbors, so he tried immediately to provide a reliable and reasonable of himself, since the very 
beginning of his mandate. Then, on June 20, 1977, he presented his government to the Knesset, 
obtaining a vote of confidence with a majority of 63 votes against 53. Trying to obtain some credit 
for his good intentions, once reaffirmed the ideological commitment of his government to Eretz 
Yisrael’s vision, he clarified that there was no plan for the immediate annexation of the West Bank 
or the Gaza Strip458 . 
Likud's victory in 1977 was not just an electoral revolution for Israeli politics, but it was also a 
watershed regarding the relations between Israel and the Arab world, especially about the way to 
manage the issue of the Occupied Territories; the fundamental difference between Labor and Likud 
foreign policy can be found in the fact that the first one was more pragmatic, while the latter had 
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stronger ideological guiding-lines. In fact, Ma’arach’s policy towards the Territories was animated 
mainly by considerations about security, while the rightist approach was oriented by ideological 
considerations; the remarking of this aspect is not to be intended as qualitative judgement, rather a 
way to emphasize the diversity of the priorities between the two political factions. Indeed, in Begin's 
attitude towards the territorial question was mainly defined by Eretz Yisrael’s principle, while inside 
the Labor camp the debate was wider and more oriented by pragmatic arguments (even if also among 
its ranks were present supporters of the maximalist territorialist current). 
Likud's victory in 1977 was not just an electoral revolution for Israeli politics, but it was also a 
watershed regarding the relations between Israel and the Arab world, especially about the way to 
manage the issue of the Occupied Territories; the fundamental difference between Labor and Likud 
foreign policy can be found in the fact that the first one was more pragmatic, while the latter had 
stronger ideological guiding-lines. In fact, Ma’arach’s policy towards the Territories was animated 
mainly by considerations about security, while the rightist approach was oriented by ideological 
considerations; the remarking of this aspect is not to be intended as qualitative judgement, rather a 
way to emphasize the diversity of the priorities between the two political factions. Indeed, in Begin's 
attitude towards the territorial question was mainly defined by Eretz Yisrael’s principle, while inside 
the Labor camp the debate was wider and more oriented by pragmatic arguments (even if also among 
its ranks were present supporters of the maximalist territorialist current). 
The integrity of the homeland (Shlemut HaMoledet) was an indispensable concept for Likud, as it was 
openly declared in its political platform for 1977 elections: «[...] The Jewish people's right on Israel's 
Land is eternal and is an integral part of his right to security and peace. Judea and Samaria must not 
therefore be abandoned to foreign domination. Between the sea and the Jordan river there will only 
exist a Jewish sovereignty and any plan for the transfer of parts of the western territory of Eretz 
Yisrael, which obstructs our right to the Land of Israel, would inevitably lead to the creation of a 
Palestinian state and it would undermine the security of the civilian population, endangering the 
existence of the State of Israel 459». 
 
3.4.1 The Camp David Accords  
Despite the attacks on him and the fear he aroused in the world media, Begin’s moderateness 
and courtesy were a pleasant surprise, but what mainly worked in his favour was the peace process; 
the prime minister did not believe in partial agreement with Arab states and he vehemently opposed 
the interim agreements tactic proposed by Rabin; rather he wanted a historic breakthrough, that to 
say a peace agreement with the biggest, most important Arab state: Egypt. Hints that he was willing 
                                                          
459Shindler C., Israel, Likud…, op.cit., p. 85. 
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to compromise on territories can be detected in the platform he dictated to his party in January 1977, 
where he expressed his before his intentions to compromise on Sinai and Golan Heights, asserting 
that the west of the river Jordan there would be no foreign rule, but rather autonomy for Arab 
inhabitants. Moreover, at his first meeting with the American President Carter, Menachem Begin 
said that he accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242460 (to which his opposition in 1970 had 
called his resignation from Golda Meir government). 
Since that moment, he initiated a series of meeting whose cumulative effects led to the greatest 
surprise of the century: Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem. In November 1977 the Egyptian president 
addressed to his Parliament saying some short sentences regarding negotiations with Israelis: «I am 
willing to go to the ends of the earth for peace, even you their house, the Knesset and talk to them. 
We have no time to waste461». Begin understood the evolutionary significance of that statement 
answering back: « I will gladly meet with Sadat anywhere, even in Cairo, and should he want to 
come here he will be welcomed462». The two protagonists in this performance were aware of the 
effect of its symbolism, the importance of gestures, the groundbreaking nature of their moves and 
the power of their psychological influence; Sadat believed in the need to break down the 
psychological barriers of the Israelis’ lack of trust in Egypt and his visit to Jerusalem and appearance 
in the Knesset were aimed at eliminating that barrier463. 
Meanwhile the Israelis could not believe their eyes: the man who symbolized “not one inch”, 
absolute refusal to compromise, had invited Sadat to Jerusalem. prime minister’s popularity soared 
when, on November 19th 1977, Sadat’s plane landed in Israel; the entire country was in front of the 
television watching the incredibles scene of the Egyptian president plane touching down in Lod. 
The aircraft’s door opened and the Egyptian delegation began descending the steps; last to appear 
was President Sadat, welcomed and escorted by Begin, down the red carpet. When the Egyptian 
President met former prime minister Golda Meir, he said: «I wanted to meet you for a long time», 
«But you never came», she answered him back. «Here i am», he replied464. The citizens of Israel were 
euphoric, if Sadat wanted to persuade them of his peaceful intentions, he had won them over in a 
single gesture. The most awaited event of this visit was Sadat’s speech at the Knesset; he spoke in 
                                                          
460 It was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council on November 22nd 1967, in the aftermath of the 
Six-Day War. The text refers to the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work 
for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area can live in security" and it 
includes the application of the principle regarding the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories 
occupied in the recent conflict. 
461 Shilon A., Begin: 1913-1992, Am Oved, 2007, p.287. 
462 Shapira A., Israel…, op.cit., p. 368. 
463 Morris B., Vittime…, op.cit., p. 563. 
464 Ibidem, p. 568. 
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Arabic about the past wars, the soldiers fallen and the sorrow of both countries for their deads; he 
knew that that was the most important issues in front of the eyes of Israelis:«We all are still crying 
for the consequences of four terrible wars, over the last thirty years […]».He blamed fear and lack of 
mutual trust the previous failed attempts to dialogue, such as in Geneva Conference465 few years 
before; but now the moment was come to pursue courageously new horizons, exposing his 
conditions for a peace agreement: withdrawal from conquered Arab territories, self-determination 
for the Palestinians, and the right for every country in region to live in peace within safe borders and 
with appropriate international guarantees. His words seemed like an ultimatum, but just the simple 
fact that he was there prevailed over the tone of his speech. 
Obviously, the distance between Begin and Sadat regarding these requirements came to light and it 
remained for the following two years, but notwithstanding this, the journey to Jerusalem was a 
milestone in the path of peace; a mutual understanding over the necessity for Egypt and Israel to 
reach a peace agreement was achieved, maybe this harmony could have been precarious, but its 
meaning was deep, because for the first time in Israeli history, the public opinion saw that there was 
an Arab leader (the most important one) ready to talk about peace and to make concessions in order 
to achieve it. There was someone in the Middle East to talk to. The same thing happened also in 
Egypt, where another psychological barrier was broken; the traditional demonization of the “Zionist 
enemy” was starting to be challenged by a more rationale approach, but for the rest of the Arab 
world, Sadat’s move was a trauma, especially for the Palestinians466. 
Almost a year later, after several attempts to dialogue and reach an understanding on several critical 
issues, President Carter invited Prime Minister Begin and Sadat at Camp David in order to try to 
bridge the differences; on September 17th 1978, Egypt and Israel agreed on a peace treaty thanks to 
the American patronage. Once returned to their countries, the two leaders had to face harsh 
criticism; Sadat was accused to be a traitor, to have left alone the Palestinians and to have turned his 
back to the Arab cause. The difficulties were significant also in Israel; first of all, Menachem Begin 
had to deal with his own conscience because, not only he didn’t keep the promise not to dismantle 
the settlements in the Sinai, but also he created a precedent for the eventual removal of those in the 
West Bank. He renounced to important strategic military positions, he conceded “autonomy” to the 
                                                          
465 The Geneva Conference of 1973 was an attempt to negotiate a solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict as 
envisioned in United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 following the called-for cease-fire to end the 
Yom Kippur War. Henry Kissinger opened the conference, articulating his step-by-step strategy and stated 
that the goal of the conference was peace; the immediate need was to strengthen the cease-fire by 
accomplishing a disengagement of forces as the "essential first step" toward implementation of UN 242. No 
agreement was reached. 
466 In November 22nd 1977, Arafat and Assad released a statement condemning Sadat’s initiative, declaring to 
be ready to use every means at their disposal in order to boycott any results and inviting the Egyptians to 
oppose to this betrayal. 
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Palestinian people (probably creating the premises for the birth of a Palestinian state) and he 
committed to the temporary freezing of the settlement enterprise.  
Giving up the settlements went against Begin’s promise according to which “One does not give away 
what has been built”; the voluntary surrender of settlements built by government’s decision was 
unprecedented and, although Begin would not withdraw from Judea and Samaria467, it was clear 
that the withdrawal from Sinai and Rafah Approach settlements was a portent of what was to come: 
settlements were not sacred. 
All these elements are alswo the reasons why the Camp David Accords were not greeted with the 
same enthusiasm as Sadat’s visit; the treaty’s opponents highlighted the concessions the leader had 
made, not enough their achievements. In Israel the decision to withdraw to the international border 
and to dismantle the settlements and airfields was received with incredulity; especially one segment 
of Israeli society, the most involved i the militant activities of national-religious parties, was against 
this decision. The threat to their settlement project was evident and they reacted immediately to it 
with vehement opposition to the agreements; it was the moment when Begin’s close friends attacked 
him, overshadowing the achievements of the peace agreements and the normalization of relations 
with the most important of the Arab states. The Knesset debate on the Camp David Accords was held 
on March 20th-21st; it was hard and, only Begin, with his authority and standing in his party, could 
have compelled the majority of Likud members to ratify the agreement (84 votes in favour, 19 votes 
against and 17 abstentions468). Yet this vote obscured the fact that only two-thirds of MKs belonging 
to government parties actually endorsed the Camp David framework. Begin indeed depended on the 
36 votes of Mifleget Ha’Avodaand of Dash order to secure the ratification. On March 26th 1979, Begin 
and Sadat were ready to finally sign the peace agreement in Washington. 
Even if Begin was able to avoid a binding commitment on the return of Judea and Samaria, by way 
of a strategic ambivalence, he had anyway to respond to far right’s attacks: «This is the greatest 
turning point in Middle East, which has come with the possibility of signing peace agreement 
between Israel and Egypt. The anguish does not surprise me. I have no complaints about the 
demonstrations469». He had difficulties facing the settlers, since in his eyes they were the pure, 
idealistic element of the right and criticism from them, hurt him very much; indeed, his heart was 
still devoted to Eretz Yisrael and settlement enterprise. They simplistically did not perceive the course 
                                                          
467 The framework agreement wasn’t completed and formulated into a final peace treaty because of the 
problems left opened: the most important of all was the linkage between the normalization of Egyptian-Israeli 
relations and the autonomy agreement that should have been reached with the Palestinians. Israel insisted for 
the removal of this linkage and for the immediate beginning of the implementation of the agreement, Egypt 
wanted it to be kept (due to its commitment with the Arab League). 
468 Shindler C., Israel, Likud…, op.cit., p 98. 
469 Naor A, Begin in power: a personal testimony (Begin bashilton: edut ishit), Yediot Ahronot, 1993, p. 182. 
  
122 
of events, believing that since the premier had negotiated the return of Sinai, this implied that he 
would have done the same for the West Bank in the future.  
The very Begin’s failure at Camp David was his inability to avert the split with the nationalist camp; 
he had spent over two decades building a diverse coalition of the right and yet, despite, alòl the 
political theatrics, he was unable to maintain the unity of this broad spectrum of political groupings. 
He admitted at the signing ceremony in Washington in March 1979: « God gave me the strength to 
preserve, to survive the horror of Nazism and Staliìnist concentration camps […]and some other 
dangers. To endure […] not to waver or to flinch from my duty. To accept abuse from foreigners and, 
what is more meaningful, from my own people and even my close friends. This effort too, bore some 
fruit470». 
Despite this harsh criticism, the peace treaty with Egypt was the apogee of Begin’s era, when he 
gained stature both at home and throughout the world, winning a Nobel Peace Prize and achieving 
more popularity among the Israelis. Indeed, the premier received full support from the Israeli 
electorate in 1981 elections, when they confirmed their trust in him and his policy, included the peace 
with Egypt. 
 
 
  
                                                          
470 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Remarks by Prime Minister Begin at a festive dinner in Washington - 26 March 1979., 
Foreign Policy- Historical Documents, 1977-1979, vol.4-5, n. 255.  
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Chapter 4. THE YEARS OF TRANSTITION: FROM A 
DOMINANT LIKUD TO A CHALLENGING LABOR 
PARTY (1981-1989) 
 
 The 1980s were years characterized by many historical events that profoundly influenced 
Israeli society, challenging the political supremacy of Likud (established with the mahapach, its 
overwhelming victory in 1977 elections). In this chapter we would like to delineate the most 
important steps that realized the conditions for such a change within Israeli political arena and 
favored the process of internal revision in HaMifleget Ha’Avoda. The purpose of this analysis won't be 
the historical dissertation by itself, but a functional use of history in order to understand better the 
dynamics that characterized the series of events in Israeli politics. 
 
4.1 Menachem Begin's second government: 1981 
The bombing of the Iraqi reactor Osirak471 had a positive effect on the electoral performance 
of the Likud in the elections of June 30th, 1981; In fact, three months before the elections, Peres's 
victory seemed certain. By election polls had shown that the Alignment enjoyed a 25% advantage on 
the deployment of Begin, but eventually the two parties gathered around the same number of votes: 
the right won 48 Knesset seats, while the Ha’Avoda 47 (increasing its representation from 33 to 47 
seats, but with its traditional allies losing a lot of support). 
For this impossibility by Peres to form a government, the leader of the majority party, Begin, was 
commissioned by President Yitzhak Navon472 to form the coalition government. He obtained the 
support of 61 MKs from the 48 Likud, Mafdal 7, 4 from Agudat Yisrael and 3 from Tami. For the first 
time in Israel's history the ruling coalition was formed only by parties belonging to the right of the 
political spectrum: numerically was a weak government with a narrow majority, but this lack was 
compensated for by the political cohesion and the ideological fervor. The composition of the 
                                                          
471 Operation Babylon was a surprise Israeli air strike carried out on June 7th 1981, which destroyed an Iraqi 
nuclear reactor under construction seventeen kilometers southeast from Baghdad. It established the “Begin 
Doctrine”, which explicitly stated the strike was not an anomaly, but instead: «A precedent for every future 
government in Israel». Israel's counter-proliferation preventive strike added another dimension to their 
existing policy of deliberate ambiguity, as it related to the nuclear capability of other states in the region. 
472  He served as the 5th President of Israel from 1978 until 1983 as a member of the center-left Alignment 
coalition. He was the first Israeli president to be Sephardi and born in Jerusalem, 
  
124 
government reflected the shift of the political center of gravity to the right; in fact, the first Begin 
government473 had seen the participation of Moshe Dayan as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ezer 
Weizman as Minister of Defense and Yigal Yadin as Deputy Prime Minister. These men had a 
moderating influence and containment on the government's policy towards the Arab world, even 
managing to get a significant result as the peace with Egypt, signed at Camp David in 1979. 
In this second government, however, there was no longer any trace of such a moderating influence. 
Begin's premiership was accompanied by two important figures of the Israeli right: Yitzhak Shamir 
as his Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ariel Sharon in the role of Minister of Defense. With this trio 
in power, Israel's foreign policy was likely to become more militant, aggressive, nationalist and 
uncompromising. In early August, the PM presented his new government to the Knesset: the 
guidelines of government policy were net, inflexible and insisted on the right of the Jewish people 
to the Land of Israel, an eternal and indisputable right, inextricably linked to the right to security 
and peace. A similar approach was in sharp contradiction with the pact signed at Camp David, in 
fact, on that occasion, the Israeli prime minister had recognized the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people and had agreed to grant full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Gaza. 
 
4.1.1 The premises of the First Lebanon War 
 Two main factors of the Israeli policy led to the large-scale invasion of Lebanon in June 1982: 
the will to forge an alliance with the Maronites474 and the desire to destroy the PLO, beginning from 
its expulsion from southern Lebanon. Begin supported strongly both elements of this project, indeed 
he had developed a strategic thinking very similar to that of his great rival David Ben-Gurion: in this 
vision the focus was on the interest that Israel could have in common with the non-Arab and non-
Muslim countries in the region, as well as with the ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle 
East. Within this' broader view Christians of Lebanon covered a special place as they were facing 
the danger of being presumably wiped out by their Arab and Muslim opponents. This condition 
exerted a special fascination Begin, due to the fact that the Holocaust had left its mark on him and 
for this reason he was used to evoke that powerful narrative trough the creation of striking historical 
parallels with the events of his time. Therefore, in this case, the PM was determined not to repeat 
                                                          
473 On  May 17th 1977 the Likud, headed by Begin, won the Knesset elections with 43 seats and  becoming the 
biggest party in the parliament.  
474 The Maronites are a Christian group who adhere to the Maronite Church. Their name comes from the 
Syriac Christian Saint Maron, whose followers migrated to the area of Mount Lebanon. The Maronite Church, 
under its own Patriarch of Antioch, is in full communion with the Holy See, whose papal primate recognizes 
it and is therefore an Eastern Particular Church of the Catholic Church. 
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the mistakes made during the Monaco Conference, in September 1938, in which Britain and France 
abandoned the fate of Czechoslovakia to Adolf Hitler. Begin felt that Israel had the moral duty to 
defend its Maronite allies; this aim was in accordance with the need to deal also with the PLO 
guerrilla, which was engaged in a continuous launching of Katyusha475 along the northern border. 
The Jewish State had then to take the initiative in order to force the Palestinian forces to move in 
the northern part of the country, as far as possible from the Israeli border. 
But, the main designer of the invasion was Ariel Sharon, whose aims were very ambitious and far-
reaching; the first objective of this plan was to destroy the Palestinian military infrastructure in 
Lebanon and weaken the OLP under a political point of view476; The second aim was to establish in 
this country a new political order, helping Christian allies led by Bashir Gemayel477 (according to 
the vision of Sharon, the latter would first formed a government that would then signed a peace 
treaty with Israel) and last, but not least, the expulsion of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Probably, 
Begin was not entirely aware of these ambitious geopolitical goals, but surely the two men were 
united by the desire to act against the Palestinian leadership in Lebanon. 
The third protagonist of this enterprise was the Chief of Staff, Raful Eitan; he was an enthusiastic 
supporter of this vision and elaborated two versions of the operation in Lebanon: “Operation Small 
Pines” was directed at wiping out the Palestinian guerrillas from southern Lebanon, while the 
operation “Big Pines” foresaw a deeper action, up to the Beirut-Damascus highway. IDF's troops 
would enter into Lebanese territory by land (from the northern border) and by sea (landing on the 
coast near Sidon) to surround Beirut and rejoin the Christian forces. The ultimate goal was the 
destruction of command centers and Palestinian infrastructure throughout Lebanon, including 
Beirut. This maneuver far-reaching was presented for the first time in front of the Council of 
Ministers in December 1981; cabinet members were amazed by the radius of operation proposed 
action and many of them are opposed to the plan.  
Eitan and Sharon decided therefore to adopt a different tactic: initially, to show a proposal to the 
Cabinet that was limited to the bombing of PLO targets in Lebanon and then, counting on the 
reaction of the Palestinian militias by launching rockets on towns in the Galilee. They hoped that, 
at that point, the government would have approved more drastic measures and start gradually the 
implementation of "Big Pines. In the meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense was going on with his 
diplomatic activity with the Maronites, who (however) were not a unified group, but rather divided 
                                                          
475 Soviet-made rocket launcher introduced during the Second World War and is generally installed on trucks. 
476 The destruction of the PLO would have broken the backbone of Palestinian nationalism and so facilitated 
the annexation of the West Bank within the Greater Israel. The resulting movement of Palestinians from those 
areas would be merged in Jordan and would sweep away the Hashemite monarchy, turning the east bank of 
the Jordan in the Palestinian state. 
477 Lebanese leader and president-elect. He was a senior member of the Phalange party and the supreme 
commander of the Lebanese Forces militia during the early years of the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). 
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into different militias led by warlords; among these: the Phalange478, founded in 1936 by Pierre 
Gemayel, entertained close ties with Israel. The relationship with the Phalangists was always 
considered very controversial among military experts: the Mossad had a general good opinion 
regarding the reliability and the military capabilities of this militia but, on the contrary, military 
intelligence had serious doubts on both the points. Indeed, from the very beginning the higher ranks 
of the IDF showed themselves cautious about the relationship with the Maronite allies and 
periodically exposed the weaknesses of this alliance. For example, General Yehoshua Saguy, director 
of military intelligence was convinced that if Gemayel was elected president, he would have sided 
with the Arab world, and certainly not with the Israelis. He repeatedly warned his superiors that 
the Maronite leader was only trying to use Israel for their own purposes, and that would not have 
been able to conclude a peace with the Jewish State, given the close ties between Lebanon and the 
Arab world479. 
The so-desired casus belli, that Israeli hawks have been waiting for, materialized on June 3rd: the 
Israeli ambassador to London Shlomo Argov was seriously wounded by terrorists of the group of 
Abu Nidal480, a group of Palestinian terrorists. Although the Mossad had information which 
suggested that the attack was designed to provoke an Israeli attack in southern Lebanon, in order 
to destroy the power of Arafat, Begin was not interested in stopping the war machine and an 
emergency meeting of the Cabinet was convened the following day. The PM was visibly shaken: 
«Assaulting an ambassador is an attack against the state of Israel and we will answer481». The 
ministers approved the operational plan with a heavy heart, knowing that the air strike would 
trigger the ground offensive in southern Lebanon.  
In the early afternoon, the IAF struck the PLO targets in southern Lebanon: two hours later, the PLO 
artillery opened fire on the towns of the Galilee region, as expected; that evening, the Israeli cabinet 
                                                          
478 The Lebanese Phalanges Party (Arabic: Ḥizb al-Katā’ib al-Lubnānīya), better known in English as the 
Phalange (Arabic: al-Katā’ib), is a Christian Democratic political party in Lebanon. In spite of being officially 
secular, it is supported mainly by Maronite. The Kataeb party was a Maronite paramilitary youth organization, 
who modeled the party after Spanish and Italian Fascist parties. By the 1970s, the party had become a political 
giant in Lebanon, with an estimated membership of 60,000 to 70,000. The vast majority (85%) of members 
were Maronites, but some were members of minority Christian communities, Shiites, Druze, and Jews. 
479 The majority of the officers agreed with the prediction of Saguy, that a clash with the Syrians would be 
inevitable that the Phalangists would remain largely passive measure and that the PLO's military machine 
would be defeated but not its political leadership 
480 Sabri Khalil al-Banna (May 1937 – 16 August 2002), known as Abu Nidal, was the founder of Fatah - the 
Revolutionary Council, a militant Palestinian splinter group more commonly known as the Abu Nidal 
Organization (ANO). Abu Nidal (“father of struggle”) formed the ANO in October 1974 after a split from 
Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
481 Morris B., Vittime. Storia del conflitto arabo-sionista 1881-2001, BUR Rizzoli, 2001, p.643. 
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was convened and the approval of the military operations seemed a foregone conclusion. The 
maneuver should have taken place along the guidelines of Little Pines482, whose explicit goal was to 
force the Palestinian guerrilla to retreat to the north, in order ensure the settlements in northern 
Israel. The PM was driven by a very clear rationale483: «The alternative to struggle is Treblinka, and 
we decided that there will be no other Treblinka484». After those events Amos Oz485 would have 
written an open letter to PM: “but Prime Minister Hitler died 37 years ago, Hitler does not hide a 
Nabatiya, Sidon or Beirut 486“ 
The Cabinet was gathered for an emergency meeting, which was characterized by a certain 
ambiguity; some maps were showed and they had big black arrows indicating clearly the suburbs of 
Beirut but Sharon did not speak at all to reach the Lebanese capital or to rejoin the Phalangist forces 
or either confronting the Syrians. Only the Minister of Communications Mordecai Zippori, a former 
general, argued that the operation would not have remained limited but it would have transformed 
into a real war: the main implication was that the clash with the Syrians would not been avoided. 
Zippori opposed openly against the reliability of those considerations, asking Sharon and Eytan to 
show on the maps where was the limit of forty kilometers for the advance. It 'interesting that Begin 
preferred to be vague about the distance that the army intended to cover: «One knows how a war 
starts, but no one knows exactly how it ends, but I declare here that nothing will happen out our 
control, as happened to Israel in previous conflicts. The cabinet will meet every day487 », he promised. 
There was no talk at all about destroying the Palestinian presence in southern Lebanon, reaching 
Beirut in order to join with the Lebanese Phalange and setting up a Christian, or sending home the 
Syrians. Sharon was very careful not to spell out that both in his opinion and in the IDF experts one, 
avoiding totally any clash with the Syrians seemed unlikely488. In this way the various members of 
                                                          
482 The plan called for: an IDF advance into Lebanese territory along three main axes, a duration of operations 
extending from twenty-four to forty-eight hours, a range limit of the troops attached to forty km from the 
border, exclusion Beirut and its surroundings from the operation objectives and the avoidance of any 
showdown with the Syrians 
483 Begin's stubbornness was reinforced by the fact that he regarded the PLO as a reincarnation of Nazism and, 
in this picture, Arafat was a new Hitler. 
484 Shlaim A., Il muro di ferro: Israele e il mondo arabo, Il Ponte, 2013. p.449. 
485 He is an Israeli writer and in addition to be the author of novels and essays, Oz is a journalist and professor 
of literature at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, in Be'er Sheva. Since 1967 is an influential supporter of the 
"two-state solution". For many years Oz was identified with the Israeli Labor Party and he was close to its 
leader Shimon Peres. In the '90s Oz came out of the Labor Party and joined the Meretz party. 
486 Morris B., Vittime..., op. cit., p. 643. 
487 Morris B., Vittime..., ibidem, p. 645. 
488 Sharon said that this possibility could not be completely excluded, but that he intended to circumvent the 
Syrian troops and force them to retreat into the Beka'a Valley. 
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the Council of Ministers voted in favor489 of the operation, relieved by Begin's reassurances that the 
military maneuvers would not differ from the plan, without an explicit decision by the government. 
On this occasion the PM decided to change the name code of the operation in “Peace for Galilee”.  
Eytan and Sharon's tactic worked out: hey obtained the permission to enact the "Little Pines" plan 
but they knew well that the war would have been conducted in accordance with the "“Big Pines” 
version (brought to the attention of the Government and rejected back in December 20th 1981490). 
The minister of defense, thanks to his military experience, was well aware that once the IDF had 
been mobilized, it would be difficult to impose political control over military actions. 
 
4.1.2 Operation Peace for Galilee and the Siege of Beirut 
 July 6th 1982, Israeli armored vehicles entered in Lebanon at 11:00 am, by attacking 
Palestinian forces in the area and blocked their escape routes to the north, during the second day of 
the war the Defense Minister ordered the army to prepare to fight Syrian forces on the side Eastern 
and move then to the Beirut Damascus highway; in the third day he was announced to the leader of 
the Falange that the IDF would join his forces and that he should then prepare to conquer Beirut to 
form the new Lebanese government. During these early stages, the operation and Peace for Galilee 
enjoyed a broad national consensus (also including the Labor Front), but the situation began to get 
complicated when there were the first contacts with the Syrian army, which unfortunately occurred. 
On June 8th , the PM had informed the Knesset: « We are not interested in a border with Syria reached 
forty km our task will be finished fighting cease»491; but despite the PM's public statements to 
reassure Damascus, Assad decided to move some batteries of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) in the 
Beka'a Valley; it was a defensive maneuver, which was exploited by Sharon who presented it to the 
members of the Cabinet as a provocative and aggressive act. The purpose was to get permission to 
                                                          
489 Both Eitan and Sharon declared later that the government actually had been made aware of the fact that 
the scope of the operation would not have been limited to 40 km, the maps were opened in front of the Cabinet 
and therefore there was no room for misunderstanding of what was being proposed. All these claims are 
contradicted by the record of the government's discussions, and the text of the decision which, however, was 
not published. 
490 Years after Sharon admitted that the decision of the Council of Ministers of June 5, 1982 spoke only in 
general terms to put the Galilee out of the reach of enemy fire, but added that the political aim of the war 
required the destruction not only of infrastructure ' PLO in southern Lebanon but also in its headquarters in 
Beirut and that everyone involved knew exactly what was the meaning of the general wording of the 
objectives. 
491 Morris B., Vittime..., ibidem, p. 656. 
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attack Syrian positions, in order to eliminate the threat that those missiles represented492. Moreover, 
the minister if defense did not inform the government about the reserves of the senior leaders of the 
army or of the possible repercussions of the initiative, but merely argue that Israeli troops in Lebanon 
were in difficulty, they were experiencing significant losses and that to correct the situation IAF 
was to help the ground forces, but that, to do this, it was first necessary to neutralize the Syrian 
network in Lebanon. As soon as the government gave the green light to the IAF attacked the SAM 
installations in the Beka'a Valley; the attack two hours completed on the same day, it was a stage of 
contemporary military history493: for the first time a 'Western Military Aviation fought and 
neutralized a complex and sophisticated anti-aircraft missile network of Soviet-made. The battle of 
the southern Beka'a ended the June 11th with the cease-imposed on the Jewish state by the 
Americans, in turn, the object of veiled but intense Soviet pressure. and after some times the 
Americans were able to bring into Notwithstanding the cease-fire, on June 13, the Israeli army 
entered the territory Phalangist thus reaching the Beirut-Damascus highway494. Many of the goals 
that Sharon had set were reached: the PLO was trapped inside the capital, Israeli forces were 
reunited with the Maronite and Syrian units had been isolated in the Beka'a Valley.  
Once the IDF had reached the gates of Beirut euphoria begin to dissipate and it was replaced by the 
sense of deep uncertainty. The second phase of the war contrasted dramatically with the first one 
but, more important, the government credibility and Begin's ability to conduct the operations was 
questioned: with the siege of Beirut, Operation Peace for Galilee had become an Arab-Israeli war.  A 
Modi'in Ezrachi poll, at the end of June, indicated that 93.3% of 1236 respondents thought that the 
war was justified and 90.7% of all Labor voters questioned in the sample concurred495.They clearly 
believed that if the threat of terrorism could be lifted from them by defeating the PLO, it therefore 
followed that Sharon should be supported. But the Israeli public were psychologically prepared only 
for a short war, with minimal cost to human life; instead the opposite happened: it dragged on and 
on and Sharon was forced into more extreme actions, which ultimately many Jews felt unable to 
                                                          
492 Each time the defense minister wanted to go beyond the limits imposed by what was approved by the 
government, was usually used to present a picture of the situation that would highlight what further change 
in the schedule of the conflict was necessary to save the lives of Israeli soldiers. 
493 Israeli tactics used by aviation is still one of the best kept military secrets 
494 Seven days of the Israeli offensive had divided Lebanon into four parts: the Syrians on the east and in the 
Beka'a, the Israelis in the south to Beirut, the Christians controlled the eastern part of the capital and the area 
surrounding it, while the PLO controlled west Beirut (surrounded by three sides by the IDF and by Christian 
forces). 
495 Shindler C., Israel, Likud and the Zionist dream: power, politics and ideology from Begin to Netanyahu, I. B. Tauris, 1995, 
p. 130. 
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justify496. The tiny Minority who was unwilling to tolerate the situation thus increased dramatically 
with the growing realization of what was taking place and with the sense that they were not being 
told the truth.  
Sharon's dilemma became increasingly acute as he realized that he was trapped by having no Cabinet 
mandate to enter Beirut; moreover, the probable heavy loss of life on the Israeli side incurred by such 
a step would not be tolerated by the Israeli public. So due to the fact that engaging clashes in the 
streets would have caused an unacceptable level of losses, then a combination of military pressure 
and psychological warfare was chosen as an interim measure to persuade Arafat and his companions 
that there was no alternative than leaving the capital. On 1st July, the seven weeks siege of West 
Beirut commenced: air strikes, shelling and naval artillery fire were used along with speakers and 
leaflets in order to create a campaign to pressure and intimidation. This approach inflicted immense 
suffering heavy human losses and also to the civilian population of the Lebanese capital, especially 
with the intensification of the siege during the next two months, in which supplies of water and 
electricity were cut.  
This situation continued until the Reagan lost patience and joined the chorus of criticism from the 
international community, asking Begin an immediate halt of the bombing and threatened to review 
the Israeli-American relations. Israelis are very annoyed at the way in which their PM was handling 
the situation, the impression was that now he had lost touch with reality and was only chasing the 
ghosts of the past497. In the meanwhile, the US had sent their negotiator Philip Habib to persuade 
Arafat498 to leave but, what the diplomat found out was that the Arab countries were not at all eager 
to give hospitality to the militants and the Palestinian bureaucracy many of them actually had a score 
to settle with Arafat and considered his followers not fully controllable and potentially subversive. 
But, at last, Habib succeeded to mediate the terms of the withdrawal of the PLO in Tunisia in order 
to end the siege of the city: at last, after seventy-five days of hard fighting the Palestinian leadership 
along with Arafat decided to leave Beirut on August 30th. 
 
4.1.3 The peace movement and the struggle for Israel's soul 
 While the siege was taking place, Sharon contradictory explanations sowed the seeds of 
public disillusion and also many serving soldiers began to feel that there was no purpose to the 
operation. There was also an opposition from most of the commanders; Colonel Eli Geva affirmed 
                                                          
496 The sight of a capital city been continuously shelled began to erode any political advantage that Israel had 
gained internationally in its crusade to get rid of terrorism. 
497 Shlaim A., Il muro di ferro..., ibidem, p.459. 
498 He didn't capitulate immediately because he knew that the longer he could hold on, the greater the 
sympathy for the Palestinian cause in the West increased by Sharon heavy handed tactics, which had created 
the best publicity for the Palestinians in living memory.  
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that the IDF was not prepared for such an operation either military or morally and he concluded 
that the honorable way to resolve his inner dilemma was to renounce the command of his brigade. 
The Geva Affair499 arose from an act of conscience which proved to be a turning Point in the attitude 
of the Israeli public to the war; his bold initiative in opposing the decision to take Western Beirut 
questioned the very purpose of Israeli presence there and methods which were being used to extend 
the war without any political accountability. Begin, Sharon and Eitan have been anxious to convince 
Geva. of the error of his ways because they well understood that his act would be perceived as the 
breakdown of the consensus that they had striven so hard to portray. 
A growing number of ministers now closely monitored Sharon's political maneuvers and they 
started not only at detecting what have been omitted, but also at asking the right questions. 
Also, Begin's behavior tended to be erratic as the war continued. As the pressure mounted on him 
from both inside and outside Israel, his explanations were increasingly seen to be transparent by a 
growing number of people. The inaccuracies and inconsistencies of PM's account gave Israeli 
journalist a field day, showing how his versions simply did not fit the known facts.  
Opinion polls indicated that the population has been carried away by a display of national fervor 
and wishful thinking about their Palestinian adversaries, it was also clear that many were not 
receiving objective information that would allow them to form an opinion contrary to that of the 
government's aims. There was not even an awareness that existed a partial information vacuum also 
due to the fact that the Likud leadership has never been warm towards the media500. Moreover, 
Sharon did not give any direct briefings throughout the course of the war, also in order to tailor the 
fact to fit his version of events for the Cabinet501. Therefore, the Minister of Defense was keen to 
ensure that no overt opposition to his presentation of the war should be transmitted through the 
media: objective reporting should not contradict the government's version of the events and such an 
approach was easily camouflaged under the blanket of national Security. Israeli dissemination of 
information was uncoordinated and situation exacerbated by the fact that the Cabinet was often 
still unaware of Sharon's latest tactic; for this reason, a young member of the Knesset, Ehud Olmert502, 
was proposed as coordinator of information with the rank of deputy minister: he tried to show that 
the march on Beirut was a consequence of events rather than a specific aim but his eloquence was 
                                                          
499 Israel, Likud..., ibidem, p. 131. 
500 Since 1949, the editors of the Israeli press had periodic meetings with state leaders, but with the advent of 
Likud, this ongoing contact changed. 
501 Sharon referred to the "journalistic poisons" which was demoralizing the troops. He was more interested in 
the presentation of positive images of the war. 
502 He is an Israeli politician and lawyer. He served as PM from 2006 to 2009 in the Kadima party and, before 
that, as a cabinet minister from 1988 to 1992 and from 2003 to 2006. Between these two periods as MKs, he 
was elected to be mayor of Jerusalem from 1993 to 2003. 
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not enough to make the public confusion fade away. This attempt simply testified the degree of 
deception and the desire to mould Israeli perception of the war through a deceiving communication. 
Notwithstanding the protest to the operation, outside Knesset, began on the first day of invasion of 
Lebanon503, it was hard for the forces in the opposition to take quickly a strong position. This was 
due to the fact that even if many Israeli intellectuals and academics were strongly opposed to the 
war (such as Amos Oz, A.B. Yehoshua504 and the leading Labor dove Yossi Sarid), they were not 
taken into consideration by the public by their political allegiance for the left and populist disdain 
of intelligentsia. Also, the Labor Party was living this difficult impasse, unable to delineate a 
common and unified position on the issue. But, in the absence of a coherent line from the Labor 
politicians, the movement of “Shalom Aksciav” (Peace Now)505 increasingly became influential in 
antagonizing Israeli right. So, by the end of that month when it was becoming clear that Israel was 
being sucked into a more complicated and more drone out scenario then act been anticipated beef 
snout became more active and code for a ceasefire.  
On  July 3rd, 100.000 people turned out to participate in a protest, which was condemned by the PM 
the very next day; he criticized the demonstration as being anti-democratic, but his harsh words 
were motivated by the fact that he didn't consider Peace Now as an autonomous organization, rather 
as an extension of his political enemy, Mapam. Perhaps Begin was unable to acknowledge the 
possibility of an autonomous grassroots movement on the left and the fact that demonstrations and 
rallies were not anymore just a prerogative of the right. For sure it served him politically to attack 
the Alignment, accusing them with lack of patriotism506. In addition, soldiers at the front began to 
write to PM with their complaints and there was a growing number of reservists who openly 
opposed the war: ninty-two soldiers wrote to Sharon asking him to resign, other ones went further 
and created organizations like “Yesh Gvul” (There is a limit). The members of this groups pledged not 
to serve in Lebanon, which effectively meant that they preferred to go to prison rather than serve in 
Sharon's war. Such a move, on such a scale was unprecedented in Israel, since the IDF was almost a 
holy institution at the heart of the nation. 
                                                          
503 For example, a Committee against the War in Lebanon was established and decided to demonstrate in its 
first major rally on 26th June, which attracted 20.000 people.  
504 He was a leading Israeli religious thinkers and philosophers and he described government policy in Lebanon 
as Judeo-Nazi during a press conference in the month of June. 
505 Peace Now was founded in March 1978, in an act known to the Israeli public as “The Officer’s Letter”. 
Following the visit of Egypt’s President, Anwar Sadat, to Israel, a group of three hundred and forty-eight 
reserve officers and soldiers from Israeli army combat units published an open letter to the Prime Minister of 
Israel, Menachem Begin, calling upon the government to make sure this opportunity for peace was not lost. 
Tens of thousands of Israelis supported the letter, and the movement was born. 
506 Sharon argued that the Labor Party had broken with the tradition of Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir and Yigal 
Alon by following the lefties. 
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At that point, Begin blamed openly the Alignment, accusing twelve of its leaders to have attended a 
Peace Now rally; this was quite untrue and the irony was that the leadership of the Labor Party was 
doing it best to keep its distance from the movement. Indeed, since the beginning of the war the 
Labor Party has been internally split between its hawks and its doves; yet the party's leadership 
desperately was trying to maintain a façade of public unity and it looked for any sign of public 
disapproval, because of the perception that the norms of political and consensual support for the 
aims of a war were being challenged. Therefore, given the degree of public support for the war and 
the stated public aims, the Alignment had supported the government in the Knesset when a motion 
of no confidence was proposed507. But, as the government's stated aims were continually being 
breached and with no sign of a conclusion of the war the doves within the Labor Party started to 
become stronger even if, when the Siege of Beirut commenced, Peres was still backing the 
government. In the following days, almost in disregard of the leadership's approach, the leading 
Labor doves Motta Gur, Yossi Sarid and Uzi Baram started arguing that the arty should take a clear 
stand from the Likud, instead of being viewed as a pale imitation of it. Such a stand annoyed the 
hawks and the leadership; Rabin pointed out that was not the opportune time for such a statement 
due to the strong public support of the war508. Notwithstanding this last consideration, the party's 
bureau called upon Begin to order a cessation of bombing West Beirut because it was severally 
damaging Israel's image as a democratic state based on humanitarian values. Together with this 
statement, was also requested to the members of the party not to participate in anti-war 
demonstrations509. 
Labor divisions and its leadership's ambivalence were characterized time and again as-anti patriotic 
by Begin510; when Peres asked the PM in the Knesset, at the end of July, why he had not foreseen 
difficulties in the operation, he replied that Gahal had refrained from raising such questions during 
the Yom Kippur War: Begin repeatedly contrasted Likud's loyalty during past wars, when Labor 
administration had been in power, with the actual lack of solidarity of the leftist camp. (referring to 
the stigma of the Yom Kippur War was a way to criticize Labor and to make public opinion 
remember of the lack of preparedness and of the unsatisfactory outcome). A contrast was drawn 
between patriotism and the Alignment's present ambivalence, blaming the latter for the growing 
                                                          
507 The defeat of that motion, 93 to 4, was indicative of the political consensus, albeit a was a shaky one. Even 
Shulamit Aloni, Yossi Sarid and Mapam (who formed the nucleus of the Peace Now movement) abstained. 
508 He took this strategic position although he was disturbed by the course of the war, even to the point to 
declare that: «Lebanon might become Israel Vietnam». 
509 Schindler C., Likud…, op. cit., p 144. 
510 The PM even considered to appoint a commission of enquiry to consider the conduct of the opposition 
during the war. 
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loss of public support, which actually was to blame to the management of the war and the lack of 
control by the Likud. 
 
4.1.4 Sabra e Chatila  
 With the exit of the PLO from Beirut, Begin felt that the major part of Operation Peace for 
Galilee had succeeded; instead, Sharon's aspirations were not fully satisfied yet. It was now time to 
complete the second part of his plan: to favor the creation of a new Israeli friendly Lebanese political 
order. It began to make sense to charge parliamentary election of a new president, national survival 
depended on the choice of a candidate acceptable to the Israelis (in this case, Bashir Gemayel) but 
the IDF had a list of all members and the election day, you did so to ensure the presence of the 
supporters of Gemayel and hinder the participation of the opposition. On August 23rd, the Lebanese 
parliament elected Bashir Gemayel President of Lebanon with 57 votes out of a total of 62 deputies 
who attended the session. Jerusalem had work hard for this result and many MKs had come to vote 
escorted by Israeli soldiers511. The main goals of the new president were, first of all, the withdrawal 
of all foreign troops (Israeli, Syrians, Palestinians) from Lebanon in order to demonstrate their 
independence, to expand its domestic political base and to emphasize the pro-Arab orientation 
rather than emphasize its connection with the Israelis. Secondly, the reunification of Beirut under 
Lebanese sovereignty, which is why he needed to agree with the traditional Muslim leadership of 
west Beirut and disarm, arrest or expel the Palestinian militias left in that part of town512: of course, 
such a cleaning got along with the wishes and plans of Sharon513. 
According to the analysis of Israeli intelligence on Arab reactions to the election of Gemayel Syria 
would not intervene militarily but there would be attempts to assassinating Bashir or encourage its 
Lebanese allies to take action against him: on  September 14th, a member of the Lebanese Syrian 
National Party detonated an explosive near the headquarters of the Phalange Party, the new 
President of the Republic was among the victims. The unexpected assassination of the young leader 
did collapse the entire Israeli policy in Lebanon like a house of cards; in the short term the president's 
death put a huge question mark on the intention of Phalangists to clean up the western part of the 
                                                          
511 Morris B., Vittime..., ibidem, p.675. 
512 At that time Lebanon had 300.000 Palestinian inhabitants, a third of whom lived in those areas. The 
Phalangists accused them of having poisoned the relations between Christians and Muslims and to have 
altered the demographic balance to the detriment of Christians. Gemayel had the desire to expel them and the 
Israeli invasion was for him miracle that might have turned the dream into reality. 
513 Many in the Israeli intelligence believed or at least judged likely coup in violation evacuation mediated by 
the Americans they had left behind between 2,000 and 2,500 militiamen and feared their attempt to take 
control of Beirut. 
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city, as Bashir and Sharon had previously decided514, but also provided a pretext for the Israelis to 
take control of the city. Sharon lost no time and even before the corpse of Gemayel was identified, 
Sharon was already at work to enact the 'occupation of the western part of Beirut; the very next day, 
the IDF occupied the areas previously controlled by the Palestinian forces: the pretext was the need 
to restore the order and to avoid reprisals between the opposing Lebanese factions. Actually, Sharon 
was hoping to remove the last traces of Palestinian terrorists left and to take advantage of the 
Phalangists, who agreed to enter the refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila. In front of this option, the 
military and intelligence leaders strongly advised Sharon not to allow the access to Christian 
militias, because after the assassination of their leader they were looking for revenge. Saguy warned 
Sharon that: «The Phalange will try to settle their accounts, one day they will begin to kill and who 
knows when it will stop515».  
Despite these strong recommendations, on 15 September the first units of 'IDF penetrated into West 
Beirut (without Cabinet's consultation or approval), on the morning after the conquest it was 
completed. The Defense Minister met the Chief of Staff and warned him that the Phalangists were 
preparing to enter the camps: at 18:00 on September 16th, one hundred and fifty men of the Phalange 
entered the refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila through Israeli lines, meanwhile an Israeli battery of 
81 mm mortars began firing lighting bullets to illuminate the path of the militias.  
Meanwhile in Jerusalem, the Government protested because the actions taken in Beirut were 
decided without their approval, then the PM explained that there wasn't simply enough time to 
inform or consult all the members of the Cabinet. Then, Eitan finally informed the ministries that 
the Christian militias were actually and already in the camps, the government was worried that the 
IDF would have to enter to help them, such was their opinion on the military capabilities of their 
ally. Apparently, only David Levy516 took note of the reality that lay behind much reticence and 
declared «“When I heard that the Phalangists have already entered into certain neighborhoods, no 
one will believe that they are there to maintain order and the blame will fall on us517», the other 
members of the cabinet were silent.  
                                                          
514 On September 12th Arik and Bashir decided that the Phalangists would root out the remaining 2000 
Palestinian terrorist which the minister of defense believed to be present in West Beirut; the implementation 
of this vague plan provided for the entrance of IDF's forces in West Beirut, in order to assume the control, 
while the Phalangists would carry out the "heavy work" in the refugee camps, performing interrogations, 
arrests and demolition of buildings. 
515 Morris B., Vittime..., ibidem, p.677. 
516 He is an Israeli politician who served as MK between 1969 and 2006, as well as Deputy PM ,Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Minister of Immigrant Absorption and Minister of Housing and Construction. Most of his 
offices in the parliament were taken under the Likud, but he also took part in Ehud Barak's Labor-led 
government between 1999 and 2001. 
517 Morris B., Vittime..., ibidem, p.678. 
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The carnage took place from Thursday until Sunday morning (16-18th September) and, only few 
hours after the entrance of the Phalangists, Israeli soldiers positioned along the perimeter 
understood that something terrible was happening; the notice that a carnage was taking place 
reached some Israeli headquarter518 but the military hierarchy considered the reports as 
exaggerations and so they did nothing to stop them. Then, the next morning, on September 18, the 
high commanders of the army in Beirut simply gave the ordered and the Phalangists left the camps 
and thus the massacre ended. The Israeli intelligence estimated that between 700 and 800 people 
have been killed, but other sources, such as the Red Crescent, gave even higher numbers. 
As the journalists and Israeli officers entered the refugee camps, reports about piles of corpses and 
the atrocities committed began to spread, but the PM, who had spent most of the time praying in 
the synagogue (it was Rosh Hashanah), claimed to have heard of the massacre for the first time from 
the BBC .In the meantime, the Phalange and the Lebanese radio began to break the news of the 
slaughter and Eitan ask the Phalangists to recognize publicly what their militias did; of course he 
received a negative response. Indeed, in that moment the Lebanese political situation it was 
fundamental to be focused on the national reconciliation and on the forthcoming future. For this 
reason, Muslim factions and even the PLO's leaders didn't try to capitalize what happened in Sabra 
and Chatila, contributing to the campaign of disinformation. For the Lebanese the Palestinians and 
the Syrians was thus preferable to shift the blame on 'Israeli army.  
 
4.1.5 The Kahan Commission  
 The outrage in Israel exploded, the world held the Israelis morally responsible for the 
massacre and the upper echelons of the IDF were in a sort of rebellion against Sharon's authority519. 
If Begin and the Israeli government hoped that the storm would have faded away, they were greatly 
misunderstanding the situation: the reports of the atrocities, including the videos of piles of corpses, 
clumped in the streets of the camps, were dominating the Western media, keeping the topic as a 
priority in Israeli politics. A sense of nausea related to the whole adventure Lebanon soon spread all 
over the Country: for many Israeli Sabra and Chatila became the symbol of that conflict, but Begin 
and his executive were resisting the pressure of the society who was calling for the establishment of 
an independent commission.  
                                                          
518 Ze'ev Schiff, Ha'aretz correspondent of war, spoke with some officers of the Chief of Staff in Tel Aviv but 
then, not at all reassured, called the Minister of Communications Zippori, that spoke to Shamir, who did 
nothing. Also, the reporter of the Israeli television Ron Ben-Yishay talked to the IDF's officials in Beirut and 
phoned Sharon in order to warn them about the ongoing massacre. 
519 Many senior commanders said that the Minister of the Defense didn't care about the reputation of the Israeli 
fighting forces, not only avoiding to taking into consideration their ethical code, but also disrespecting it.  
  
137 
Labor members of the Knesset called upon the PM and the minister of Defense to draw the immediate 
and personal conclusions about their responsibility in the matter. This time, the wishes of the Labor 
Party's leadership seemed to correspond with the initiative of Peace Now, who approached Yossi 
Beilin520, the spokesman of the party, with the idea of a joint demonstration. So, the doves in the 
Alignment tried to persuade the party bureau in order to give Peres the mandate to meet the peace 
movement. possibly the largest demonstration. The common efforts resulted in a 400.000 
demonstration in Tel Aviv on 25th September (possibly the largest in Israel's history), calling for an 
inquiry committee and the government's resignation. This rally was the expression of the anger, the 
opposition and the resentment that Lebanese enterprise originated. Therefore, the out-of-the-blue 
decision of the Labor Party to take part in a public protest, after months of vacillation, was an index 
of the sharp political polarization that was taking place in the Country. taken place in the country. 
But, despite such protestations, the PM did not immediately abandoned his position of self-
justification; actually, he was persuaded appoint a judicial commission, not by a moral argument 
political one, rather by a political ones: the Mafdal emphasized the importance of it, threatening a 
coalition crisis and President Navon's appeal for the establishment of a commission placed the 
greatest pressure on Begin: «We owe it to ourselves and to our image in the world [...] and to the 
cultured world of which we see ourselves apart to find out quickly and exactly what has 
happened521». Finally, Begin appointed a commission of inquiry chaired by Yitzhak Kahan, the 
President of Supreme Court, on September 28th. 
The Commission heard dozens of witnesses, read plenty of statements and documents and finally, 
its report was published on February 7th 1983;the conclusions stated that the IDF and the State of 
Israel had an indirect responsibility for the massacre, proven beyond any doubt that the perpetrators 
were the members of the Phalange and not the Israeli army (the militias entered in the refugee camps 
and concretely carried out the slaughter, but under the army's encouragement and the unawareness 
of the government). Therefore, on the political level, the Commission charged a certain degree of 
responsibility to Begin for his lack of involvement and Shamir for ignoring reports of the massacre, 
also Raful Eytan (the Chief of Staff) was heavily criticized for his grossly negligence and omissions. 
But the Commission reserved its harshest judgment for Sharon, highlighting that the Minister of 
Defense had personal responsibility for what happened and that he should draw the appropriate 
personal conclusions regarding the failings in the manner in which he discharged the duties of his 
office: the report recommended to discharge him from his office. The suggestion was that the PM 
could exercise his authority to remove the Minister from his duty (together with several senior army 
                                                          
520 He is an Israeli statesman and scholar who has served in multiple ministerial and leadership positions in 
the Israeli government. Much of his political career was in the Labor Party. He also writes for some important 
Israel newspaper such as Ha’aretz and Yisrael HaYom. 
521 Shindler C., Likud..., op. cit., p. 162. 
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officers). Of course, Sharon announced immediately the rejection of the findings of the Commission; 
but the point was that neither Begin did wish to dismissing him (also because the PM felt some 
personal responsibility for having appointed Sharon in the first place and then for having failed in 
controlling him). After days of debate, a compromise was finally struck and Sharon was hunted 
sideways to be minister without portfolio, replaced on defense by Moshe Arens, Israel's ambassador 
to Washington. The Kahan Report ended with a blind, general criticism against the IDF, regretting 
that the reaction of the soldiers of the Israeli army was not strong enough in order to prevent such 
despicable acts522. 
 
4.1.6 The end of the Lebanon campaign 
 On September 21st Amin Gemayel was elected President of Lebanon but, notwithstanding 
the degree of kinship with Bashir, he wasn't in favor (as his brother was) of Israeli influence in 
Lebanese politics. During the months following the massacre, Israel continued to sink deeper and 
deeper into the Lebanese quagmire and the appointment of Amin (with his friendship with 
Damascus) put a definitive end to Israeli political aspirations in Lebanon. So, on May 17th 1983, the 
two countries signed an agreement that formally put an end to the conflict and recognize as 
inviolable the border between two states: Jerusalem would have to withdraw its armed forces 
within a distance between forty and forty-five km from the international border, while the UN forces 
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) would have controlled the northern territory adjacent to that area. But there 
was an flaw in the agreement, now that Damascus had conquered again its influence on the country, 
it never declared its commitment upon the withdrawal of the troops from Lebanon. 
From then on, the Israelis antagonized all the Lebanese factions, especially in the South, where the 
Shia population, which at the beginning of the Lebanese enterprise welcomed the Israeli troops due 
to the rivalries with the Palestinians in the area, now was beginning to show a harsh resentment 
against Israeli presence523. In such conditions, a new guerrilla movement, called Hezbollah524. appeared. 
It was far more effective and resolute than the defeated PLO and its Shia militias were able to force 
                                                          
522 Morris B., Vittime..., op. cit., p. 684 
523 Once the PLO left those areas, the Israelis and given the strong Israeli presence was strong and the army 
seemed to be insensitive towards the local people's welfare needs and it appeared to be unconcerned about 
the necessity to open a dialogue with them. 
524 Hezbollah (Party of God) is a movement that was created by a group of ultra-religious families, guided by 
some Shia priests, after the Israeli invasion in the summer of '82. Its main goal in the short-term was to expel 
all the foreigners from Lebanon (Israelis included), while in the long-term to transform the Lebanese Republic 
into an Islamic Republic on the model of Iran. Then, even in the longer-term, the goal is to carry on an anti-
Israeli jihad in order to give back Jerusalem and Palestine to Islam. Its militias in Southern Lebanon were able 
to build a sort of little Shia state in the Lebanese one.  
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Israeli government to definitively withdrawal from Lebanon525: Indeed, through the growing 
number of ambushes carried out by the militants against the IDF (mostly carried out by using suicide 
bombers), Hezbollah proved to be able to bear the cost of guerrilla warfare much better than the 
Israelis, whose public opinion more and more considered the war in Lebanon as intolerable; but it 
was only in 1985 that, after the formation of a National Unity Government526, the plan for the 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon was finally approved527. 
At that time, the dead soldiers were 650 and nearly 3,000 seriously injured528 (without taking into 
account the victims among the Lebanese and Palestinians civilians, without any reliable data we can 
refer to). Besides the nonsense and the bloodshed that characterized this conflict, Sharon achieved 
some undeniable goals: the Palestinian military infrastructure in southern Lebanon was wiped out 
and the organization have to leave the country. The PLO lost many fighters and its headquarters 
moved to the far away Tunisia, its military units were dislocated almost everywhere in the Middle 
East and North Africa, ceasing to threat Israelis borders. Also, Arafat was greatly weakened and, 
forced to scale back his ambitions, he started an internal review process, which culminated in 1988 
with the PLO official statement recognizing the Jewish state and renouncing to terrorism. Therefore, 
the invasion of Lebanon pushed the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine on the diplomatic 
track. 
On the other hand, the expulsion of the PLO from southern Lebanon brought with it a side-effect, 
the appearance of a terrible enemy, namely Hezbollah; this organization would prove to be much 
more determined and lethal, aggravating the situation to the point that, in the mid-nineties the 
Israeli Generals would call this guerrilla, war of attrition: the goal of the forty years of peace along 
the border with Lebanon, which Begin Sharon had in mind, had been completely missed.  
Finally, the whole Arab world was deeply impressed by the massive force that the IDF used in 
Lebanon, the level of suffering inflicted during the siege of the capital and the massacre in the refugee 
camps of Sabra and Chatila. This feeling influenced the Egyptian attitude towards the distension 
process which was taking place between the two countries since the signing of Camp David; so, 
even if Egypt did not give up the peace treaty, it took severe diplomatic measures (such as the recall 
                                                          
525 Since the elections of 1984, the Likud government was avoiding to seriously take into account the only and 
sole real alternative, a sort of unilateral disengagement, fearing that such a move would make the entire 
invasion of Lebanon to appear as a senseless mission.  
526 The Israeli electorate didn't give the majority neither to the Likud, nor to the Ma’arach. Since none of the two 
main political blocs appeared capable of forming a stable majority without the other, Peres and Shamir (the 
new leader of the nationalist camp who succeeded Begin in 1983, following his resignation) decided to form 
together a broader coalition. 
527 The withdrawal was rapid, unilateral and without any political or military agreements with Hezbollah or 
any other kind of warranty by the Syrian and the Lebanese governments. 
528 Shlaim A., Il muro di ferro..., op. cit., p.464 
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of its ambassador from Tel Aviv), freezing the normalization process and replacing it with a "cold 
peace". In conclusion, Operation Peace for Galilee damaged the international image of Israel, 
weakening its relationship with the US and creating a deep and bitter division within the society, 
leaving the Israelis with a sense of failure. 
 
4.1.7 Consequences of Operation Peace for Galilee on Israeli politics 
 Menachem Begin’s instinctive response was to turn his back on his international critics, 
appealing to the Cabinet and his close ranks in an act against a hostile world, saying: «Goyim are 
killing goyim and the whole world is trying to hang Jews for the crime529»: In addition to invoke this 
historical Jewish suspicion, he confounded the difference between Israeli moral responsibility for 
the crime and the actual crime itself which was committed by the Phalangists. The question of 
responsibility for the massacre quickly moved from beyond the political, to the realm of morality: 
the course of the war and the massacre in the camps became almost a struggle for the correct 
interpretation of Jewishness; assimilated Jews, secular and Diaspora intellectuals looked to religious 
sources in order to support their understandings of Jewish values.  
Several historians and military commentators, who subsequently examined the Lebanon war, 
observed that the real question was whether or not the IDF reacted proportionally to the threat and 
whether it was sufficiently committed to the minimization of material damages and loss of human 
lives; those considerations reflected the fear of many Israelis, who were afraid that the army had lost 
its doctrine of the tohar haneshek (the purity of arms). But, despite the leadership of Sharon and Eitan 
that were giving minimal importance to the respect of such principles, there were plenty of examples 
that testify the contrary (many soldiers and commanders explicitly protested against the way the 
war was conducted, many of them also refusing to serve under the leadership of Sharon). 
Notwithstanding these episodes, there was a shocked awareness for the political direction in which 
Begin and his government had taken the Jewish State, especially due to the high cost of the war in 
terms of human losses. Also, the outside world lingered disoriented after Operation Peace for Galilee: 
Labor-dominated Israel, which was familiar with, seemed to have disappeared, after having turning 
down the self-imposed restrictions on the use of power and its values. 
This sense of responsibility for the moral and intellectual virtues of the Jewish tradition permeated 
in the psyche of thousands of Israeli Jews and became as central as the war objectives. Operation 
Peace for Galilee was more than a bad war for Israel: it polarized the political division within the 
society because what happened in the summer of 1982 was, for many Israelis, a sort of challenge to 
their very identity as Jews and was a watershed for a mental change to take place: the citizens of the 
Jewish State learnt that it was very important not to retreat intellectually but instead to participate 
                                                          
529 Shindler C., Likud..., op. cit., p. 161. 
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in the struggle for the soul of Israel. Therefore, plenty of political activities arose from this realization 
and they formed the basis of the opposition to the policies taken by the Likud, in the next decade. So, 
the situation that came out was a bad outcome for this party because, not only the succession for 
the leadership was more uncertain (Sharon forfeited the possibility of succeeding Begin and he was 
now marked as a figure who could not be trusted with high office), but was the end of a dream. 
During Begin's second term as PM, the revisionist philosophy was carried forward on in a 
triumphalist way without taking into account the demands of the other actors on the political 
scenario, simply swepting aside the reality and causing the incapability to elaborate an adequate 
response. This was possible thanks to a cocktail of heavy nationalism and total disdain for all those 
who questioned the grand vision pursued by Begin and his allies. Actually, those conditions were 
mainly favored by the fact that a larger part of the population was inclined to listen to that kind on 
narrative and it was in support of those ideals: Begin was seen as though and effective and the fear 
of Palestinian terrorism hat provoked, in this way the need for absolute security silenced minority 
views. 
The war in Lebanon was a war for the Greater Israel, even if could be absurd to think that the 
Palestinian problem would have been solved by military action in a foreign country, where the 
problem had no roots. Moreover the story of Sabra and Chatila became the catalyst of international 
attentions, bringing back on the world scene the Palestinian question and  causing a substantial 
shift in the American attitude: with the Reagan Plan (1982) the US government shifted from the 
acceptance of the concept of autonomy for the Palestinians (as conceived in the Camp David 
agreement), to a plan that called for a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank in order to create 
a homeland for the Palestinians to administer together with Jordan. With the first Lebanon war, 
Begin provided an interesting illustration of what it is defined as a "security dilemma": the pursuit 
of absolute security turns into a self-damaging behavior, due to the fact that such type of attitude 
creates insecurity in the enemy forcing them to adopt self-defense countermeasures. The final 
outcome is a vicious circle of accumulation of security and use of power. 
In the light of the Holocaust narrative, Begin had developed the burning desire to reach absolute 
security for the Jewish people, without considering the reactions that his fears and anxieties would 
have generated in the neighboring Arab countries and within Israeli society itself. For Begin was the 
end of an epoch: he could no longer hold back to reality and his conditions were aggravated by the 
death of his wife, at the end of 1982. It was a tremendous blow for the leader that, together with his 
gradual realization of what it actually happened during the war, left him with all the symptoms of a 
depressive psychosis. On September 15th 1983, Begin resigned and retreated to private life.  
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4.2 The 1984 National Unity Government, first attempt  
 On August 1983, Begin announced his intention to resign and retire from political life, with 
a sole personal reason to explain his decision: « I can't go further530». Under a political point of view, 
the conflict in Lebanon was probably the main cause of his disappointment and despair531: The 
Central Committee of Likud chose Shamir as the successor of the Begin: the personality and character 
could not be more different; the first one was an extraordinary idealistic orator, the second one a 
pragmatic man of few words. However, the distance between the two was not so wide, in fact both 
were disciples of Jabostinsky's revisionist Zionism and, if could be possible, Shamir was in some 
ways even more intransigent than Begin532: his natural instinct was to resist the change, to keep the 
status-quo and to be insensitive to the idea of negotiation and compromise. This trend will be the 
element that will bring down the National Unity Government (NUG) formed in 1988, paving the 
way for Labor Party's victory in 1992 elections. 
The 1984 election results were very disappointing for the Alignment. The situation in Lebanon was 
rapidly deteriorating, the economic crisis was mounting with an inflation around 400% and the 
Likud was quite fragmented due to internal party struggle; due to these preconditions an 
overwhelming electoral victory of the Labor camp was expected, but the final outcome of the polls 
was much more disappointing. the Labor Party was unable to secure a clear electoral victory, 
obtaining the preference of its traditional supporters (mainly Ashkenazic, from the areas of Tel Aviv, 
Haifa and Givatayim and from older age groups). This was due to Peres' inability to obtain the 
support of the Sephardic voters, who went back to Likud's realm at the very last-minute costing the 
victory533. The more probable explanation for the Sephardim's reluctance to vote for the Alignment 
was both the strength of their previous emotional commitment to the Likud and their continuous 
suspicious attitude towards the Labor camp. The overall performance of the Alignment confirmed 
that it had become a party which enjoyed a continuing high degree of support from its traditional 
                                                          
530 Shlaim A., Il muro di ferro..., ibidem, p.463  
531 A group of demonstrators affixed outside his home a sign on which was constantly updated the number of 
victims. Moreover, family members of the dead soldiers accused him for the absurd death of their beloved; a 
father wrote him: <<...and if you have a glimmer of conscience and humanity within yourself, could my great 
sorrow, the suffering of a father in Israel whose world has been destroyed, forever haunt you during your hours 
of sleep and wakefulness. May be a sign of Cain for the eternity>>: 
532 For the new prime minister, the idea of withdrawal from any part of the Land of Israel was simply 
unconceivable. Indeed, he was a strong opponent of the withdrawal from Sinai and the greatest supporter of 
the annexation of the Golan heights. 
533 Many of those who voted for the Likud in 1981 but who had previously stated their preference for the 
Alignment, returned to the Likud. In this group, the 3% were of Sephardic origin and they were crucial to the 
outcome of the election. 
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constituencies534, but crucially did not enjoy access to all strata of society as it had done during its 
period as a dominant party (until 1977)535. 
In those elections the Alignment went from 47 to 44 seats, while the Likud led by Shamir slided from 
48 to 41 seats: Although the Likud had lost 7 seats and 120,000 votes, this was a rather important 
result considering the absence of Begin. But this outcome was reached also to the alliance with the 
extreme-right parties and price to pay was a redistribution of the votes from the nationalist 
electorate, promoting the advancement of those political factions in the Knesset (the greater scandal 
was that the Kach536 party was able to attract enough votes to secure a seat in the parliament). What 
was evident was the deep division of the electorate: the combined votes of Likud, Tehiya, Morasha and 
Mafdal were 875,001, while the Labor, Yahad and Ratz 874,821537. 
Actually, the Labor Party had little choice but to agree to the formation of a NUG after the 
elections538. As Ezer Weizman539's Yahad party540 was against the formation of a narrow-based 
Labor-led government which relied on the support of the Arab parties, it would have been extremely 
difficult for Peres to form a coalition even if they had wanted to. Actually, the Labor leader was also 
against such an idea for two main reasons: first of all, he believed that a government with a Jewish 
majority was necessary in order to withdraw the IDF from Lebanon541. Secondly, he was strictly 
influenced by the self-narrative promulgated by socialist Zionism, the current of the founding 
fathers of the nation, and for this reason he was extremely reluctant to rely on the votes of non-
Zionist parties. Moreover, there were further intuitions that brought Peres to think that joining the 
                                                          
534 In addition, Peres made a tactical error by allowing the elections to be held during the month of July, instead 
in the month of May as it was in its original proposal. Indeed, it was estimated that among 100,000-150,000 
Israelis were abroad during the summer; most of them were voters belonging to groups loyal to the Labor 
camp: these numbers, in electoral terms, meant to have lost between 6 and 9 seats in the Knesset. 
535 Lochery N., The Israeli Labor Party in the shadow of the Likud, Ithaca Press, 1997, p. 250. 
536 It is a radical Orthodox Jewish, ultranationalist political party in Israel, existing from 1971 to 1994. Founded 
by Rabbi Meir Kahane in the early 1970s and following his Jewish nationalist-Orthodox ideology, the party 
entered the Knesset following the 1984 elections, after several electoral failures. However, it was barred from 
participating in the 1988 elections under the revised Knesset Elections Law banning parties that incited 
racism. 
537 Shindler C., Likud ..., ibidem, p.203. 
538 The weakness of the Labor block prevented Peres from forming a coalition government. 
539 He was the seventh President of Israel, first elected in 1993 and re-elected in 1998. Before the presidency, 
Weizman was commander of the Israeli Air Force and Minister of Defense. 
540 The party managed to win three seats in the election and they were invited to join Yitzhak Shamir's 
coalition government, with Weizman becoming Minister without Portfolio. 
541 He believed that the Israeli electorate would only accept a Jewish government to realize the disengagement 
from Lebanon, because it would have been perceived as a choice free from Arab interference. 
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NUG was a necessity in order to deal with the economic crisis and other important internal issues. 
Lastly, Peres had to protect his position as a leader of the party, so he needed to participate to the 
broader coalition with the Likud in order to obtain positions both for his clients and his potential 
rivals (for example Rabin made it clear that the price for not challenging Peres was the Defense 
Ministry). 
Also, Shamir had strong motivation that persuaded him to form a National Unity Government, 
mainly they were related to the need to manage relations with the radical right; the difficulty of 
Shamir was originated by the scandal concerning the Jewish Underground542 that broke out a few 
weeks after the elections of 1984. In addition, the fascination of the electoral promises made by the 
Likud in 1977 had already significantly dissipated, plus there were 100,000 new voters and Likud in 
danger of losing many of these votes in favor of far-right parties. The latter scenario was perceived 
by Shamir 's strategists as a far worse threat than the collaboration with the Labor Party543. 
So, after the elections, the complex negotiation between the Likud and the Alignment took place and, 
as a result, Peres secured a Rotation Agreement for the position of Prime Minister and the Defense 
Ministry for the entire period of the government 544: this pact provided for an equal share of the 
premiership office. Peres would have assumed this role from 1984 until 18ì96, from that year until 
new elections Shamir was entitled for that position; Rabin would have been the Ministry of Defense 
from the beginning until the end of the mandate. This unusual balance reflected the fact that the 
two leading parties had approximately equal power, in practice this meant that each of the two 
coalitions had the capability to exercise the veto power that, together with the deep ideological 
chasm between the two (especially regarding the peace process and the relationship with the Arab 
neighbors), could easily originate a political paralysis545.  
The government's guidelines were composed by thirty-three points. Following are listed the more 
important statements related adopted to guide the foreign policy (the reason of this selection relies 
on the fact that the relationships with the Arab countries were the catalysts of the main frictions 
                                                          
542 The Jewish Underground (Hamakhteret hayehudit) was a Jewish terrorist organization formed by prominent 
members of the Israeli political movement Gush Emunim, existed from 1979 to 1984. During those years the 
organization try to carry out a terroristic attack in order to blow up the Dome of the Rock. On  April 27th 1984, 
the Shin Bet agents arrested twenty-five people, predominantly settlers in the West bank and the Golan 
Heights. The arrests followed an extensive two-year investigation. At the end, the members of the Jewish 
Underground were eventually rounded up and brought to trial on charges that including violating the 1948 
Prevention of Terrorism Decree. The charge of membership of a terrorist organization was dropped against 
ten out of the twenty-seven in a plea bargain.  
543 Shindler C., Likud ..., op. cit., p. 201. 
544 As well as an equal division of the remaining twenty-four portfolios between the Likud and the Labor block, 
with the creation of an inner Cabinet consisting of ten ministers (five from Labor and five from Likud). 
545 That was also due to the fact that an inner Cabinet was created. 
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inside the NUG): the completion of the withdrawal from Lebanon, the assurance of a stable 
environment for the northern settlements, the continuation of the normalization process begun with 
Camp David and the opening of the negotiations with Jordan546. 
The formation of the NUG which followed the Knesset elections of 1984 marked the next ideological 
step in Israeli politics: in the period between 1984-1988, both the major parties (Likud and Ha’Avoda) 
seemed to accept the tie of near parity between them. The consequences of the participation to this 
broad coalition for the Israeli left became clear almost immediately with Mapam's decision to leave 
the Alignment and return to opposition. The split marked a realignment in the Israeli left with the 
Labor leadership drifting further towards the center in pursuit of the government, while Mapam 
started to offer an alternative path, culminating in a more radical leftist position. The major 
accusations of the leaders of Mapam to the Labor Party was to put the Peace Process back ten years 
with its participation in the NUG; moreover, they claimed that the leaders of the party were 
obsessed by power and would exploit any opportunity to return to government547. Labor Party's 
participation had an important consequence for the party itself: the emergence of a strong dovish 
element (with Uzi Baram as unofficial head) that in the long-term will increase its independence 
from the leadership (more hawkish): this created a greater ideological distance inside the party, 
stimulating a process of internal democratization.  
 
4.2.1 The premiership of Shimon Peres (1984-1986) 
 Despite the limited maneuverability of his government during its first years, Peres' 
performance as PM was remarkable548. He had three priorities: to bring inflation under control, to 
withdraw from Lebanon and to revive the Middle Eastern peace process. The ability to achieve all 
these goals549 was also due to his decision to be supported by a group of professionals, known as the 
“100-days Team”. Moreover, the NUG itself worked batter and the degree of the cooperation 
                                                          
546 Shlaim A., The iron wall..., op. cit., p. 472. 
547 The party's thirst for power was based on its previous status; for its entire history prior to 1977 it had been 
at the center of the development of the state and had the status of dominant party. By 1984, the conditioning 
effects of this dominance period were still apparent in its overriding desire to return to government. 
548Due to Peres' outstanding results, there was uncertainty over whether Peres would have reneged on the 
rotation deal and not hand over the power to Shamir: this factor was a source for constant tension within the 
government during that period. 
549 The first issue was dealt by Peres himself, while the second one was achieved by Rabin as Minister of 
Defense. 
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between the parties was much greater and more successful in this first period than after the rotation, 
notwithstanding Shamir's difficult acceptance to act as Peres' number two550.  
The first result was the withdrawal from Lebanon: according to a survey, the 90% of the population 
was in favor of such political move551 and it was widely welcomed in Israel. It was the demonstration 
of Peres and Rabin's political skills to widespread a sense of security, even regarding the very 
instable situation on the northern border. The Likud opposed the withdrawal, so Peres needed to be 
backed by all Labor ministers and by minority parties (the Mafdal and Shas); but the PM didn't want 
to create an evident Labor-Likud rift on this fundamental issue. For this reason, he started to look for 
support also inside the Likud and he found it with David Levy552 who, with his vote, gave to Peres a 
larger majority than expected553. 
Comparing with the Lebanese withdrawal, the economic crisis represented a major challenge for the 
NUG: at that time, the inflation was out of control at an annual rate of 500%554 (and it was in the 
three digits bracket since 1979555). However, Israel's wild inflation was one of the symptom of deeper 
social and economic problems556 which were manifesting themselves in balance of payments 
problems and increasing foreign and domestic debts. The situation was tough and the Ministry of 
Finance was sacrificed to the Likud, in order to secure the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister 
to Labor, but Peres knew that his work would have been mainly judged on his ability to restore the 
economic situation. Therefore, the PM decided to take it upon himself and to largely bypass Yitzhak 
Moda'i, the Likud Finance Minister557.  
                                                          
550 Even if Shamir himself accepted that Peres operated better when he was in charge as Prime Minister, he 
still found it nearly impossible to work with him. 
551 Shlaim A., The iron wall..., ibidem, p. 474 
552 He mainly voted for the withdrawal in order to damage Shamir and Sharon, moreover he was well aware of 
the popularity of such a move inside Israeli society. 
553 Levy's motivations for voting with the Labor Party were mostly dictated by intra-party considerations, in 
order to damage Shamir but, most of all, Sharon. Indeed, he was aware of the popularity of such a position 
inside Israeli society. 
554 Worldwide inflation data, Historic inflation in Israel (CPI), (http://www.inflation.eu). 
555 From 133% in 1980, it leaped to 191% in 1983 and then to 445% in 1984. 
556 A joke at the time asked whether it was cheaper to take a bus or a taxi from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. The price 
in shekels was about the same, but the correct answer was the taxi. Why? Because, unlike the bus, you paid 
at the end of the one-hour trip (when the shekel would be worth less than at the start). 
557 He was removed after speaking out against government policies and his dismissal caused a major crisis in 
the NUG, which almost led to its collapse. 
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During the summer of 1985, the government introduced the Emergency Stabilization Plan558 (ESP), 
an austerity program, whose aim was to enact realistic cut on the budget expenditure. The more 
fundamental problem with economy was to be found in the Zionist institutions559 which, instead of 
allowing the production to determine the standard of living, permitted the flow of capital to do so. 
For this reason, the government announced the program of economic liberalization in order to 
reduce the governments' highly interventionist role in economy and to encourage competition 
within the domestic market. The ESP proved to be extremely popular with the public, due to the 
fact that it produced prices stability and the relative economic calm benefited the population, who 
increased its support for both Peres and the Labor Party. 
 
4.2.1.1 Back to the Jordanian Option 
 Conversely, for the inflation and the withdrawal from Lebanon, Peres got some difficulties 
in changing the diplomatic and political climate of the Arab-Israeli relations, this was his greatest 
ambition in order to set the preconditions needed to solve the Palestinian issue, through a separate 
agreement with Jordan. That was the true leitmotiv of his policy during the entire life of the NUG. 
He believed that the long-term goal of the Likud to keep the control over the West Bank was a 
tremendous mistake because, with the time against Israel, it would have undermined the basis of 
the Jewish and democratic character of the State. Besides this, the continuation of the military 
occupation was not a satisfactory solution: primarily because Israel was ruling over a half million 
Arabs living in difficult conditions and, secondly, because given their birth rate (much higher than 
the Israeli one) the demographic balance would have changed soon less in their favor. For these 
reasons, the only possible alternative consisted in the Jordanian Option, a territorial compromise 
with King Hussein in order to return the most densely populated areas of the West Bank to the 
Hashemite kingdom and to keep the most important strategic areas under Israeli control. By the 
way, this strategy had always been the option from preferred by Labor party since 1967. Also, Rabin 
totally agreed with this vision and together asked the team of experts headed by Yossi Beilin to 
                                                          
558 A total freeze of prices of all goods and services was imposed and the linkage mechanism was suspended. 
Everything from price tags in shops and stores, charges for services, prices specified in contracts, wages and 
public budgets to foreign exchange rates, remained fixed at the exact nominal quotation on the day the policy 
was declared. 
It worked. In 1985, inflation fell to 185% (less than half the rate in 1984). Within a few months, the authorities 
began to lift the price freeze on some items; in other cases it took almost a year. In 1986, inflation was down to 
just 19%. 
559 Histadrut above all and the measures taken were possible thanks to the historical control that Labor Party 
had always had on this institution. 
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investigate the means by which to realize this aim; the recommendation expressed was to recreate 
the model of Camp David of direct negotiations, with the involvement of the US.  
When the PM started to approach Amman, the response was cautious and encouraging; king 
Hussein was willing to start the negotiations without preconditions, but he was facing was faced 
two problems: the first was that the Summit Arab League, held in Rabat in 1974, had recognized the 
PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (then he couldn't start any official 
negotiations without the approval of the latter); the second was related to another summit of the 
Arab League Summit, held in Fez in 1982, according to which the negotiations with Israel were 
allowed, but only in the framework of an international conference. Unfortunately, at that moment 
the idea of an international forum was extremely unpopular because the result of such a meeting 
would have considered as an external imposed solution. 
In 1985, Peres held a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations where he announced the 
world that Israel intended to launch peace talks with the kingdom of Jordan and that the purpose 
of these meetings would be to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and the Arab, in addition to 
find a solution for the Palestinian issue. A week later the PM repeated the statement in the Knesset 
and there were again complaints from members of the Likud and extreme-right parties, 
notwithstanding these complaints the Knesset approved the plan. Shamir and his party colleagues 
were deeply against this proposal, but they feared that if they would have refused, Peres would have 
refused to keep the Rotation Agreement. Shamir knew that a political crisis on this issue would lead 
to the creation of a government headed exclusively by Peres or to new elections (most likely won by 
Labor).  
Peres, as a PM, kept on working frantically, developing as much as possible his diplomatic activities 
because he was aware that the end of his term was coming and, despite some of his supporters were 
pushing him not to keep the rotation agreement with Likud, he wanted to be respectful to the oath 
with Shamir and leaving to him the premiership560. In a statement to the Knesset on October 7th 1986, 
he showed his achievements, among them: the reduction of internal economic crisis, the withdrawal 
from Lebanon, the new co-existence in the territories and the progress in the process peace. As he 
explained: «The choice was between preconditions without negotiations, or negotiations without 
preconditions. I chose the first561». On October 20th 1986, he left the premiership to Shamir: the 
handshake between the incoming and the outgoing PM was marking the fate of the peace process, 
but it became clear just some months later. 
Peres disappointed many in the party by implementing the rotation agreement in 1986 but, actually, 
he had little choice. Indeed, even if he could have called the elections as a successful Prime Minister, 
                                                          
560 Peres decided to keep the promise with Shamir also because he believed that if he would have reneged on 
his word, his credibility would have been compromise. 
561 Shlaim A., The iron wall..., ibidem, p. 485 
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in such circumstances the party may have been defeated because the electorate thought it unfair that 
the rotation agreement had not be respected. For instance, there was a clear majority among Israelis 
that wished to see the maintenance of the NUG562. 
 
4.2.2 The implementation of the Rotation Agreement, Shamir to power (1986-
1988) 
 The post rotation government led by Shamir, with Peres serving as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, was dominated by the peace process. Consequently, this NUG was characterized by a sense 
of paralysis caused by the major differences between Labor and Likud on the conduct of the peace 
process and by the state of parity within the Cabinet, which prevented any substantial decisions 
from being taken on the issue563. Even if there was a high degree of mistrust between Likud and Labor 
during the duration of the NUG, it was better contained in the first phase than after the post-
rotation period: the problems that appeared in the year 1986/1988 were caused (as the Likud claimed) 
by Peres' reluctance to play a secondary role similar to that Shamir had occupied and by leftist 
attempted to push the peace process beyond the limits of NUG's policy564. 
The Likud leader was starting his period of premiership confronting with the growth of the extreme 
right both inside and outside the party, and opposing Peres campaign to start an international 
conference sponsored by the permanent members of 'UN that would have pressured to agree on a 
solution based on the principle of "land for peace". In practice during his years as Prime Minister 
Shamir, along with the leadership of the Likud, kept his political ideology (inspired by Revisionist 
Zionism) as the major guideline of his government: his aims were to retain and conquest the regions 
of Judea and Samaria through a policy of expansion of the settler enterprise565. In that particular 
moment, the territorial attachment was sustainable and justifiable thanks to the scourge of 
terrorism, in Israel and all over the world. The conducting of terroristic attacks contributed on one 
hand, with the delegitimization of the Palestinian national cause and especially on the other one, 
with the reinforcement of the nationalist territorial claims in name of security.  
                                                          
562 In a poll published in the Jerusalem Post (April 7th1986), the 54% wanted to keep the agreement. Moreover, 
Peres' chances to be able to form a narrow-based Labor-led government were very limited, due to the 
unwillingness of the religious party to take part to it. 
563 Lochery N., The Israeli..., ibidem, p. 208. 
564 This situation brought to a deterioration in the relationship between Shamir and Peres, with the former 
blaming the latter of attempting to run an alternative foreign policy to that of the NUG. 
565 Morris B., Vittime..., ibidem, p 705. 
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The tensions and the differences within the government reached the climax with Peres' London 
Agreement566 of April 1987, which called for an international conference between Israel, Jordan, the 
United State and the Soviet Union, followed by direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan: the 
Likud was not only angry about the content of the plan but the fact that Peres had secretly negotiated 
the deal with Hussein in London567. When the secret negotiations between Peres and King Hussein 
were released to Shamir, he immediately understood that it was opening the road that would lead 
to the withdrawal and the transfer of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank. For this reason, the 
London Agreement was consequently blocked by the PM and the Likud members of the inner 
Cabinet, this refusal provoked much bitterness in the Labor Party, especially from Peres. From this 
point on, the NUG was effectively finished but continued to function in order to serve the intra-
party needs of both Shamir and Peres568.Unsurprisingly, the Labor leader was not happy with this 
situation; after the rotation was implemented his personal position was transformed from number 
one569 in the government to second, equal to Rabin and, after the failure of the London Agreement, 
to the third place.  
Generally, Shamir was very coherent with his ideological perception of the world and he made the 
security principle the main guideline of his premiership. His revisionist legacy and his reputation of 
being a strong supporter of the nationalistic claims found in the security-belief a strong basis on 
which articulate his premiership and catalyze public support, taking also advantage on Israeli fears 
that had deep historical roots in the history of the Jewish people. Therefore, the existence of a siege 
mentality caused by Palestinian violence strengthened the position of the Israeli right among the 
electorate and the Likud benefited politically from this condition suggesting that any dialogue with 
the Palestinians was dangerous and unpatriotic. In 1987, the outbreak of the Intifada will challenge 
this ideological inflexibility and the stagnation of the government, by requiring to the political 
                                                          
566 The London Agreement between King Hussein of Jordan and Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon 
Peres was signed during a secret meeting held at the residence of Lord Mishcon in London on April 11, 1987. 
The agreement outlined the framework for an international peace conference hosted by the UN, whose 
purpose would be "the peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, based on resolutions 242 and 338". The 
agreement also stipulated that the conference would not impose a solution on the parties, and that the 
Palestinians would be represented by the Jordanian delegation. The signatories agreed that their plan would 
be presented to Israeli PM Shamir as a proposal made by US Secretary of State George Shultz.  
567 Peres informed Shamir of the existence of the agreement only after it had been finalized  
568 Since the rotation agreement, Rabin had in effect become the senior Labor Party minister and it was in his 
interest to maintain the government for as long as possible. 
569 Some polls showed that public support for Peres was approximately 50-60% with Shamir that instead 
hovered around 20%. But there is to say that despite his great success the leader of the Labor camp of was 
viewed with great suspicion by the Israeli public. 
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leadership the capability to confront with an unexpected crisis situation and to provide adequate 
responses to tackle it down. 
 
4.3 The Palestinian awakening and the collapse of the status-quo 
 In 1987, the Palestinian national uprising, the so-called Intifada, burst out in the Occupied 
Territories, this event ended the Israeli perception that the status quo of the territories was eternal 
and opened up a harsh discussion about its future status.  
The spark that ignited the rebellion was a car accident on December 9th, in which an Israeli truck 
driver killed 4 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip; immediately rumors was spreading the  false news that 
the man  had deliberately caused the crash to avenge the death of his brother. That event incited the 
Palestinian people and, in few days, the unrest spread also to the West Bank. The Occupied 
Territories were inundated by unprecedented popular demonstrations and spontaneous strikes: all 
the people, including women and children, were participating to the demonstrations burning tires, 
throwing stones and Molotov cocktails towards Israeli soldiers and military installations, waving 
the Palestinian flags. The outbreak of the Intifada was completely spontaneous and it was not 
organized or programmed neither by the local and nor by the Tunisian leadership; therefore, we can't 
say that at the origin of the overwhelming popular insurrection there was a national purpose, rather 
that its roots were in the miserable living conditions of the Palestinians: poverty, hatred for the 
occupation and especially the humiliation that the inhabitants of the Territories had endured for 
twenty years. Only after, during the course of the uprising those wider purposes became the act of a 
conscious political action and were clearly set; the ultimate goals were self-determination and the 
creation of an independent Palestinian State. 
The revolt caught completely by surprise Israel's political leaders and the entire intelligence system, 
they simply were unaware of the process that was taking place under their noses; but once the revolt 
broke out, the whole Israeli society was forced to seriously take into consideration some alternative 
options to the status quo. The issue was (and still is) very controversial among Israeli society and 
from this harsh debate, a political shift took place towards the extreme poles on both sides of the 
political spectrum570: the left claimed the necessity to find a political solution, while the right 
reinforced the belief that the problem could be resolved just with the use of military force.  
For those reasons, the Intifada also exacerbated the division within the NUG, also because no party 
was able to find out and to propose a clear line of action in order to handle the situation. The division 
was clear: Peres was in favor of a political initiative, while Shamir was inclined to tackle down the 
problem through the use of force; in this case the Minister of Defense Rabin had a propensity to 
                                                          
570 Aronoff M. J., Power and ritual in the Israel Labor Party: a study in political anthropology, M.E. Sharpe, 1993, p. 208. 
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agree with the Likud PM571. Along with their view the real question was not based on a territorial 
dispute that could be resolved by making concessions, rather it was a real threat to the very existence 
of the State of Israel. In this case, Rabin's attitude was fundamental because he, as Minister of 
Defense, was the main responsible for the management of the riots; unfortunately, he didn't manage 
to keep a linear behavior during all the Intifada. Indeed, when the turmoil began he severely 
underestimate the situation, leaving for a scheduled visit to the United States and when he came 
back, he adopted the other extreme, ordering a large-scale use of force in order to defeat the rebellion. 
His purpose was to make the Palestinians understand that they wouldn't have obtained any political 
gain through violence. So, in order to quell the unrest, the Israeli security forces used all the means 
of repression available: bats, teargas, water cannons and rubber bullets, however, the unrest 
continued unabated, actually increasing its intensity, as a demonstration that such extreme 
measures were not able to handle with the situation. 
Only academics understood that: «For the first time is taking place a popular action which is 
involving each group and social class (...) The entire population is rebelling and this is creating a 
national common experience572». Actually, the Intifada reached many more successes in few months 
than Arafat with years of terrorism; Shlomo Avineri remarked that: «The West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip under the Israeli government are a threat against which the whole forces of the IDF can't be 
sufficient (...) An army can defeat another army, but it can't defeat a people (...)Israel is learning that 
the military power has a limit573“. 
The consequences of the Intifada on Israel, its society and its political scenario were plenty. As for 
the tragedy of Sabra and Chatila, also the Occupied Territories were the focus of an intense media 
coverage, the world was shaken by the violent images of the Israeli troops shooting on 
demonstrators who threw stones: Israel's image will be seriously damaged and the message that 
emerged was that a powerful army was sent against a civilian population who was fighting for their 
basic rights and their right to political self-determination. All of a sudden, the biblical image of David 
and Goliath seemed to have reversed. 
The Labor Party was affected more negatively than the Likud574 for two reasons: on one hand, as a 
short-term consequence, the Israeli public opinion started to be more hawkish, manifested this new 
tendency with a shift of the electorate away from the center-leftist camp and towards nationalist-
                                                          
571 The “iron fist” policy applied by Shamir and Rabin to suppress the uprising was applauded by the majority 
of Israelis, but it wasn't an effective solution to the problem: neither in the short-term nor in the long-term. 
572 Shlaim A., The Iron Wall…, op. cit., p.500. 
573 Ibidem. 
574 On May 1988, Ma'ariv reported a survey that indicated that the support for the Likud was risen from 33% to 
39%, while support for Labor declined from 46% to 38% during the same period. 
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religious parties575; on the other one, King Hussein was forced to reconsider its relation with the 
West Bank and in July 1988, he suddenly announced that Jordan was cutting its administrative and 
legal ties with the Territories in order to clarify that the East Bank was not Palestine and leaving the 
Palestinians to deal directly with the Israelis to decide about their own future. Now Israel was alone 
with the PLO and this situation blowed up all the previous effort made by Peres to fulfill the envision 
of the Jordanian Option, on which the entire Labor approach towards the Palestinians was built 
(since 1967). 
Another consequence of the Intifada was the birth of Hamas 576, an Islamic movement for resistance 
that was founded in 1988 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. In the very beginning, the Israeli authorities 
encouraged this organization, in the hope that it would have weaken the secular nationalism of the 
PLO. However, after the uprising Hamas radicalized more and more its position and its members 
began to overstep the limits of legality, starting to carry out suicide attacks inside Israel in 1994. But 
if the Intifada radicalized Hamas, it had a calming effect on secular Palestinians as well because, the 
revolt raised the national morale but at the same time missed the main objective: the end the Israeli 
occupation and the improvement of the living conditions of the residents in the West Bank and 
Gaza. This is the reason why local Palestinian began to put pressure on the PLO establishment in 
Tunis in order to forfeit the conditions that would allow them to negotiate with Israel: the leaders 
in the Territories understood that a diplomatic dialogue was the only way for the Palestinians to 
start a peace initiative, essential in order to achieve any concrete political result. 
On the Israeli side the most significant consequence of the Intifada was that it showed that the 
status quo was no longer a solution577. The Palestinian uprising had challenged many assumptions 
that were taken for granted by most Israelis (and Palestinians as well): if the short-term effect was 
not positive for the dovish camp of Israeli politics, the long-term effect instead the Labor Party could 
be advantaged only if it would be able to articulate a plausible scenario for peace, alternative to the 
Likud's policy of perpetuation of the occupation.  
 
 
                                                          
575 Arian and Shamir found out that one-third of the Israelis had become more hawkish and around one-quarter 
more dovish, as the result of the Intifada. 
576 Hamas or the Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah) is a Palestinian Sunni-
Islamic fundamentalist organization. It has a social service wing, Dawah and a military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-
Qassam Brigades and, since 2007, has been the governing authority of the Gaza Strip. When the movement 
born, in the '80s, it was a valid alternative to Fatah in the Occupied Territories, thanks to his affiliation to the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
577 A survey conducted on June 1989 showed that only 13% of the population (16% Jews and 4% Arabs) 
considered the status quo a viable solution.  
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4.4 HaMifleget Ha'Avoda towards the '90s 
 The elections in November 1988 took place in the shadow of the Intifada. The Palestinian 
uprising catalyzed the attention on issues of national importance, such as: security, peace and the 
future of the occupied territories. During the election campaign the Labor camp chose the Peace 
Process as the main subject, but the issue of security had become crucial thus strengthening the 
position of the right-wing parties that were supporting the “iron-fist” policy in order to restore the 
order in the Territories. Also, the Ha’Avoda had been forced to rethink its political mindset in 
response to the withdrawal of King Hussein from the negotiations concerning the West Bank 
(1988); the priority was to maintain party unity and to seek a pragmatic compromise in order to 
place the Labor platform at the center of the Israeli political continuum in order not to be perceived 
as too dovish by a public opinion more and more hawkish. For this reason, the campaign was led by 
the party focusing on the personality of Peres and trying to create a balance between ideology and 
personality, to get the winning formula578. 
The Palestinian revolt had caused, in the short-term, a significant shift to the right, towards more 
nationalistic positions; paradoxically, despite the polarization of the electorate, if we analyze the 
electoral results for the twelfth Knesset it can be said that the outcome was not clearly in favor either 
of the Alignment, nor of the Likud (even if the latter got more seats more than the first one579). Both 
camps lost their seats in favor of smaller, but with a more ideological, parties to the extreme right 
and to the extreme left of the political continuum580. But the most unexpected development in this 
election was the increased vote for religious parties; their growth in terms of parliamentary was 
around the 50% with a total of eighteen seats, thus becoming the kingmaker in the new Knesset581. 
This was a symptom of disillusionment towards the secular culture identified with the two major 
parties with the decline of idealism many sought a new spiritual home. 
President Herzog asked Shamir, leader of the largest party, to form a new NUG; despite this 
recommendation, the Likud leader tried first to form a government with a narrow majority, in 
colLaboration with religious and ultranationalist parties. But after days of intensive negotiations, 
                                                          
578 Peres despite his excellent performance as PM was not able to overcome the image problem and the 
electorate was still hard to trust him. 
579 The representation in the Knesset of the Likud had dropped from 41 to 40 seats, while the Labor Party went 
from 44 to 39. 
580 Smooha S. and Peretz D., Israel's Twelvth Knesset Elections: an all-loser Game, Middle East Journal, vol.43, n. 3, 
1989, p. 6. 
581 The lessons of 1988 indicated that there had been a shift from the two major parties. By calculating their 
seats won, they decreased from 85 in 1984 to 77 four years later. The decline in voting for the Labor camp was 
much more dramatic than the relatively static vote for Likud and for its allies of the extreme-right. 
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the secular Shamir realized that the best solution was to create a broader coalition government with 
Labor582, a better partner who would give fewer problems583. 
Peres and Rabin agreed to join the NUG, however they asked for a probationary period of nine 
months, within which if there had been no progress toward compromise and peace, they would have 
given their resignations. This decision attracted many critics, one of them pointed out that the 
decision to be part of the 1988 NUG (rather than going to the opposition) was taken for the great 
desire of power and not for ideological considerations; according to some commentators it was a 
dumb choice because in 1988 there were no special issues on the political agenda, as in 1984 (the 
withdrawal from Lebanon and inflation): this time it was just power politics 584.  
Against this criticism Peres had drawn up a list of five reasons that pushed him to participate in this 
government: the fear of a coalition led by the Likud which would annex the Occupied Territories, the 
worry that such a kind of government would try to crush the Intifada with excessive measures, 
avoiding the increasing polarization of Israeli society that would be accentuated with a government 
coalition led by religious parties and by the extreme right and finally the need to confront the 
economic problems of the country585  There were also other reasons, for example that the ministry 
of defense would be granted to Rabin, persuading him not to challenging Peres' leadership in the 
party586. 
This time, however, the center-left camp entered as a junior partner and for that reason no Rotation 
Agreement was expected, Shamir would remain the PM. Peres gave up the post of Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in order to be Deputy PM and, above all, Minister of Finance587, while Rabin would 
have kept the Ministry of Defense. The main and only consequence of the formation of the NUG in 
1988 was the continuation of the stalemate on the most significant issues that the nation had to face, 
such as the Intifada management of the. 
                                                          
582 What influenced Shamir were also intra party considerations, indeed he would have preferred to assign 
portfolios to Labor leaders rather than to his colleagues in the Likud. 
583. Shamir also saw the need for Likud to remain a party to the center of Israeli politics without succumbing 
to the extreme demands of some smaller parties that would have definitely increased the divisions within 
Israeli society. 
584 Aronoff M. J., Power and ritual..., op. cit., p. 232.  
585 Ibidem, p. 235. 
586 Indeed, the position of the minister of defense in the Israeli Cabinet is more important than any other office, 
just behind the PM. Moreover, taking this task would have meant to have a major responsibility on peace, 
security and a wide control over the Occupied Territories and Israeli security policy. 
587 Peres tool the ministry of finance in order to save the kibbutz movement and the Histadrut from bankruptcy. 
He entered the NUG also because he felt to have the duty to safeguard these last bastions of Labor support; 
the price was very high not only the loss of the office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also the burden to 
handle the difficult Israeli economic situation. 
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As we have seen, the Shamir government coincided with a revolution in Palestinian political 
thought; the impulse of this radical change gave the occasion to Palestinian leadership to gain the 
self-confidence needed in order to moderate its political program. In 1988588 the PLO recognized the 
legitimacy of Israel by accepting all the relevant resolutions of the United Nations (242 and 338) and 
adopting the principle of the "two-states solution". Israel reacted very sharply to these statements: 
just when the Palestinians were moving towards a territorial compromise, Israel under the 
leadership of Shamir he was walking away.  
Basically, Peres blamed the Likud leaders of this new development, arguing that when the Likud 
opposed the London agreement (1987) it had paved the way to new unexpected outcomes. Peres 
said: «Something happened and now we need to answer back589». Rabin played a major role in the 
formulation of this response; the Intifada had taught him some important lessons: first he realized 
that would not be Jordan to lead the Palestinians into the negotiating table (but that it would be 
exactly the opposite), second he understood that Israel would have to negotiate directly with the 
local Palestinian leaders and finally he came to the conclusion that the policy of Israel towards the 
territories could not just rest on military repression, but also it had to take political initiative590. 
From these considerations, the Minister of Defense came to formulate a plan in four phases which 
required the cessation of Palestinian violence, a period of calm from three to six months before the 
elections in the West Bank, negotiations with local elected leaders (and with Jordan) for a form of 
transition autonomy with the final status negotiations of the territories. 
The pressures that came from the new US administration were decisive for the NUG; President 
George Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker were much less tolerant in front of the 
obstructionism of Shamir, compared to what they had been Reagan and Schulz against Begin. The 
new administration wanted to open new ways to revive the peace process and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Moshe Arens understood that in the current situation could not continue forever to 
pursue a stalemate but a practical solution must be formulated so, along with Rabin, he joined the 
American pressure to persuade the PM to make some new proposals.  
                                                          
588 The Algeri Declaration is the “Palestinian Declaration of Independence”, a statement proclaimed by Yasser 
Arafat on November 15th 1988. It had previously been adopted by the Palestinian National Council, the 
legislative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)  
589 Shlaim A., The Iron Wall..., ibidem, p 515. 
590 Rabin and Peres became much more moderate during this period. The first one thanks to the Intifada, the 
second one due to the failure of the Jordanian Option. Both were very pragmatic and understood the need to 
find a partner for negotiations. They were always very cautious regarding this ideological change because they 
were concerned about the electoral positioning strategy of the Labor Party 
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On May 14th 1989 the unthinkable happened and the Israeli prime minister presented the 
government a peace initiative opened to discussion and voting, the Shamir Plan591. The centerpiece 
of the proposal mainly modeled on the plan drawn up by Rabin and the end of the debate twenty 
ministers voted in favor and six against. His proposal was short-lived as the PM could not resist to 
the fiercest opposition, which came just from his party, also because it did not waste a lot of energy 
to defend his plan592, on the contrary allowed this group of opponents to force him to sink his own 
initiative the possibility of a clash within the central Committee of the party concerned a lot more 
certainty Shamir of a clash with America or the daily clashes with the Palestinians. 
The point of non-return came in 1989 when during the respective months of September and October, 
the Egyptian President Mubarak593 and US Secretary of State Baker proposed two plans to revive 
negotiations about the Palestinian question. What remained constant was the position of 
continuous refusal of Shamir's (in the long run also destroyed the understanding with Rabin594) and 
his ministers; Meanwhile, the Likud seemed serious difficulty and without a clear direction. This 
made even the government unable to move in any direction: the PM looked to head on the road of 
self-destruction. 
Between late 1989 and early 1990, the US Secretary of State Baker became more and more insistent 
and increasingly frustrated by Israeli internal clashes and the 'intransigence of their government. 
Meanwhile Shamir was trying to gain time by giving credit to the critics moved by his Likud 
companions, being forced to demand the fulfillment of certain preconditions in order to start 
negotiations: for the ministers of the Alignment these premises were unrealistic and thus impossible 
to meet. Coherently with the electoral campaign, the peace process became the central dividing issue 
used by anti-government groups present in the two camps; the consequence of this behavior was 
that the NUG wasn't able to take any major decision and, at that point, Ha’Avoda threatened to 
withdraw from the government if the Cabinet had not taken seriously into account at least one of 
the available options. The NUG was on the verge of collapse. 
                                                          
591 The document was not really Shamir's, but it was more an expression of the new minister of foreign affairs' 
approach. Specifically, the peace process would have been formulated on the basis of the Camp David 
agreements and on the UN resolutions 242 is 338. 
592 A rebellion started in the Likud. The "constrainer Ministers" led by Sharon were accusing Shamir to bring 
Israel to ruin. 
593 His plan was structured in ten points and mainly concerned the issue of the Palestinian elections and the 
acceptance of the “land for peace” formula by Israel. That proposal did not provide for a participation of the 
PLO in negotiations, neither for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, nor for the formation of a Palestinian 
state. 
594 The most important relationship in the NUG was the one between Rabin and Shamir. It was the 
cornerstone around which the broader coalition was surviving.   
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But we must keep in mind that Peres was reluctant to leave the government and call new elections 
because he knew he could risk the loss of its leading position within the Labor Party, in fact there 
were considerations about the fact that a break of government could lead to a real challenge for the 
leadership in the party between Rabin and Peres. It was known that the Defense Minister was the 
most popular in the Cabinet and even some doves within the Labor Party believed that Rabin 
represented the best hope to take out the party from the NUG and to lead it to electoral victory. 
Once again, the Alignment was again forced to face a perennial dilemma: stay or leave the coalition. 
 Yossi Sarid challenged his former colleagues saying Labor: «Be honest with yourself, turn away from 
this government and tell the public what you know to be the truth: there can't be peace without the 
PLO and without a withdrawal from the territories. Believe it or not, you could also have a chance 
to win595 ». 
On March 13, 1990 Shamir told the Cabinet: «Peres asked me to dissolve this government and has 
undermined the foundations unjustly accusing the government of not advancing the peace process. 
This situation leaves me no choice but to end his service in this government596». Immediately after 
the ten Alignment ministers presented their collective resignation, even going out to them by the 
ruling coalition and two days later the Labor Party put on the agenda of the Knesset a motion of no 
confidence in the government: the motion was approved by 60 votes in favor and 55 against. Shamir 
was thus the first PM in the history of Israel to fall for a parliamentary no-confidence vote. One of 
the main reasons why the Labor Party broke its coalition with Likud was to avoid to be the witness 
of the consequences derived from Shamir's intransigent attitude towards the peace initiatives of 
those years.  
After six weeks Shamir was able to put together a narrow coalition with the support of the religious 
and two ultranationalist parties: it was the most right-oriented government in the whole history of 
Israel, as well as the more extreme regarding Arabs-Jews relations. This executive would lead Israel 
for two years until the turning point of 1992 elections. 
In 1988 the Labor camp seemed unchanged and fatigued; If the Labor Party wanted to win back 
voters was necessary that risked in the electoral competition articulating a vision of the nation to 
explain the opportunities created by new realities and articulating policies that could realistically 
relate to these new conditions, although violated aspects that always were considered a taboo (such 
as negotiating with the PLO). Only by taking this risk, it would be possible to stand out from the 
Likud597. 
                                                          
595 Aronoff M. J., Power and ritual..., Ibidem, p. 213 
596 Shlaim A., The Iron Wall..., ibidem, p 519. 
597 With its participations to the NUGs the Labor party was becoming nothing more than a reflection of the 
Likud. Those years were a fundamental opportunity for the younger generation within the party to influence 
the internal ideological debate.  
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This period would be fundamental for the Labor Party itself because it saw the start of a process of 
change in both the Mifleget Ha'Avoda and the Israeli political system which were to culminate in 
Labor's election victory in 1992598 Indeed, in those years some reforms were introduced inside the 
Labor camp: the most important one was the adoption of primaries, in order to open up the method 
by which party candidates were chosen. The reforms were proposed by Uzi Baram, the party's 
Secretary-General, who believed in a stage by stage process of democratization: with the primaries 
all the members were to be given a chance to vote for their candidates. 
The principal aim of the reform was to present a Knesset list more representative of party electorate 
and of Israeli society as a whole, increasing the electoral appeal of the party. An important factor 
that contributed to the internal acceptance of the reforms was a relative breakdown in party 
discipline; this was the result of the decision taken by the party's large majority to participate to the 
NUG. This participation launched a growing confidence process in the younger generation, which 
resulted in the formation of a more independent parliamentary faction, who strongly supported 
Baram and thus his program. At the end both Peres and Rabin accepted the idea after expressing 
initial concerns over it; this change of heart took place when it became clear that the primary system 
would not have radically altered the balance of power within the party and when it soon became 
apparent that Baram's proposal was extremely popular, not only within the Labor but also with the 
electorate.  
In conclusion we can see the major changes that began to take place within the Labor Party from 
1988 onwards, concerning the ideological change, a generational challenge and an internal process 
of democratization. This revolutionary process was motivated by the need to respond to the 
transformations of Israeli political scenario and by the desire to achieve a main objective: bring back 
the Labor Party to power.  
  
                                                          
598 Aronoff M. J., Power and ritual..., Ibidem, p. 240. 
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Chapter 5. MIFLEGET HA’AVODA AND THE RABIN ERA 
(1991-1995) 
 
 By the end of the 1990s, the fate of the Palestinian territories had become one of the most 
important issues in the country's consciousness, destined to divide into opposite sides those who 
nourished almost antithetic ideas. In order to give a more specific methodological framework, it 
must be said that the aim of this chapter is to highlight the importance of the historical 
(international and domestic) framework, which is the active context where the events of 1992 
elections and then of the Oslo Process could take place. 
As we did in the previous chapters, these historical events are not the main focus of our discourse, 
but they are functional to our analysis of the Israeli political scene and society; rather these two 
issues are pivotal to this work because they allow to catch the dynamics between Israeli voters, 
Miflagat Ha’avodah and the development of the negotiations with the Palestinians. This last aspect is 
not taken as the core-subject of this chapter, for this reason the analysis of the Oslo Process (from 
1992 to 1995) is not detailed in itself, because the purpose it is not to show the entire development 
of the peace talks, neither to illustrate the state of the art. 
Thus, what it is reported is an attempt to give a clearer idea of the cause-effect mechanism between 
the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, public opinion building-process and electoral outcome (more 
precisely regarding Labor Party’s performance) in Israel. 
 
5.1 Israel in the Nineties: between normalization and new waves of 
immigration 
 By the end of its first fifty years, Israel has been transformed from a country whose symbol 
was the Jewish pioneer blowing and sowing his fields (in accordance with the Zionist idea) into an 
industrialized country, proud of its cutting-edge high-tech industry. Moreover, the privatization 
trend, began in the Eighties, continued gaining momentum; the Histadrut-owned companies, the 
kibbutzim and moshavim were used to operate in a framework of state-subsidized credit, but once 
the state shifted away from direct guidance of capital market, those enterprises were unable to 
operate in an expensive-credit market and faced bankruptcy. 
Israel was changing, adapting to globalization; it was no longer a land of socialist pioneers, but was 
formed by people who wanted to enjoy the benefits of a normal life, like most of the Western 
consumerism countries, so the economy was not to consider anymore as a secondary matter and it 
has become harder and harder to justify to ordinary citizens billions of dollars that were being 
poured into Judea and Samaria: the age of ideology was ended.  
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The peace process brought about a significant weakening of the Arab boycott of Israel and contact 
with other countries in the region led to economic projects and encouraged growth; Western 
European countries that before the peace process had reservations about Israel’s policy toward the 
Palestinians now discovered Israel and became more open to contact with it. During these years the 
state balance of payments, which had been one of the weaker points of the economy, went from 
negative to positive (thanks also to its dependence on US aid and the Jewish donations); so Israel's 
reliability in the world credit market attracted international investors and during that period the 
standard of living rose, but creating also a growing gap between the richest and the poorest599. From 
one of the world more egalitarian societies in the Sixties, Israel turned into one of the least 
egalitarian in the Nineties.  
The revolution took place also in the social climate, changing basic element of Israeli society (stable 
domicile and place of work, closeness to the extended family, children’s group that stayed together 
from kindergarten to the army): the entire range of familial connections that made people feel rooted 
in their place and society was suddenly undermined and, although there was greater opportunity 
and higher standard of living, something important had been lost. 
As a result, Israelis’ exposure to one another had diminished; each social group shut itself up in its 
own neighborhood and in its own home. Thus, the rise in the standard of living had led citizens to 
becoming alienated and distanced from one another. 
On a cultural level, the introduction of multi-channel television allowed American culture (the 
universal culture without roots) to penetrate in Israel; the demise of Zionist-Socialist ideology 
created a vacuum which was hard to fill but, in a way, it affirmed the success of Zionism’s program 
of normalizing the Jews to be like other people. The sense of security and loss of existential fears, 
the death of idealism and ideology, the appearance of a generation with no past and no future, solely 
interested in the present, were all elements of these “normalization600”. In this domestic context, 
massive wave of immigrants arrived from the Former Soviet Union. One of Gorbachev’s first acts in 
1989 was to reform Russia’s emigration policy: Russian Jews could now leave the country and 
between 1990 and 2000, about 900,000 people immigrated to Israel, thus increasing the population 
by 15%601. This influx brought immigration to the highest historical levels (385.00 immigrants in 
1990-1991, followed by an annual average inflow of 65,000/70,000 people from 1992 to 1997). The big 
difference between immigrants of this aliyah with respect to the previous migratory waves, layed in 
these underlying reasons: if politics, ideology and culture prevailed until the 1970s, in those hours 
economic considerations gained momentum, indeed: «In the last ten years the main motivation to 
                                                          
599 The two main pockets of poverty were the ultra-orthodox and the Arab population. 
600 Shapira A., Israel…, op.cit., p. 453. 
601For the sake of accuracy between 1989 and 2000, 886,292 citizens of the former USSR entered Israel, 
accounting for 84.2% of the total number of immigrants in that period. 
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leave former URSS (or Russia) was no longer a question of identity or even adherence to the values 
of the Zionist movement602». 
The arrival of such large number of people in the country had caused some side-effects which 
reverberated not only on the new-comers, but also on hosts; particularly regarding the management 
of cultural integration. Indeed, this group of immigrants (one million people) was very attached to 
the Russian traditions and culture; their identity603 has always remained homogeneous and Judaism 
is considered, by many of them, a major aspect of its history, but not the only one, still feeling 
connected with their land of origin whose language, traditions and habits were still preferred by the 
Russian immigrants in Israel. It is an intersection of the collective patrimony, with a personal Jewish 
dimension, that in the choice of immigrating to Israel has found a new dimension.  
The Russian immigrants’ desire to preserve Russian culture within a Russian-speaking community 
did not encounter criticism from the establishment. This could have been a sign of a more pluralistic 
society, that looked with more tolerance the immigrants but this habit reflected also the trend 
regarding collapse of the cultural hegemony of the first Israel, which became a divided society with 
no basic consensus on values. 
Israel's response was entrusted with new immigration policies, different from those applied in 
previous migratory waves, based on a criterion, called the “direct absorption604”; if previously the 
government and public administrations were asked to direct and support the olim, both in the house 
and Labor market, in the Nineties this process had to rely on the free market, opting for a kind of 
spontaneous fluctuation of demand and supply. In a first phase, therefore, the immigrants could 
choose and, as a result, many of them settled down in the most central and urbanized areas of the 
country; only at the beginning of 1991, it was decided to intervene by facilitating the dispersal of the 
Russian population in peripheral districts: this need encountered Likud essential belief to settle the 
West Bank and Gaza, but this intention collided with the opinion of the new-comers who were far 
less inclined to this vision,  lacking of any ideological or even pioneering motivation. Despite this, 
the costs of absorption still remained and the amount of money needed in order to integrate a family 
of three persons was around $62.000605. Accordingly, Israel asked the Bush administration for $10 
billion of loan guarantees spread over a five-year period606.  
                                                          
602 Goldkorn W., La scelta di Abramo. Identità ebraiche e post-modernità, Bollati Boringhieri, 2006, p.22.  
603 Three are the strains of origin: the Asian and Crimean regions; Ashkenazi Jews from the Baltic countries, 
Ukraine, Moldova and the territories acquired by the USSR after the Second World War; Ashkenazi Jews 
resident in the territories already belonging to the Soviet Union before 1939 (Belarus, Russia and Ukraine). 
604Shapira A., Israel…, op.cit., p. 455. 
605 Shindler C., The Land Beyond Promise…, op. cit., p. 265. 
606 Washington immediately understood the real significance of this mass immigration and that it could be 
used as a lever to extract concessions from the Shamir government regarding the Middle East peace process. 
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By 1991, the cost of the houses for the Soviet Jews had become a major source of tension in US-Israel 
relations; Baker complained on several occasions that Israel had not supplied the necessary 
information on its settlement policy, showing a report by the US State Department which estimated 
that 4% of the 185.000 Jews who had immigrated in 1990 had settled in the Territories607; this 
compared with the figure of less than 1% which the Israeli government had put forward.  
Ariel Sharon, the Minister of Housing Construction, developed settlements near Jerusalem (such as 
Ma’ale Adumin) and by then it was difficult to differentiate between these settlements and the 
outlying suburbs of Jerusalem. Since 1967, a belt of settlements including French Hill and Gilo had 
already effectively expanded Jerusalem area. Since Arik had become Minister, the number of units 
planned for the Territories had increased fourfold; an analysis of the annual population growth in 
West Bank and Gaza showed that the under Shamir there had been a marked increase compared to 
the Begin era608. But, even if Shamir wished to downplay the expansion of the settlements program, 
the far right would have not allowed it. For this reason, Washington was able to block the loan 
guarantees the prime minister asked for. 
Another element of potential friction with the new immigrants was the high rate of schooling and 
the high professional profile: highly qualified people, who had considerably increased the human 
potential of Israel, whose Labor market earned nearly 100,000 engineers, more than 43,000 teachers, 
about 20,000 doctors and as many writers, poets, journalists and musicians609. This level of skills 
demanded to be recognized and appreciated, generating expectations that were not always met. 
Moreover, the new immigrants had a strong identification with their work, due to the fact that it 
represented one of the key factors in defining one's own identity as an element of differentiation in 
a society such as the Soviet Union, where there could be no diversity of wealth or lifestyle. 
The integration of the Russian component into the Israeli Labor market was therefore not easy; until 
1992, the unemployment rate remained high (42%, while in 1996 it had already fallen to 16%610), both 
for the lack of professional outlets and for the initial refusal of the new-comers to perform tasks 
below their training. An adequate response was given only since 1993, in conjunction with the peace 
process promoted by the Labor government and the American concession of loan guarantees for 
access to international credit. 
                                                          
607 Including the suburbs in and around East Jerusalem. 
608 In 1991, it was announced the construction of 2.150 units, with the addition of another 4.670 buildings, by 
the end of the same year.  
609Vercelli C., Israele. Storia…, op.cit., p. 347. 
610To have more data and information about the immediate impact of the Russian aliyah on Israeli politics see 
Reich B., Dropkin N. and Wurmser M., Soviet Jewish Immigration and the 1992 Israeli Knesset Elections, Middle East 
Journal, vol. 47, n.3, Summer 1993. 
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If long-term economic reflections have turned out to be very positive, things have gone differently 
on a cultural level; the new Russian community, while oscillating between integration and complete 
isolation, opposed a clear refusal to an assimilationist perspective, thus giving life to a complex of 
material institutions, attitudes, and conduct, which are property of this Russian enclave, in this way 
a dense network of websites, newspapers, periodicals, clubs, radios, magazines was developed. 
The community’s cohesiveness and internal communication were an excellent foundation for the 
development of political organizations and the influence of the Russian aliyah on elections results 
was felt as early as 1992, when the Soviet vote was estimated to count for 8 or 9 MKs611. Even if there 
were those who believed that they would have chosen the right side of the Knesset from the start, in 
the 1992 they mostly voted for the Rabin-led coalition, assuring Labor’s victory, but during the 
Nineties, their support will swing among the two political camps  
Indeed, the following years, their support allowed Netanyahu in 1996 and Barak in 1999 to form their 
governments, a strong indication of the weight the Russian vote has on the country's internal 
balance. Simultaneously to Prime Minister Brak's victory in 1999, Yisrael Beitenu612 (Israel's home) was 
founded by Avigdor Lieberman appeared and got 4 MKs which, together with the other seats gained 
by the other Russian-speaking parties, reached 12 MKs total. 
Notwithstanding their debut in Israeli politics was marked by a leftist preference, during time, 
Israelis of Russian origin have matured a mostly political position on the right, especially with regard 
to relations with the neighboring Arab states and the negotiating path with the Palestinians. This 
attitude of Russian electorate in Israel is linked with their cultural and historical origins; coming 
from Former Soviet Union, from the former Zarist Empire, they were used to shared images of strong 
nations with an extended hegemony and a powerful role in the international arena. When they came 
to Israel, their political vision was still soaked with that type or rhetoric which they wanted to be 
concretize also in the Israeli experience. From these premises comes a claustrophobic perception of 
the small Israeli territory and a consequent desire to make Israel a strong and secure state within 
the region, preserving its territorial integrity. 
 
5.2 The advent of a new scenario: Labor's chance to come back to power 
 Israeli policy, like the Palestinian one, saw substantial evolutions in the late 1980s; 
significant was the fact that this shift took place under Shamir's government, with an extreme right-
wing orientation which, was not inclined to change the status quo through negotiations. 
                                                          
611 Shindler C., The Land Beyond Promise…, op. cit., p.277. 
612 As we will see later, Lieberman's real success was recorded during the 2006 elections, where he had 11 seats, 
thus entering the majority of government.  
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On the Palestinian side, the intifada had imposed a choice: the PLO forced to observe at a distance 
what was happening in the Territories was at risk of being excluded from decision-making. 
Moreover, some intellectual currents had already realized the need to move forward with the 
rhetoric of the past613, understanding how the use of force could not solve anything: it was not a 
pacifist turn, but an act of realism614. To encourage this change of attitude also contributed the 
American pressure that demanded Yasser Arafat a recovery of clear positive signs capable of 
encouraging an evolution of the dialogue. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 decreed the collapse of URSS and the United States became the 
only superpower; this context, together with the consequences of the Gulf War and Israel's 
commitment to absorbing the flow of Soviet immigrants, made possible the creation of a more 
favorable environment to open a new dialogue. Moreover, the interlocutors (especially Israelis) were 
particularly sensitive to American economic aid; Washington was conscious about the power of this 
economic lever and played all its power to bring Shamir to the negotiations of the 1991 Madrid 
Conference. Although the plenary sessions and the following bilateral talks did not decide anything, 
it was the first official meeting between an Israeli delegation and a Palestinian, in an international 
context. 
In addition, the Shamir government had to face one major security threat, in the second half of 1990: 
the crisis triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Initially, the Persian Gulf crisis had clouded the 
intifada but this international conflict ended up provoking serious repercussion in the Israeli-
Palestinian question615; indeed, in the public debate, the Gulf crisis was increasingly linked to the 
solution of the Palestinian problem, thus giving rise to a new term: linkage. 
In April of that year, Saddam Hussein threatened to use chemical weapons to destroy Israel if it 
would have dared to attack Iraq. Several incidents had convinced the Iraqi leader that an Israeli 
conspiracy was underway to sabotage its nuclear program, an idea that was heavily fueled by the 
Israeli airstrike attack in 1981 to the Osirak reactor. Hussein's threat was thus directed at deterring 
any military initiative by the Jewish state. 
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Israel Air Force (IAF) was put on precautionary alert, however 
the intelligence leaders did not feel that the maneuvers of Saddam's troops were a real threat for 
Israel; however, the Likud used the invasion to support its main claim, that there were far more 
dangerous and destabilizing elements in the Middle East than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 
itself. 
                                                          
613 We are referring to the declaration made in 1989 by the PLO, declaring the establishment of a Palestinian 
State on the basis of the UN resolutions 181 and 242. 
614 Vercelli C., Israele…., op.cit., p. 369. 
615 Shlaim A., Il Muro di Ferro…, op.cit., p. 520. 
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There was a comeback to a rhetoric that had been typical of Menachem Begins' era, in this 
perspective, very soon Saddam Hussein was compared to Adolf Hitler and, consequently, the 
invasion of the small Kuwait state to the aggression lead by Nazi Germany against Poland at the 
beginning of the Second World War. Such an analogy made this conflict to fall into a pattern 
involving Israeli perception of this war as a battle for their survival, in this way the government felt 
legitimized to claim the intervention of the western countries, particularly the United States, in 
order to stop the Iraqi dictator. 
In the meanwhile, also the Western world demanded the Iraqi dictator to stop the invasion; the 
military intervention came after the formation of an international coalition led by US and composed 
by numerous Arab states. One of the peculiarities of this Middle Eastern crisis was that Israel found 
itself alongside several countries, which were its sworn enemies (for example, Syria). There was, 
however, a big difference between the intentions of coalition members: the majority of them wanted 
the end of Iraqi aggression, the restoration of the political status quo and the containment of Iraq; 
Israel instead wanted the annihilation of Saddam Hussein's military resources. 
The crisis began on August 12th the Iraqi leader suggested that Iraq could retreat from Kuwait if 
Israel would have withdrawn from all occupied Arab territories and Syria from Lebanon616. It was 
exactly this proposal that introduced the concept of linkage in the Middle Eastern diplomatic 
lexicon and from that very moment, all of a sudden, Saddam became the hero of the Arab masses and 
the savior of the Palestinians. The Iraqi leader tried to link his actions with the wider Arab-Israeli 
conflict stating repeatedly that his invasion was in support of the Palestinian cause and in 
opposition to American and Zionist imperialism617; these declarations were stated in order to attract 
the maximum consent possible among the Arab world, which had found itself divided on the issue.  
Although this ploy failed to attract Arab states away from the alliance with the Western world, 
Saddam’s stock among Palestinians rose considerably, until Arafat cast his lot with the Iraqi leader 
and the pro-Iraq coalition. This decision was influenced by popular sentiment throughout the 
Palestinian Diaspora, as well as within the Territories; Palestinian sympathy for Saddam was mainly 
the result of the fatigue and frustration felt by the Palestinian community after three years of 
intifada, which contributed to the embrace of an Arab leader who was prepared to stand up against 
the United States and Israel618. 
                                                          
616 Ibidem, p. 522. 
617 In what became known as the “Mother of all Battles” speech, Saddam spoke of the eventual victory of Iraqi 
forces that would open the doors for the liberation of the beloved Palestine Lebanon and Golan. Then 
Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock will be released from bondage. 
618 Finkelstein N., Palestinian Attitudes during the Gulf War, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol.21, n.3, Spring 1992, 
p.54-70. 
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Arafat’s support for Saddam Hussein created a deep sense of disillusionment among Israeli peace 
movement. Faisal Husseini619, Sari Nusseibeh620 and the other Palestinian leaders, with whom they 
Israeli peace movement had developed a closer relationship, did little to lessen the shock: they too 
sympathized with the overwhelming pro-Saddam mood. Yossi Sarid, an outstanding leader of the 
Israeli doves, expressed the sentiment of the Israeli left with these words: «One needs a gas mask to 
overcome the poisonous and repellent stench emitted by the pro-Saddam position adopted by the 
PLO. [...] It is not only disgusting but also a grave strategic mistake, since Saddam will betray the 
Palestinians as soon as they are no longer of service to him. The occupation of Kuwait provided 
Shamir the best of vindication for his annexationist policies, since he legitimated violent occupation 
of territories[...]». As far as Sarid was concerned: «Until further notice the Palestinians can count me 
out621». 
 
5.2.1. Waiting into the sealed rooms, dancing on the rooftops 
 On November 29th, the Resolution 687 was approved by the Security Council, authorizing 
the use of all the necessary means against Iraq, unless the latter would have withdrawn from Kuwait 
by January 15th, 1991. At that point, consultations between UN and Israel intensified with the 
approaching deadline for Iraqi retreat; it was crucial for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to refrain 
from taking unilateral action against Iraq. Shamir then promised Bush not to launch preventive 
attacks and to consult the Pentagon before responding to any Iraqi aggression. To facilitate 
coordination, a direct line (codename, Hammer Rick) was created between Washington and the 
Israeli Defense Ministry: all this encouraged Tel Aviv to maintain a low profile and to refrain from 
creating further tensions622. 
As the likelihood of war increased, Israel began to implement measures in order to protect the 
population from the threat of Iraqi missile attacks, including the possible use of chemical warheads. 
On October 1st, the Shamir government decided reluctantly to distribute to the civilian population 
                                                          
619 Husseini was an important Palestinian politician, who went to work for the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) upon its establishment in Jerusalem. Later on, he served as a Palestinian spokesperson 
and as head of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference. Subsequently he 
became head of the Fatah faction in the West Bank, and Palestinian Authority Minister without Portfolio. 
620 He is a Palestinian Professor of Philosophy and former President of the Al-Quds University in Jerusalem. 
Until December 2002 he was the representative of the Palestinian National Authority. He achieved a Ph.D on 
Islamic Philosophy at Harvard University in 1978. He has long been viewed as a Palestinian moderate.  In 2008, 
Nusseibeh said that the quest for the two-state solution was floundering. He called on Palestinians to start a 
debate on the idea of a one-state solution 
621 Ha’aretz, August 17th 1990. 
622 Ma’ariv, (insert), March 29th 1991. 
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anti-gas masks: for a nation obsessed with the remembrance of the Nazi gas chambers this was a 
very delicate question. The IDF also provided Israelis with instructions that recommended to seal 
one room in every house or apartment against possible chemical contamination and on hearing the 
air raid siren shut themselves inside it and put on their gas masks. Mamad (the acronym for Protected 
Home Space), entered the Israeli lexicon and the public went through the realization that the danger 
of a missile attack was genuine. 
On the evening of January 17th, Scud missiles began crashing into the suburbs of Tel Aviv; it was the 
first air strike in an Israeli city after 1948 and, by the end of the forty-days US led air-land campaign 
against Iraq, forty-three missiles had hit Israel. The primary effect of the attacks was psychological: 
night after night, for six weeks, millions of Israelis went to bed with the knowledge that they might 
be awakened by sirens signaling another missile. The feeling of vulnerability reminded many of the 
helplessness Jews experienced during the Holocaust623. 
The Cabinet was gathered urgently and the prevailing opinion was to respond back to the Iraqi 
attack, but the prime minister was very resolute to maintain the agreement with made with Bush 
and he closed the meeting saying he was opposed to any action that did not foresee coordination 
with Washington624; his position remained unchanged throughout the conflict and this was his 
main argument against military intervention625. 
Shamir’s predisposition (both by character and by political attitude) to inactivity, resistance to 
external pressures and maintenance of the status quo, did not give him any plaudit as a leader of a 
nation in war instead, what came to light was the defense establishment’s inadequacy to protect the 
civilian population. It was mainly this factor that transformed the first weeks of 1991 into a 
psychological trial for the Israeli population. Notwithstanding this, the overwhelming majority of 
the public supported the decision taken by Shamir to abstain from answering back626 because they 
were aware of the importance of Israeli restraint in order to obtain American support627 once the 
war would have ended. Shamir's fellow citizens well understood the reasons their Prime Minister had 
for his containment policy, but they felt the need for a leader to support them, guide them and keep 
them united in time of crisis; unfortunately all they got from Shamir was a frosty silence: «Maybe we 
                                                          
623 No one died for the direct explosion of a Scud missile, but many people died of a heart attack or because 
they forgot to open the anti-gas mask air valve; even if the missiles never caused one victim directly, the 
psychological impact of the attack was profound. 
624 M., Broken Covenant and Barzilai A., The Fateful Saturday, Ha’aretz, January 13th 1995. 
625 Ma’ariv…, op. cit., and Ha’aretz, February 13th 1991. 
626 Polls taken by the Scud attacks showed that 80% of those surveyed supported the “restraint/non-
retaliation” policy. Katz E. and Levinson H., Public Opinion in Wartime, Israel Institute of Applied Social 
Research, February 20th 1990. 
627 Bush asked Shamir to remain still and out of the battle ground, in order to avoid embarrassing the Arab 
allies, members of the coalition. 
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do not deserve someone like Churchill, but do us a favor first Minister: say something628», a journalist 
wrote. 
This posture was maintained also despite the complaints made by several hawkish strategists, who 
were concerned that Israel’s inaction might be misinterpreted by Baghdad as a sign of passive 
defense, and therefore eroding the IDF’s deterrent power. In order to overcome this possibility, 
Shamir released very hard statements in those days, whose content could be summarized in the 
warning that an eventual Iraqi attack with chemical weapons would have caused the Israeli nuclear 
response. The prime minister did nothing to contradict this interpretation of his statements, 
seemingly satisfied that the message was spread in these terms by the international press629. 
When the missiles starting to fall, Israeli media reports of joyous Palestinian reactions to the attacks 
disturbed and angered Israeli public. It was reported that during the Scud attacks, Palestinians in 
the Territories climbed on their roofs to watch cheering as the missiles passed overhead on their way 
to Tel Aviv. Some of these reports were indeed accurate, but the phenomenon was rarer than many 
journalists claimed. While Shamir continued to resist all attempts to associate the Gulf conflict with 
the Palestinian question, PLO leadership seriously compromised its international image; greeting 
Saddam as their champion, the Palestinians were venturing out the frustrations that had 
accumulated in the previous two years. The Shamir government took the opportunity to use 
Palestinian rhetoric and the anti-Israeli rhetoric used as a further rejection to negotiate with PLO. 
The weeks preceding the Gulf War and during the missile attacks were not propitious for peace 
activities; people’s minds were preoccupied with the prospect of war and the Palestinian betrayal 
brought the credibility of the peace movement agenda into question: Israelis never forgave the 
Palestinians for dancing on their rooftops as Saddam's missiles hurtled above on their way to Tel 
Aviv.630 The peace activists were encouraged, however, by the prospect for renewal of the peace 
process once the war would have been ended. With the United States grateful for the support of its 
Arab allies and for Israeli restraint, the Bush Administration was widely expected to undertake a 
new Arab-Israel peace initiative, as soon as the war was won. 
Meanwhile, the Desert Storm operation had reached its goals: Iraqi forces had been forced to 
abandon Kuwait and the legitimate government of this country had been re-established. On 
February 28, President Bush ordered the ceasefire. 
Within six months of the end of the Gulf crisis, the Americans were trying very hard to start 
negotiations for the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the atmosphere in Territories was still inflamed by 
                                                          
628 Samet G., Even If We Have No Churchill, Ha’aretz, January 25th 1995.  
629 Margalit D., The Name of the Game-There is No Alternative, Ha’aretz, October 3rd 1991. 
630 Polls taken in 1990 showed a decline in the support for the negotiations with the PLO, from a high 37% in 
April, to 22% in August and 24% in November and December. Katz E., Levinson H. and Al-Hajj M., Attitudes 
of Israelis (Jews and Arabs) toward Current Affairs, Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, January 10th 1991. 
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Palestinian extremists; so, an increasing number of Israelis could be heard calling for hafradà 
(separation); the degree of acceptance of the idea of a separation grew, along with the fact that the 
concept of a Palestinian state was more palatable631. Shalom Aksciav (Peace Now632) tried to capitalize 
on this new mood and came out with a new slogan Lehipared Leshalom633(Let us separate in peace). 
 
5.3 What was started in Madrid? 
 Two major events allowed the United States to promote the Madrid peace conference on 
October 30th 1991: the collapse of the Former Soviet and the defeat of Iraq during the Gulf War. 
Basically, the fall of the Soviet bloc took away the support the Arab states had so far enjoyed in 
opposing any form of agreement with Israel, while the controversial support for Saddam declared 
by Jordan and PLO had put these two actors in a very unfavorable position in their relationships 
with US. The idea was to hold an international conference under the auspices of the United States 
and Russia, attended by Arab States, Israel, the UN and the European Community, in order to find 
a new approach to move on negotiations for peace in Middle East.  
Yitzhak Shamir was the most difficult leader to convince and strong US pressures were needed to 
make him accept the invitation; notwithstanding his participation, the prime minister, meanwhile, 
announced a plan for a new wave of construction that would have doubled the Jewish population 
in occupied territories within four years634. This shift explained clearly the strategy of the Israeli 
leader: on one hand attending to the conference in order to please Bush and, on the other one, carry 
on the settlement project in order to keep his government together. 
During the summer of 1991 it appeared that Shamir’s resistance to an international conference was 
weakening; this was a response not only to US pressure, but also to Israeli public opinion. After four 
years of intifada most Israelis had come to the conclusion that the uprising could not be 
suppressed635. In one poll 92% supported Shamir’s decision to go to Madrid, although only 56% 
                                                          
631 Bar-On M., In Pursuit…, op. cit., p. 284. 
632 It was founded in March 1978, in an act known to the Israeli public as “The Officer’s Letter.” Following the 
visit of Egypt’s President, Anwar Sadat, to the Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, calling upon the 
government to make sure this opportunity for peace was not lost. Its mission calls for peace agreements 
between Israel and its neighbors. In particular, regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the organizations 
work in order to promote among Israelis the idea of two states, meaning the creation of a Palestinian state 
alongside Israel. 
633 Peace Now Archive, Peace Now Newsletter, n.4, 1991 file, March 1991. 
634 Shlaim A., Il Muro di Ferro…, op.cit., p.533. 
635 Katz E. and Levinson H., What Israelis Agree About?, Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, published in 
Yediot Aharonot, June 21st 1991. The headline stated: «Polls:75% support returning Territories in exchange of a 
peace agreement».  
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expected that the conference would result in peace. The question of territorial compromise in 
exchange of peace still divided the nation into roughly equal halves, for and against. 
However, in a poll conducted in November 1991, the question “if the establishment of a Palestinian 
State turned out to be the last obstacle to peace, would you agree to concede?” produced the 
unprecedented 84% affirmative response636. Despite this, most Israelis remained uncertain about the 
true meaning of Madrid: «Every Israeli has a Citizens Right Movement and a Likud party in his head 
and now they can no longer ignore the debate between them637».  
Instead, the real debate within Likud was whether Israel should participate in these peace talks and, 
if so, with whom this dialogue should take place. During a party meeting, Moshe Arens638recalled 
the article written in 1923 by Jabotinsky, arguing that negotiations had to be made with the Arab 
neighbors in search of an agreement, but only after an iron wall had been built. Arens went on to say 
that this wall had already been built and that the Jewish presence could no longer be canceled. For 
this reason, he was in favor of opening up a dialogue with the Palestinians and talking to them about 
a transitional agreement that would have been concluded on following the Camp David’s pattern639. 
Most likely, the heaviest factor concurring to the decision taken by Yitzhak Shamir‘s government to 
attend Madrid was Israel's economic vulnerability; his dependence on American funding for the 
absorption of massive Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union provided President Bush with 
unprecedented influence640:«If there was to be an American moment in the Middle East, this was 
surely it641». The Madrid Conference was thought in order to foster bilateral talks between Israel 
and the major Arab states (Egypt, Syria and Jordan) and with the aim to regional context; regarding 
the Israeli-Palestinian question, Washington set as essential conditions for the negotiations the UN 
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, together with the “land for peace” principle.  
For the first time, the Palestinians were represented on an egalitarian plan with Israel and the mere 
presence of official Palestinian representative, even if inside the Jordanian delegation, constituted a 
change in the Israeli basic refusal to consider the counterpart as a valuable partner642. Moreover, the 
                                                          
636 Published in Yediot Ahronot, November 29, 1991. Other polls appeared in that period, confirming the general 
mood inclined to compromise: Hadashot, November 1st 1991 and Yediot Ahronot, November 8th 1991. 
637 Professor Yaron Ezrachi quoted in Bar-On M., In Pursuit…, op. cit., p. 292, from an interview in the 
Washington Post, December 24th 1991. 
638 He was a Likud politician, member of the Knesset between 1973/1992 and again from 1999 until 2003. He 
served as minister of defense three times and once as minister of foreign affairs. 
639 Arens M., Broken Covenant…, op. cit., p. 223. 
640 The American president refused to grant the $ 10 million loan required by Shamir, thus pushing Israel to 
attend the negotiating table. 
 641Miller A. D., The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, Bantam Books, 2008, p.14. 
642 The Israeli veto in the presence of PLO members and residents of East Jerusalem settled in a Palestinian 
delegation embedded in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. 
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presence of Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, in addition to representatives of the UN and the 
European Community, provided a dramatic validation of the seriousness of the conference. 
Shamir traveled to Madrid distrustfully and this attitude clearly manifested itself in his opening 
speech, which was anachronistic, saturated of past rhetoric and full of anti-Arab clichés; what the 
Israeli Prime Minister declared was so inadequate for the occasion that was dangerously close to the 
complete refusal of the conference’s pre-conditions. The contrast with Haidar Abdel Shafi’s speech, 
head of the Palestinian delegation, could not be more evident by substance and spirit. His discourse, 
though briefly referring to the past, looked to the future: «In the name of the Palestinian people, we 
want to turn directly to the Israeli people, with whom we have long shared the sufferings: let us 
share hope instead. We are willing to live side by side on the earth and on the promise of the future. 
To share, however, the two parties must be considered to be equal. [...]. Your security and ours are 
mutually dependent, as intertwined as are the fears and the nightmares of our children643». As he 
advanced the claim of a Palestinian sovereignty, Shafi also defined it in two fundamental ways: 
accepting the need for a transitional phase and imagining the creation of a confederation between 
independent Palestine and Jordan. 
The PLO, because of its internal divisions and the limits of inter-Arab politics, had never been able 
to articulate such a clear opening to the peace with Israel; in that situation the goal was to convince 
Israeli public opinion of the sincere Palestinian commitment in a peaceful coexistence. Probably this 
marked Palestinian openness has contributed to highlight Shamir's poor performance, which raised 
harsh questions about the ability of Likud’s leaders to work for a true agreement with the 
Palestinians. 
After the plenary session ended, the second phase of the conference began, which took shape in a 
series of five separate bilateral meetings between Israel and each Arab delegation; the strong 
differences between the Palestinian and other more intransigent positions (such as the Syrian side), 
led to the collapse of the common Arab front. But the element that decreed the Palestinian discreet 
success in Madrid was the emergence of an understanding with the Americans, which overthrew 
Middle Eastern politics, marking a watershed in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conference was 
unable to conclude any agreement between the parties concerned. but the symbolic significance was 
great: for the first time Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians and Syrians sat together at the same table. 
By early spring 1992, progresses in the peace process had evidently slowed down and the 
negotiations were affected by a number of external factors; Shimon Peres later wrote: «Those who 
determined the course of the talks did not participate in them, whereas those who participated in 
the talks had no say in the course of the negotiations644».At the conference venues the atmosphere 
was very formal, but friendly, the meetings were characterized by paralysis and inertia, and the 
                                                          
643 Shlaim A., Il Muro di Ferro…, op. cit., p.534. 
644 Peres S., The New Middle East, Henry Holt, 1993, p.7-10. 
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Israeli delegation was distinguished by the lack of willingness in conducting the negotiations. 
Afterwards, the Shamir declared to the press that progress was not in his intentions and that he 
would not be disappointed if the negotiation would have been dragged for a decade645, even though 
he later claimed that his words had not been reported faithfully. 
During the talks, the Likud government continued in the attempt to gain time and the Israeli 
delegation had received recommendations not to deal truly with concessions on substantive issues, 
but to give only the impression that a real discussion was taking place646. This attitude was designed 
to convince the Americans that Israel was negotiating in good faith but disagreement over some 
principles couldn’t be resolved. 
Bilateral talks triggered in Israel an intense debating on the future of the Occupied Territories and 
on the relations with its neighbors; opinion polls showed that the Israelis were much more affected 
by moderation signals coming from the other side and were available to give some territories in 
change of peace. It was mainly on the eastern front that the national debate was focused, either 
because it touched the core values of Israeli identity and because it was still the field involved with 
clashes of the protracted intifada. 
Shamir was targeted then on two fronts: the left wing accused his political and economic priorities, 
facilitating the allocation of funds for the settlements in the Territories, instead of dealing with 
immigrant absorption and welfare issue inside the Green Line, disfiguring in this way the Zionist 
idea and transforming it in something unrecognizable. The rightist parties accused him of being too 
compliant and too fast on undertaking the path of Palestinian self-government, selling Israel’s 
integrity under American pressure. In order to avoid the attacks both on the international and on 
the domestic sides, the premier adopted an ambiguous strategy, trying to convince Washington that 
he was doing everything to reach an agreement with the Palestinians, while simultaneously 
reassuring the far right that they had nothing to fear about any significant territorial concession. 
Despite his efforts, in January 1992, Rehavam Ze'ev, leader of Moledet and Yuval Ne'eman, leader of 
Tehiya, deprived the government of its slight majority in the Knesset, in order to make the Middle 
Eastern peace process to waver: «I hope our government exits slowing down the peace process, 
which we consider as a deadly danger to the state of Israel647», Ne'eman declared in his letter of 
resignation. With Tehiya and Moledet out from the government, the Prime Minister began the 
countdown for new general elections; such precarious political situation did not soften Shamir's 
policy towards negotiations, making Washington come to the conclusion that there was no hope of 
getting a change of attitude from this government. The Bush administration decided then to suggest 
to the Israeli electorate who, if they wanted to maintain American economic support, would have to 
                                                          
645 Ma’ariv (Heb.), June 26th 1992 and Jerusalem Post, June 28th 1992. 
646 Schiff Z., in Ha’aretz, June 19th 1991. 
647 Shlaim A., Il Muro di Ferro…, op.cit., p. 544. 
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form the next government, delaying the concession of the loans of $10 billion that Israel needed to 
absorb the mass immigration from former Soviet Union, 
 
5.4 1992 Elections, a second mahapach 
 The elections of June 23rd 1992 were among the most important in Israel's history, as they 
focused clearly on the issue of peace and on the future of the Territories. Shamir represented the 
political tradition of Likud territorial maximalism; Yitzhak Rabin, the Labor attitude towards 
territorial compromise. The right camp was even more fragmented than ever; in contrast, the three 
parties of the peace camp (Mapam, Ratz and Shinui) united to form Meretz. Mifleget Ha’Avoda reformed 
itself648: a one-person one-vote system of over 100,000 party members elected numerous (of the so-
called) doves to high positions on Labor’s candidate list, moreover it produced a more youthful, 
dynamic and attractive proposal for the electorate649.The election campaign began with an 
electorate tired of the right government, especially due to Shamir’s stubborn opposition to 
negotiations with the Arab states and his refusal to stop building settlements. 
 
5.4.1 All about Rabin 
 The Mifleget Ha’Avoda focused its campaign650 on presenting the Rabin (the new leader of the 
party) as a credible Prime Minister for the nation; Rabin was “Mr. Security” in the eyes of Israeli 
public, the man who knew how to protect Israeli interests and could be trusted to make the right 
decisions on security651. The public trusted his personality, his integrity, his undiplomatic 
propensity to speak the truth and, above all, his commitment to making a change. 
The Labor Party played a dominant role thanks also to the use of very interesting slogans, such as 
“Israel is waiting for Rabin”, which was deliberately played on the phrase “Nasser is waiting for 
Rabin” became famous during the Six Days War. The use of this refrain had a dual purpose: first to 
remind the electorate that Rabin was in charge of the IDF during its success in 1967 and to portray 
                                                          
648 The most important change was the ousting of Shimon Peres as party leader, that had a great impact on 
public opinion attracting many voters, also from the right. 
649 In 1988, just a handful of Labor candidates for the Knesset were in the thirties and forties, but in 1992 the 
number was twenty-four. 
650 Peres’ 1988 team was changed and replaced by people from outside the party and some veteran politicians, 
such as Haim Ramon and Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, the campaign manager. 
651 See Labor Party’s electoral poster, figure n.12 “We are security. Labor Party”, ANNEX II - Collected selection 
propaganda for the Knesset. 1948 - Series 13 (V 2885): Elections to the Thirteenth Knesset - 1992, The National 
Library of Israel, V 3503, file n.1: Mifleget Ha’Avoda, p.435. 
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him as a father and a hero of the nation. Moreover, the party decided to change its name in order to 
emphasize the election of Rabin as its candidate for the premiership (instead of Peres652), calling it 
“Labor under Rabin’s leadership653” and underlying the campaign’s presidential approach654.  
The decision to concentrate on Rabin was based on the attempt to make the elections a direct 
contest between Rabin and Shamir; indeed with the adoption of such positioning strategy, Rabin 
aimed to blur his differences with Shamir on the peace and security issue and concentrate on what 
he termed a “re-ordening of national priorities655”, meaning the redistribution of resources from the 
settlements within the Green Line and the freeze of the construction of what he called “political 
settlements656” in the Territories. Rabin portrayed himself as though on security but pragmatic in 
terms of peace negotiations, on social and economic issues he made full use of the cost of Likud’s 
priority of Eretz Yisrael, particularly on the new Soviet immigrants and other lower-income groups657. 
During the election campaign, Rabin essentially played all the traditional cards of Likud propaganda, 
but without ideology, in this way he could afford to produce general responses, while Shamir had to 
justify his government on specific issues. Voters were called therefore to express their preference 
about the destination of the limited Israeli economic resources between the integration of Soviet 
immigrants within the country's borders before 1967 and the construction of the Great Israel 
envision658. There was an even more critical choice hidden in these alternatives: to live in a Jewish 
majority respectful of the rights of the Arab minority, or in a state with a large Arab population 
                                                          
652 Some polls showed that between Rabin and Peres, the first one would have had more chances to win against 
Shamir, due to the fact that he was more popular than him. This was the main reason that brought Labor Party 
to choose him as its leader. 
653 Azulay-Katz O., Rabin, Rabin and again Rabin, Yediot Ahronot, May 8th 1992. 
654 See Labor Party’s electoral poster, figure n.9 “Labor headed by Rabin” and figure n. Error! Main Document 
Only. “Let’s choose the prime minister. Rabin”, ANNEX II - Collected selection propaganda for the Knesset. 
1948 - Series 13 (V 2885): Elections to the Thirteenth Knesset - 1992, The National Library of Israel, V 3503, file 
n.1: Mifleget Ha’Avoda, p.434.  
655 Lochery N., Israeli Labor Party…, op. cit., p.  
656 He distinguished between security settlements and political ones; the first one was placed for military 
reasons in the Golan Heights and in the Valley of the Jordan River, while the second type were usually founded 
in the wake of the national-religious ideology. 
657 This proposal for a new order of priorities can be explicitly found in in the very first page of Ha’Avoda’s 
electoral program for the elections of 1992 (p.1), provided in ANNEX I – Mifleget Ha’Avoda’s Political Platforms 
for Knesset Elections, 1, Labor Party’s platform for the Thirteenth …, op. cit., p. 297. 
658 The stress put on the possibility to a radical change of leadership is showed in Labor’s campaign poster, 
picturing a ballot precedeed by a diagram symbolizing the critical situation of the country after years of Likud-
led governments, saying “The decision is yours”, figure n.10, ANNEX II - Collected selection propaganda for 
the Knesset…, op. cit., , p.434. 
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sharply opposed to Israeli domination, which would then have to be subjected to a military regime. 
Voters would have to choose between a democratic Jewish state or a state that could have become 
bi-national and anti-democratic. The elections became thus a sort of thing on the issue of peace. 
Moreover, Shamir’s assurances to settler audience during the election campaign that he would not 
accept an American diktat to halt the settlements may have won him some votes, but undoubtedly it 
also hardened the stand of the Bush administration on the question of the loan guarantees. So, Baker 
told in May 1992 that Israel would have not received the $10 billion because Shamir had reneged on 
his promise of February 1991 to restrict settlements. No doubt Baker used the loans issue to influence 
Shamir’s electoral downfall. For the US Secretary of State Shamir’s refusal in January 1992 to accept 
US terms, effectively destroyed the last vestiges of American confidence in the cooperation with 
Likud government; this event catalyzed a feel-bad factor in the Israeli electorate which had the still 
supported Shamir.  
The general strategy of 1992 was to attract specific key target groups, such as the new Soviet 
immigrants and some 100.000 soft Likud voters, 60% of whom was of Mizrachi origins. Labor Party’s 
strategy was based on winning an extra 3 seats from the Likud and fragmenting the rest of the 
disillusioned Likud voters among other smaller right-wing parties. The tactic of moving votes to the 
extreme right proved to be effective to the Mifleget Ha’Avoda, because not all the right-wing parties 
crossed the new electoral threshold (1,5%), in this way this shift gave to Labor camp its victory in 
the election, with a far higher number of wasted votes from the Likud-led block. 
The Likud adopted two lines of attack against Mifleget Ha’Avoda and the lack of real ideological 
counter-arguments, demonstrated how the electoral campaign was dominated by personalities and 
by a leadership contest. In the first place Likud asserted that Rabin would be controlled by the dovish 
majority in the party, as Roni Milo659 stated: «Behind Rabin is Peres, behind Peres is Beilin, behind 
Beilin in Sarid, behind Sarid is Miari660 and behind Miari is Arafat661». Of course, Likud objected Labor 
promise to suspend construction and development of new Jewish political settlements in the 
Occupied Territories, charging Rabin to “put Eretz Yisrael on sale” and to “engage in conspiracies 
with Arabs”662. 
                                                          
659 He moved into politics with the Herut faction of Likud, and was Chairman of the party's Information 
Department; He also became Chairman of the World Likud Organization and he was the campaign manager 
for Likud in the elections of 1992. 
660 Mohammed Miari headed the Progressive List for Peace (HaReshima HaMitkademet LeShalom), a left-wing 
political party in Israel, an alliance of both Arab and Jewish left-wing activists. 
661 Lochery N., Israeli Labor Party…, op. cit., p.  
662 An example of such rhetoric is well expressed in pictures n. 14 and 16, respectively saying “Today you chose 
which identity card will have for the country” and “The Left is a danger for the unity of Jerusalem”, see ANNEX 
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When it became clear that this first strategy was not successful, the Likud turned to personal attacks 
on Rabin himself663, based on two separate incidents: his nerve break-down on the eve of Six Days 
War and his failure to return home from Washington at the breakout of Intifada. Moreover, one 
commercial showed a lighted cigarette doused in a whisky glass, intended to fuel the flames on 
rumors that Rabin was an alcoholic664. The concealed message: Rabin may appear to be a tough 
former general but he has a flawed character likely to crack under pressure. But also, this plan 
boomeranged against Likud. 
In general, Mifleget Ha’Avoda and Rabin decided to respond on Likud attacks, developing 
argumentations in areas in which they felt to enjoy an advantage over the adversaries, mainly 
pointing at its mistaken national priorities, such as how their infatuation with developing 
settlements had resulted in the neglect of serious economic and social problems. Labor’s accusations 
were reinforced in April 1992 when the report of the State Comptroller was released; it charged 
government’s officials with using public funds for personal use665, favoritism and spending millions 
on empty buildings in the West Bank, while there was housing shortage in Israel. 
Rabin and his team avoided attacking directly the issue of Territories about retaining or returning 
them, instead they denounced the allocations of the limited economic resources available to the 
wrong targets and, because that stubborn policy, the hurdle of the relations with the United States, 
which meant the loss of the proposed loan guarantee of $10 billion for absorbing the immigrants. 
Likud incompetence, corruption and disunity also stood at the center of the campaign, while on the 
other side Mifleget Ha’Avoda contrasted this reality with the fact that its ranks closed around Rabin 
and conducted the first democratic and open primary666 for the Knesset list.  
 
 
 
                                                          
II - Collected selection propaganda for the Knesset. 1948 - Series 13 (V 2885): Elections to the Thirteenth Knesset 
- 1992, The National Library of Israel, V 3503, file n.1: Mifleget HaLikud, p.436.  
663 An example of this type of propaganda could be seen in picture n.15, in which Rabin is portrayed while 
drinking alcohol and a big warning on him saying “Danger”, ANNEX II- Collected selection propaganda for 
the Knesset, op. cit., p. 436,  
664 Tal Y. and Galili O., David Levy: Likud’s Line of Propaganda of Attacking Rabin is a Mistake, Ha’aretz, June 3rd 1992 
665 Ha’Avoda’s electoral poster, figure n. 10, says “We all are cleaning the country” and makes a list of points 
criticizing Likud’s mistakes, in ANNEX II - Collected selection propaganda for the Knesset…, op. cit.,  p. 434. 
666 The decision taken was to open the selection process to the 160.000 party members, in order to ensure the 
selection of more genuinely popular candidates. As a result, 14 of 40 candidates on the Labor list were 
newcomers to national politics.  
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5.4.2 The return of Mifleget Ha’Avoda as a dominant party 
 The election results were dramatic: the Likud vote dropped from 40 to 32 MKs; there was a 
move away from the Likud towards Labor and Tsomet. On the other side, Mifleget Ha’Avoda and Meretz 
increased their vote and they achieved 61 seats with the help of the Arab parties; meanwhile the far 
right declined dramatically. Shas retained its vote. The heyday of Likud had come to an end due to the 
inability of those of the extreme right to think pragmatically had contributed to the heavy defeat of 
Likud and to the mahapach of 1992.  
The turnout, although it was the second lowest since 1951, was still high at 76.8%, moreover the new 
electoral threshold meant that 1.5% of the total vote (39.253 votes) was needed by a party to win a 
seat in the Knesset; off the 3.616,841 votes cast some 130.989 were lost because the respective list failed 
to reach that percentage. Crucial to the outcome of the election was the fact that the number of votes 
lost by pro-Likud lists was twice than the pro-Labor lists and it was this element that gave the Mifleget 
Ha’Avoda coalition its 1 seat victory over the Likud camp. The Labor Party scored a double victory in 
the election667: first, it increased its number of seats from 39 to 44 and second, its block increased 
from 55 to 61668. 
Conversely, the major loser was the Likud which experienced a double defeat669 both at the party and 
block levels with its number of seats declining from 40 to 32, with the party losing ground in all 
sectors of the electorate670. In addition, many of the disillusioned Likud voters simply didn’t vote at 
all, contributing to the relatively amount of lost votes; moreover, among the Soviet immigrants (9% 
of the electorate) the right block won only 18% of the vote compared to the 47% of the Labor Party, 
thus making a considerable contribution to Likud’s double defeat671. The Israeli left out-performed 
the parties of the right: Mifleget Ha’Avoda, Meretz and Arab lists totaled 1.284.992, while Likud, Tzomet 
and Moledet won 928,380 votes We have to take into account Tehiya’s loss672, which was vital for 
Mifleget Ha’Avoda as without it there would have been parity between the two blocks, allowing the 
Likud a blocking majority against the narrow-based Labor government. 
The other major winner was the secular parties Meretz and Tzomet, which originated from the 
opposites of the political spectrum, but shared a common attitude opposing religious coercion; 
                                                          
667Its percentage of votes grew by 15 points. 
668Arian A., Two Reversal in Israeli Politics: why 1992 was not 1977, Electoral Studies, vol.12, n.4, 1993, p.316. 
669 The Likud vote decreased by 8%, from 709,305 to 651.229. 
670 This loss took place also in Sephardi areas, with the voters either moving to the right (Tzomet), towards Shas 
or shifting their vote for the Labor Party. 
671 This numbers are taken from a poll conducted by the Israeli Broadcasting Authority on June 23rd 1992. 
672 It failed to reach the threshold and to gain a single seat in the Knesset. Many of its voters switched to Tzomet. 
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Tzomet rose its numbers from 2 to 8, while Meretz from 10 to 12. The increase of these two groups can 
also be seen as the rejection by segments of the Israeli society of the power and influence that the 
religious parties enjoyed well beyond their numerical strength during the 1980s673. Indeed, there was 
a widespread sense that the courting of the religious parties had being damaging as well as totally 
futile; this enabled Rabin to articulate the frustration of the secular Israeli public against the 
peripheral (yet electorally important) religious parties, stating that the he opposed the extreme 
dependence on such groups. Even if Rabin was yet careful not to alienate the religious public, he 
was a change of wording in a controversial resolution which had already been passed by the Labor 
Convention: “a separation of state and religion” was rephrased as “a separation of religion from 
politics”. 
Based on these data Labor Party won about half of its increased support from the new voters 
(100.000) and half of the Likud voters (100.000)674; among these, half went to Mifleget Ha’Avoda and 
half to the extreme right, in particular Tzomet which benefited of the public’s disappointment with 
Likud. 
The 1992 elections were more than a defeat for the Likud; they also signaled, at least temporarily, the 
weakening of the block of parties on the right and the breakdown of the coalition of the right wing 
with religious parties. The parliamentary balance between left and right/religious parties was 
61:59675 in favor of the first ones; this result enabled Labor to dominate government coalition, having 
a blocking majority that prevented the formation of a right-religious front, even if Rabin could form 
the Cabinet with difficulties. 
The voters made Ha’Avoda return to power with the clear mandate to carry out its political program; 
Rabin with his though, security-minded image attracted undecided voters and move seats from 
Likud to Labor; he was seen as a man who would have transcended ideology and seek practical 
solutions to long-standing problems. Moreover, the main reasons of Likud defeat can be found in the 
following elements: the party's presentation to voters with a series of internal discord, corruption, 
and lack of leadership, the incompetence of Shamir's government in restoring the economic situation 
(with a high level of inflation and unemployment). The Shamir and his party had apparently had 
forgotten that the party came to power in 1977 on a wave of discontent at the corruption within the 
Ma’arach. Likud's poor performance in addressing the absorption of migrants from the Soviet Union, 
the failure to contain the Intifada by reaching a political agreement, the inclination of a large number 
                                                          
673Additionally, Tzomet picked up the votes of the disillusioned supporters of Likud, mainly in the lower-income 
urban areas; while Meretz drew support from the Kibbutz movement and first-time voters.  
674 Most of them were Sephardim and Labor’s success was related to the ability of prying them away from Likud. 
675 Knesset Elections Results, Elections to the Thirteenth Knesset - 23 June, 1992, 
(https://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_res13.htm). 
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of moderate Israelis who considered was the time in order to reach a peaceful settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict and Shamir's sacrifice of special relationship with America on the ideological altar of 
Great Israel, fostered the belief among Israeli voters that the Likud was affected by power malaise, 
that it had been in office for too long and it was time for change. 
 
5.4.3 The impact of demography  
 In 1992, the electorate was 48% Ashkenazim, 44% Sephardim and 8% Israeli born676. Despite 
Ashkenazim continued to dominate the reality of Israel in the 1990s (thanks also to the mass 
immigration from the former Soviet Union), the proportion of Mizrachim had grown in the electorate 
and it was clear that Labor would have to fight in order to increase its share of the Oriental vote and 
regain power. That shift occurred in 1992 when, even if the trend was not overwhelming, the 
movement of Sephardim to Mifleget Ha’Avoda (26%) was substantial enough to provide the boost 
necessary to win elections677. It worked because it occurred in conjunction with the impetus 
received by the votes of Soviet immigrants and the movement of former supporters of Likud towards 
parties of the extreme right678. 
The electoral bounce that Labor Party received from Sephardim voters was due also to a scandal, 
involving the ethnic theme, occurred in the Likud party during the electoral campaign. Shamir 
relationship with David Levy679, the Foreign Minister, was already plummeted some months before, 
when Levy refused to attend the Madrid conference because Shamir suddenly decided to head the 
delegation himself; a dovish Levy could not trust the hard-liner Prime Minister in such an 
unprecedented international gathering. In the wake of the elections, the Mizrachi politician found 
himself marginalized when he discovered that he had been ranked only 18th in the candidate stakes 
by the Likud Central Committee. Feeling that his way to the top of the party was blocked, he started 
                                                          
676Central Bureau of Statistic, Statistical Abstract of Israel - 1992, n.43, 1992, pp. 94-95. 
677When we examine the socio-demographic profile of the group of Likud’s voters that chose Mifleget Ha’Avoda 
or extreme right in 1992, we would observe that in that year the shift was less along ethnic lines and more 
along issues. Among the voters who switched from Likud to Labor, the 80% were influenced by the fact that 
Rabin was ahead of the Labor Party list. 
678 The Likud share among this group fell from 53% to 41%. 
679 He is an Israeli politician, born in Morocco, who became an important representative of Mizrachi Jews in 
Israeli politics, in particular in the Likud. He served as a member of the Knesset between 1969 and 2006, as well 
as deputy prime minister,  minister of foreign affairs,  minister of immigrant absorption,  minister of housing 
and construction. 
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complaining of ethnic discrimination680, pointing out that while Sephardi Jews comprised the 
majority of the electorate, they constituted only a minority in the Central Party Committee, MKs 
and Cabinet ministers. The threat of resignation and the desertion to Labor, soon forced Shamir to 
promise that Levy would retain anyway the Foreign Ministry681, but this event damaged the electoral 
image of Likud as a home for Mizrachim. 
Another sector of Israeli society that secured Labor’s victory was the group of about 350.000 new 
Soviet immigrants arrived in Israel during the two years before the elections. Since Israeli law 
permits adult immigrants arriving three months before the election day to vote, these immigrants 
constituted 9% of eligible voters in 1992682. Most of them were undecided, apparently making up 
their minds only during the election campaign, hoping to benefit from the economic growth 
promised by Ha'Avoda. The newcomers voted 3 of 1 in favor of Mifleget Ha’Avoda, making a 
disproportionate contribution to Labor come-back683. The new arrivals were dissuaded not by the 
Likud’s uncompromising ideology of Greater Israel, but by its religious allies, whose values and 
proposals didn't have any appeal for these immigrants who were strong secularists.  
Lastly, also the vote of Israeli Arab citizens (11% of the electorate in that year684) was fundamental 
in order to boost Rabin’s victory; for the first time, this social group helped to decide a changeover 
of the government. Indeed, without the 5 seats of Hadash and the Arab Democratic Party, the Labor 
camp would not have obtained the minimum 61 votes required to block Likud. In the final analysis 
Arabs played, willingly or inadvertently, a crucial role in Labor’s ascendance to power.  
 
5.4.4 The role played by political issues 
 The main sources of this electoral change were socio-demographic factors and political 
issues. In both critical elections of 1977 and 1992, when a political reversal took place, the role played 
by these two elements was fundamental, but the degree of their impact was very different685 in 
defining voters' inclination towards Mifleget Ha’Avoda or Likud. Political homogeneity of groups in the 
                                                          
680 Indeed, this set-back couldn’t be addressed to a loss of popularity, due to the fact that Levy had secured 
31% to Shamir’s 46% in the leadership contest against Sharon and Arens.  
681 Shindler C., The Land Beyond Promise…, op. cit., p. 276. 
682 The Israeli Democracy Institute, Elections for the 13th Knesset- 23.6.1992, (https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-elections-
and-parties/elections/1992/). 
683 Reich B., Dropkin N. and Wurmser M., Soviet Jewish Immigration..., op. cit. 
684 Smooha S. and Peretz D., Israel’s 1992 Knesset Elections: Are They Critical?, Middle East Journal, vol.47, n.3, 
Summer 1993, p.461. 
685 In their work (Two Reversals in Israeli Politics…, op. cit.), Asher Arian and Michal Shamir calculated for each 
year the respective role of different electoral variables, through multiple regression.  
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Israeli population has increased from the 1970s through 1984 in terms of ethnicity, social class 
indicators and religiosity, in addition an important trend had been also the growing electoral 
importance of the territories issue over time. Extending this type of analysis to the 1992 elections, 
enable us to understand that the role of demographic factors has continued to recede since 1984 
while the role of issues has increased further. 
It appeared also that the issue regarding the dichotomy God/Nationalism has become more powerful 
over the years; coherently, also the debate about the relationship between religion and state had a 
trend of increasing correlation over time. The identification of Mifleget Ha’Avodaas a territory-peace, 
anti-clerical party has strengthened while its platform became less vague. In 1992 many more voters 
said that Territories would be an important consideration in their voting decision: 81%686 said that 
this issue would influence them greatly or very greatly (by contrast class cleavage, defined by income 
variable, is not the best measure of class in Israel). 
Besides the Territories (that had had the strongest importance), also religiosity gained in relevance 
over time, reaching the highest point in 1992 elections while, ethnicity, after having reached its 
highest peak in 1984 elections, has receded ever since. 
At the very end, issues are dominant in order to explain 1992 vote to a much greater degree than 
socio-demographic characteristics of the voters; moreover, the Territories had the strongest impact 
(0.46)687. While, in 1977 the evidence was quite the opposite, showing demography carrying the 
weight and determining the ascent of Likud in Israeli politics by many the ethnic cleavage688. 
While also economy played an important role, socio-economic questions are not as central and 
critical as the major topic dimension of Israeli politics, the Territories and the Arab-Israeli conflict; 
this type of topic indeed may generate high degrees of group loyalty, reinforcing existing cleavages 
by providing new reasons for the members to support the same parties. Here we can see a mutual 
reinforcement process between the issues and the voting groups, which are defined, becoming 
politically and socially cohesive; thus, the extent to which vote is related to socio-demographic 
characteristics of voters depends also on the nature of the issues in the agenda. 
The 1992 turnout was seen by many commentators as a referendum over the future of the Territories 
and its result as a rebuttal of the “no-one-inch” position of Greater Israel ideology; but party 
strategists preferred not to stress position-issues689, so as not to alienate big segments of the 
electorate. For this reason, a wedge-issue690 campaign was chosen, mainly relating on priorities; this 
                                                          
686 Arian A. and Shamir M., Two Reversals…, op. cit., p.321. 
687 Ibidem. 
688 Ethnicity has been a very important theme in the first two generations of Israelis. 
689 They are divisive political issues for which there are different (even opposite) preferences among voters. 
690 They are topics which are able to split the opposition camp and make some former supporters of the other 
side amenable to appeals to change their vote. 
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meant that Mifleget Ha’Avoda tried to lure the voters on the basis of a different set of priorities. This 
tactic was realized by denouncing Likud settlements policy on the basis of allocating too much of 
Israel’s limited resources to the wrong target, rather than attacking the merits of retaining 
Territories. So, Rabin promised to invest in infrastructures, education and welfare within Israel; this 
line of argument could appeal not only Likud voters with more conciliatory attitudes towards the 
Territories, but also to hardliner voters who were not willing to give up Gaza and the West Bank, 
but who felt a deep concern about socio-economic issues. In 1992, the management of the debate 
over settlements and the scandals of Likud's corruption were  the perfect examples of a campaign's 
strategy based on wedge issues, adopted to break adversaries’ common front, The fact that the main 
issue of the campaign still remained the peace process was  due to the temporal proximity of those 
elections to important events of the Arab-Israeli conflict: the round of voting was held eighteen 
months after the Gulf War, nine months after the negotiations in Madrid started and four and a half 
year into Intifada, so the dilemma of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Territories became the major 
focus for the electoral change691.  
The longstanding Palestinian uprising made Israelis feel unsafe, damaged in the economy and 
deepened internal political rifts; the lesson that was drawn by many of them was that the Palestinian 
question could not be settled by force according Likud’s prescription, but only through political 
negotiation. So, besides the massive disaffection with Likud, Shamir’s party fell victim of the evolving 
peace process. In these terms the intifada had a cumulative effect registered among the Israeli public 
only at a later time; this was the same delayed response that affected Labor in 1977, as a consequence 
of the 1973 war. 
 
5.4.5 Interpreting the 1992 elections 
 In 1992 the central-left bloc (Mifleget Ha’Avoda, Meretz the Arab Democratic Party and Hadash) 
received the support of 1.283.338 voters, obtaining a majority of 61 seats; while the Greater Israel-
bloc, including Likud, Tzomet, Moledet and Mafdal, received only 1.074.658 votes. This electoral shift 
symbolized the birth of the Third Israeli Republic692. Fifteen years earlier, on May 1977, Israeli voters 
produced the first electoral earthquake leading to the fall of the First Israeli Republic which had 
been ruled since 1948 by the Mapai; the Second Israeli Republic born in that year brought forward 
the national-religious alliance, with its adherence to the Eretz Yisrael ideology693. Despite some 
parallels existing between the scenarios that led to the fall of the first and second republics (such as 
                                                          
691 Shaked R., A Poll: the Majority Are for the Allon Plan (Heb.), Yediot Aharonot, June 7th 1991.  
692 Allon G., The Final Results of the Elections for the Thirteenth Knesset, Ha’aretz, June 26th 1992. 
693 This periodization if Israeli political history is explained by Hadar L.T. in his article The 1992 Electoral 
Earthquake and the fall of the “Second Israeli Republic”, Middle East Journal, vol.46, n.4, Autumn 1992.  
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the loss of charismatic leaders in the leading party, an important failure in national security and 
widespread corruption among the political elite), some observers argued that the shift which took 
place in 1992 was merely superficial and that it did not involve a more profound change in Israeli 
political culture, as happened in 1977. One very supported interpretation is that 1992 turnout was 
mainly a popularity match between Rabin and Shamir, with an election campaigns devoid of serious 
ideological and political debate, dominated by superficial advertising; and with the voters, 
dissatisfied with Likud government’s performance, as well as with its lack of unity and high 
corruption, casting a vote of protest which basically did not reject the message of the party. Along 
with this version, the Israelis did not change their political and ideological orientation, rather they 
were not convinced by the medium of transmission represented by Shamir and this element brought 
many of them to vote instead for Rabin, the candidate of the left parties. This interpretation is very 
important in order to understand better the type of mandate that Mifleget Ha’Avoda received and, by 
consequence, to the chances of pursuing successfully the Arab-Israeli peace process; if the Israeli 
public rejected Likud’s vision, so the Rabin government had effectively a mandate to change the 
posture the Jewish state has been maintaining in the last fifteen years. 
Any analysis that explains the 1992 elections only in terms of a contest between the two leaders is 
not enough in order to understand the dynamics that brought to this change; the “Second Republic”, 
like the first one, fell also as a result of the interaction between the domestic system and the 
international environment: in both cases the collapse of the political establishments, based on a set 
of values, was a product of three domestic mechanisms694 (Sephardi demographics, political 
orientation of the religious-orthodox bloc and the inclination of the national consensus on national 
security) and three international developments (the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict during the 
1980's, the end of the Cold War and the US-Israeli relationship). Reading this factors all together, it 
is possible to deduce that Israeli voters not only rejected the Likud for its leadership, but also for the 
historical visions and attitudes it promulgated: somehow, Shamir’s agenda ceased to respond to the 
realities Israel was facing, so the electorate chose for the more pragmatic and moderate Mifleget 
Ha’Avoda , that they believed to be able to deal with the problem of the state: «Instead of the “three 
no’s” that dominated the old national consensus during the years of the Second Republic, the new 
national consensus, which reflected the mood of the Israeli voters in 1992, was characterized by 
“three yes’s”: yes to negotiations with the Arabs, yes to the land-for-peace formula and yes to a 
stronger relationship with the United States695». 
The break out of the Intifada, the end of the Cold War, the Madrid Conference and the change of 
the American-Israeli relations shattered the status-quo in Israel and helped transform the three 
                                                          
694 For further detailed studies see Reich B. and Kieval G. R., Israeli Politics in the 1990’s: Key Domestic and Foreign 
Policy Factors, Greenwood Press, 1991. 
695 Hadar L.T., The 1992 Electoral Earthquake…, op. cit., p. 599. 
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pillars of Likud power: Sephardi support, the pro-Greater Israel nationalist-religious alliance and a 
hawkish national consensus. The need for bold, swift steps towards peace replaced these elements 
and formed the core of Rabin’s message to Israel; his government maintained that for Israel’s own 
sake it should withdraw from most of the Territories and dissociate itself from any involvement with 
the Palestinian populations, if Israel wanted to remain a Jewish and democratic state. 
Even if Mifleget Ha’Avoda scored a victory, defined by many as “technical result696”, Labor’s ascendance 
to power was a response to deep concerns and Rabin went to power, thus, mainly as an outcome of 
a struggle between two visions of the Jewish State and, in 1992 won the secular, socialist and 
progressive camp of Zionism, that Rabin’s government represented, being the most moderate in 
Israeli history. 
The 1992 elections are critical because Ha'Avoda was able (thanks to the convincing and charismatic 
leadership of Rabin) to break the ideological monopoly of Likud, reshaping Israeli political culture, 
demonstrating to be another mahapach in public minds697. Even if Mifleget Ha’Avoda wouldn’t be able 
to maintain numerically political dominance in the following elections, since these elections, the 
country embarked a new course with electoral turnouts that we will see to be characterized by a 
stronger relevance of peace and territorial issues (as the most important variable orienting voters' 
decision), a higher turnover between the two major parties, a greater importance given to leadership 
and more decisive role for collective identity as the major resource for political mobilization, 
inseparable part of Israeli political struggle. 
5.5. Ha'Avoda's approach: land for peace  
 On June 23rd 1992, when Labor camp returned to power with 44 seats for Miflget Ha'Avoda 
and 12 for Meretz; Rabin formed the government with Shas698(acronym of Shomrei Torah Sephardim, 
Torah's Sephardic Guardians), which abandoned within few months the ruling coalition, forcing 
                                                          
696 The recurrent argument is that the hawkish vote was greater than the dovish one among the Jewish voters. 
It is argued that the vote for Likud and the religious-nationalist bloc (Likud, Tzomet, Moledet, Tehiya, New 
Liberals, Geulat Yisrael, Torah and Land, Shas, Mafdal and Yahadut HaTorah HaMeuhedet), for a total of 1.290.226, 
out-numbered the votes for Labor and Meretz (1.157.447). It is further supported that a stalemate between the 
two blocks is apparent, even the votes cast by Arabs for Hadash, the ADP and the PLP are added to Labor and 
Meretz (1.284.962). 
697 Arian A. and Shamir M., Elections in Israel 1992, SUNY Press, 1994, p. 9. 
698 The acronym also refers to Shisha Sedarim, the six orders of the Mishnà. Founded in 1984 under the eagerness 
of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Sephardi chief rabbi of Israel, along with the non-Chassidi Haredim (orthodox) Jews of 
Ashkenazi origin. The political positions of this party were flexible and flexible on all subjects that did not 
relate to religious areas. 
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the Prime Minister to rely on Hadash external support699 and the alliance with HaMiflaga HaDemokratit 
Ha’Aravit 700 (Arab Democratic Party, al-Hizb al-Dimuqrati al-Arabi). 
The composition of the government meant a clear cut with the previous administration; if Shamir's 
government was the most aggressive in Israel's history, Rabin’s one was the most moderate, in fact 
his main partner was the leftist Meretz. Although the prime minister had only a narrow majority of 
62 to 120 MKs, he could still count on the support of Arab and Communist parties to handle a 
moderate foreign policy more inclined towards dialogue. The electoral results had given the premier 
the mandate to make a change in Israeli approach towards the peace process: «We inherited the 
structure of the Madrid conference from the previous government, but there is a significant change: 
the previous government has created the means, but has never intended to use them to achieve 
peace701», he told to the Knesset. 
The Prime Minister exercised a very strong authority, due to his personality and his military career, 
which aroused profound confidence in the Israeli public. His direct involvement in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, first as a soldier and then as a diplomat and politician, played a key role in shaping his 
approach. His perception of the world was shaped by the suspicion towards Arab neighbors and by 
a deep sense of responsibility for Israeli security; even if these crucial points remained, he started to 
change his approach after the intifada, believing that diplomacy should be supported by military 
force and that regarding the Palestinian question, the solution was political and not military. Thanks 
to his pragmatism, he could recognize that the “iron wall” of Jewish military power had achieved its 
purpose and it was time to negotiate the end of the conflict702. 
If Rabin was the security expert, his Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, was the skilled statesman; he 
had much more empathy with the Arab populations and he had come to a clearer assessment of the 
situation, articulating it in the vision of a new Middle East703. Security from his point of view was 
not only related to the military realm but also to an economic and psychological dimension, so he 
firmly believed in the economic element of peace-building as he firmly believed in the peace process. 
                                                          
699 Rabin was very concerned about the composition of its government, indeed, due to the foreign policy 
actions that he was about to take, he knew very well that he would have needed a solid Jewish majority. For 
this reason, he preferred not to include Hadash and Miflaga HaDemokratit Ha’Aravit in the coalition government, 
rather to form an external alliance. 
700 Founded in 1988 by Abdel Wahab Daroushe, a former member of the Labor Office, is based on a platform 
to ensure total equality with Israeli Arabs and full withdrawal from the Territories with the establishment of 
a Palestinian state. 
701 Ha’aretz, September 11th 1992. 
702 Aronoff Y. S., The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers: When Hard-Liners Opt for Peace Paperback, Cambridge 
University Press, 2014. 
703 His vision, developed in The New Middle East (Shaftesbury, 1993), inspired the European Union model, 
giving great emphasis to integration and economic cooperation. 
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When he became part of the government, he immediately clarified that he would have put aside old 
rivalry with Rabin and took part of the Cabinet only for the sake of the peace process, but if the talks 
would have derailed, he would not hesitate to rebel against government’s decisions704. 
On July 13th Rabin presented the Knesset its program, divided into three points: national priorities, 
peace process and Israel's role in the world; the premier explained that instead of squandering 
resources in the Territories, his government would employ those funds to integrate new immigrants 
and implement economic and social reforms. As far as peace was concerned, he announced that 
priority would be given to talks on Palestinian autonomy705 but that, however, peace could not be 
at the expense of national security: «With regard to Israel's security, we will not grant anything. 
From our point of view, security has precedence over peace706».  
But the most striking part of his speech was the role of Israel in the world; Jewish history was 
traditionally represented as an infinite chain of tribulations, at the apex with gas chambers. Many 
Likud leaders had adopted this rhetoric, cultivating the image of a Jewish state alone and vulnerable, 
providing as a solution to the establishment of Eretz Yisrael. Rabin openly contended that the whole 
world was against Israel: «We must overcome the sense of isolation we have been succumbed for 
almost half century707». Rabin set his objectives changing Israel’s national agenda and kick-starting 
the peace process. 
The question of the Territories was lived by the electorate not only as the problem of relations with 
the Palestinians and the Arab neighbors but, in a wider sense, also as the question of the 
“normalization” of the state of Israel in a region that remained basically hostile. The 
acknowledgement that Israel could not fully and permanently occupy the Territories and that the 
dialogue with PLO was inevitable and this awareness was going to meet a favorable momentum, 
corresponding to the global dominance of the United States that had the necessary influence to 
foster long-lasting arrangements between the Jewish state and its neighbors708 But, above all, the 
problem was (and it has always been) the legitimation of the enemy and for Israelis it was very 
difficult to offer it to an organization, whose ultimate goal in the past was the destruction of the 
                                                          
704 Peres S., Battling for Peace..., op. cit., p.320-321. 
705 Although not convinced that peace was within the reach, he was prepared to examine the possibilities and 
two avenues of actions were open: negotiations with President Assad of Syria or with Palestinians. A peace 
treaty with Damascus had solid strategic advantages, but reaching an agreement with the latter would address 
the painful core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, changing the relations between Israel and the Arab world.  
706 Shalim A., Il Muro…, op.cit., p. 555. 
707 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Address to the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin Presenting his Government - 13 July 1992, 
Israel's Foreign Relations - Selected Documents, vol. 13-14: 1992-1994, n.1. 
708 Makovsky D., Making Peace with the PLO: the Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accords, Westview Press, 1996, 
p.111. 
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Jewish state born in 1947. So, Rabin had to proceed cautiously along this path, also because he had 
to face the increasingly intense opposition of the right and of the settlers. In the early 1990s, the 
future of the Territories had become the most relevant political issue in Israel. 
 
5.5.1 Rabin, the Mifleget Ha’Avoda and the Oslo Process 
 Early in December 1992 Yair Hirschfeld, a professor of Middle Eastern history at Haifa 
University, met in a London hotel with Ahmed Suleiman Karia, the head of the PLO Finance 
Department, better known as Abu Alaa. The meeting was proposed by Hanan Ashrawi, then the 
spokeswoman of the Palestinian delegation to the Washington talks, and mediated by Terje Rod 
Larsen, a Norwegian scholar whom Hirschfeld had met the previous year. Hirschfeld and Abu Alaa 
agreed on trying to formulate a declaration of principles that would be acceptable to both sides. 
Hirschfeld had been a member of Mifleget Ha’Avoda for many years and he was active in its different 
“dovish” circles; it was in these circles that he met Yossi Beilin, a confidant of Peres. Immediately 
after his meeting with Abu Alaa, Hirschfeld called Beilin, who encouraged him to continue with this 
new channel, but Beilin couldn’t give him the authority to speak on behalf of the Israeli government. 
The decision to engage in direct secret negotiations with the PLO was a diplomatic revolution in 
foreign policy and paved the way for the Oslo agreement in September 1993. Three men were chiefly 
responsible for these decisions: Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin. The latter, then 
Deputy Foreign Minister, was categorical in his view according to which speaking with Arafat and 
his men was a necessary condition for reaching an agreement with the Palestinians. He had always 
belonged to the dovish wing of the Labor Party and he was the true architect of Israel's recognition 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization. 
Beilin understood immediately that in order to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians, Israel 
would have to pay a very high price: first of all, the return to the pre-1967 borders, then an 
independent Palestinian state, together with the dismantling of Jewish settlements and finally the 
granting of Palestinian formal control over East Jerusalem709.  
Towards the end of January 1993, Beilin actively encouraged secret meetings in Oslo: over a period 
of eight months, fourteen sessions of negotiations took place, all in utmost secrecy. Far from public 
attention and political pressures, they worked tirelessly and by the end of April 1993 the Oslo group 
produced a joint statement of principles and this was possible thanks to a change within the PLO; 
now its members were ready to discuss temporary agreements without prior agreement on the final 
result. Peres reported regularly the PM about developments in the informal “Norwegian channel” 
and, at first, Rabin showed little interest but he did not even raise objections to this attempt; 
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gradually, however, he showed more and more interest in the details and took an active role in 
directing the negotiations alongside Peres.  
Four assessments (which between May and July) were crucial to catch Rabin's full involvement in 
the Palestinian track: the first one was the opinion of Itamar Rabinovich, head of the Israeli 
delegation in the negotiations with the Syria, according to whom an agreement with Damascus was 
attainable, but only at the expense of a complete retreat of the Golan Heights; secondly, the IDF 
director's report about the precarious situation of Arafat and his possible imminent collapse, making 
him the most convenient interlocutor of Israel at that time (since it was not possible to predict what 
kind of leader would have succeeded him); the third element was the impressive progress achieved 
through the Oslo channel and, the last one, the announcement that an alarming rise in the popular 
popularity of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Occupied Territories underlined the urgency of finding 
a political solution to the crisis between Israel and residents of the West Bank and Gaza710. 
In April 1993, the issue of National Insurance began to be debated in the party and showed its 
potential for conflict; indeed, Health Minister Haim Ramon, one of Labor younger and more 
charismatic leaders, firmly backed the bill and he threatened to resign if the party did not push the 
bill through the legislative process. After one month, the first significant coalition crisis erupted, the 
focal point was between Meretz and Shas, consisting of declarations by the Education Minister 
Shulamit Aloni that offended the religious members of the government. The tensions ended in June 
with a cabinet reshuffle, in which Aloni was replaced by another member of her party, but the 
government still remained with its slim majority and dealing with secular-religious tensions. 
Moreover, in September of the same year the coalition began to unravel, due to the fact that the two 
Shas representatives Arye Deri and (Interior Minister) and Rafael Pinhas (Deputy Minister of 
Religion) both faced criminal prosecution and Israel Supreme Court ruled that they could not 
remain in office while their criminal cases were pending. This legal decision forced Shas to depart 
from the coalition and the establishment of Israel’s longest-lasting minority government. 
Even if, Mifleget Ha’Avoda accepted easily the dramatic policy change towards the Palestinians, the 
Israeli public had to be convinced and, just after Oslo agreement it was adopted the government 
adopted the “peace is my security” and, in the last months of 1993, the battle for the hearts and minds 
of the Israeli citizens focused not only on the legitimacy of the peace process, but also of the 
government itself. Indeed, due to the composition of Rabin government, the opposition was pointing 
out the allegation that the Prime Minister had not been elected on a platform that allow them to 
take such a step, with all the dangers that the Oslo process brought with it. Israel society divided 
into two antagonistic equalized camps, with the national-religious camp manipulating successfully 
some aspect of the Oslo agreement for public relations purposes and creating some frictions (also 
inside the Labor Party itself). 
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Rabin scrupulously examined every word of the joint declaration of principles elaborated in Oslo, 
despite his caution, he made a long way in a short time: in June he had not even taken seriously the 
Oslo channel and on August 23rd he publicly stated that there was no other way besides the 
negotiation and the recognition of PLO. The day after, on August 24 Peres and Abu Alaa signed the 
Declaration of Principles, then the Oslo Agreement was subsequently submitted to the Israeli 
Cabinet on August 30: intelligence and IDF officers also attended the meeting and, almost all 
ministers expressed, Secret Service and Defense Officers expressed positive opinions and approved 
the document unanimously with only two abstentions.  
On September 9th and 10th, two letters of recognition followed711and on September 13th, in 
Washington, Arafat and Rabin signed the Declaration of Principles712(DOP). «When Rabin shook 
Arafat's hand I thought for a minute that the ceiling in the room would blow up in the air of joy. 
Somebody opened a bottle of champagne and disused the sweating heads of those assembled with 
the sparkling liquid. [...] Many cried when they sang “we will not overcome”713». The Declaration of 
Principles on Transitional Self-Government Agreements, rather than a definitive agreement, was 
essentially a negotiating agenda marked by a rigorous roadmap, which would have led an agreement 
on Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho.  
The form of the definitive agreement was not specified and it is not difficult to understand the 
reasons for this silence: there were issues (such as the future of settlements in the West Bank and 
Gaza, the status of Jerusalem, the borders of the Palestinian entities) on which there would be no 
agreement. Both sides ran a calculated risk by realizing that a large-scale deal would have come as a 
result if the Palestinian self-government experiment would have actually worked. The underlying 
idea of the aforementioned strategy was that small steps would have lead inevitably to larger ones, 
particularly since the two sides in negotiations get into the habit of talking and compromising. This 
would have made easier for the negotiators to reach successive interim agreements and to sell the 
compromises reached along the way to their governments and publics714.  
The Oslo Agreement (Oslo I) was composed of two parts, the first consisted in the mutual 
recognition between Israel and the PLO, which took shape in two letters dated September 9 but 
                                                          
711 In the letter Arafat acknowledged Israel's right to live in peace and security, it also accepted resolutions 242 
and 338, declaring itself in favor of a peaceful resolution of the conflict and against the use of terrorism. For 
her part, Rabin recognized the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 
712 Which had to be set up by the birth of a temporary self-government authority in Gaza and the West Bank. 
After five years, a definitive settlement of the Territories would result, through further agreements. The 
passage of powers was to take place gradually, in conjunction with the Israeli withdrawal; the most difficult 
issues such as Jerusalem, borders and settlements were postponed to another time. 
713 Sarna I., Their November 29th, Hadashot, September 14th 1993. 
714 Gelvin J. L., The Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One Hundred Years of Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 
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signed by Arafat and Rabin respectively on September 9 and 10 almost all advertising went to sign 
the statement of the principles but without the prior agreement on mutual recognition there would 
be no significant agreement on the self-governing Palestinian government. Arafat affirmed the 
commitment of the PLO to recognize the right of Israel to live in peace and security, to accept UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, to renounce to terrorism and other acts of violence and 
to modify those parts of the Palestinian National Chart that were incompatible with the 
commitments undertaken with Oslo I. In his concise answer, Rabin confirmed that in the light of 
such promises, the government of Israel decided to recognize PLO as a representative of the 
Palestinian people and to start negotiating with it within the Middle East peace process715. The Oslo 
turning-point was achieved by separating the transitional agreement from the definitive one. 
The document was composed by two parts: the first one was constituted by the DOP itself, along 
the letters of mutual recognition; instead the second one was an accord that established the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and affirmed a Palestinian 
right of self-government within those areas through the creation of a Palestinian Interim Self-
Government Authority. Palestinian rule was to last for a five-year interim period during which 
“permanent status negotiations” would commence in order to reach a final agreement. The real 
paradox was that Rabin needed a strong PLO in order to implement the agreement, but a strong 
Palestinian leadership could only strengthen its position fighting for a Palestinian independent 
state, a hypothesis that the Israeli PM was not inclined to give by courtesy. On the contrary, for 
Rabin the core of Oslo I was the demonstration by the PNA to be able to identify and pursue 
terrorists and to ensure Israeli security. This was the condition that would have measured the 
feasibility of further negotiating steps716. According with the agreement, a controlled withdrawal 
from Gaza and Jericho was supposed to be completed within four months, moreover, within nine 
months, Palestinians would have elected a National Council in order to take office and assume some 
government responsibilities (except for defense and foreign affairs). Israel and Palestinians agreed 
to start negotiations for statehood within two years and, after five years, the definitive agreement 
would have entered into force717. 
Israel's change of attitude towards Palestinians was as remarkable as the Palestinian one towards 
Israel; indeed, Zionist politics has always been based on the assertion that it would have been easier 
                                                          
715 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition- Letters and Speeches- 10 September 1993, Israel's 
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to reach an agreement on the division of Palestine with the leaders of the other Arab states, rather 
than with the Palestinian leadership. The tacit hope was that recognition by the Arab neighbors 
would have helped to alleviate the burden of the conflict, without granting Palestinians the right to 
national self-determination. Now that strategy was overturned. 
The minority of Palestinians, led by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Palestine Liberation Front opposed 
to the agreement and immediately organized a violent campaign to derail the peace process. Those 
terrorist acts strengthened Israel's right-wing opposition to the agreement, depriving Rabin of the 
necessary space for diplomatic maneuvers; in the same way, in front of a once uncompromising 
Jewish state, Arafat, would not have had the strength to advance peace, due to the fact that also the 
Palestinian leader was dealing with internal struggle and difficulties to keep terrorism under 
control: «No systematic strategy was ever put into practice by the Palestinian Authority to block 
terrorist activity718» which continued through the slander of attacks that were carried out in the 
background of the diplomatic activity of those years719. Meanwhile there was a series of meetings 
like in Oslo, Cairo and Taba all meant to break the stalemate on the withdrawal of the IDF from 
Gaza e Jericho; the DOP that this will take place by April 1994, notwithstanding those initiatives, 
violence began to take its toll on the fragile process720. On February 25, 1994, inside the Ibrahimi 
Mosque, inside the Tomb of the Patriarchs (or Me'arat ha-Makhpela) holy place for Muslims and 
Jews, Baruch Goldstein a militant Jewish settler belonging to Kach (anti-Arab ultra-Orthodox 
movement) killed dozens of devotees gathered for the prayer; the massacre blocked the negotiations 
between Israel and PLO, fueling the tensions throughout the Occupied Territories. Rabin uttered 
words of deep contempt for the Jewish extremists and he expressed himself all defending the secular 
and democratic state of Israel: «You are a shame for Zionism. You have no right to be part of our 
people and not even of a democratic society721». Only after the condemnation by the UN (Resolution 
904), the ban of Kach and of the Kahane Hai by the Labor government and the agreement between 
Israel and PLO on the deployment of a Temporary International Presence in Hebron(Tiph722), 
negotiations were resumed.  
                                                          
718 Marzano A., Israele e Palestina.., op.cit., p.120. 
719 Morris B., Vittime…, op.cit., p.772. 
720 1994 began with the prominence of domestic politics, more specifically with the protracted issue of the 
National Health Insurance bringing about Ramon’s resignation Idan created a new party to run in the election 
of the Histadrut. This division represented a major challenge for the Labor Party and its internal cohesion. 
721 Reported in Levi A., Yitzhak Rabin, 1210 giorni per la pace, Mondadori, 1996, p.115. 
722 TIPH in its present form is the result of the Hebron Protocol which calls for Denmark, Norway, Italy, 
Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey to provide observers for the mission in Hebron, with Norway as the 
coordinator. 
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Arafat's arrival in Gaza on July 1, 1994 was taken by Likud's leaders as an opportunity for a powerful 
demonstration of strength by organizing a rally in Zion Square in Jerusalem, when Moledet, Tzomet 
and other 10.000 members of the national-religious right showed their fury against government’s 
policies, touching high level; but the wave of violence showed by the opponents to the peace process 
wasn’t able to gain public sympathy and to incite the majority of the Israelis against Rabin and Peres. 
far from raising the nation against government policy. At the same time, as Arafat was losing his 
popular support, it was more difficult for him to make further concessions to the Israelis, and in 
turn, it was much more complicated for Rabin, under the crossfire of terrorism and of the extreme 
right, to advance with the peace process and concede to the PNA other territories and other 
competences. Yet, the Prime Minister realized that only giving more to the Palestinians, the number 
of terror attacks could be reduced by elimination of the swamp in which terrorists thrived. 
The peace process moves ahead again in the mid-1994 and on July, Rabin flew again to Washington 
for another ground-breaking ceremony, this time with King Hussein of Jordan in order to sign a 
peace treaty between the two countries. Notwithstanding this great achievement, by the end of 1994 
the political situation of the government became problematic because Shas was still outside the 
coalition and MK Ramon and his allies had left Labor ranks, determining government instability. 
Some gains in polls during early October, due to the treaty with Jordan, did little to help the 
government, especially since terrorism kept on striking; extremist violence had become a serious 
problem and public support both for the peace process and Mifleget Ha’Avoda again declined.  
Labor Party had more trouble on the domestic front; the party’s main power basis from Histadrut and 
the kibbutz movement had been broken or weakened, moreover the opposition, whereas constrained 
by internal rivalries, united behind Benjamin Netanyahu who, at that time, led Rabin in the polls. 
The Labor ministers began to fear electoral defeat and longer solidly backed the government, its 
policies or its leader. By December 1994, the prime minister appeared to be stretched on the limit, 
he openly attacked anyone who criticize his policies; the domestic environment was so tense that 
on the eve of Rabin’s trip to Oslo to accept the Nobel Prize, one of the MKs called out: «Rabin the 
house is burning. Stay home and help put out the fire [...] We are committing political suicide723»: 
Fractiousness continued in 1995 as did the impasse in the peace process; Israeli fears about 
Palestinian inability to maintain security were confirmed when on January 22nd 1995 at the Beit Lid 
junction in Netanya, two bombs exploded causing a serious toll of twenty-one dead. The symbolism 
of the attack was very significant because the attack took place on the day of the Shoah 
commemoration and it was carried out in front of the prison where hundreds of Palestinians were 
detained. Following the massacre, Israeli President Ezer Weizmann, considered a dove, also called 
for the suspension of peace talks with. The anti-government protests that followed became massive 
                                                          
723 Hazan R. Y., The Labor Party and the peace process: partisan disintegration amid political cohesion, The Leonard Davis 
Institute, Jerusalem, 1998, p.10. 
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and hostile, while polls showed that support for Rabin and the party was considerably declining. 
After each attack the public took the streets, the PM was personally assaulted; many observers 
indicated that he had withdrawn you from the peace process and that Peres was now the only one 
trying to impel it. A vicious circle had developed: the lack of progress in the peace process caused 
internal problems in the Labor Party which, in turn, generated further difficulties in the peace 
process.  
In order to face the spiraling situation, Rabin promised the launch of some extraordinary security 
measures, beginning with strengthening the demarcation lines between Israeli and Palestinian 
territories; it is no coincidence that the main word became afrada (separation). Israeli political and 
military authorities in fact set up a separation plan with the construction of a giant metal fence along 
the 500 km border with the Palestinian West Bank724. 
The response of Mifleget Ha’Avoda to developments in the peace talks was not uniform and there were 
different degrees of consent depending on the country the government was speaking with, indeed 
while there was a widespread support for the treaty with Jordan and there was a majority backing 
the deals with the PLO, regarding the negotiations with Syria, strong opposition raised inside the 
party. Indeed, there were pockets of internal resistance coming from hawkish members, such as 
Avigdor Kahalani and Emanuel Zissman725, which was starting to become a real split regarding the 
opposition to any territorial compromise with Syria on the Golan Heights726. Senior personalities of 
the party (among them also the secretary-general of the party Nissim Zvili), aware of the electoral 
damage that the peace process could inflict on the party, argued that parts of the implementation of 
the peace accords with the Palestinians should be postponed until after Knesset election: Israelis 
were becoming increasingly disenchanted by the Oslo process.  
Rabin’s typical response was to accuse those making such demands of losing their nerve727. Despite 
Rabin’s decisiveness, the question of the return of the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for peace, 
was potentially divisive for Mifleget Ha’Avoda given the fact that the majority of 13.000 Golan settlers 
were established there by Labor administrations (after the Six Days War) and they all were loyal 
                                                          
724 Codovini G., Geopolitica del conflitto ...,op.cit., p. 62. 
725 Their contrast with the party's willingness to entertain the idea of withdrawing from the Golan Heights in 
return for peace with Syria became so deep that,  on March 7th 1996, they founded a new party, The Third Way 
(HaDerech HaShlishit), breaking away from Mifleget Ha’Avoda. 
726 The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, Meetings of Standing Committee (Heb.), Secretary General of 
the Labor Party, 2-021-1995-272, 25/05/1995-31/05/1995, pp. 1-64. 
727 A typical example of this occurred on July 4th 1994 at the weekly meeting of the Labor party Knesset faction 
where Rabin attacked some Labor MKs for panicking unnecessarily as the majority of the public still 
supported the peace policies of the government. Rabin finished his outburst by stating “thanks a lot panic 
mongers. Stop crying and start working” 
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supporters of the party; this was in contrast to the 100.000 plus Jewish settlers in the West Bank 
and Gaza who generally support parties form the Likud-led block728. The difference was mainly based 
on the fact that the Golan settlers were encouraged to live there for security rather than political 
reasons (Rabin coined the phrase that the Golan Heights are: «tank land and not holy land729»).  
Despite the climate of violence, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip730, better known as Oslo II, was signed in Washington on September 28th 1995; its field 
of action was extremely important because it was foreseen that a political framework would be 
established in which to transfer the control of civil functions to the PNA in the most populous cities 
of the West Bank (including the Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron), 
corresponding to 4% of the West Bank, and another 25% for administrative and civil control. In the 
Gaza Strip, Israel maintained control over 35% of the territory that contained Jewish settlements 
and the roads leading to them, while the rest was transferred to the Palestinian National Authority. 
Moreover, was created a division of the West Bank into three areas A, B and C: Area A (consisted by 
densely populated Palestinian urban centers) was put under exclusive Palestinian control; in Area 
B (68%, consisted of Palestinian villages and less densely populated areas) the PNA exercised civil 
authority, while IDF continued to take care on security; while Area C (included settlements and 
military installations) under Israeli control alone. 
On October 5th, the PM provided the Knesset with an overall assessment of Oslo II; his speech was 
clear731 and explained that there was no intention to come back to the pre-1967 borders, to maintain 
the security border of the State in the Jordan Valley and to safeguard a united Jerusalem under Israeli 
sovereignty, while preserving the rights of the members of the other faiths, like the freedom to access 
and to worship in their holy places. The future Palestinian entity would have been less than one 
state, whose territory would be demilitarized. The Knesset ratified the agreement with a 61 majority 
in favor and 59 against. Despite these problems, the Labor leadership managed to maintain majority 
support during the conduct of the negotiations; a major factor for this was the ability of Peres and 
Rabin to work together and marshal all the clients behind the peace process. Moreover, Peres had 
specifically the role to prepare Israeli public opinion for a change of policy before Rabin committed 
himself to a position. In short, Peres was seen publicly as making difficult concessions thereby 
allowing Rabin to maintain his “Mr. Security” image. But, mainly, Rabin was very careful to make 
                                                          
728Lochery N., Israeli Labor Party…, op. cit., p.  
729Hartley C. and Cossali P., Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations, Europa Publication, 2001, p.201.  
730 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - 28 
September 1995, Israel's Foreign Relations - Historical Documents, vol. 15: 1995-1996, n. 28. 
731 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Address to the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin on the Israel-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement, Israel's Foreign Relations vol. 15: 1995-1996, n. 85, October 5th 1995.  
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many of the key Knesset debates on the Golan Heights and on peace deals, votes of confidence in his 
government. 
Starting from the analysis offered by Reuven Y. Hazan, we have tried to report the events that had 
significant consequences for the party and the peace process732, that is to mean those occurrences 
which show us how and when the peace process impacted on Mifleget Ha’Avoda internal mechanisms 
and vice versa. This paragraph didn't want to report a complete historical analysis of the Oslo 
Process negotiations, rather its purpose is to highlight the most salient passages of the Israeli-
Palestinian dialogue explaining how Israeli domestic and foreign policy are reciprocally influenced. 
Moreover, as one can notice, this analysis is mainly focused on the Palestinian track of the peace 
process and that is not meant to suggest that the other talks (like the Syrian ones) were irrelevant 
but, as Shimon Sheve (former director-general of the prime minister’s office) declared: «The 
explosive potential was in the Palestinian context; if we could disarm this it could lead to 
achievements on other fronts as well733». Indeed, the agreements with the PLO were the fundamental 
objective of the protests from the national-religious camp, not only because its strategic meaning, 
but most of all for its ideological and cultural significance. The Israeli right was perceiving that the 
vision of Eretz Yisrael was in jeopardy. 
 
5.6 From political opposition to political assassination: how to change a nation 
 Since the Intifada, Rabin734 had clearly changed his mind, rationalizing that the Palestinian 
revolt was more than a local disturbance and coming to the conclusion that the solution was not 
relying in a military response. From this experience, came Rabin’s commitment to change Israel’s 
priorities, which produced immediate results as the freezing of the settlements and the reallocation 
of economic resources to social and economic problems within the Green Line. This move was 
applauded by US Secretary of State Baker and within few weeks since Rabin was elected, president 
Bush authorized the $10 billion loan guarantees that had been denied to the previous government. 
The peace process seemed to be reenergized and a gradual softening of Israeli attitudes towards the 
withdrawal from the West Bank took place: 71% of the respondents thought that freezing the 
settlements would have helped to advance with the negotiations and 74% said they could accept 
withdrawal from at least some territories in exchange for peace735. In comparison only 21% thought 
no withdrawal should occur under any circumstances736.  
                                                          
732 Hazan R. Y., The Labor Party and the peace process, op. cit. 
733 Ibidem. 
734 During the first months of the Palestinian insurgency, he was Minister of Defense and his attitude towards 
the situation was very controversial (as we have seen in the previous chapter, pp. ). 
735Bar-On M., In Pursuit…, op. cit., p. 299. 
736 A majority was still opposed to relinquish from the Golan Heights. 
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The deals with the PLO were far more controversial and were bitterly opposed not only by the right-
wing parliamentary parties but also by hawkish elements from within the Labor Party; although 
Peres was seen as the principal controller of the various stages of the negotiations, it was Rabin who 
had the final veto on their outcome737. The PM, thanks to his reputation as “Mr. Security”, was seen 
by Israelis as the suitable leader to speak with Arafat and the PLO and to sign an accord with them 
(contrary to Peres and his persistent image problem). Indeed, Rabin’s reputation was vital in 
winning initial support from the public opinion, that was around 66%, once the deal was made 
public738. 
Despite this positive numbers, this majority support remained fragile during all the Olso Process, 
due to the strong linkage between Israeli personal security with the Palestinian question, vital 
element in order to understand Israeli public’s support for the deals with the PLO; in other words, 
the majority of Israelis initially supported Rabin’s cautious support for the DOP on the belief that it 
would have brought to an increase in Israeli personal security. However, the attacks by Hamas and 
the Islamic Jihad, together with Arafat’s failure to prevent them, led to a decrease in Israeli public 
backing for the deals739. 
Since the signing of the DPO and the application of Gaza-Jericho, the Israeli right began to manifest 
itself aggressively against the peace process; every episode of Islamic terrorism was followed by 
demonstrations against Rabin. Palestinian peace enemies provided arguments and consent to their 
Israeli counterparts. The Likud and other opposition parties were very quick to exploit the attacks 
as proof of the failure of the DOP, which led Rabin (in more than one occasion) to accuse them to 
work with Hamas against the peace process: «The radical right is dancing on the blood of the victims 
of radical Islamic murderers, trying to turn these victims into a lever against the peace agreement[…] 
The fanatic murderers of the Islamic Jihad and Hamas are the means of the Israeli radical right. There 
is an evil and wicked circle of partnership between Hamas murderers and the Israeli radical right 
wing740». 
These remarks were made following a demonstration organized by the Likud and other opposition 
groups in Jerusalem on July 2nd 1994 against the peace process deal. The demonstration ended in 
violence with a Jewish mob attempting to enter the old part of the city, with the intention of 
                                                          
737 Makovsky D., Making Peace…, op. cit., p. 
738 The Peace Index, May, July and August 1995, (http://www.peaceindex.org/indexYearsEng.aspx?num=16 
739 This linkage between the Israeli support for the peace process and the frequency of the terror attacks is 
well reported and analyzed in the work of Arian A., Security Threatened. Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. In this book those oscillations of public opinion’s attitudes towards the 
peace process are documented through a detailed series of polls and surveys.  
740 The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, Minutes from meetings (Heb.), Archives of organizations and 
institutions Mapai - Labor Party, 2-023-1994-151, 29/05/1994-03/07/1994, pp. 113-116. 
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destroying Arab properties. The rally was characterized by the chant “Rabin traitor” and “We will 
drive Rabin out with fire and blood” which became the slogans of the opposition in subsequent 
rallies against the peace process up to Rabin’s assassination741. 
Both on the Israeli and Palestinian side742,the agreement between Rabin and Arafat provoked strong 
opposition from the extremists; both were accused of betrayal and selling their own country. Likud's 
leaders and extreme right-wing nationalists attacked the prime minister, accusing him of 
abandoning 120,000 settlers of occupied territories to the mercy of terrorists; the project for Gaza 
and Jericho was denounced as a bridgehead for the Palestinian state and as the beginning of the end 
of Great Israel. However, a survey published on The Guardian on September 16th 1993 showed 
considerable popular support to the premier and, on 1,000 Israelis interviewed, 65% claimed to 
approve the peace agreement and only 13%said it was very contrary. 
The rejectionist organizations headed by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad were determined to undermine 
the accords through terrorism; April 1994 saw the start of a series of suicide bombings that hit 
Israelis all over the country. The suicide attacks undermined Israelis’ belief in the Oslo Accords and 
in Rabin’s peace policy: Israeli public opinion, which had supported the PM, began to veer to the 
right. Rabin’s response to the violence was to argue that terrorist organizations were seeking to stop 
the political process and that they shouldn’t be allowed to win by doing so. He was determined to 
advance the process. 
The divisive debate on the future status of the Occupied Territories led to a level of polarization of 
Israeli politics not seen since the early days of the state with the battle between the Labor movement 
and the Revisionists; the opposition parties helped to create the volatile tone of the debate that 
produced an atmosphere which, many claim, resulted in Rabin’s assassination. The Prime Minister 
responded the attacks by the Likud, ultra-right parties and Settlers movement on the peace process 
in a similar way to what Ben-Gurion did in order to delegitimate the revisionists, including crude 
measures as his refusal to speak to the leader of the opposition, or even to refer to him by name in 
the Knesset.  
The principal opposition figure to Rabin was Netanyahu; despite he was hugely politically 
experienced, he was confronted with the announcement of the Oslo Agreements in 1993 with a 
dilemma that no previous leader of Likud had had to face; in essence Netanyahu had to choose if to 
                                                          
741 It is possible to find plenty of videos and documentaries on the internet which portray the level of verbal 
violence reached during in those days. Another interesting source it’s the following documentary, Seven days in 
November Yitzhak Rabin 1922-1995, Holon: Classikaletet, 1997. 
742 Within the PLO, radical nationalists were now accused of abandoning the principles of power despite the 
fact that the leader succeeds in seizing the majority needed to favor the agreement between the 18 executive 
members outside the organization for the release of the Palestine covenant raises the implacable wrath of 
militant movements Hamas and Islamic Jihad who considered any compromise with the Jewish state a sacrilege 
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accept the deal as a fait accompli, or to reject the document and fight it using all means 
(parliamentary and extra-parliamentary at his disposal). While to choose the former was to renege 
Likud’s dream of Eretz Yisrael, the inevitable consequence of the latter would be to push the party to 
the right743. It is worth noting that much of Netanyahu's public action was motivated by intra-party 
concerns and, in particular, the constant threat to his leadership from Sharon and Levy, for this 
reason he tended to show publicly a strong attitude against the peace process, far tougher than the 
one conceived his private opinion. 
On the other side of the political spectrum, after Oslo, Mifleget Ha’Avoda was already seen as having 
shifted to a position more inclined toward negotiations; Netanyahu’s decision completed the 
process of the abandonment of the center ground of Israeli politics. Consequently, the Israeli party 
system came to mirror the polarized system of the early years of the state. 
It was a vacuum in the center of Israeli politics which allowed the development of protest 
movements which culminated in the murder of Rabin by an assassin who believed he had the 
political and religious legitimacy to carry it out. Rabin and Mifleget Ha’Avoda were elected largely 
because of its promise to divert economic resources from the Occupied Territories towards the 
development of infrastructures within the Green Line. 
As the negotiations progressed, tension mounted between Israeli left and right. As far as the settlers 
were concerned, the entire process was perceived in the perspective of their nationalist belief as a 
betrayal of their fundamental values. For the 150.000 settler existing at the time, there could be no 
forgiving for what they termed “the crimes of Oslo744”. The extreme Right’s struggle against Rabin 
government constantly straddled the thin line that separates civil resistance and protest from acts 
of violence. A permanent vociferous protest was maintained outside the Prime Minister’s residence 
and he frequently needed a police escort to enter. The non-religious right was swept along on this 
wave of hostility and confrontation; representations of Rabin and Peres as “traitors” began to appear 
in public places (posters with Rabin wearing Arafat’s or Nazi uniforms); moreover, some rabbis, 
linked to the more militant groups, declared that (according to their interpretation) anyone handing 
over areas of the Land of Israel was a traitor and as such subject to din rodef745(law of the pursuer), 
                                                          
743 Many in the Likud argued that Netanyahu’s choice was wrong and that he should have accepted the deal 
and worked to undermine it within the framework of the Oslo Agreement. Sharon, well-known for his 
hawkish views, supported this point of view. 
744 Shapira A., Israel…, op.cit., p. 434. 
745 Din Rodef (Hebrew:  ףדורןיד), literally means “law of the pursuer”, is a part of traditional Jewish law. It is a 
status in Halakhah of a person pursuing another in order to kill him.The origin of this law can be found in the 
Babylonian Talmud (Tractate Sanhedrin, 73a).However, there are a few restrictions to this law: the allowance 
to kill the rodef does not apply in a case where lesser means would prevent the innocent's murder. In addition, 
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that is he should be killed. But they were not alone, the political leaders of the traditional Right (to 
name a few: Netanyahu, Sharon, Eitan Zebulon Hammer) often joined the choir. 
The backdrop of this inflamed mood was the fragility of the Rabin government. Although Shas 
leadership supported the Oslo Accords, the party’s rank thought differently due to the fact that their 
voters supported the right-wing block and being part of a government of the Left contravened their 
beliefs. This was a signal that pressure from the party’s militant would led it to resign from the 
government. After Deri’s own resignation (following charges of corruption against him), Shas did 
quit the coalition. Then, the Rabin government held only 58 MKs and was dependent on the support 
of the Arab members and, from there on, the settlers accused the Cabinet of making decisions fateful 
to the Jewish people when the government had not a Jewish majority. Notwithstanding the right’s 
de-legitimization of the Oslo Process, Rabin did not desist: he was adamant in advancing the peace 
process without taking into account the strong opposition manifested by the settlers. His 
determination not to be diverted from his course was also due to his lack of empathy with the 
national-religious claims, which didn't belong to his set of values and attitudes.   
It was partly in order to disperse this violent climate that Peace Now, Labor Party and Meretz 
organized the pacifist rally of November 4th 1995 in Tel Aviv's King's Square in Israel, with around 
150,000 people746. The initiative was an energetic tonic for Rabin and Peres, both on stage to meet 
the crowd that was there to support the peace process and their work. The usually introverted Prime 
Minister appeared to the public radiant and, for the first time, he told about his personal feelings 
and experience on the path to reach a final agreement with the PLO. Despite all the difficulties, in 
that occasion he was showing his gratitude for the support they got. 
That night there was another memorable scene; Rabin hug Peres in front of the exultant crowd. 
Then, the PM made a speech: «I was a soldier for twenty-seven years, I fought for a long time because 
there was no prospect of peace. But I think today there is a chance for peace, a great opportunity to 
be caught». He then concluded, «This event should send a message to the Israeli public, to all the 
Jews in the world, to the crowds in the Arab countries and to the whole world. The nation of Israel 
wants peace, supports peace and for this I thank you747». At the end of the event as the people began 
to leave the square, Rabin and the other authorities moved to get in the car; in this short way, Yigal 
Amir, a twenty-seven-year-old Bar Llan law student, walked over the bodyguards and fired three 
shots at Rabin, who, hit back from two bullets, died on the way to the hospital. In the pocket of his 
jacket was found a sheet of paper carefully bent with the words of a song he had sung during the 
                                                          
according to the Rambam, killing a rodef who may have been stopped by lesser means constitutes murder, 
though the punishment for a murderer in this case is not dealt out by bet din (judicial court). 
746 The presence of police was massive because some possible Arab terror attacks were foreseen.   
747 Rabin Y., The Last Speech Address by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at a Peace Rally Kings of Israel Square, Tel Aviv 
November 4, 1995, The Yitzhak Rabin Center Archives, Tel Aviv (http://www.rabincenter.org.il). 
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demonstration; the “Song of Peace748” was stained with his blood and was perforated by one of the 
shotguns shot by the assassin. 
Amir, captured on the spot, said during the interrogations that he wanted to stop the peace process 
and prevent the sale of part of Israel. The killer had repeatedly stated that he wanted to kill the Prime 
Minister and immediately after the assassination said he had acted to save the Jewish people, 
applying Jewish religious law, according to which a Jew who endangers the lives of other Jews must 
be killed. He said to the inquiry commission: «When I shot at Rabin, I felt I was shooting a 
terrorist749». Amir was sentenced to life imprisonment and never showed any remorse for his act. As 
soon as the investigations went to the militant right circles750, attended by the killer, the political 
parties closest to the religious-nationalist movement began to accuse the government of taking too 
drastic measures in an attempt to prove (for political ends) that the assassination had been 
instigated. Peres and his colleagues, near imminent elections, fearful of embarrassing the moderate 
public opinion, left the investigations to be conducted under the usual routine and only one of Amir's 
friends (Margalit Har-Sefi) was sentenced for not having reported his project751. 
The terror attacks after the Oslo Accords triggered an unprecedented reaction among Israelis which 
contributed to the creation of such a violent environment, where verbal confrontation had translated 
several times into physical confrontation between representatives of the two factions, never 
experienced before. The shock of the murder was tremendous and it exposed Israeli democracy’s 
vulnerability. Rabin underestimated the ideals that animated the national-religious right and the 
risk that such political involvement could transform the public debate into a violent confrontation ; 
as a profoundly secular man, he did not understand the strong motivations at the basis of that 
opposition and he was inclined to consider it as an expression of a marginal adverse political group, 
although since months written threats to on the  Prime Minister’s life appeared publicly on the and 
mystical religious ceremonies752 had been conducted to enlist divine forces to kill him. The truth 
was that very few Israelis could even seriously take into consideration the possibility a Prime 
Minister of Israel being assassinated by an Israeli. The horror of an assassination of a Jew by the 
                                                          
748 Shir laShalom was composed in 1969 and became the peace movement’s anthem since then. 
749 Shlaim A., Il Muro…, op.cit., p. 598. 
750 In this milieu, Amir grew up, along with other young radicals whose formation was based on the legacy of 
the national-religious party Kach, founded by rabbi Meir Kahane and was banned by Israeli government in 
1994. 
751 Morris B., Vittime…, op.cit., p. 788. 
752 It refers to the Kabalistic ceremony of the Pulsa Denura ( ארונדיסלופ, “lashes of fire”) in which the angels of 
destruction are invoked to block the heavenly forgiveness of the subject's sins, causing all the curses named in 
the Bible to befall him resulting in his death. However, the Torah prohibits praying that something bad should 
happen to another person. Prior to the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, there were 
reports that the curse had been recited against him. 
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hands of another Jew had created a profound split within Israeli society, thereby undermining 
national solidarity to the very basis of the historical experience of the state of Israel. The shock was 
tremendous. 
Rabin's death also posed the thorny issue of his succession, for the peace process was closely 
identified with the leaders who had longed to initiate dialogue, conclude the agreements and assume 
political responsibility; Shimon Peres thus appeared as his natural successor. The murder of Rabin, 
while a major tragedy, did not derailed (in the short term) the peace process as Amir intended; 
indeed, there was some evidence to suggest that Rabin’s death had the opposite effect, speeding up 
the implementation of Oslo II by withdrawing the IDF from the Palestinian cities, where the first 
Palestinian elections took place on time on January 1996, producing the expected victory of Arafat 
and his party Fatah. 
Shimon Peres assumed the role of  prime minister since November 1995 to the end of May 1996; 
during those months he demonstrated to be actually Rabin’s heir, totally committing himself in the 
prosecution of the peace process; notwithstanding his decisiveness and the outcomes achieved, in 
the public opinion's  eyes, he turned out be a too fragile political personality in order to achieve the 
main result that the Oslo Process had promised: a final peace agreement which would have granted 
Israel's security, at that time, desired by Israelis more than ever. He was not “Mr. Security” and, in 
1996, he had to leave the path he had taken with his colleague. 
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Chapter 6. THE SEEDS OF LABOR DECLINE AND THE CRISIS OF THE 
OSLO PROCESS (1995-2001) 
 
 This last chapter has been thought in order to provide an analysis of the electoral dynamics 
which affected the Labor Party in 1996 and 1999 elections, after Rabin’s death. The choice to examine 
the electoral turnout until 2001 was taken due some considerations: 1996 and 1999 are the last two 
real occasions for Mifleget Ha’Avoda to be competitive and succeeding in providing a convincing 
electoral platform for polls provide a real political alternative to the electorate, whereas 2000 is a 
catalyst year because the failure of Camp David summit and the breakout of the al-Aqsa Intifada that 
definitively ended the Oslo’s peace process. This new epoch is characterized by the decline of the 
“land for peace” approach and by the clear political and electoral decline of the Labor Party. 
The elections of 2001 were easily won by Ariel Sharon753 (1928 - 2014), the Likud’s candidate, which 
succeed in interpreting Israelis dissatisfaction towards the peace process and their need for security, 
becoming the main voice in Israeli politics. Besides this phenomenon other two dynamics were 
taking place during the Nineties: on one side the fractionalization of the Knesset   through the 
proliferation of the sub-identity group vote and, on the other the polarization of the electorate 
between the two main political camps (right and left) in the context of the direct election for the 
Prime Minister (introduced with the electoral reform in the 1996 elections).  
The reinforcement of the cross-cutting cleavages of Israeli society, the delusion towards the Oslo 
process and the strong connection between the territory-peace issue with the definition of Israeli 
national identity originated the conditions which led to the overall crisis of Mifleget Ha’Avoda. Taking 
into account the transformations and events that involved Israeli political system in the previous 
decades, this chapter, wants to provide a multi-dimensional framework in the attempt to be show 
the conditions in which Ha'Avoda ongoing electoral decline originated.  
 
 
                                                          
753 Ariel “Arik" Sharon was an Israeli statesman, former Prime Minister and retired Major-General who served 
in the IDF for more than twenty-five years. Sharon was appointed commander of a Paratroop Corps in 1956 
and fought in the Sinai Campaign. Sharon resigned from the army in June 1972, but was recalled to active 
military service in the 1973 Yom Kippur War to command an armored division. He led the crossing of the Suez 
Canal which helped secure an Israeli victory in the war and eventual peace with Egypt. In 1981, Ariel Sharon 
was appointed Defense Minister, serving in this post during the Lebanon War, which was followed by the 
Kahan Commission of inquiry for the episodes took place in Sabra e Chatila. In September 28th 2000, Sharon 
made a visit to Temple Mount in Jerusalem, which was the sparkle that triggered the Second Intifada. In a 
special election held on February 6th 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister. 
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6.1 The struggle for national identity. 1996 elections 
The two key-issues of peace and security dominated the short Peres government (1995-1996) 
just as they had done with Rabin’s. On the question of peace, the new Labor-led government quickly 
moved on to implement as much of the Oslo Accords as it could; this was possible due to the short-
term shift in Israeli public opinion in favor of the Agreements with the PLO in the aftermath of Rabin 
assassination, giving the fact that the deals were perceived by the public as Rabin’s legacy754. 
Peres decision to move forward the elections from November to end of May was closely related to 
the fact the final status talk with the Palestinians were due to start; it was clear for the PM that 
these negotiations would led to some difficult and probably unpopular decisions for the government 
to make. Pere’s rational was therefore to avoid having to go to the electorate for a new mandate in 
such a sensitive time. This decision to delay the electoral turnout cost very much to Peres in terms 
of popularity, both inside the party and among the people755. His team argued that the continuation 
of the peace process had the priority on any other type of considerations, but, in retrospect, this 
strategy proved to be a costly mistake. 
 
6.1.1 Mifleget Ha’Avoda and Likud’s electoral strategies 
The campaign for the 14th Knesset was one of the calmest in Israeli history in which the 
political language and debate were moderate and kept under strict control. There are two main 
reasons: the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the implementation of the new electoral reform into 
the electoral system, resulting from the modification of the basic law756 “The Government757” 
(developed by Rabin's government in 1992758), which called for the direct elections of PM. The first 
event caused a significant shock, felt by most Israelis: a Jew had assassinated the Prime Minister of 
Israel in the name of national-religious ideology. The psychological blow was still strong and there 
were many fears that the political (and physical) violence could take place once again759: «Fear of 
                                                          
754 Lochery N., The Israeli Labor Party…, op. cit., p.253. 
755 According to a poll conducted by an Israeli newspaper on December 1995, Peres enjoyed an average of 21 
percentage points ahead Netanyahu. 
756 Since the Constituent Assembly and the First Knesset  were unable to put a constitution together, the Knesset  
started to legislate basic laws on various subjects. After all the basic laws will be enacted, they will constitute 
together, with an appropriate introduction and several general rulings, the constitution of the State of Israel. 
757 The Knesset, Basic Law: The Government (1968 - null), The Existing Basic Laws: Full Texts, (https://www.Knesset 
.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic1_eng.htm). 
758 The Knesset, Basic Law: The Government (1992 - null), The Existing Basic Laws: Full Texts, (https://www.Knesset 
.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic7_eng.htm). 
759 Also because Peres received a number of death threats and he was closely guarded. 
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another Yigal Amir has forced Peres to become the country’s first Prime Ministerial candidate to 
campaign without direct and unmediated contact with the public. There is no way to measure the 
mood on “the street” toward Peres because, in this campaign, there is no street760». 
On the other hand, the reform was a dramatic change in the competitive electoral orientation of the 
Israeli party system; it forced the two big parties to concentrate on attracting the floating voters, 
located in the center and, consequently, to tone down their ideologies. Now, we are going to examine 
how Mifleget Ha’Avoda and Likud managed their electoral campaign, in the wave of such events. 
Strictly connected to the electoral reform, was also the fact that it was almost impossible to keep 
separated the campaigns of the two major parties for PM and for the Knesset; at the very end, there 
was only a comprehensive electoral competition and the race for the premiership resulted to be more 
relevant761. The Knesset elections were, not only relegated to a lower level of importance but they 
were actually absent among the issues debated during the campaign, stressing instead the contest 
between Shimon Peres and Benyamin Netanyahu; indeed, the two candidates thought correctly that, 
whoever won the contest for premiership would have also been able to form the govern coalition. 
Moreover, the general shift towards the center that took place was expected, both Peres and 
Netanyahu were committed to the task of converting the floating voters and this brought to choose 
a positive campaign, based on moderation and pragmatism, on one side, while on the other to 
organize a negative campaign against the rival.  
Shimon Peres decided to move towards the center on two level: the first one consisted in a shift away 
from the left, taking positions closer to Likud; the second one involved a turn toward the religious 
parties. An example of the first tactic can be seen in Labor’s platform with the reappearance of the 
Golan Heights defined as “an area of national importance for the State of Israel762”; with the Likud 
solidity against any compromise over that territory (and the presence of HaDerech HaShlishit763), the 
elimination of any expression that wouldn't have suggested Ha’Avoda commitment towards the 
retention of some significant areas, could have scared off many undecided voters. Also, the attempt 
                                                          
760 Halevi Y., Peres preaching to the converted, Jerusalem Report, June 13th 1996, p.15. 
761 Hazan R., The Electoral Consequences of Political Reform, in Arian A. and Shamir M., The Elections in Israel 1996, 
SUNY series in Israeli Studies, 1999. p.166. 
762 The Moshe Sharett Labor Party Archives, Labor Party platform for the 14th Knesset – 1996, 
(http://www.archavoda.org.il/AvodaArch/matza/index.asp). 
763It began as a political movement in 1994, and led the struggle against the plan for an Israeli withdrawal from 
the Golan Heights in exchange for peace with Syria. Shortly after the movement became a political party in 
early 1996, Knesset   members Avigdor Kahalani and Emanuel Sussman resigned from the Labor party and joined 
it. 
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made by Peres to reach an agreement with the ultra-Orthodox parties764 demonstrated that Labor 
leader was trying to broaden its electoral constituency both on security and religion, in order to win 
the elections. He knew that it would have been expensive for Labor in terms of the reduction of the 
seats in the Knesset that would be assigned to the members of the party, but it was a price he was 
willing to pay 765.  
At the same time, Likud’s shift to the center was, to an extent, a reaction to Labor tactic. In mid-
April, Netanyahu’s policy guidelines were announced and a paper was issued, called “The Principles 
of Netanyahu Government for Continued Negotiations with the Palestinians”, referring not only to 
a willingness in negotiating with them, but also included the acknowledgment of the Olso Accords 
as well766. Netanyahu stated for the first time ever that he accepted the PLO as a partner for 
negotiations; this statement was aimed to attract the center-ground voters who, at the same time, 
supported the Oslo agreement but also wanted a stronger action of the government in order to 
increase Israelis security.  
In accepting the Oslo agreements, the leader of Likud helped to blur the difference between himself 
and Peres, moving the focus of the electoral campaign on the line of personal credibility to govern 
the country, leaving behind the ideological debate767. 
In addition, Netanyahu adopted the slogan “Peace with security” and concentrated on the fact that 
peace was possible only under a nationalist government: the campaign was focuses on Israelis fears 
over personal security and the fact that the Labor-led government had compromised security in its 
search for peace. For these reasons, Likud’s TV propaganda was vivid, showing footage of the bloody 
aftermath of suicide bus attacks; aiming to play on the electorate’s sense of insecurity, the party’s 
central theme was “this is not real peace”. 
Another strategy followed by Netanyahu was a negative campaign portraying Peres as not as 
security—minded as Rabin and Labor’s peace initiatives as leading to the deterioration of personal 
security; but despite this tactic, polls showed that twice as many respondents believed that Peres, 
and not Netanyahu, was the candidate who “could be more trusted”, “would better protect Israel’s 
                                                          
764 We are referring, for example, to Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah which, since 1992, formed a unique front 
called United Torah Judaism (Yahadut HaTorah). 
765 The search for the center is important in order to understand the decision by Labor not to feature Rabin’s 
assassination in the campaign. This was clearly a strategic decision, designed in order to attract the undecided 
by emphasizing the common ground rather than the divisive issues.  
766 Ha’aretz, May 8th 1996. 
767 This factor highlighted the decline of the importance of the role of ideology in Israeli party system 
  
207 
interest” and was “more convincing768”. In order to improve its image as a man of security, Peres 
decided to adopt Rabin’s concept of afrada (separation), renovating the concept and meaning of 
fencing off Israel from contact with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza769. Another 
manifestation of this new tough security policy was the beginning of the “Grapes of Wrath” 
operation, in April 1996, against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon770, after a renovated wave of missiles 
launched by the militias on Israeli urban centers in the North of the country.  
Now that the context in which the electoral competition was played has been explained, it is 
important to show the contents that were proposed by the parties. Regarding the dominant issues 
involved in 1996 campaign, territories and peace were the leading topics, with socio-economic 
problems ignored by all the major parties; this was partly a mistake made by  Mifleget Ha’Avoda which 
was perceived by the public as effective in carrying out its economic policies. Moreover, the party 
did not enough to illustrate the fact that a slowing down or eventual collapse of the peace process 
would greatly endanger the economic development. Instead, major efforts were put in the realization 
of the slogan “a strong Israel with Peres771”, designed to build up Peres’ credentials in what was 
perceived to be both his weakest point: providing security. It has to be noticed that this strategy 
was quite the opposite than to that employed by Rabin’s team in 1992, which had attempted to focus 
on the issues in which Rabin and the party were perceived to enjoy an advantage over the Likud 
among the people. 
Basically, this campaign appeared to be based on Haim Ramon’s belief that the party and Peres were 
ahead in the polls and on the presumption that if there would have not been additional suicide bomb 
attack during the latter stages of the campaign, then Labor Party would be victorious772. 
                                                          
768 Vadana Y., Survey for the Labor Party, Panorama, January 1996, pp.14, 40-44, as reported in Peretz D. and 
Doron G., Israel’s 1996 Elections: a Second Political Earthquake?, Middle east Journal, vol.50, n.4, Autumn 1996, p. 
534. 
769 This separation policy involved the construction of a fence along the Green Line. Moshe Shahal, the 
Minister of Interior, that the 200$ billion-plan would not be 100 %successful. 
770 IDF was in Lebanon since Operation Peace in Galilee, promoted by Prime Minister Begin and his Ministry 
of Defense Sharon. 
771 Lockery N., The Israeli Labor…, op. cit., p.257 
772 Such a naïve attitude, insisting a lot on the developments of the peace process, is also evident in 
the structure of Labor Party’s electoral program, where (in the section “Policy for peace and 
Security”, pp.5-10) it is predominant the word “shalom”. Moreover, in this part of the party platform, 
is explicitly expressed a program “in order to end the Arab-Israeli conflict by 2000”. See ANNEX I – 
Mifleget Ha’Avoda’s Political Platforms for Knesset Elections, 1, Labor Party’s platform for the Thirteenth Knesset, 1996 
–The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, Beit Berl-Israel, p. 342-347. 
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Unfortunately for him, it didn’t happen. On the contrary, by early 1996, a series of tragic events led 
again to sharpened rhetoric between Labor and Likud: Hamas carried out suicide bombings in 
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Ashkelon, taking scores of Israeli civilian lives, changing the political 
atmosphere. In this context, it became important for Mifleget Ha’Avoda’s to show Israeli its efficacy in 
to provide security which was the dominant issue debated in the electoral race.  
Both the terrorist attacks and the campaign increased the perception of personal threat, having also 
a direct and immediate impact on the performance of the two major political parties. The dimension 
that were most affected were those most significant for the voters and they were at the expenses of 
Labor and in favor of Likud: the mood of Israeli public suggested773 that the party which could handle 
better terrorism and which one was more likely to lead to true peace; indeed,  suicide bombings 
helped in increasing Likud's appealing due to the fact that it was already perceived as the party with 
the stronger attitude towards securitization.  
Despite a basic gap on the most fundamental principles between Labor and Likud, in the 1996 
elections It was clear that both sides decided to blur their ideological differences in order to attract 
the floating voters. This intentional blurring seems to have produced a paradox, where each side 
thought that its opponent’s policies were favored by that section of the electorate: Likud perceived 
that that the vacillating voters wanted to achieve a final peace agreement and it adopted some leftist 
policies, while Labor began to mimic numerous Likud principles. The overall result was that ideology 
took a backseat in the race for Prime Minister, while individual factors, such as credibility, rose to 
the forefront: «The Israeli voter was presented with a Labor candidate in Likud’s clothing and vice-
versa; “Peace with security” opposed to “Peace with security”, or Coca-Cola versus Pepsi-Cola774». 
 
6.1.2 The performances of the two main political blocks 
Both elections were held on May 29 1996 and Netanyahu’s victory by only 30.000 votes 
illustrates the narrow margins which now appear to decide Israeli elections. He defeated Peres by 
winning the 50.5% of the 3 million votes cast: he received about 55% of the Jewish vote, while his 
opponent more than 90% of the votes from non-Jews775. What is interesting to examine is the high 
rates of invalid votes776 in the Prime Minister race that was around 4.8% (almost 150.000 votes), 
more than double compared to the rate for the Knesset (2.2%). These numbers suggested that if they 
                                                          
773 The Peace Index, April- May 1996, (http://www.peaceindex.org/indexYearsEng.aspx?num=15). 
774 Hazan R, The Electoral consequences…, op. cit., p. 173. 
775 Arian and Shamir, Israel elections 1996…, op. cit., p. 4. 
776 In the Knesset elections 3.119.195 votes were cast, of which 67.601 could not be considered  
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were for Peres, the result could have been very different; he received 1.471.566 preferences against 
the 1,501,023 for Netanyahu777. 
This hypothesis could be made because many of those spoiled votes came from the Israeli Arab 
community, in protest against the “Grapes of Wrath” campaign; this operation was costly both 
materially and politically; the cost was over $200 million in military expenditure, considering also 
more $30 million in damages caused by katyusha falling on Israel778 The Labor-led government was 
highly criticized but, above all, the operation had serious repercussions within Israel’s Arab 
community, who decided to punish casting blank ballots for the election of Prime Minister in May . 
Shimon Peres failed for a fifth time to win a mandate from Israelis to form a government. The Mifleget 
Ha’Avoda s aw its number of seats fall from 44 in 1992 to 34 in 1996 but, despite the losses it remained 
the largest party in the Knesset. Likud -Tsomet declined from 40 seats in 1992 (32 Likud, 8 Tsomet) to 32 
in 1996779. The party system was fragmented as never before. 
The group interests emerged, represented by Arab parties (Hadash and the Arab Democratic List for 
example, raising their representation from 5 to 9 seats); religious parties, such as Shas, Mafdal and 
Orthodox United Torah which experienced a grow from 16 to 23 seats, the good first performance of 
the Russian party Yisrael Ba’Aliyah (7) and HaDerech HaShlishit, a centrist party formed by former 
Labor members. 
This electoral turnout produced a more fractionalized parliament, with the two main competitors 
Mifleget Ha’Avoda and Likud, weaker than in the past elections; the two parties captured only half of 
the Knesset ’s seats, leaving 54 of the 120 MKs split among nine other parties. Labor Party remained 
the largest political formation (34 seats) but Netanyahu’s was able to conquer the mandate as prime 
minister . 
In order to understand better these results, it is necessary to observe the voting patterns which 
guided electoral preferences; also, this time the electoral conflict showed the traditional voting 
patterns of Israeli society, based on socio-demographic divisions: the majority of Ashkenazi, secular, 
middle-class and the Israeli-Arabs supported Peres, while the Mizrachi, religious, working-class 
voted for Netanyahu780. The latter received 55% of the Jewish vote compared to the 45% obtained 
by the Labor candidate; at the same time 53% of the population supported Oslo II (1995) and 41% 
                                                          
777 Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 1996, n. 47. 
778 Jerusalem Post International, May 4 1996, p.3.  
779 Knesset Election Result, Election for the Fourteenth Knesset – 1996 (https://Knesset 
.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_res14.htm). 
780 Peretz D. and Doron G., Israel’s 1996 Elections…, op. cit., p. 543. 
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were opposed, showing that this cleavage was channeled into two principal issues: the peace process 
and the role of religion in defining State institutions and values. 781.  
Thus, the total number of seats for Labor and the Likud was reduced from 76 after the previous 
elections, to 66 in 1996. The decline of the two major parties can be seen a consequence of the new 
electoral system where, Israelis voted in two ways: the election of the Prime Minister was 
characterized by a concentration of personality politics, instead for Knesset elections, voters were 
more likely to select a party that reflected their opinion on several issues. 
Netanyahu’s victory, albeit narrow, meant that as directly elected Prime Minister he could conduct 
the coalition negotiations to form a new government from a position of strength, thus relegating the 
Labor Party to opposition even if it remained the single largest party in the Knesset. It is clear, 
therefore, that in the new electoral system the election of the premier will largely determine which 
of the major parties occupies a pivotal role in coalition negotiations even if that party has not 
emerged from the Knesset election with the highest number of seats.  
Peres’ poor electoral performance could be attributed also to the re-emergence of the ineffective 
party’s machine, which set for the party’s candidate an as much ineffective electoral campaign. This 
strategic failure can be perceived because the key constituencies which had voted for Rabin in 1992 
did not vote for Peres or Mifleget Ha’Avoda in 1996, determining Labor's loss: Soviet immigrants, 
confirming their previous vote as a vote of protest against Likud and the Sephardi community which 
switched their preferences for Rabin, they felt this time unable to back Peres because he was still 
strongly perceived as representative of an elitist, secular, Ashkenazi electorate.  
About the voting trend among Israeli Arabs, it has to be underlined how they deliberately spoilt 
their ballot papers (20.000), as a form of protest against operation “Grapes of Wrath”, launched by 
Peres (even if the 95% vote for him). Taking into consideration the lack of support from these 
groups, it is evident that Peres was able to attract and to conquer the traditional Labor's supporters 
(mainly middle-class Jews with European origins): «The blame [for the election performance] lies in 
the fact that this is a party built around a yuppie, superior, Ashkenazi elite which doesn’t grasp the 
sensitivities of Israeli society782[…]». 
Both Peres and Netanyahu concentrated their efforts in convincing the leaders of the religious 
parties and Soviet immigrants to endorse their candidature. If, regarding the religious parties, 
Netanyahu correctly believed that they were natural allies to support his vision of Israel, instead the 
voting preferences of the Soviet Aliyah immigrants were less clear. Notwithstanding the fact that 
these immigrants were viewed as “security hawks”, suggested their stronger affinity with the right 
                                                          
781 Ibidem, p. 546. 
 
782 Yudelman M., Into the political desert, Jerusalem Post International, June 22 1996, p. 8. 
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camp than with Peres, the creation of the party Yisrael Ba’Aliyah783 effectively attracted Russian 
voters away from the two major parties. In this way Mifleget Ha’Avoda would lose many of the votes 
it had won in 1992784. Despite the fact that the conditions of this group were improved during the 
four years of Labor-led government, the decision to form an immigrants’ party reflected their 
dissatisfaction with both Likud and Labor 
 
6.2 How Israelis voted? The link between identity and issues 
For the first time in Israel it was used a system of split ballots: one for the office of the Prime 
Minister and the other one for political parties. This method was chosen because it was supposed 
to grant extra power to the PM and, thus, to increase the general stability of the government 
coalition. Instead, the major outcomes involving the structure of the Israeli political system were: 
the strengthening of the boundaries between the two main political blocs and a higher expression 
of pluralistic, ethnic, religious and cultural interests of the electorate, affirmed by voting for smaller 
parties.  
The voters intuitively understood the potential of the reform; large parties were abandoned since 
voters assessed that policy would be by the election of the Prime Minister and not by the vote for 
the Knesset and accordingly the vote for parliament became the arena for sectarian contestation785; 
the naïve expectation that voters wouldn’t split their vote to let the Prime Minister they chose to 
more forcefully affect policy has been found unattainable. After satisfying themselves with the vote 
for the prime minister that could reflect either preferences over security issues and general public 
interests, voters could choose their representatives in accordance with their particular interests.  
Moreover, we have to take into account that also Rabin’s murder in 1995 contributed to sharpen the 
boundaries and the identity inside Israeli society, through a political dynamic of mobilization and 
counter-mobilization; the four years of Labor-led rule were indeed characterized by strong attitudes 
towards secularization which, by contrast, stimulated religious sensitivity. 
The major changes were thus taking place inside the two blocks and not between them; Mifleget 
Ha’Avoda and Likud were considering “ruling parties”, losing their ability to absorb sub-identities and 
sub-cultures within their constituencies and thus control cleavages in the Israeli society; the new 
                                                          
783 The party was an initiative of immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Its leader, Natan Sharansky, was a 
former “Refusenik” or “Prisoner of Zion”, a term used to refer to individuals whom the Soviet regime had barred 
from emigration to Israel, and imprisoned. As a sectorial party, Yisrael B'Aliyah was intended to promote the 
interests of immigrants from the FSU. 
784 The vast majority of these voters chose Labor in order to protest against the treatment by Likud-led 
government.  
785 Arian A. and Shamir M., The Elections in Israel…, op. cit., p. 5. 
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electoral system contributed to transform social structure in Israel along the lines of major distinct 
sub-cultures which, according to Baruch Kimmerling786 the six cleavages are: the Orthodox and 
Ultra-orthodox (haredi) culture, the national religious vision, the Jewish secularist approach, the 
oriental traditionalist attitude, the Arab subculture and the Russian enclave. 
These cross-cutting lines already existed since many years787 and they already provided strong 
voting pattern but, the elections of 1996 reinforced them giving more power and legitimization. All 
of these have institutional and territorial bases, a distinct social stratification and their members 
could also be recognized by their daily clothing.  
What is more important, they represented strong pattern of values, symbols and attitudes which 
can be detected in electoral results and in voting trends oriented by ideology which, in the 1996 case, 
were more strongly driven by issues (as we are going to see in the next paragraph). This aspect is 
very interesting because electoral politics in Israel provide an example were identity dilemmas 
intertwine issue and social groups-based voting, this is particularly true for the electoral turn out 
that we are analyzing, which can be read in this framework.T< hanks to the analysis done by Arian 
Asher and Michal Shamir788, which studied the cleavage systems and voting patterns to support 
their claims about the long-term trends in issue and social- group-based voting, we can examine in 
depth the primary role of collective identity concerns in the 1996 elections. The results coming from 
this research emphasized that, first of all, among socio-demographic characteristics taken into 
consideration789, religiosity was the most relevant for the vote and, secondly, that the issue of 
collective and national identity790 raised strongly in these elections.  
Issues differ in their potential to generate group allegiance: for example, economic topic are weaker 
(for example how to handle inflation) rather than identity question (in this case the debate on the 
State's boundaries definition). Some issues may be only weakly related to specific social groupings, 
but other issues can connect and reinforce existing cleavage structures by providing new reasons for 
the same people and groups to support the same parties. Identity questions trigger group allegiance, 
                                                          
786 Kimmerling B., Elections as a Battleground over collective identity, in Arian A. and Shamir M., Elections in Israel…, 
op. cit., pp 33-40. 
787 The creation and the development of these deep rifts among Israelis are well explained in Del Sarto R., I 
confini del consenso. La Guerra dei Sei Giorni e la frammentazione della società e della politica israeliana, in Marzano A., 
Israele e Palestina. Un conflitto lungo un secolo, Plus, 2003, pp. 33-47. 
788 Arian A. and Shamir M., Collective Identity and Electoral Competition in Israel, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 93, No. 2, June 1999, pp. 265-277. 
789 In Arian and Shamir’s analysis, they considered voting behavior in reference to the major socio-demographic 
variables (Age, Gender, Density of Dwelling, Education, Income, Religious Observance, and Ethnic 
Background) alone to allow for the most comprehensive test of the role of social group in voting. 
790 This term is used as an expression of the boundaries chosen both in the sense of dividing groups into 
different communal and social entities and dividing nation-states territorially or geographically. 
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thus, the extent to which the vote is related to group characteristics of voters depends, at least in 
part, on the nature of the issues on the agenda: when identity dilemmas are present, such as the role 
of religion and the future of the territories in Israel, they involve basic collective identity linked to 
conceptions about territorial and social communal boundaries.  
The peace process, the Oslo agreements, and the questions of territorial compromise embody the 
policy implications of those collective identity dilemmas regarding geographical boundaries and 
Israel's relations with other nations, in particular its Arab neighbors and, even more specifically, the 
Palestinians.  
If dilemmas of collective identity tie into social cleavages, identity types are strongly related to social 
groupings: religious, Sephardi, less educated, and lower status workers have voted for the right-wing 
Likud and religious parties, whereas the Left (Labor and Meretz) has had a disproportionate share of 
secular, upper-class Ashkenazi voters. Asher and Shamir confirmed that the most distinct identity scale 
types in terms of ethnicity are Israeli Doves identifiers (category 1), almost 60% of whom are Ashkenazi, and 
all Jewish identifiers, irrespective of their external identity (categories 3, 6, 9), 60% of whom are 
Sephardi. As we move from Israeli to Jewish identification within each external identity type, Sephardi 
ethnicity increases. As we move from Dove to Hawk identifiers within the Israeli and middle identity 
categories, the more Sephardi they become, but the differences are smaller than in the comparison 
along the internal identity dimension, and this relationship does not hold for the Jewish identity type. The 
most distinct identity scale types in terms of religious observance are, on the one hand, the Israeli identifiers 
(categories 1, 4, 7), who are overwhelmingly secular (more than 90% observe only some or no religious 
practice) and, on the other hand, the Jewish Hawk identity type (category 9), 65% of whom are highly 
observant Jews (observing all or most of the Halacha). As we move from Israeli to Jewish identity (within all 
external identity categories), and from the Dove to the Hawk pole on external identity (within the middle and 
Jewish internal identity categories), the percentage of religious respondents increases. 
The 1996 Knesset results reflected the expression of ethnic and religious identities to an 
unprecedented degree, but the core issues revolved around dilemmas of collective identity and the 
issues debated involved the territorial boundaries of the state and conflict over the definition of 
Israel as a “Jewish state”.  
The two scholars tested the “collective identity” conceptualization in order to gain better 
understanding of these dimensions through questions791 made to the respondents of a survey 
conducted before 1996 electoral turnout. The May 1996 pre-election poll included several items 
intended to measure more extensively collective identity, which has an internal and an external 
dimension; the external aspect concerns identity in terms of land, borders, and relations with Israel's 
                                                          
791 These questions were about values priorities regarding the definition of Israel and Israelis identity, the role 
of democracy and religion, the peace talks, the agreement about the establishment of a Palestinian state and 
the relationships with Israeli Arabs. 
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Arab neighbors, while the internal character is about citizenship, nationhood, and religion in the 
Jewish state. The internal aspect concerns the nature of the Jewish state and society; this notion of 
Israel as a Jewish state provides a common denominator for most Israeli Jews and that secular 
nationalism is beset by religious ritual. At the same time, it is clear that the meaning assigned to the 
Jewish state is dynamic and differs dramatically across groups. This dissent provides the basis for a 
struggle between cultures, often defined in terms of religious versus secular, primordial versus civil, 
Jewishness versus “Israeliness”, or Eretz Israel versus the state of Israel792. 
The overlap between the internal and external dimension started in 1967 and became more evident 
in 1996. The Six Days War can, indeed, be considered the very moment in which religion has become 
closely intertwined with nationalism, when religious authorities provided legitimization for 
keeping the territories taken in the war of that year, strengthening the link between the people, their 
history, God, and the land. The term hardal (mustard), an acronym for haredi and dati-leumi (national 
religious) captures this process within the religious sector, whereby nationalist religious Jews grew 
closer to the haredim in their religious observance, and the non-Zionist ultra-Orthodox community 
became more nationalistic regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
In the Israeli case, the power of significant political issues to guide Israeli voting preferences has 
increased over time, even if the importance of socio-demographics (and of socio-demographic and 
attitudinal variables in combination) has not declined. We suggest that the source of this pattern 
lies in the identity dilemmas raised by the issues and their interrelationship with group 
characteristics: this is most evident regarding two issue variables, the territories and state-religion 
relations. The territorial debate was clearly dominant growing in importance from the 1984 election 
onward, the point at which the territory issue emerged as the overriding dimension, ordering the 
party system; the effect of the territories issue on the vote remained very high, in terms of 
distinguishing both Left from Right and Labor from Likud adherents.  
Issues and social group allegiances reinforced existing social cleavage structures and taking them 
into account help us understanding the dynamics of Israeli politics as well as the causes of Mifleget 
Ha’Avoda’s electoral defeat and its general political decline.  
Over time, Labor identified itself as the territories-for-peace party, and its platforms became less 
ambiguous on this issue. The public perception of the difference between Labor and Likud on the 
territories issue did not change much; almost two-thirds of the respondents in the 1981, 1984, and 
1992 surveys thought these differences were large or very large. By 1996 the figure had jumped to 
80%, although the campaign rhetoric of both parties stressed a center position.  
                                                          
792 Kimmerling B., Between the Primordial and Civil Definitions of the Collective Identity: Eretz Yisrael or the State of Israel , 
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Both 1992 and 1996 differed from previous elections in that many more voters said that the territories 
would be an important consideration in their voting decision. In the 1996 sample, 71% claimed that 
this issue would greatly influence their vote, compared with 52% in 1992 and less than one-third in 
previous elections. Summing the two categories of response, 90% in 1996 and 81% in 1992 saying 
that the territories issue "will influence my vote" or "will greatly influence my vote," they consisted 
in less than two-thirds in previous elections. 
 
6.3 Netanyahu’s premiership and the coming back of Revisionist Ideology  
The dualist nature of Israeli collective identity and the Israeli polity mean that elections do 
not cause simply the change of a ruling- party  with another one, rather, they bring about a change 
of social order considered a mahapach 793; along with this interpretation we can understand how 
electoral campaigns become part of an ongoing cultural clash into Israeli society: «The election and 
the electoral campaign widened the cleavages and reinforced the divide boundaries on two 
interrelated levels: between the civil-primordial identities and between the diverse subcultures of 
an immigrant-settler society794» but are, at the same time, the strongest cult of solidarity for the 
Israeli state and its civil religion.  
This is also the meaning of the ascendance to power of Benyamin Netanyahu795in 1996. It meant a 
break with the pragmatism which had characterized the Labor approach towards the Arab world 
and, in particular the Palestinians. It was a new success for the hard-line policy which derived from 
Revisionist Zionism, indeed, when he was elected in 1993 as the leader of the party, Netanyahu also 
wrote a book “A Place among nations: Israel and the world”, inspired by the teachings of 
Jabotinsky796 and Benzion Netanyahu797, Benyamin’s father. Basically, in this work he claimed the 
                                                          
793 Horowitz D., More than a change in government, The Jerusalem Quarterly, n.5, 1977, pp. 3-20. 
794 Ibidem, p.42. 
795He is currently the Prime Minister of Israel. Netanyahu (born October 21st 1949) was born in Tel Aviv, grew 
up in Jerusalem and spent his adolescent years in the United States, where his father - a noted historian - 
taught Jewish history in Philadelphia. In 1967, at the age of 18, Netanyahu returned to Israel to fulfill his 
military obligations in the Israel Defense Forces and volunteered for an elite commando unit. Following his 
discharge, Netanyahu studied at MIT and Harvard University. In 1982, Netanyahu joined Israel's diplomatic 
mission in the United States - serving for two years as Deputy Chief of Mission under then-Ambassador Moshe 
Arens. After returning to Israel in 1988, Netanyahu entered the political arena and was elected a Member of 
Knesset  for the Likud ,becoming in few years one of its main leader. 
796 Chapter 7 of this book is entitled, “The Wall” alluding to the famous Jabotinsky’s article of 1923. 
797 Benzion Netanyahu (born Benzion Mileikowsky, March 25th 1910; died April 30th 2012) was born in 
Warsaw and he emigrated with his family to pre-state Israel in 1920. He was a student of the Hebrew 
University, where he specialized in history. In the late 1930's, after having become active in the Revisionist 
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world’s general hostility towards the State of Israel, considering the relationships with the Arab 
world as a long-lasting conflict, showing his personal and negative image of Arab people: «Violence 
is omnipresent in the political life of all Arab countries. It is the first method to deal with domestic 
and foreign opponents, Arabs and non-Arabs798». But, much of his vehemence was directed against 
the Palestinians, basically undermining their national claims, arguing that this issue was not the 
core of Middle Eastern conflict, but rather the internal rivalry between the Arab peoples which 
artificially created it. He therefore excluded any compromise with PLO: «Regarding PLO is different. 
It is constitutionally linked to the idea of Israel's destruction. Take off this idea and you will not 
have PLO anymore799». 
When the Oslo Agreement was signed, Netanyahu was relentless in condemning it, even if Israelis 
were inclined in supporting the peace process with the Palestinians800, but during the 1996 electoral 
campaign, he began to indulge on public opinion’s mood, accepting the Oslo Accords but making 
Israelis understand that, in case of victory, he would have frozen the negotiations. He wanted to 
underline that the true difference between him and Labor leaders relied in the fact that they brought 
peace without security, while he would have assured peace and security. 
Netanyahu was the youngest Prime Minister in Israeli history and was head of a very heterogeneous 
coalition; in addition to Likud and Mafdal, clearly in favor of Eretz Yisrael vision, there were also the 
religious parties (like for example Shas of United Torah Judaism) concerned primarily in obtaining 
funds in support of their voters and without a clear position on the territories. There were finally 
two new parties: Derech Ha'shlishit made up of deputies who had left Mifleget Ha’Avoda in opposition 
to the possible withdrawal from the Golan Heights and Yisrael Ba'Aliyah, who collected the votes of 
Russian Jews. 
While the new premier gave birth to its majority, Likud was formulating the guidelines of the new 
government which if on the one side it was generously promising to extend the scope of peace talks 
to all the neighboring countries, the document established a series of who were hopelessly against 
the process of peace, such as: «The government's opposition to the emergence of an independent 
Palestinian state and the adoption of initiatives to consolidate and develop settlement activities, the 
declaration of Jerusalem as indivisible and Israel's capital [...]remaining forever under Israeli 
sovereignty801». 
                                                          
Zionist circles and befriending the father of the movement, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, Benzion moved to New York to 
become Jabotinsky's personal secretary. 
798 Netanyahu B., A Place among Nations. Israel and the World, Bantam Books, pp. 102-103. 
799 Ibidem, p.232. 
800 The Peace Index: 1996, March-April-May 1996, The Israeli Democracy Institute (http://www.peaceindex.org). 
801 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Guidelines of the Government of Israel - 17 June 1996, Israel’s Foreign Relations, 
Vol. 16: 1996-1997, n. 3. 
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Those premises were reaffirmed during his inaugural address to the Knesset, the PM promised that 
his government would lead to a national revival in Israel and would resumed talks on permanent 
status, claiming the fulfillment of all the obligations assumed by the Palestinian National Authority, 
particularly in cooperation with Israel in order to contain terrorism802. 
Shimon Peres, as leader of the opposition, replied to Netanyahu's words: «Time is not neutral. Time 
has a critical importance [...]», then looking at Netanyahu said: «My friend, Prime Minister, I'm afraid 
you will soon find out that the electoral program with which you have been elected can’t work as a 
recipe for progress in the peace process. You will have to disappoint many of your voters and your 
partners if you ever want to achieve some results. Attractive slogans can’t replace good policies and 
coalition formulas will not eliminate the need to take bold decisions and difficult choices803». 
During the early months of his government, Netanyahu did not show signs of his much-claimed 
flexibility regarding the Arab question, nor did he demonstrated his willingness to continue the 
talks with the Palestinians and whether this meant that Israel should continue with the policy of 
the iron wall, he replied: «Until new order, we are in a Middle East made of iron walls. The iron walls 
give us time. Hope is that, during time these walls will be abated, this process is gradually taking 
place This process is gradually taking place but, in order to complete it we have to build in the Arab 
World the irreversible consciousness that we won’t disappear 804». 
Netanyahu therefore accused the Labor government of having taken political and military risks 
while allowing the decline of national power and territorial reduction; he wanted to change this 
trend: «We must realize that peace treaties help security but they can’t work as surrogates of 
deterrence. The opposite is true. Military power is a condition for peace805». 
Netanyahu's intention was to shift the focus of attention from peace talks on Israel's security, rather 
than on the “land for peace” approach, which was the central idea of Labor government; his first 
target were the Oslo accords which, sooner or later, would have impose to Israel the acceptance of 
an independent Palestinian state, were taking that direction. By clarifying its firm opposition to 
Palestinian independence, he removed the pivot around which the peace process was built. 
From his point of view, Labor predecessors conceded to much initiative to the Arab side and now 
he was to regain the power lost, the main points of his strategy were to reduce Palestinian 
expectations, to weaken Arafat and the Palestinian National Authority, to suspend further 
implementations of the Oslo Accords and to use the security conditions set out in the agreements to 
                                                          
802 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Address in the Knesset by Prime Minister-elected Netanyahu presenting his 
government- 18 June 1996, Israel’s Foreign Relations, Vol. 16: 1996-1997, n. 4. 
803 Shlaim A., Il Muro.., op.cit.,  p. 622. 
804 Shavit A., A New Middle East? What an Amusing Idea, Ha’aretz, September 26th 1997. 
805 Ibidem 
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re-affirm Israel's dominant position. The prime minister believed that his uncompromising position 
would have forced the Arabs to come to further compromises. 
 
6.3.1 The stalemate of the peace process 
During his first one-hundred days in power, Netanyahu clashed with most of the people 
around him, including his government allies, but the substantial divide was between him and the 
members of Israel's security services who advised him not to stop the implementations of the duties 
undertaken with the Oslo Accords, but the Prime Minister was very determined pursuing his idea, 
in the attempt to slow down or to interrupt the peace process806. In this context Palestinian living 
conditions deteriorated progressively and hopes for a better future faded away, overwhelmed by 
Palestinian dissatisfaction.  
The spark which ignited the clashes was provided by Netanyahu, with the order given the night of 
September 24th 1996, to open an archaeological tunnel under the al-Aqsa mosque807 in the Old City of 
Jerusalem808; the specific purpose of the tunnel was to make it easier for the tourists going through 
the famous archaeological site. 
A new passage was opened through the Western Wall, at the basis of the sacred Muslim site, the 
Dome of the Rock, situated on the top of Temple Mount, it was considered by Palestinians a 
symbolic psychological provocation and, in this way, the Prime Minister swept away the latest 
hopes for a peaceful dialogue809. The action violently triggered Palestinian wrath and the Israeli 
public was shocked in front of the scenes of Palestinian policemen opening the fire on the Israeli 
counterpart, however most observers knew that Netanyahu's policy aimed to bury the peace 
process. Conversely to Netanyahu’s intentions, the Arab and American reactions to the tunnel 
uprising forced him to make concessions to Palestinians on another major front in the West Bank 
                                                          
806 There was no Israeli evacuation from Hebron, any opening of a “safe passage” from Gaza to the West Bank 
and no discussion on the further withdrawal from the West Bank, whom Israel had committed itself to 
807 Located inside the Haram al-Sharif (the noble sanctuary), placed at the top of the complex known as Mount 
Temple. 
808 The tunnel is a passage used by the Hasmoneans in the II century BC. to bring water to the Jewish temple. 
Today, this tunnel is underground, completely covered by the present Old City of Jerusalem. 
809 The Rabin’s government had to give up to this project several times, due to the fears that such an initiative 
would have been taken as a provocation. Moreover, the Muslim community accused the Israeli government to 
pursue this intervention in order to undermine the foundations of al-Aqsa and of the Dome of the Rock, paving 
the way for the reconstruction of the temple (even though the tunnel doesn’t pass under Temple Mount but 
runs along it). 
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dispute: Hebron810. This city, indeed, had always had an important meaning for both the Jewish and 
Muslim communities due to the presence of Ibrahimi Mosque, originally an Herodian Synagogue 
which guarded the tombs of the Patriarchs, venerated by Judaism and Islam. 
The two sides spent three months and half to reach a common point and the process was interesting 
for both the active role the US mediation and because for the first time a Likud government was 
engaged in negotiations with the Palestinians on the basis of the DOP and of the interim agreement. 
The Hebron Protocol was signed on January 5th 1997. 
It was a milestone in the Middle East peace process, the first agreement signed by the Likud with the 
Palestinians; the protocol divided Hebron into two areas that would be governed by various security 
arrangements: the Palestinian area (H1) comprised 80% of the city, while the Jewish area (H2) 
corresponding to the remaining 20%, including the settlements of Ben Hadassa, Tel Rumeida and 
half of the Tomb of the Patriarchs (Me'arat haMakhpela) inside the present Ibrahimi Mosque811. 
Furthermore, an agreement for joint patrols carried out by Israeli and Palestinian units was 
established, as well with the entrance of400 Palestinian police officers in the Arab side of Hebron. 
Palestinian critics noticed that this formula of coexistence allowed 450 colonists who constituted 
0.3% of the population the best 20% of the city's commercial center, while 160,000 Palestinians went 
to 80% of the territory subject however to numerous restrictions and limitations. 
The Hebron Protocol was presented to the Israeli Cabinet on January 14; the meeting was marked 
by strong tensions and lasted for 13 hours but, at the end, the ministers approved the agreement by 
a majority of 11 to 7812. In order to secure the majority, the Prime Minister had to implicitly threaten 
that if the protocol was rejected he would have no choice but to dissolve the coalition and form a 
national unity government with Labor. This perspective was not favorable to the small far-right 
religious parties which, in this case, would be relegated to the opposition813. 
On January 16th Netanyahu made a statement in front of the Knesset about the Hebron protocol, 
assuring that Israel was not abandoning Hebron, stating that this agreement allowed better 
conditions for Israel because it provided a far more convenient time frame, with increased freedom 
of action. In short, said the Prime Minister, the Hebron Protocol gave Israel peace and security. At 
the end of the debate, lasted for 11 hours, the parliament approved the protocol with 87 votes against 
                                                          
810 In September 1995, the Labor government had reached an agreement on the reorganization of the city but 
it was suspended six months later due to terrorist attacks. After his electoral victory, Netanyahu tried to deal 
with the Hebron issue, treating it as a completely separate question from the Oslo process. 
811 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron- 17 January 1997, Israel’s Foreign 
Relations, Vol. 16: 1996-1997, n.72. 
812 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cabinet communique on the Hebron Protocol-15 January 1997, Israel’s Foreign 
Relations, Vol. 16: 1996-1997, n.71. 
813 Morris B., Vittime…, op. cit., p.799. 
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17 rejections and 15 extensions. The majority of the opponents belonged to the ruling coalition and 
many supporters came from the opposition group; the Knesset ’s vote reflected the broad national 
consensus to the continuation of the peace process. 
 
6.3.2 The Likud government between settlements and terror attacks 
Netanyahu, forced to adopt a relatively conciliatory line regarding the Hebron issue, found 
himself alienated by many of his supporters, decided to adopt a hard line on the Jerusalem issue, 
therefore he solemnly promised to strengthen Israel's control over the city and its surroundings by 
avoiding any compromise. he knew that no Palestinian would have accepted less than a strong and 
shared sovereignty. Accordingly to this approach, on 19 February, a project was approved for the 
construction of 6500 residential units for 30,000 Israelis in Har Homa814,near Jerusalem815; by mid-
March the Prime Minister declared: «The battle for Jerusalem has begun816».  
On the internal side, the Labor camp took distance from the government and criticized it bitterly 
for having failed to reach both peace and security. At the annual meeting held in May 1997, Mifleget 
Ha’Avoda adopted a resolution in order to cancel from the electoral platform of the party's, the 
anachronistic statement opposing to the establishment of a Palestinian state: the new policy was 
not in favor of the establishment of a Palestinian state, but it simply recognized the right to 
independence as complementary to the right of self-determination817. Opinion polls showed that the 
majority of Israelis was accepting the emergence of an independent Palestinian state as an inevitable 
result of the Oslo process. 
In the attempt to get rid of Labor opposition, Netanyahu presented to the Cabinet a program that 
would have allocated 40% of the West Bank to the Palestinian. The Prime Minister did not provide 
his proposal with a detailed map, but pointed out the areas that would have remained under Israeli 
sovereignty: the broaden Jerusalem, the Jordanian valley, the densely-colonized areas near the 1967 
borders and roads for water resources; Netanyahu called this project “Allon plus818”, hoping to win 
the support of left-wing supporters. His plan was therefore directed more to the Israeli public than 
                                                          
814 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministerial committee decision on building in Har Homa - 26 February 1997, Israel’s 
Foreign Relations, Vol. 16: 1996-1997, n.87. 
815 More precisely, it is located in the Southern part of the city, right in front of the Palestinian village of Beit 
Sahour. Such settlement officially is inside the Jerusalem municipal district, as unilaterally declared by Israel 
in 1967. 
816 Shlaim A., Il Muro.., op.cit.,  p. 629. 
817 The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, The Sixth Conference of the Party, First Session [Session A] Protocol. 
Draft (heb.), Section: Archives of organizations and institutions. Mapai - Labor Party, 14/05/1997-31/12/1997, 2-
021-1997-190b (Volume II, A meeting on May 5th 1997), pp. 28-36. 
818 Ha’aretz, May 29th-30th and June 5 1997. 
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to the Palestinians, indeed there were no chances that they would accept the offer, due to the fact 
that within the framework of Oslo II Transitional Agreement, they expected to receive the 90% of 
the West Bank. 
If his policies seemed to theoretically conform to Oslo's formula, on the ground they had the opposite 
effect: while the Palestinians were obtaining less lands, Israelis were receiving less peace. Indeed, 
the sale of new houses supported by government incentives, increased by more than 50% in the first 
seven months of 1997, 1.560 homes were sold and the Jewish population of the West Bank and of the 
Gaza Strip reached 161.157 units. 
It is not by chance if Hamas decided to spoil this situation coming back in that precise moment with 
two suicide attacks in Jerusalem on July 30th and September 4th.The PM ascribed the responsibility 
to the Palestinian Authority, blaming it of not being able to handle the terrorist attacks that 
originated in areas under its control; the government therefore called for mass arrests of Hamas 
activists and declared that Israel would not concede any territory to the Palestinian Authority, if 
they had been used as a basis for launching terrorist attacks. 
Giving too much importance to Hamas, Netanyahu ended up to elevate it to a prime position giving 
it indirect negotiating power. But, besides terrorist attacks, the other biggest obstacle to the 
resumption of the peace dialogue was the policy followed by the Likud government to provide 
complete political and financial support to the expansion of Jewish settlements in Palestinian 
territory beyond the Green Line.  
This behavior was criticized not only by Palestinians, afraid that the new settlements were implying 
annexation of the land undermining their claims to a national homeland, but also from 1.500 officers 
of the Israeli army and police forces who appealed to the Prime Minister to abandon his expansion 
policy in Palestinian areas and to choose peace. The letter said: «A government that prefers keeping 
settlements beyond the Green Line, rather than resolving the historic conflict and establishing 
normal relations in our region, will oblige us to ask ourselves how our path is right and just819»: 
The lack of trust between the Palestinian Authority and the Likud government had made the Oslo 
process impracticable; it began to collapse under the heavy pressure exerted by Netanyahu's 
government. Any Israeli concession, albeit minimal, was made only after exhausting negotiations 
and, in the absence of progress, Arafat began to threaten to unilaterally declare Palestinian 
independence by the pre-established date. Only US President Bill Clinton's intervention succeeded 
in mediating an historic agreement: Wye Plantation Memorandum, signed in Washington on 
October 23rd 1998. 
The agreement promised to reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process begun in Oslo and to 
lead to general negotiations that would bring about a definitive peace. Israel therefore pledged to 
withdraw its troops in three phases and to transfer another 13% of the West Bank territory, giving 
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the Palestinian Authority total or partial control over 40% of the territory. In return, the Palestinians 
accepted a detailed work plan structured in collaboration with C.I.A. to capture and arrest Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad extremists. 
Back at home, the Prime Minister should have transformed the achievement of the memorandum 
into a political success; the challenge was hard because, although a survey by Yediot Aharonot daily 
newspaper showed that 74% of Israelis agreed to the agreement, Netanyahu had to face with the 
harsh opposition coming, not from Mifleget Ha’Avoda, as well as from his own coalition partners, in 
particular by national-religious parties., Netanyahu was not able to persuade neither the right nor 
the left, losing the confidence of both political camps them; the nationalist parties thought that the 
Palestinians would have achieved somehow to obtain the territories, while the leftist group 
expected some pretext by the Prime Minister in order to derail again the peace process. 
On November 11, the Cabinet reluctantly approved the deal based on the transfer of land in exchange 
for security, but the approval came after a stormy debate that lasted seven hours and after 
Netanyahu’s consensus on the beginning of the construction of Har Homa; this was the price to pay 
to persuade the right-wing's parties in the coalition. 
Also the Knesset approved the Wye River agreement on November 15thwith 75 votes in favor, 19 
against and 9 abstentions; the vote revealed a broad national consensus in favor of the continuation 
of the Oslo process. As a result, from his dependence from smaller parties, 
 Netanyahu tried to rescue his government by moving to the right and emptying to void any 
significance the agreement he had just signed. On December 20th the Israeli government decided to 
suspend the implementation820 of the second withdrawal provided for in the memorandum821, until 
the Palestinian Authority had met a list of five conditions822 . But 
despite this extreme rescue attempt, the reality was that Netanyahu's position was untenable: 
among his coalition there was no majority neither to apply not to dismiss Wye memorandum823and 
on December 23, his government crumbled when the Knesset decided with 80 votes in favor and 30 
opposing to go towards new elections; Netanyahu had lost the trust of his Likud colleagues, of his 
coalition partners, of the Israeli public opinion and of the Palestinian Authority. 
 
                                                          
820 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cabinet communique - 20 December 1998, Israel’s Foreign Relations, Vol. 17: 
1998-1999, n.127. 
821 This transfer was involving the 5% of West Bank territory, going from an exclusive Israeli control, to a co-
joint supervision with the Palestinian National Authority.  
822 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel's position on the Wye Memorandum - 22 December 1998, Israel’s Foreign 
Relations, Vol. 17: 1998-1999, n.128. 
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6.4 Barak and a new chance for Mifleget Ha’Avoda 
With the collapse of Israel's government in December 1998, the Knesset called for national 
elections to be held in 1999, more than a year ahead of schedule. According to the electoral law 
introduced in 1992, voters would, for the second time, be allowed to cast two separate votes, one for 
Prime Minister and a second for a political party or Knesset list. 
The general elections that took place on May 17, 1999 were very harsh and the five-month election 
campaign showed the profound internal divisions of the country and the growing hostility between 
secular and religious, Jews and Arabs, Sephardim and Askenazim. The electoral turnout was considered 
crucial for the future formation of a divided Israeli society and its relationship with the Arab 
neighbors. 
 
6.4.1 Ehud Barak and the creation of Yisrael Ahad 
Peres’ failure to win elections more than once and, especially, in 1996 after Rabin’s murder, 
brought to a change of the Labor candidate. The primaries of the party, held on June 3rd 1997, 
included four candidates: Ehud Barak, Efraim Sneh824, Yossi Beilin and Shlomo Ben-Ami. Barak 
received the 50,3% of the 114.000 votes casted by the party’s members who participated to the 
elections, becoming the candidate in the race for premiership. He had at the same time a very though 
approach, concerning security issues and a centrist political perspective; moreover, his military 
background (he was Chief of Staff, Rav Aluf and served in the Sayeret Maktal825) gave him the 
reputation of the most decorated soldier of the country, a hero who had participated in some of the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) most dangerous missions.  
Soon after his 1995 retirement as IDF chief-of-staff, Barak was recruited by Prime Minister Rabin as 
Minister of Interior826, his first step in order to gain credibility for the role of national leader, a man 
who wouldn’t sacrifice the country827. In this perspective, he was presented as the heir of Rabin, a 
                                                          
824 He is an Israeli politician, physician, and a retired Brigadier General in the Israel Defense Forces. He was a 
member of the Knesset for the Labor Party between 1992 and 2008. 
825 General Staff Reconnaissance Unit 269 is a special forces unit of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). First and 
foremost a field intelligence-gathering unit, conducting deep reconnaissance behind enemy lines to obtain 
strategic intelligence, Sayeret Matkal is also tasked with counter-terrorism and hostage rescue beyond Israel's 
borders. 
826 For many observers Barak’s quest for the post of Prime Minister began in this moment. 
827 The choice to put inside the party’s platform a picture of Rabin and Barak together (p.7) was thought in 
order to strengthen the continuity and the relationship between the two leaders, ANNEX I – Mifleget 
Ha’Avoda’s Political Platforms for Knesset Elections, 1, Labor Party’s platform for the Fourteenth Knesset, 1999 –The 
Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, Beit Berl-Israel, p. 398. 
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soldier who spent his life fighting against the enemies of the state and who decided to battle for 
peace from then on. Moreover, his victory over Yossi Beilin and Shlomo Ben-Ami confirmed the 
decision by the party members to adopt the “Rabin winning formula828”, which meant that Barak’s 
recent affiliation with the party was considered a further positive element, because he wasn’t too 
identified with the historical movement and with old-fashioned party politics. 
He was a pragmatic man so he took some controversial decisions that would helped him during the 
electoral campaign: first of all, in order to avoid intra-party tensions, he decided to offer Peres the 
second spot on the list without his participation to primaries; secondly, he refused a last-minute 
appeal from Benjamin Netanyahu in December 1998 to join with him in a national unity government 
(many of his colleagues doubted the decision of early elections for fear of a defeat)829 and after his 
nomination as party’s leader, he took the decision to build a new organization which would be more 
appropriate to the new politics, instead of relying on the party apparatus. 
Therefore, he distanced himself by the symbols of Labor and created a new framework which could 
not be perceived as belonging to the old patterns830. Barak also sought to build alliances with parties 
representing groups who traditionally support the right; the combination of all these variables 
brought to the foundation of Yisrael Ahad (One Israel). The new formation was an electoral front 
composed by three parties: Mifleget Ha’Avoda, Gesher831 and Meimad832. The presence of each of these 
parties, representatives of those groups which were considered politically distant from Ha’Avoda, 
was of fundamental symbolic importance for Barak because they contributed to give a new image to 
Labor Party. Gesher was led by David Levy, a Sephardi politician and Meimad was a religious party with 
moderate views in foreign policy.  
Given the alienation of Mizrachi and the segment of Israeli population more attached to religious 
values, Ha'Avoda’s objective to include these two groups was fundamental in order to soften this 
                                                          
 
828 Goldberg G., The Israeli Left in the1999 Elections, Israel Affairs, 2000 p.24. 
829 Doron G., Barak, one-One Israel, Zero, or, How Labor Won the Prime Ministerial Race and Lost the Knesset Elections, in 
Asher A and Michal S., Elections in Israel 1999, SUNY Press, 1999. 
830 For example, he decided against appointing Peres as the president of the new party. 
831 Established in 1996, Gesher (bridge) formed as a break-away from the Likud. David Levy, Gesher's founder, 
was protesting against Netanyahu's refusal to integrate Sephardim into the upper echelon of the party.  
832 Established in 1988 as a religious Zionist alternative to the Mafdal, Meimad (Dimensions - Movements of the 
Religious Center) was discouraged by the NRP’s increasingly right-wing positions on the peace process and 
security matters. Meimad maintains that peace between Israelis and Arabs is possible and that Israel can 
negotiate land for peace because of the concept of pikuach nefesh, which states that saving a soul is more 
important. 
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antagonism. To penetrate these groups a long-term strategy833 was needed and, as part of this 
approach, was the emblematic apology Barak made in the name of the party, asking Mizrachi 
forgiveness for the mistreatment received by Labor Party (at that time Mapai) when they arrived in 
Israel during the 1950’s. This controversial act was effective in opening up this sector to Barak’s 
social programs. 
With the Russians he used a different strategy, continuously communicated to their sophisticated 
network (Russian radio, television and newspaper), focusing mainly on his military background and 
his pragmatic attitude (for example, he also translated his biography into Russian). From these 
maneuvers, we can understand how the main achievement of “One Israel” was to provide Israeli 
voters with a more inclusive concept of Mifleget Ha’Avoda, in contrast with the traditional elitism that 
had characterized the Labor camp for decades834. 
 
6.4.2 Electoral strategies  
In accordance with the new electoral system, the highest priority in the campaign was given 
again to the election of the PM, while the elections for the Knesset were consciously ignored (like in 
1996). In the context of a two-competitors race, median strategy could assure victory, regardless the 
distribution of voters’ preferences and, in order to obtain this position Barak held a similar position 
to that of Netanyahu on security dimension. From this point of view the Labor leader had only to 
emphasize his personal attributes, his military experience, in order to appear as the best negotiator 
for Israel’s security835. 
Of course, no sign of ideology appeared in One Israel’s platform, rather it was characterized by 
ambiguity, particularly concerning security and foreign policy issues. The document stated that: 
                                                          
833 Yaron Tzemach, Plan of Action to Bring Labor Back to Competition in the Battle Field Over Mizrachi Public Opinion, 
Segev Yaron Strategies, 1998. 
834 In the attempt to offer a new image of the party, more transparent for the electorate, Labor’s platform is 
addressed directly to Israelis, with Ehud Barak speaking to them, saying: «Citizens of Israel, I ask for your 
trust, so in this way we can build together a State of Israel with a better future. I believe in the State of Israel, 
I believe in the citizens of the State of Israel», (p.4), ANNEX I – Mifleget Ha’Avoda’s Political Platforms for Knesset 
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the entire program is really strongly centered around his person, with the recurrence of his pictures), ANNEX 
I – Mifleget Ha’Avoda’s Political Platforms for Knesset Elections, 1, Labor Party’s platform for the Fourteenth …, op. cit., 
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«We will keep Jerusalem United forever. We will never agree to return back to the 1967 borders836», 
these statements could have been adopted by almost any party in the Israeli political arena. Meretz 
avoid to make the same mistake of the previously election: supporting Peres publicly, harming 
Labor’s attempt to move towards the center; this time Meretz did not identify too much with Barak, 
enabling him to achieve the positional goal.  
This move to the center was attempted by both candidates, in this case we will focus on Labor’s 
party platform in order to understand how Barak set the entire political agenda. With Barak's 
military career and his reputation as a skeptic in the Oslo proceedings he seemed to differ little from 
Netanyahu on security, giving great importance to the containment of terror attacks. Rather than 
challenging the premier on these issues, he indicated that his military background made him a more 
effective guarantor of Israel's security, thus on many occasions political observers had commented 
in the media that Barak is “Bibi's Compatible837”, to indicate that there is really no difference between 
the two. 
By the way, Barak attempted to bolster his campaign and to differentiate from his adversary, 
promising the withdrawal the IDF from the “security zone” in south Lebanon and to sign final status 
agreements with the Palestinians which, for the first time in the country's history838., would have 
been the subject of a referendum839. However, these agreements would be circumscribed by four red 
lines: Jerusalem was to remain Israel's “united, eternal capital”; no return to the 1967 borders; no 
Palestinian refugees840.  
Barak was also able to addressed national concerns about the state of the economy, including the 
relatively unemployment rate and stagnation of the economy, albeit on the rhetorical level only. He 
decided to develop the social dimension because many of Likud’s voters were susceptible to policies 
that promised to improve their economic well-being. Conversely, the sole issue which was presented 
in a militant way was the enlistment of ultra-Orthodox citizens in the army, calling for the 
immediate change of the unjust situation in which the Haredi public does not serve in the army, while 
receiving mass funding from the state.  
                                                          
836 The Moshe Sharett Labor Party Archives, Labor Party platform for the 15th Knesset – 1999, 
(http://www.archavoda.org.il/AvodaArch/matza/index.asp). 
837 Doron G. and Peretz D., Sectarian Politics and…, op. cit., p.263. 
838 Jerusalem Post North America, n. 2007, April 23rd 1999, p. 4. 
839 See the party’s program at p.8, in ANNEX I – Mifleget Ha’Avoda’s Political Platforms for Knesset Elections, 1, 
Labor Party’s platform for the Fourteenth …, op. cit., p. 399. 
840 Consult the section “Shalom veBitachon” (pp. 6-8) in Ha’Avoda’s electoral program), ANNEX I – Mifleget 
Ha’Avoda’s Political Platforms for Knesset Elections, 1, Labor Party’s platform for the Fourteenth …, op. cit., pp. 397-
399.  
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His major tactic was to win over a small sector of the political right and the “undecided” among 
Israeli voters. These included a substantial number of Oriental Jews, who traditionally supported 
Likud, the new Russian immigrants, who backed Netanyahu in 1996, and moderate, religious 
Orthodox Jews. To attain their support Barak had to present himself as neither hawk nor dove, but 
a centrist on the vital security dimension. For this reason, the ideological differences were not object 
of the campaigns; this was due to the new electoral system which required the candidates for 
premiership to conquer the center voters and to the fact that most Israelis were accepting the land 
for peace formula (although some differences regarding the land that should be given up). Rather 
than be focused on issues, the electoral campaign was about only one topic: Netanyahu’s 
performance as a premier. The main issue became “to bring Netanyahu down841”. 
Netanyahu’s main strategy was to emphasize his success in preventing the terror attacks of the 
Rabin-Peres period and in holding Palestinians accountable for alleged violations of the Oslo 
Accords. In this context, he tried to identify Barak as and his possible administration with sift 
policies of the 1992 Labor government842. Moreover, the campaign used the slogan “A strong Leader 
for the Future of Israel”, sending the message that he was the only one able to defend Jerusalem, 
basically it was a variation on the Peace and Security slogan that brought him to power in 1996.To 
counter Netanyahu’s accusations that he would be soft on terror and compromise Israel’s security 
in negotiations with Palestinians, Barak gave main importance to his military career843. 
As election day approached and support of Barak grew, Netanyahu became more desperate and Likud 
video propaganda played scenes of suicide bombing attacks in Israeli streets, blaming Labor to be 
too soft with terror. This appeal to such controversial argument showed how embattled Benyamin 
Netanyahu felt. 
 
6.4.3 The success of Barak’s leadership in the elections 
The outcome was a smashing personal victory for Barak but a major setback for One Israel 
as well as for Netanyahu and his Likud party. Barak's 12% margin of victory over Netanyahu (the 
largest victory in two decades) seemed to end the political tie between the left and right political 
camps that had characterized Israeli politics since 1981. In the election for Prime Minister Ehud 
Barak received 1,791,020 votes or 56.08%while Benjamin Netanyahu captured 1,402,474 votes or 
                                                          
841 Doron G., Barak, One-One Israel, Zero…, op. cit., p. 185. 
842 Elazar D. J. and Mollov B., Introduction: Elections 1999 – The Interplay between Character, Political Culture and 
Centrism, Israel Affairs, Volume 7, 2000. 
843 For example, he appeared in uniform during commercials and he translated his military career in Russian, 
in order to attract Soviet immigrants.  
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43.2%844. In addition to capturing votes of groups that traditionally supported Labor, Barak 
attracted support from two of Netanyahu's power bases: Sephardi and new Russian immigrants 
disillusioned by the failure to achieve more rapid upward mobility845.  
Barak won by a landslide (56% to 44%), the electoral triumph of the left was even more stunning 
because the Labor candidate was able to win also among Jewish voters as well as Arab electorate. 
But the parties of the candidates, Labor and Likud, won fewer seats in the Knesset than they had in 
the previous decades: even if Mifleget Ha’Avoda was the largest party, he lost 8 seats and could not 
form any coalition without involving right-wing or centrist parties. 
The support of Labor declined more than 40%, however it wasn’t the sole victim, also Likud suffered 
even heavier losses and barely retained its position as the second largest party (with 19 seats, 
compared to Shas’ 17). The combined size of the two major parties can control only one third of 
Knesset seats. 
The three components of the left (Meretz, Labor and Arab parties) gained an absolute majority of 61 
MKs, but only 670,484 voters supported One Israel, 148,086 less than in 1999; conversely, the double 
electoral system was confirming a fragmentation of the Knesset, with a high probability of an unstable 
government. In that new political game, the Prime Minister was again the focus of power and policy, 
so concentration of power was increased but, since the premier couldn’t rule without a majority, he 
became hostage of coalition negotiations. 
Thus, those parties such as Mifleget Ha’Avoda, Likud or Meretz, that were representative of general 
interests, shared by the majority of Israelis, together combined received 65 seats in the Knesset. The 
rest of the MKs were awarded by sectarian parties. This situation, could be described as “polarized 
pluralism”846, whose paradoxical result is that while the two largest parties moved towards greater 
consensus, smaller parties found new dimension of conflict, along which they could gain electoral 
benefits by staking out extreme positions. Israel today is characterized by polarization along 
multiple dimensions847. 
Coherently with the dynamics taking place, Shas emerged as the most successful list. It has become 
the fastest growing party in Israel, from four seats in 1984, six in 1988 and 1992, ten in 1996, to 
                                                          
844 Ha’aretz, May 20th 1999; NY Times, December 15th 1999; Pedahzur D., Elections to the Fifteenth Knesset and for 
Prime Minister - Preliminary Analysis, Labor Party Planning and Research Office, Tel Aviv, May 1999. 
845 Barak received 5.3% more votes than Peres in 1996 among Mizrachi electorate and 10% more from the Russian 
voters. 
846 It is a concept created by Giovanni Sartori and explained in his work, European Political Parties; the Case 
of Polarized Pluralism, Princeton University Press, 1966. 
847 These dynamics are showed in Canetti D., Frant H.L. and Pedahzur A., The Triumph of Polarization, in Arian 
A. and Shamir M., Elections in Israel…, op. cit., pp. 166-174. 
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seventeen in 1999. The party began when a minority of Jewish Haredim from Morocco, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Yemen rebelled against the Ashkenazi leadership of Agudat Israel.  Since then it broadened its 
appeal to include not only Oriental Jews, but even some Araband religious Russian voters as a result 
of its extensive network of social services, schools and appeals to the economically deprived. Shas 
replaced Likud as the party of the disadvantaged in many development and slum areas.  
Barak’ victory was possible thanks to the formation of Yisrael Ahad, a good campaign based mainly 
on his military background and an increased performance among Arab, Sephardi and Russian sectors 
of the electorate; these factors allowed him to improve the numbers of votes. As expected, Barak 
received more than 90%of the Arab vote, while Netanyahu, in Nazareth and Umm al-Fahm, received 
only 1.1%848, we can also deduce then that the Arab electorate voted for Barak, not for his policy 
positions, but by a desire to terminate Netanyahu's tenure. Barak was the lesser “evil” between the 
two candidates. 
On the other hand, many Arabs could not bring themselves to support any Zionist candidate, either 
Barak or Netanyahu, and refrained from voting for Prime Minister while supporting one of the Arab 
parties for the Knesset; the percentage of Arab citizens who voted for Jewish parties dropped from 
36% in 1966 to 30% in 1999 Mifleget Ha’Avoda, the Zionist party that usually received the most Arab 
support among Jewish lists, received only 10% of the Arab vote, about half the percentage of 1996. 
Despite his personal victory, Barak was faced with a conundrum identical to Netanyahu's after the 
latter's victory in 1996, i.e., how to establish a workable coalition choosing among a group of parties 
with such diverse priorities that any government would be based on a mixture of opposites. 
 
6.4.4 A strong leader, looking for a strong government  
Barak's landslide victory as PM did not assure an easy task in forming a new government. 
He was supported by the smallest Knesset delegation of any Prime Minister and one of the most 
factionalized party structures from which to select cabinet members. Thus, Barak faced the complex 
situation: the 15thKnesset included fifteen parties and at least seven would be needed in order to form 
a minimal working coalition. While Barak could have opted to form a more limited government 
involving “One Israel”, Meretz, Shinui, the Centre Party and Sharansky, he decided for a wider coalition 
which would involve either Likud or Shas, providing the cabinet with a more solid consensus for 
maneuver on sensitive foreign policy issues dependent on ten Arab votes to obtain majority support 
on security issues, a contingency that Barak wanted to avoid.  
He could form two types of coalitions: a peace-oriented government including Meretz, Am Ehad, 
Center, Shinui, the Russian and Arab parties (70 seats); or an alignment with Likud, Center, the 
                                                          
848 Ha’aretz, May 20th 1999. 
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Russians, and Shinui (67 MKs) focusing on domestic programs, but this combination would slow 
down negotiations with the Palestinians. On July 6, after six weeks of strenuous negotiations with 
all these factions Barak formed a seven-party coalition849 (the law allows 45 days to form a new 
government). It included his loyal partner in the peace process, Meretz, and NRP, United Torah 
Judaism, Shas, Center, and Yisrael B'Aliyah (75 seats). Four of the seven had been members of 
Netanyahu's government, supported most of his policies and backed him in the race for Prime 
Minister. At times the four had taken a more hard-line stance on peace issues than Netanyahu 
himself. In his peace negotiations, Barak would have to be sensitive to the preferences of these 
parties. For a similar reason, he wanted also to avoid the creation of the pitfalls of the Rabin-Peres 
government which had a narrow base and limited support among the population; thus, efforts at 
coalition negotiations with Likud and Shas were evident in order to forge a centrist government. In 
order to achieve this goal, the Prime Minister allowed Shas to the relinquishment by Aryeh Deri of 
any formal decision-making position, the denial of Shas ministerial control of the interior ministry 
and the postponement on the abolition of most military exemptions for yeshiva students850.  
In this context we have also to say that the Arab parties were considered as a safety net for the new 
government, although their ten MKs spread over three parties, were not included in the government. 
Barak, however, sought to placate Arab feelings and the 524.000 Arab voters who overwhelmingly 
supported him, by assigning one leading Arab representative to the prestigious Knesset foreign affairs 
and Security Committee, in a symbolic and precedent-breaking move. 
Israel is no longer a homogeneous society as it was in the first years of its existence, moreover the 
characteristic social and political solidarity has dissipated over the years as the traditional 
egalitarian ethos has been undermined by the rise of individualism. Society has divided into 
conflicting groups and the elections in 1999 showed political fragmentation with proliferation of 
parties representing this diversity of interests, and inability of any single constituency to represent 
Israel at large. At that time, these differences overlap with contending views on the peace process 
and the extent to which Israel should be committed to territorial compromise. This was Barak’s 
domestic situation while he was starting to approach the difficult path of the negotiations with 
Palestinians.  
 
 
 
                                                          
849 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Address in the Knesset  by Prime Minister Elect Ehud Barak upon the 
presentation of his government-7 July 1999, Israel’s Foreign Relations, Vol. 18: 1999-2001, n 1. 
850 Morris B., Vittime…, op.cit., p.807. 
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6.5 The fading of the Oslo era between Camp David’s failure and the breakout 
of al-Aqsa Intifada 
The new premier wanted immediately to reassure Arafat about his intention to going on 
with the implementation of the commitments undertaken by Netanyahu in Wye Plantation and 
that, even better, he was going to boost the entire peace process but also, that the new Israeli 
government would have preferred to include further withdrawals in a wider and definitive peace 
agreement, rather than proceeding with a fragmented and weak process. Barak’s main concern was 
that the final result of the interim peace talks would have forced Israel to spend its negotiating cards, 
without obtaining a real peace accord.  
This integration of the Wye memorandum and the final status negotiation was included in the 
Sharm el-Sheikh agreement851 signed on September 4th 1999 by Barak and Arafat. The agreement was 
indeed an improvement over the previous one, as it was considered the beginning of intense 
negotiations about a definitive peace accord. 
Israel agreed, in accordance with the terms of the Sharm el-Sheyik agreement, to leave to the 
Palestinians another area, equivalent to 6.1% of the West Bank, 341 square miles around Jericho, 
Ramallah and Jenin; however, from this point onwards, the constraints linked to the heterogeneous 
composition of Barak’s government began to emerge until July 2000, when Shas and Mafdal ministers 
resigned as protest against the political line officially adopted by the Prime Minister for the 
upcoming summit of Camp David852. 
US President Bill Clinton recently announced that Barak and Arafat would meet in Camp David on 
July 2nd; the Israeli premier didn’t arrive to the summit backed with a favorable political situation. 
Just before his departure, Knesset had expressed a motion of no confidence for his government with 
54 votes in favor and 52 and against. Although the majority of MKs had welcomed the coming of 
new elections, the no confidence motion didn’t achieve the 61 votes needed by law to overthrow the 
government and so Barak managed to keep the command.  
Thus, the PM met with Arafat, thanks to the fundamental mediation of Washington, in order to face 
the main problems that divided Israelis from Palestinians, such as refugees, the status of Jerusalem, 
the borders of the future Palestinian and Israeli state, settlements in the West Bank and the 
management of water resources. On the background was the threat of Arafat, who argued that if no 
definitive agreement had been reached, on September 13th the Palestinian National Authority would 
have declared unilaterally the constitution of an independent state and, consequently, also its 
                                                          
851 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict: an interactive Database (BETA), Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum – 1999, 
(https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/222). 
852 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Briefing to the Cabinet by Prime Minister Barak, regarding Camp David Summit – 9 
July 2000, Israel’s Foreign Relations, Vol. 18: 1999-2001, n 139. 
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boundaries. Jerusalem turned out to be a crucial deadlock and, despite Bark's decision to break an 
Israeli taboo by accepting the division of the city, the agreement was not reached because no meeting 
point was found regarding the Old City and, in particular, the complex of Mount Temple and Haram 
al-Sharif853; Arafat remained inflexible with his request to obtain full sovereignty on the entire Old 
City and on the mosques. Other disagreements came about the Palestinian demand for recognition 
and enforcement of the right of refugees to return to their homes854, their villages and their cities in 
Israel, based on UN resolution no. 194855. Finally, Arafat's refusal in front of the Israeli concession of 
84/90% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was experienced by many members of the delegations as 
the final blow to their commitment, surrendering to a widespread discouragement 856.  
Both the leaders went home empty-handed and disillusioned. A new set of contested narratives was 
soon created, attempting to explain what went wrong and who was to blame: according to one 
version, Barak’s irritation was due to the Palestinian refusal of the unprecedented generous offers 
proposed, which Arafat rejected without counterproposals, proving he was not a serious partner for 
peace. According to a second account, Barak tried to sell, with the American help, an unattractive 
and non-negotiable deal to the Palestinians857 concessions, the most generous that the Israelis had 
ever done; Arafat himself defied the proposals of Israel, which in his view were only apparent and 
did not grant real sovereignty to the Palestinians; the Americans attributed to the Palestinian side 
the responsibility of suspending the talks, believing that, contrary to Barak, the counterpart had 
failed to offer any concession on important issues. 
                                                          
853 Amirav M., Jerusalem Syndrome: The Palestinian-Israeli Battle for the Holy City, Sussex Academic Press, 2009. 
854 See: Lesch M. and L. S. Lustick, Exile and Return: Predicaments of Palestinians, University Pennsylvania, 2005 
and Shikaki K., Refugees and the Legitimacy of Palestinian-Israeli, in Arab-Jewish Relations from Conflict to Resolutions: 
Essays in Honour of prof. Moshe Ma’oz, edPodeh E. and Kaufman A., Sussex Accademic Press, 2006. 
855 United Nations Information System. The Question of Palestine (UNISPAL), 194 (III). Palestine -- Progress 
Report of the United Nations Mediator, General Assembly, A/RES/194 (III) 11 December 1948, 
(https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/C758572B78D1CD0085256BCF0077E51A). 
856 For the discussion of the Camp David Summit, see Akram Hanieh, The Camp David Papers, Al-Ayyam 
Newspaper, 2000, Swisher C. E., The Truth about Camp David: The Untold Story about the Collapse East Peace Process, 
Nation Books, 2004 and Ross D., The Missing Peace:The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2005. 
857 Pressman J. subjects both of these dueling narratives to critical scrutiny in Visions in Collision: What Happened 
at Camp David and Taba?, International Security, vol.28, n. 2, Fall 2003, pp. 5-43. Rabinovich distinguishes 
between four narratives, the first two of which (the orthodox and the revisionist) correspond roughly with 
the two presented here: Rabinovich I., Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948-2003, Princeton University Press, 
2004. 160. 76. 
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But what was interpreted as the real Palestinian response to the peace offers made in Camp David 
was the breakout of a second Intifada, known as al-Aqsa Intifada; this name was chosen because the 
event that inflamed Palestinian violence, took place on September 28th 2000, after Ariel Sharon’s 
walk on Haram al-Sharif; the action was seen as a provocation by the Palestinians, but also by the 
Muslim community which immediately reacted attacking Israeli police and throwing stones.  
The day after, during the Friday prayer, other clashes took place, this time they rapidly escalated, 
causing the first victims; the demonstrators clashed with the Israeli policemen also in West Bank 
and Gaza: a new Intifada was begun, but this time it was very different from the first one due to the 
fact that, members of Palestinian police joined the rioters, shooting back to IDF soldiers and, with 
the time passing by, weapons and terror attacks would have become the main tools of the uprising, 
while strikes and street rallies were losing their importance. 
A second paramount difference, relied in the participation of Israeli Arabs; this time 1 million people 
belonging to Arab minority in Israel joined the clashes on September 30th: they attacked the police 
with stones and molotov bombs, blocking the main roads and burning Israeli institutional 
headquarters in their cities. The highest participation was registered among the Arab residents in 
Yafo, Akko and Nazareth, besides the Galilee’s Triangle858; the Israeli police reacted ineffectively, 
often worsening the situation killing or hurting people. Those victims will be fundamental for the 
definition of the relationships between Israelis Jews and Arabs in the following years. For sure, one 
of the reasons that brought Arab citizens to participate to the Intifada has to be traced down the 
long history of social marginalization experienced and also in the progressing radicalization of their 
political vision. Besides this, Barak’s recent indifference towards this minority exacerbated the still 
existing tensions; after having received 95% of Arab votes during the 1999 elections, the Prime 
Minister didn’t ask the Arab parties to join the coalition, neither consulted them on substantial 
governmental issues or, least of all, tried to respond to their needs and problems. 
The causes of the outbreak of these disorders were deeper; even though Sharon's visit to the mosques 
undoubtedly constituted a provocative element that inflamed Palestinian anger, this event can’t be 
considered the only cause of Intifada. Indeed, even if the initial momentum was spontaneous, the 
Palestinian leadership was driven by the desire to strengthen the position of the PNA in peace 
negotiations with Israel and quickly took control of the uprising859. This was the interpretation of 
                                                          
858 The Triangle (HaMeshulash in Hebrew or al-Muthallath in Arabic) is a concentration of Israeli Arab towns 
and villages adjacent to the Green Line, located in the eastern Sharon plain, among the Samarian foothills; 
this area is located within the easternmost boundaries of both the Central District and Haifa District 
(between Haifa, Nazareth and Afula). 
859 For an insight of Palestinian strategy during the second intifada, see Ayigh Y., Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt, 
Survival, vol.43, n.3, Autumn 2001, pp. 47-60 and The Palestinian Strategic Impasse, Survival, vol.44, n.4, Winter 
2002, pp. 7-21. 
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the situation given by the Israelis in the official report860 for the International Commission of Inquiry 
led by Senator George Mitchell861; in support of this thesis, the report cited the statement by a senior 
Palestinian official Abu Ali Mustafa (July 23rd), shortly after the end of Camp David summit and two 
months before the outbreak of the Intifada: «The issues about Jerusalem, the refugees and 
sovereignty will be decided on the ground and not by negotiations, regarding this point it is 
necessary to prepare the Palestinian people for the next step [...] I think that in the future the 
situation will be more violent than the 1987-1993 Intifada862». 
The most immediate effect of the Intifada’s outbreak was to hurry the last and desperate attempt for 
a diplomatic initiative; Barak had said that Israel would not continue to negotiate peace with 
protracted violence on the background, but in November the Prime Minister agreed with 
Washington for a last attempt to resume talks; but Barak was subjected to different pressures: the 
clashes and terror attacks on one side and, two imminent institutional deadlines corresponding with 
the end of Bill Clinton's presidency (January 20 2001) and the Israeli elections scheduled on 
February 6th 2001. 
After weeks of secret diplomatic activity, on December 23rd, Clinton's proposals863 were announced. 
The proposal included the transfer of 94-96% of the West Bank to Palestinian sovereignty and 
territorial compensation for Palestinians refugees, evacuation of most Israeli settlements and an 
international force to secure the new borders, demilitarization of the Palestinian state, division of 
Jerusalem on the basis of demographic and a sort of Palestinian sovereignty over  Haram al-Sharif 
and Israeli control on the Western Wall and Jewish Holy Places; at the end of December the Israeli 
government officially accepted Clinton's proposals as the basis for a final agreement, Arafat 
responded with a “blunt rejection864”.  
Over the following weeks, Barak sought to reach a peace agreement in order to reduce Palestinian 
violence and consequently, make the Israeli public more likely to continue the negotiations; the final 
attempt was made in Taba from 21st to 27th January 2000, but the talks were continually undermined 
by the ongoing Intifada. Indeed, this meeting ended without significant progress being made, even 
if paradoxically the agreement had never been so close. The day after, January 28th, Barak decided to 
                                                          
860 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict: an interactive Database (BETA), Mitchell Report (Sharm al-Sheikh Fact-Finding 
Committee Final Report) - English -2001 (http://ecf.org.il/media_items/965). 
861 The Mitchell Report, officially the “Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report” is a report that was 
created by an international fact-finding committee, led by former US Senator George Mitchell. The report 
describes possible causes of the al-Aqsa Intifada, and gives recommendations to end the violence, rebuild 
confidence and resume negotiations. It was published on  April 30th 2001. 
862 Ha’aretz, February 1st  2000. 
863 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Clinton Peace Plan, 21 December 2001, Israel’s Foreign Relations vol. 18: 
1999-2001, n.226. 
864 Ha’aretz, December 28th  2000. 
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stop any talks with the Palestinians and spend the weeks remaining in his election campaign, the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process was suspended indefinitely. 
Undoubtedly, the greatest consequence of the Intifada was political because it affected the 
government stability, accelerating Barak's coalition downfall and provoking a major ideological 
turmoil among Israeli left: confusion and the feeling of been betrayed by Arafat were dominant. Since 
1967 what divided the Labor camp from the nationalist right was the will to reach a compromise 
with the Palestinians, which included territorial concessions but, in a matter of months the 
Palestinians rejected the concessions made. Without any other viable political alternative, the 
Mifleget Ha’Avoda no longer knew what to offer to Israeli electorate voters, so on December 9th Barak 
announced his resignation and called for new elections for the premiership within sixty days.  
Barak then had to face Ariel Sharon, leader of Likud; at the beginning opinion polls gave the latter a 
slight advantage, but then he greatly increased the gap after every new Palestinian attack (just as 
they contributed to Netanyahu's victory in 1996). Israeli public opinion chose Sharon, whose victory 
was overwhelming with 62.4% votes against Barak's 37.6%: it was the clearest electoral success in 
Israel’s history. 
 
6.6 Ariel Sharon and the beginning of new political dominance 
After the defeat experienced by Binyamin Netanyahu against Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon was 
chosen by a demoralized Likud party as a temporary caretaker. Less than two years later, in a special 
election held in February 2001, Sharon defeated Barak to become Prime Minister, gaining record 
support exceeding60% of the vote. Sharon proceeded to build on this foundation, forming a national 
unity government (NUG), and after the coalition collapsed, triggering the general elections of 2003, 
Sharon led the Likud to a sweeping victory.  
The key to this startling and far-reaching change in Israeli politics is clearly to be found in the 
catastrophic failure of the Oslo process and the Palestinian campaign of violence that followed. 
Indeed, foreign policy and issues related to the last phase of the Oslo negotiations dominated Israeli 
politics after 1999. The prominence of the peace process in Israeli politics is hardly a new 
phenomenon, but there has been a fundamental change in the way the public relates to the peace 
process. In the wake of the Six-Day War, Israelis increasingly came to believe that they were able to 
shape their relations with the Arab states and the Palestinians. As a result, the ideological debate 
over the future of the territories became a major part of the political discourse. In contrast, in the 
wake of the collapse of the Oslo process, the ideological divide over the peace process has been 
replaced by a growing consensus, as the Israeli public no longer believes that Israel has much ability 
to alter the fundamental positions of the Palestinians, at least in the short term. 
The results of the 2001 and 2003 elections (and the general consensus that they reflected) should 
not be seen as a temporary ripple, but rather as representing a transformation within Israeli politics 
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triggered in July 2000, following the failure of the ‘permanent status’ talks and the beginning of the 
violence that brought down the government of Ehud Barak. 
As a result, by the 2003 elections, positions on these issues had already largely crystallized among 
the vast majority of Israeli voters. In the campaign itself, the debate on security, responses to 
terrorism,  negotiations with the Palestinians were secondary, with little impact on the results. 
However, for 35–40% of the electorate, security was the key issue, as opposed to the only 6% who 
thought corruption was the key issue. Indeed, foreign policy and issues related to the last phase of 
the Oslo negotiations still dominated Israeli politics after 1999865. 
As in the 2001 election for Prime Minister, the large swing away from Labor and the left towards 
Likud and its right coalition was primarily to be considered as a vote of “no confidence” towards the 
consideration of the Palestinians as partners for peace, especially the leader of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA), Yasser Arafat.  
Ha'avodah's victories in 1992 and 1999 were achieved by candidates with impeccable security 
credentials, former chiefs of staff Rabin and Barak, and both emphasized the security benefits of 
their policies. Following the collapse of the peace process in 2000, the public came to believe that a 
government led by Sharon was most likely to generate a secure path towards peace866. Here, Sharon’s 
success rested on the transformation of his image in the eyes of the public from “hard-liner-hawk” 
to a credible candidate. In addition, Sharon began to implement the popular and bi-partisan demand 
for the construction of a separation fence between Israel and the Palestinians. 
Finally, the scale of Sharon’s victory, if not the victory itself, was greatly assisted by the inability of 
the Israeli left to present an alternative policy that appeared viable to the majority of the public, 
especially centrists. Part of the problem was that the left was internally divided; with the collapse 
of Oslo it had no unifying theme. With a weak leadership, it was also difficult for Labor to formulate 
a credible alternative to Likud. 
Over 80% of Israelis thought the Palestinians were solely (49%) or mostly (35%) responsible for the 
continuation of the conflict. Around 70% thought that the Palestinians in general did not want peace 
and that their true aim was to kill as many Jews as possible and conquer. 
 
  
                                                          
865 As perfectly explained in Rynhold J. and Steinberg G., The Peace Process and the Israeli Elections, Israel Affairs, 
vol.10, n. 4, Summer 2004. 
866 Shavit A., Lessons of the Blood Curve, Ha’aretz, December 12th 2002. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Through these six chapters we have examined and analyzed the most important and transformative 
events of the political history of Israel, this path was essential in order to study the framework 
within which Mifleget Ha’Avoda (the Labor Party) born (as Mapai), developed, transformed and (as it 
seems until today) has declined. In order to achieve this purpose, we had to focus our analysis on 
specific topics that could help us catching the dynamics and variables which contributed in the 
long-lasting decline of Labor after 2001. These conclusions aim to highlight the remarkable facts 
emerged and to show the implications they have on the premises of the analysis. 
We started with the birth of Zionism and the Mandate period before the foundation of the State; in 
this epoch the cultural, ideological and political dominance of Mapai (Mifleget Ha’Avoda's precursor) 
was established thanks to two different elements: the power of the Labor Zionist ethos and the 
creation of a developed institutional apparatus. On one hand the values and the symbols of Zionist 
ideology were actualized in the halutz, the pioneer farmer who cultivated and defended his land, 
active in the construction of a Jewish national home and of a native Hebrew culture in Zion; on the 
other, the 1920's and the 1930's were the years where some important Jewish institutions born in 
the Mandate of Palestine like the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut, both of them were important in 
the eyes of the Zionist leadership for the birth of the future national state.  
Histadrut in particular was the mean by which Labor Zionism, led by Ben-Gurion, was able to set up 
a strict relationship between the party and the population. Indeed, this organization (whose 
majority belonged to Ben-Gurion's ranks) providing the main basic services to the people, created a 
deep sense of dependence, which together with the strength of Labor ideology became also political 
affiliation.  
In this way, when the State of Israel born in 1948, Ben-Gurion was already become naturally the 
leader of the Zionist enterprise and Mapai the dominant party of the newborn Israeli political system. 
The development of an ideological dominance was also due to the beginning of a process which 
would have led to the creation of Israeli civil religion, a group of values, myths and symbols upon 
which “Israeliness” would have been based on (as we have seen, one of these founding events is the 
1948 war, called by Israelis Milhamat Ha'Zmaut, War of Independence). 
With these premises, Ben-Gurion (as the Prime Minister of the State of Israel) began the nation-
building venture, first of all introducing the new concept of Statism, better known as mamlachtiut; 
around these principles the policies were decided and all the efforts were directed to, in order to 
provide Israel with a cohesive, high mobilized population and with the resources which would have 
allowed its political and economic growth. In those years, the priorities of Mapai and its leader were 
mainly three: absorbing the waves of mass immigration that were arriving in Israel, creating a strong 
national culture and identity and stabilizing the precarious situation of the borders.  
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All those activities were conducted through the strict control of the party, which was able to build 
a strong and centralized bureaucracy (Gush, the party machine). In that period the leadership of the 
party was solidly held by Ben-Gurion, who only in 1963 decided to retire; after fifteen years the 
leadership of the Mapai changed and Levy Eshkol became Prime Minister. We have to remember that 
until the 1960's the party had full dominance in Israel under any point of view: cultural, ideological, 
institutional and political, for these reasons no other political group was able to win the elections, 
neither Herut (Menachem Begin's party, inspired by Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionism) which was 
considered Mapai's main rival. 
But things were about to change indeed, notwithstanding Ben-Gurion's resignation, he still exerted 
strong influence on the party, especially on the young generation of Mapai—(including Moshe 
Dayan, Shimon Peres); the tensions between Eshkol and Ben-Gurion precipitated due to the Lavon 
Affair, which led  in 1965 to the creation of a new party, Rafi: this was the first time Mapai suffered 
such an important crisis among its ranks but, three years later, this secession ended with the 
creation of the Mifleget Ha’Avoda (Labor Party), as the union between Mapai, Ahdut Ha'Avoda and Rafi. 
It is very important to keep in mind this period because it give us the idea of the beginning of a 
general crisis regarding the leadership which, after those years, never left the party and opened a 
new era of internal accentuated fractionalization and contest for power; with these characteristics 
and a brand-new composition, Ha'Avoda was immediately called to face one of the most demanding 
challenged ever faced by Israel: the Six Days War.  
Besides the stunning and significant consequences both on the entire Middle East and on Israeli 
foreign policy, this major historical event had paramount and irreversible effects also on Israel's 
internal dynamics, which originated mainly by the conquest of the West Bank and the Old City of 
Jerusalem: reaching the most significant places for Judaism (such as the Kotel or the Ma'arat 
Ha'Machpelahin in Hebron) awaked strong emotions among Israelis that seemed to the buried, after 
the predominance of the Labor, secular vision; the fulfillment of an ancient nostalgia gave birth to 
longing religious feelings which had then the possibility to be granted through the control and the 
settlement of those territories, which were the cradle of Judaism and the origin of the Jewish people. 
Starting from that point a deep change in Israeli political culture took place and, during the 
following years, numerous groups adhering to the principles of this new “Religious Zionism” were 
created; this renewed type of Zionism vindicated a new ideological predominance over Labor 
Zionism which seemed to have run out of its initial impetus. In few years the ethos of the halutz 
started fading away and was been replaced by a type of settler who was deeply inspired by those 
national-religious values. 
On a political level, the formation of a national unity government in 1969 in order to face the war, 
gave legitimization to Gahal, the new political formation led by Begin which was seen by Israelis as 
a valid alternative option to Ha'Avoda rule. It was an historical occasion for Revisionist Zionism 
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which, at the same time was discovering a kindred spirit in the new national-religious spirit 
diffusing on the ground. 
We have to notice that until that very moment, Israeli society was culturally characterized by the 
attempt of realizing the melting-pot idea, a Ben-Gurion's envision according to which the creation 
of a common Israeli identity would be reached by the absorption of new immigrants (coming mainly 
from North Africa and Middle East) who would have abandoned the patterns of the culture of their 
countries of origins, embracing the Israeli one which was mainly based on Labor, Ashkenazi cultural 
elements. The Six Days War opened the path for the challenge to this cultural prominence and for a 
more definite emergence of different and strong inside Israel's society; these divides, which are still 
and more evident today, were mainly based on three distinctions: ethnic (Mizrachim/Sepahrdim-
Ashkenazim, that is to say Jews with Oriental or European origins), religious (dati'im -hilonim religous 
or secular attitude towards the state) and political (iamanim- shmolanim, supporters of the right or 
left-wing parties). 
Notwithstanding these new emerging trends, Mifleget Ha’Avoda was able to retain power also in the 
1973 elections; this year could be considered as a catalyst moment for Israel's political history, not 
only due the Yom Kippur War itself, but mostly for its tremendous ramifications on Israeli politics 
and society. Indeed, the bad management of the war (mechdal), which saw Tsahal (Israeli army) 
suffering heavy losses, revealed Ha'Avoda's increasing weakness, due to the internal clashes (for 
example those regarding the nomination Golda Meir and then Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister), 
together with excessive degree of bureaucratization and corruption. The fact that the party 
demonstrated to be no longer able to satisfy Israeli main needs as it did in the previous decades, 
especially the demand of security and defense, opened a further breach in its image of powerful, 
dominant and un-challengeable party. 
All the dynamics mentioned above brought to the machapah (revolution) of 1997 elections, when the 
victory of Menachem Begin's Likud set forth, for the first time in Israeli political history, the 
formation of a government led by a right-wing party. This round of voting is considered critical for 
the transformation of Israeli political arena because in introduced or strengthened some electoral 
trends which are still today fundamental in order to understand Israeli politics.  
Indeed, Menachem Begin's success was possible because of his ability in intercepting the wide 
discontent among Israelis for Labor rule, especially the dissatisfaction coming from particular 
sectors of society, the Mizrachi, lower-income, traditionalist voters. The Oriental Jews were very 
resentful for the treatment Mapai and Ha'Avoda (perceived as elitist, Ashkenazi parties) addressed to 
them and Likud achieved to channel these feelings, together with the new national-religious feelings 
and to win their vote. These events gave birth to the first great overlap of two different cleavages: 
the identitarian/ethnic (oriental Jews) and the national-religious (political) one.  
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On the other hand, Mifleget Ha’Avoda demonstrated to have lost its inefficacy to attract new 
immigrants but also the new young generations and, in general, the strata of population which didn't 
belong to its traditional constituencies of voters, that is to say Ashkenazi, secular, middle-class 
Israelis. This inability confirmed the external perception of the party, seen as representatives of 
strong and limited interests which didn't corresponds to the need of Mizrachim, youngsters and 
workers, who decided to cast their vote for the anti-establishment formation, symbolized by Likud. 
As emerged since 1967, Israeli society was undergoing to major changes involving their identity and 
their political culture: in the meanwhile, Labor Party was unable to change its structure in order to 
respond to these transformations, due to the internal struggle for power and to the widespread 
perception (also among political observers and commentators) that its national leadership could not 
be challenged.  The final outcome was a detachment of the party platform from the demands and 
from the characteristics of Israeli electorate.  
This need of reform accompanied Mifleget Ha’Avoda during the years of its opposition (1977-1983) and 
during the 1980's; in this period Israeli political system became more and more competitive, making 
even more difficult for only one party to achieve the type of dominance enjoyed by Mapai and 
Ha'Avoda in the previous decades. This dynamic resulted with the creation of a series of national 
unity government, in which Labor Party was the main partner of Likud (1984) or, at least its major 
member (1988).  
The elections which took place in those years were characterized by different and important 
elements which contributed to shape the political environment of Israel approaching the 1990's; so 
we have to notice that during the 1980's the main parameter guiding Israeli electoral behavior 
changed from 1981, when it was strongly defined the ethnic element, to 1984 and 1988, when this last 
element lost importance and political issues (linked to the future of territories and the peace with 
the Arab neighbors) began to become the main factor guiding electoral affiliation. 
At this point, a further element has to be added to our analysis, the peace process. Before going on, 
two clarifications have to be made: first of all, as already explicated in the chapters, the evolution of 
the peace talks is not analyzed within the context of the negotiations per se, but contemplated only 
regarding its internal repercussion on Israeli politics. Secondly, this topic is introduced only at this 
point of these conclusions, not because it didn't have any importance in the political debate before, 
but because its major effects become visible and dominant in Israeli arena, at the 1990's threshold. 
As we have seen, when the West Bank and Gaza were captured, this event upset Israeli perceptions 
of external but also internal identity and territorial borders; immediately an intense debate erupted 
between two different position: one more inclined towards negotiations with the Arab states 
regarding a territorial compromise, represented by Mifleget Ha’Avoda and other leftist parties, while 
the other one totally committed to the idea of Eretz Yisrael (Greater Israel) and, for this reason, 
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supporting the holding of the conquered land (Likud and Mafdal were the leading parties). But inside 
each camp, the opinions were not so cohesive and defined. 
Among Ha'Avoda 's rank, the debate over the future of the Territories was lively and characterized 
by different position, expressed by leading political figures, such as Yigal Allon or Moshe Dayan. But 
what it is important for our analysis is to clarify that, despite this diversity of attitudes, one common 
point was the intuition that the land could have become a mean in order to grant Israel's security: 
holding some of those areas for strategic reasons or negotiating them with Arab neighbors, in 
exchange of a peace agreement.  
Only in the 1980's, after Camp David Accords signed by Menachem Begin with Egypt, the Lebanon 
War of 1982 perceived by Israelis as the first conflict fought “by choice” and the breakout of the first 
intifada, the “land for peace” approach took a prominent importance in Labor Party's platform. In 
particular, Shimon Peres was since the very first moment the mastermind and the major contributor 
to the peace process, trying to carry on negotiations with Jordan about the sovereignty over the 
West Bank. Until the beginning of the second half of the Eighties, the Palestinian question was still 
considered a complementary issue. 
But something was going to change in 1987, with the breakout of the First Intifada, whose 
widespread and long-lasting uprising made Israelis aware of the un-sustainability of the status quo. 
In those years, Mifleget Ha’Avoda was member of the government formed by Likud in 1988 and Yitzhak 
Rabin was Minister of Defense who, having to face the magnitude of the riots and their popular 
participation, understood that the solution to that question should have been political, while 
military approaches resulted totally ineffective. 
As we have mentioned before, these aspects of the peace process are relevant to this research because 
they make us to understand some critical turning points in Israeli political history. The elections of 
1992 are one of them and they are not completely clear considering these dynamics in the 
background of the analysis of the electoral results, indeed traditional and new elements cooperated 
to determine Labor's victory in that year. An old pattern presented again: Likud, in power since 1977, 
was now seen by the electorate as corrupted, ineffective and incapable of facing the new challenges 
posed by the recent transformation of the international arena.  
As it happened in 1977, Israeli voters wanted to punish the party representing the existent 
establishment and this choice was made easier by the strategy adopted by Mifleget Ha’Avoda, which 
was highly attractive thanks to the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin. Indeed, he was able not only to 
convince undecided voters, but also to persuade traditional Likud's supporters among Mizrachim to 
vote for Labor. Moreover, he also adopted an interesting approach towards the peace process, 
underlying the economic aspect related to the conspicuous investments direct beyond the Green 
Line and proposing to re-direct that money inside Israeli borders for welfare services. This tactic 
won the support of the immigrants just arrived from Former Soviet Union. 
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The years under the government of Yitzhak Rabin were characterized by important achievements 
(the economy was getting better, the Oslo Accords were signed and Israel improved its international 
positions establishing relationships with foreign countries) but, at the same time, were very though 
and posed Israeli society under heavy pressures. The achievement of the agreements with the 
Palestinian caused the explosion of the internal debate between doves (supporters of the “land for 
peace” approach and, in general, of the work done by Prime Minister Rabin and his Foreign Minister 
Peres) and hawks (against the policy of territorial compromise, adherents to the Eretz Yisrael's vision 
and loyal to Benyamin Netanyahu's right-wing coalition). 
These two camps were representatives of two completely opposed visions not simply of the 
territorial extension of the State of Israel but also of Israeli identity, involving the way Israelis 
perceived themselves and, consequently, how they perceived external elements, in this case the 
Palestinians. This clash, this challenge for Israeli cultural dominance and identity definition 
culminated with the murder of Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995; that event shocked profoundly the 
society, giving birth to profound considerations about the meaning of democracy within a highly 
volatile social and political environment, as Israel is. Israelis found themselves profoundly divided 
and the electorate became more and more polarized, especially about the territorial-security issue. 
Approaching the 1996 elections, Mifleget Ha’Avoda was self-confident about the positive outcome of 
the round of voting: Shimon Peres, his candidate, became Proem Minister after Yitzhak Rabin's 
death and he spent all his efforts in order to implement the peace process. In front of the Israeli 
electorate deeply shocked by the political assassination, committed towards the legacy of former 
Prime Minister Rabin and pretty hostile toward the right-wing parties, the victory seemed assured. 
On the contrary, Benyamin Netanyahu was able to regain the lost support and to win the elections. 
The Likud's performance demonstrated that Labor' success in 1992 was due to particularly 
conditions and that it couldn't be interpreted as a coming back to its dominant position. Indeed, in 
1996 Mifleget Ha’Avoda 's was still in need for internal reform and its criteria adopted in order to 
choose its candidate and its electoral strategy were completely opposed to the 1992 ones and, most 
of all, they were not  of the candidate and of the electoral strategy to adopt were completely 
unsuitable for the new Israeli political system that was then characterized by the direct election of 
the prime minister, which asked for strong leaders able to catch the central undecided voters. 
The Labor Party seemed to have learn from its previous mistake when it decided to propose as its 
candidate for the electoral race Ehud Barak, a man with a moderate political attitude, but with a 
strong military background: Ha’Avoda chose to adopt again the winning “Rabin's formula”. This time 
the strategy worked out, thanks to some measures adopted by Ehud Barak: first of all, the decision 
to rename the party in the framework of an overall strategy of reform; “One Israel” met with success 
the electoral competition, winning thanks also to the vote of some constituencies that before that 
moment were considered as “electorally out of reach”, such as the Mizrachim, the religious or the 
younger generations. The general strategy of reform bared fruits and entrusted Ehud Barak with a 
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mandate to form the government and to proceed with the peace process and to complete the work 
started by Yitzhak Rabin. 
The 2000 was a turning point in Israeli political history due two main events: the failure of the Camp 
David negotiations and the breakout of the al-Aqsa intifada; indeed, these two occurrences closed 
the era of the “land for peace” approach, started in 1992 with the election of Prime Minister Rabin. 
They were the demonstration, to the eyes of the Israeli public opinion, that compromise was 
impossible because there was nobody to talk with and, besides this, the counterparty decided to 
respond to the most considerable offer ever made by any other Israeli government starting a new 
wave of violence. From that moment on, the Israeli electorate shifted its attention from the 
negotiation path, considered arrived at a dead point, towards concerns about daily life security and 
the containment of terror attacks. 
In this environment Mifleget Ha’Avoda was destined to pay a heavy toll: its envision was in completely 
disarray and it wasn't able to attract anymore Israeli public, which were seeking for an alternative 
strategy to adopt towards Palestinians. Ariel Sharon, leader of Likud, was the man of the moment 
embodying the strong personality Israelis needed in a very hard time and, for this reason, he was 
chosen by the voters to lead the country, in the direct election for Prime Minister in 2001, following 
the resignation of Ehud Barak. This victory inaugurated a long-lasting period of political crisis 
experienced by Labor Party which corresponded to an apparent irreversible electoral decline. 
Indeed, since 2001, Ha’Avoda has never won a round of voting in the last 17 years. Starting from the 
dynamics emerged during this analysis and summarized above, we are going to respond to the initial 
questions which this research relies on, specifically about the reasons of Mifleget Ha’Avoda ongoing 
crisis. Our main hypothesis consisted in tracing back the causes of this decline in the period 1995-
2001, corresponding to the downfall of the Oslo process and preceding the “final” defeat of Labor by 
Ariel Sharon. There are some causes of this process:  
1. The lack of a strong leadership within the party, after the death of Yitzhak Rabin;  
2. A strict connection with the Oslo process and a failing reformulation of a new approach toward 
the territorial and peace issues; 
3. The persistence of some structural characteristics (old and new) which caused the profound 
detachment of the party from Israeli electorate.  
With this premises in mind we can examine how the detailed study of each subject has contributed 
in achieving our aim. 
The first point found some evidence looking to the positive performances during the Nineties (1992-
1999) and to the negative ones (1996-2001); the Mifleget Ha’Avoda tried to fill the void left by Yitzhak 
Rabin's death by proposing Shimon Peres, who demonstrated to be unable to “capitalize” the shock 
and the sorrow of the Prime Minister's murder did not win the 1996. In this precise case we notice 
how the main reason for this failure is to be attribute to Shimon Peres' character which never gained 
Israelis' trust as instead Mr. Security Yitzhak Rabin did. In 1996, Labor's rival was the Likud headed 
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by Benyamin Netanyahu, who was able to win with a narrow difference of 300.000 votes; this tight 
advantage was mainly justified, taking into consideration the new electoral system which 
introduced for the first time the direct election of the Prime Minister. Indeed, in such a competition, 
the role of the candidates acquired paramount importance and the electoral campaign was totally 
focused on this aspect, leaving on the background the contents of the political platforms.  
A better attempt was made with Ehud Barak in 1999; this choice not only was more suitable in order 
to face the new characteristics of the political system, but also Labor's candidate had some of the 
elements necessary to gain the trust of the Israeli electorate.  
But, besides his charisma, he was able to win because he understood the party's need for reform; the 
creation of One Israel in 1999 was precisely the attempt to respond to the necessity to revive the 
Labor Camp, as explained before. The lack of strong leadership meant also the absence of a guide 
that could led the Mifleget Ha’Avoda through a process of renewal designed to make the party more 
responsive to changes and new electorate needs.  
The work started by Ehud Barak was not enough and, in 2001, Ariel Sharon was able to win the race 
for the premiership, defeating Labor Prime Minister. It is possible to understand this victory, taking 
into consideration the historical context: the rise of the Second Intifada, characterized by 
widespread violence and numerous attacks carried out by suicide bombers, created in Israel a 
negative psychological atmosphere, dominated by the fear of terrorism. In such circumstances, the 
moderate posture proposed by Mifleget Ha’Avoda was perceived as completely inappropriate and 
useless by the majority of Israelis, who preferred the sense of security provided by the charismatic 
Ariel Sharon. 
Since the Nineties, candidate's importance increased over time within Israeli political system 
(following a general political trend toward the “personalization of political power” within the 
international system), not only because of the demand for security due to contingencies, but also for 
the increasingly individualistic nature of electoral campaigns, more focused on leaders' personalities 
and less on ideological features.  
The second statement found some correspondence in the research's development showed before, 
where it is possible to observe how the Arab-Israeli conflict influenced Israeli internal politics. In 
the context of this general trend, it was noticed how this dynamic is particularly true for the Labor 
Party whose performances were conditioned in particular by the evolution (or in this case the 
derailment) of the peace process begun with Oslo. As demonstrated by the analysis of the electoral 
results, the territorial and peace/security issues, especially in the period 1992-2000, became the most 
significant variable defining voting preferences. 
An example is the negative repercussion of the terror attacks that took place during election 
campaigns (1996 and 2001) which discouraged Israelis to vote for the party which was fostering the 
peace talks. Indeed, they were detrimental for the success of the Labor/peace camp, which was 
highly identified with the peace process itself. With the definitive failure of the land for peace 
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process during the Camp David meeting in 1999 the Labor party lost the main factor which had 
characterized its political identity during the 1990’s.   
Through its electoral campaigns and electoral platforms, Ha’Avoda tried to propose its own 
guideline, consisted in the “land for peace” approach, which was unable to change and to adapt its 
political agenda to the mood of the Israeli public opinion, as well as to the reality of the failure of the 
peace process, exacerbated by the violent Second Intifada. Indeed, in 2001, Labor proposal for 
negotiations was considered a too moderate line by the majority of the Israeli voters. 
Labor’s difficulties in re-formulating an alternative approach to the “land for peace” principle can be 
considered a preliminary condition to Labor’s imminent decline because it affected Labor's Ehud 
Barak's performance in 2001 and which was going to increase its weight in the following years.  
The last issue was not included in the formulation of the initial hypothesis, but it came out as a 
strong factor determining Mifleget Ha’Avoda’s decline in the years taken into consideration. The 
transformations experienced by Israeli political system asked to the parties the ability to respond to 
these major changes. Labor Party seemed not to be able to implement the expedients necessary 
because until the beginning of the 2000's it maintained its complex bureaucracy and its “sectorial” 
social image as an Ashkenazi, secular, middle class party. This perception favored the alienation of 
specific sectors of Israeli society, especially true in the case of Orientals Jews who, together with the 
religious and the younger generations, had always represented for Ha'Avoda, difficult groups to 
approach during election campaign.  
The same dynamic is also true for Likud, which has always been associated with Mizrachi, lower-
income and more traditionalist (or religious) Jews; however, in the last decades, the party managed 
to conquer more easily undecided or center voters. This trend has been reinforced by dynamics 
emerged in Israeli political system in those years, that were: the appearance of a more “tribal” vote; 
even if this tendency already existed, the electoral reform introduced in 1996, gave birth to the 
fragmentation of the Israeli preferences among the myriad of parties representing the specific 
interests of the numerous identity groups present in Israeli society. While, on the other hand, it 
polarized the choice of Israeli electorate among the two opposing camps, represented by Likud and 
Mifleget Ha’Avoda on paramount political issues such as peace and security. 
Definitely, the years 1995-2000 were fundamental because they showed some traditional structural 
characteristics of the Labor Party which it was unable to overcome becoming, in this way, unable to 
react to the change of the electoral system; other features, such as the difficulties in setting a new 
political agenda, are elements which are strictly linked to the context of Israeli politics during the 
Nineties but which constituted new challenges to Mifleget Ha’Avoda and its electoral performances. 
During this research it was useful to compare and overlap these dynamics as they give a specific 
picture of the circumstances which favored the Labor electoral decline. specific picture of the 
circumstances which favored the Labor electoral decline. Israeli society, which is heterogeneous, 
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fluid, polarized and fragmented but it is possible to understand its mechanisms thanks to a sort of 
scheme built around the three main crossing-cut lines, defining three main groups characterized by 
different perceptions and attitudes towards ethnicity (Ashkenazi-Mizrachi), politics (left-right) and 
religion (observant and secular Jews). We discovered that these three lines of division are a 
trajectory along which the electorate distributes itself regarding some major issues of the public 
debate, resulting in an intense and growing polarization of the political arena. 
The analysis of electoral dynamics allowed  to understand how Israelis select their representative, 
through the discovery of their electoral criteria and of the reasons which motivate their political 
affiliation. It was possible to develop these questions thanks to the investigation of the most 
significant elections (like 1977, 1992, 1996 and 1999) in Israeli history, trying to catch the paramount 
dynamics. Understanding Israeli voting patterns in a historical perspective was fundamental in 
order to track down pivotal variables for the transformation both of the electorate and of the 
political system. This type of method allowed to better comprehend Labor decline in perspective.  
Certainly, some voting patterns have been confirmed by the data and the dynamics analyzed: the 
first type involves the cleavages we have seen previously, making them to overlap and giving rise to 
preferences and common needs that guide the Israeli vote. The second type is more closely related 
to the different variables which triggered the political debate in the different electoral campaigns. 
For example, from 1977 to 1981 (when it reached its peak) identity of sub-communities was the 
variable that led significantly the choice of the electorate; the result was that the two major parties 
kept their predominance representing these two groups, the Ashkenazi Labor and the Mizrachi Likud. 
Instead, since 1984, the electoral debate in Israel relied mainly on the territorial/peace /security 
issues, giving birth to a process of polarization that deeply polarized the public opinion into two 
opposing camps. During the development of our analysis, we saw how the political vote reflects 
these identity and tribal dynamics and how they strengthened over the years, coming to its peak in 
1996 and 1999 elections. 
It is therefore clear that the causes to Labor Party’s electoral decline from 2001 on, are complex and 
strictly intertwined not only with domestic changes of the political system or the paramount 
transformation of the Israeli society, but they are also connected to the strong identity issues that 
are expressed in the political debate over the territories. Moreover it is important to read these 
dynamics with an historical perspective, inside a long/term path of change.  
Several observers stated that the crisis that Miflagat Ha’avodah is experiencing and the positive results 
of Likud camp are due mainly to some demographic dynamics which contributed to increase 
numerically the Israeli constituencies that are loyal supporters of the right/wing parties (Sephardim, 
Russian and the religious). These trends seemed to affirm this apparently irreversible success of the 
national-religious group.  
But if we look at the electoral results of 2009, 2013 and 2015, we can observe how this demographic 
advance is not so overwhelming; in all these cases the victory of Likud was by a narrow margin (2013 
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and 2015) or was technical result (2009). These evidences bring us to the most interesting remarks 
emerged by this analysis: if the socio-demographic factors have always been fundamental in order to 
mobilize the electorate and in order to understand voting patterns in Israel, they are not sufficient 
to explain Labor defeats. Demographic trends are indeed important to understand social and 
political shifts; however, they alone do not explain a phenomenon which has a deep historical 
perspective.  
Despite its current weakness, the Labor party is not doomed: Ha'avodah bet it all on the “land for 
peace” approach gambling on a specific definition of Israeli identity which could shape also the 
relationship with its neighbors. But, since the great debates over the State, its boundaries and 
identity it is not over yet, the Labor Party could re-establish its central role in the Israeli political 
scenario, trying to provide a new vision, as powerful and attractive, as the “land for peace” approach 
was for many years. The challenge for Israeli identity is still ongoing , the gamble is still open. 
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GLOSSARY OF MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
GROUPS 
 
NAME 
 
NAME IN HEBREW 
 
TRANSLITTERATION 
 
Agudat Yisrael לארשי תדוגא  
Ahdut Ha’Avoda תודחא הדובעה  
Alignment  ךרעמה HaMa’arach 
Arab Democratic Party הגלפמ תיטרקומד תיברע HaMiflaga HaDemokratit 
Ha’Aravit  
(al-Hizb al-Dimuqrati al-Arabi) 
Balad – National Democratic 
Assembly 
לב" ד -תירב תיטרקומד תימואל Brit Leumit Demokratit  
(at-Tajamuʿ al-Waṭanī ad- 
Dīmuqrāṭī) 
Black Panthers םירוחשה םירתנפה HaPanterim HaShhorim 
Dash – Democratic Movement 
for change 
יונישל תיטרקומד העונת - ש"ד Tnua Demokratit LeShinui 
Degel HaTorah לגד הרותה  
Gahal   שוג  תורח-םילרביל - גח"ל  Gush Herut Liberalim 
Gesher - National Social 
Movement  
תימואל תיתרבח העונת - רשג Tnua Hevratit Leumit 
Ha’Avoda - The Israeli Labor 
Party 
תילארשיה הדובעה תגלפמ - הדובעה Mifleget Ha’Avoda HaYisrelit 
Hadash - Democratic Front for 
Peace and Equality 
ןויוושלו םולשל תיטרקומדה תיזחה - ש"דח  HaHazit HaDemokratit LeShalom 
uLeShivion (al-Jabhah ad-
Dimuqrāṭiyyah lis-Salām wa'l-
Musāwah) 
HaHaganah הנגהה  
HaOlam HaZeh םלועה הזה  
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HaPalmach  ץחמ תוגולפ - מלפ"ח  Plugot Maḥatz 
HaPo'el HaTza'ir ריעצה לעופה  
HaShomer רמושה  
HaShomer HaTza’ir ריעצה רמושה  
Haskalah הלכשה  
HaTzohar - Union of 
Revisionist Zionists 
םיטסינויזיוורה םינויצה תירב - ר"הצה Brit HaTzionim HaRevizionistim 
Herut תורח  
Hibbat Zion ןויצ תביח  
Hovevei Zion ןויצ יבבוח  
Independent Liberals םייאמצע םילרביל Libralim Atzma'im  
Irgun (Etzel) לארשי ץראב ימואלה יאבצה ןוגראה - ןוגרא  
(ל"צא) 
Irgun Zvai Leumi 
Israel Liberal Party תילארשי תילרביל הגלפמ Miflaga Liberalit Yisraelit 
Kach כ"ך  
Lehi - Fighters for the Freedom 
of Israel 
לארשי תורח ימחול – י"חל Lohamei Herut Yisrael 
Likud דוכילה HaLikud 
Mafdal – National Religious 
Party 
הגלפמ תיתד תימואל - דפמ"ל  Miflaga Datit Leumit 
Maki - The Israeli Communist 
Party 
תילארשיה תיטסינומוקה הגלפמה - "קמ HaMiflaga HaKomunistit 
HaYisraelit  
(Al-Ḥizb ash-Shuyū'ī al-'Isrāīlī) 
Mapai - The Workers Party of 
the Land of Israel 
לארשי ץרא ילעופ תגלפמ - י''אפמ Mifleget Poalei Eretz Yisrael 
Mapam - United Workers Party תגלפ םילעופה תדחואמה - ם"פמ Mifleget HaPoalim HaMeuhede 
Meimad - Jewish State, 
Democratic State 
תיטרקומד הנידמ ,תידוהי הנידמ - דמימ Medina Yehudit, Medina 
Demokratit 
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Meretz  צרמ  
Moledet תדלומ  
One Israel לארשי תחא Yisrael Ahat 
One People םע דחא Am Ehad 
Po’alei Tzion ןויצ ילעופ  
Poalei Agudat Yisrael לארשי תדוגא ילעופ  
Rafi - The Israeli Workers List לארשי ילעופ תמישר - י"פר Reshimat Poalei Yisrael 
Ratz - Movement for Civil 
Rights and Peace 
העונת תויוכזל חרזאה םולשלו - צר   HaTnua LeZkhuyot HaEzrah 
veLaShalom 
Religious Torah Front תיתרות תיתד תיזח Hazit Datit Toratit 
Shas דרפס ירמוש - ס״ש Shomrei Sfarad 
Sheli - Left Camp of Israel לארשיל לאמש הנחמ - י״לש Mahaneh Sheli 
Shinui יוניש  
Shlomtzion - Peace-Zion ןויצמולש Shalom-Zion 
Ta’al - Arab Movement for 
Renewal 
תושדחתהל תיברע העונת - עת"ל  Tnua Aravit LeHithadshut 
Tami - Movement for the 
Heritage of Israel 
לארשי תרוסמ תעונת - מת"י  Tnuat Masoret Yisrael 
Tehiya היחת  
The Free Center זכרמה שפוחהי  HaMerkaz HaHofshi 
The Third Way תישילשה ךרדה HaDerech HaShlishit 
Tkuma המוקת  
Tzomet תמוצת  
United Arab List תדחואמה תיברעה המישרה HaReshima Ha’Aravit HaMeuhedet 
United Religious Front תדחואמ תיתד תיזח Hazit Datit Meuhedet 
United Torah Judaism  תהרו  תדחואמ תודהי Yahadut HaTora HaMeuhedet 
United Torah Judaism  הרות תדחואמ תודהי Yahadut HaTora HaMeuhedet 
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Ya'ad - the Civil Rights 
Movement 
דעי-חרזאה תויוכזל העונת  Tnua LeZkhuyot HaEzrah 
Yahad דחי  
Yisrael beAliyah היילעב לארשי  
Yisrael Beiteinu ונתיב לארשי  
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ANNEX I: 
MIFLEGET HA’AVODA POLITICAL PLATFORMS FOR 
KNESSET ELECTIONS 
Labor Party’s platform for the Thirteenth Knesset, 1992 –The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party 
Archives, Beit Berl-Israel. 
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Labor Party’s platform for the Fourteenth Knesset, 1996 –The Moshe Sharett Israel Labor Party 
Archives, Beit Berl-Israel. 
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The main points of Barak's plan “Yisrael Tovà Ioter” (Better Israel), 1998–The Moshe 
Sharett Israel Labor Party Archives, Beit Berl- Israel 
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ANNEX II: 
ELECTIONS POSTERS AND ADVERTISEMENTS 
 
1977 Elections 
 
 
1- “Truth. Economy and society. Peace and security”. 
 
* 
From the platform of the Ma'arach – Israeli Labor Party, Collected selection propaganda for the Knesset. 1948 - 
Series 9 (V 3007): Elections to the Ninth Knesset – 1977, The National Library Of Israel, V 3503, file n.2:Mifleget 
HaMa’arach. 
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2 - “Jewish State. I believe in the covenant: I gave to your seed this Land” 
 
 
 
3 - “Safra and Sayfa. I will vote for Mafdal. I believe in Israel’s eternity” 
 
* 
Mafdal – National Religious Party, Collected selection propaganda for the Knesset. 1948 - Series 9 (V 3007): 
Elections to the Ninth Knesset – 1977, The National Library of Israel, V 3503, file n.4: Mifleget HaMafdal. 
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4 - “Dash, led by Yigael Yadin” 
 
* 
Dash,, Collected selection propaganda for the Knesset. 1948 - Series 9 (V 3007): Elections to the Ninth Knesset 
– 1977, The National Library Of Israel, V 3503, file n.3: Mifleget Dash. 
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5 - “Disaster prevention council – As long as we survive the Likud” 
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6 - “Menachem Begin, Likud’s candidate for 
Prime Minister!” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
Collected selection propaganda for the Knesset. 1948 - Series 9 (V 3007): Elections to the Ninth Knesset – 1977, 
The National Library Of Israel, V 3503, file n.1: Mifleget HaLikud. 
  
7 - “The Arafat State Won’t Arise!” 
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1992 Elections 
 
8 - “The decision is yours” 
 
 
9 - “Labor headed by Rabin” 
 
10 - “We all are cleaning the country” 
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* 
Collected selection propaganda for the Knesset. 1948 - Series 13 (V 2885): Elections to the 
Thirteenth Knesset - 1992, The National Library Of Israel, V 3503, file n.1: Mifleget Ha'Avoda. 
 
 
  
11 - “We are security. Labor Party” 
 
12 - “Let’s choose the prime minister. Rabin” 
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13 - “Today you chose which identity card will have for the country” 
 
 
15 - “The Left is a danger for the unity of Jerusalem” 
 
 
 
* 
Collected selection propaganda for the Knesset. 1948 - Series 13 (V 2885): Elections to the 
Thirteenth Knesset - 1992, The National Library Of Israel, V 3503, file n.3: Mifleget HaLikud 
  
14 - “Danger! Oganization Alcoholics 
Anonymous” 
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